



Gulielmus fole fecit

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The subject and order of
these three Books.

The First Book teaches the knowledge
of our selves and our duties concerning
which is the foundation of Wisdom, by
five great and principal considerations
of man, and contains 6. Chapters.

The Second contains the principal rules of
Wisdom, the principles and properties
of a wise man, and hath 10. Chap.
ters.

The Third, in a Discourse of the four
virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude,
Temperance, sheweth the manner
in instruction of Wisdom in 4. Chap.
ters.

The subiect and order of these three Books.

THe First Booke teacheth the knowledge of our selues and our humane condition, which is the foundation of Wisdome, by five great and principall considerations of man, and conteineth 62. Chapters.

The Second conteineth the principall rules of Wisdome, the priuileges and proper qualities of a wise man, and hath 12. Chapters.

The Third, in a Discourse of the foure Morall vertues, Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, Temperance, setteth downe the particular instructions of Wisdome in 43. Chapters.



TO THE MOST
HIGH AND MIGHTY

Prince, HENRY, Prince of

GREAT BRITAIN, Sonne

and Heire apparent to our

Souereigne Lord
the King.



*Eccit is in the heart
of them that ima-
gine euill, but to the
Counsellors of peace
shall be ioy. It is the
saying (most excel-
lent Prince) of the wisest Prince that
ever liued; and it is the unspeakable hap-
pinesse of vs that liue under the grations
gouernment of your renowned Father,*

THE EPISTLE

that he doth not onely approoue what he sayd, but practise it too, and in the whole course of his gouernment findes it to be true : for peace he counselleth, and ioy, and peace, and content he enioyeth : nay, it is by his wisdom and prouident care that we are all at peace with the whole world, and the whole world with vs : a blessing that few Kingdomes of the earth do truly enioy ; and the greatnesse whereof we know not because we enioy it. It is an Argument vnto my selfe of that inward peace that his Highnesse hath with God and his owne soule : for, Pax a nobis incipit, quia dum lex carnis repugnat legi mentis, non modò alteri sed nec nobis possumus esse pacifici : sed postquam intus spiritus imperat vt totus homo spiritui seruiat, tunc pax ad alios deriuatur, vt pacem cum omnibus habeamus. And
he

DEDICATORY.

he that neuer spake but wisely sayth,
When the wayes of a man please the
Lord, he will make all his enemies at
peace with him. Euer may all his ene-
mies be at peace with him, and he with
his enemies: and let all that loue the
peace of our Ierusalem say, Amen.
This peace (right excellent Prince)
whose nature it is to turne swords into
mattocks, souldiers into husbandmen,
(forasmuch as my education made mee
not fit for that) hath turned my sword
into a penne. Then my profession was
armes, and I fought for peace; which
since we now enioy, I thought I should
dishonour so honourable a profession too
much, to be idle, and abuse so excellent a
blessing as peace is, by making it the mo-
ther of so vntoward a childe. Heerup-
on I hung vp my sword to rust in the
scabbard till good occasion might draw it
forth.

THE EPISTLE

forth againe ; and long I had not thought with my selfe which way I might serue my King and my Country in these peaceable times , but this booke fell into my hands ; which when I had read, I thought woorthy the translation : and though I had no reason to thinke the translation worthy your Highnes protection, yet the matter fittest for a Prince , and your Princely clemencie to others in the like kinde , haue emboldened me to become humble petitioner to your Highnes, that you would be pleased to honor the excellencie of the worke with your patronage, and protect my infirmities. The subiect of this worke is *Wisdom*e : And what fitter for a Prince ? If you honor it, it will honor you as it hath done your royall Father, whom it hath crowned with honour as with a garland , made the mirrour of Princes, and the woonder of the world.

Long

DEDICATORY.

*Long may you live an heire apparent to
his virtues and to his Kingdomes, and
when God shall haue turned his earthly
crowne into a crowne of glorie, long
may you reigne a glorious
Sonne of so glorious
a Father.*

Y o u r H I G H N E S S E

in all humblenes of duty

to be commanded,

Samson Lennard.



To the Reader.

I Doubt not (gentle Reader) but some there are that will not gently censure these my labours; for I am not ignorant how hard a thing it is to please all. Some are curious, whom if I should endeavour to please, I should displease my selfe: Some are enuious, and those I care not whether I please or no. As for the iudicious Reader, I confesse I would willingly content him, because if he be truly iudicious he will iudge of my faults as if they were his own, and rather commend my good endeuors, than condemn my infirmities. This is the man whom I desire to satisfie, and must giue to vnderstand that I haue vsed a plaine English phrase, because the grauitie of the matter required it; and I loue not to smell of the inkhorne: and of all others I haue auoided the French, wherein it
was

To the Reader.

was written, because I would not haue it seeme to be a translation. The Latine I haue left vntoucht; and if that be a fault, I disburden it vpon the Author: He did it; and why not I? And if hee thought all French men vnderstood it; why should not I haue as good a conceit of my Countreymen? If he thought none fit to reade his booke, but such as vnderstood it, it is no fault in me if I thinke so too. Howsoever, or whatsoever my ouersights may be (which I doubt not but a curious eie may make too many) let it suffice that I acknowledge mine owne weaknesse, and both in respect of the tongue and weight of the matter it selfe, should not haue presumed to haue vndergone so heavy a burden, had I not been encouraged by my learned, iudicious and honest friend *M. Roger Webb*, sometime student and fellow of *S. Iohns Colledge in Oxford*; from whose fulnesse I am not ashamed to confesse I haue receiued that little sufficiency, whatsoever it be, that is in me, and whose learned assistance I haue vsed both in the cull, and altering of such points as were either erroneous, or not otherwise fit to passe the presse. If any man shall thinke, that by this ingenious acknowledg^{ment} of his worthinesse

To the Reader.

thinesse I detract from mine owne sufficiencie, it sufficeth my turne, if I adde vnto mine owne honestie by yeelding this thankfull requitall of his loue towards me, and his labors bestowed vpon me; which forasmuch as they were not mercenarie, but friendly and neighbourly, they do binde me the rather with my labours to honour him. Touching the Author of this Worke I can say little, because I knew him not, let his worke commend him; and as for the worke, let it commend it selfe: for I had rather with silence passe that ouer which I can not sufficiently commend, than derogate any thing from the worth thereof by speaking too little. Let me only say, That if I haue any way wronged him in these my labors (by turning him out of his holy dayes sute into his worky-dayes apparell) I am sorie for it; it was not my purpose so to do, but to honor him. And howsoeuer our English attire may alter him in the outward appearance, yet my hope is, that he that prieth into him with a single impartiall eye, shall finde him no changeling, but one and the same.

S. L.



A TABLE OF THE CHAPTERS of these three Books of Wisdome.

THe Preface conteining a Discourse of the name, subiect, purpose and method of this worke, with an aduertisement vnto the Reader.

The First Booke, of the knowledge of our selues and humane condition.

An exhortation to the studie and knowledge of our selues. pag. 1.

The Preface of the First Booke.

The first Consideration of man, which is naturall, by all the parts whereof he is composed.

CHAP.	PAGE.
1 O F the frame of man.	7
2 The first and generall distinction of man.	10
3 Of the body. & first, of all the parts therof with their places.	12
4 Of the singular properties of the body of man.	15
5 Of the goods of the body, Health, Beauty, &c.	16
6 Of the vestments of the body.	20
7 Of the soule in generall.	22
8 Of the soule in particular, & first of the vegetative faculty.	34
9 Of the sensitive facultie.	35
10 Of the senses of Nature.	37
11 Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.	42
12 Of the other faculties, imaginative, memorative, appetitive.	45
13 Of the intellectuall and truly humane facultie.	46
14 Of the humane spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reason, inuention, veritie thereof.	54
	15 Of

THE TABLE.

CHAP.	PAGE.
15 <i>Of Memorie.</i>	65
16 <i>Of the imagination and opinion.</i>	66
17 <i>Of the Will.</i>	69
<i>Of Passions and Affection, with an Aduertisement.</i>	70
18 <i>Of Passions in generall.</i>	71
<i>Of Passions in particular, with an Aduertisement.</i>	75
19 <i>Of Loue in generall.</i>	75
20 <i>Of Ambition.</i>	76
21 <i>Of Couetousnesse and her counterpassion.</i>	80
22 <i>Of carnall loue.</i>	83
23 <i>Desires, Lust, or Concupiscence.</i>	85
24 <i>Hope, Despaire.</i>	86
25 <i>Of Choler.</i>	87
26 <i>Hatred.</i>	90
27 <i>Enuie.</i>	91
28 <i>Ielousie.</i>	91
29 <i>Reuenge.</i>	92
30 <i>Crueltie.</i>	94
31 <i>Sadnesse or heavinesse of heart.</i>	94
32 <i>Compassion.</i>	98
33 <i>Feare.</i>	99
34 <i>The second Consideration of man, by comparing him with all other creatures.</i>	101
<i>The third Consideration of man, which is by his life.</i>	113
35 <i>The estimation, breuie, description of the life of man, and the parts thereof.</i>	113
<i>The fourth Consideration of man morall, by his maners, humours, conditions, very lively and notable.</i>	118
<i>The Preface.</i>	
36 <i>Vanitie.</i>	119
37 <i>Weaknesse or infirmitie.</i>	124
38 <i>Inconstancie.</i>	136
39 <i>Miserie.</i>	137
40 <i>Presumption.</i>	152
<i>The fift and last Consideration of man, by the great varieties and differences which are in him, and their comparisons.</i>	161
41 <i>Of the difference and inequality of men in generall.</i>	161
42 <i>The</i>	

THE TABLE.

CHAP.		PAGE.
42	<i>The first naturall and essentiall difference of men, drawn from the diuersitie of the site or situation of the world.</i>	163
43	<i>The second distinction and more subtle difference of the spirits and sufficiencies of men.</i>	168
44	<i>The third distinction and difference of men accidentall, of their degrees, estates, and charges.</i>	171
	<i>Of the estates and degrees of men in particular, with an Advertisement.</i>	173
45	<i>Of commanding and obeying.</i>	174
46	<i>Of Marriage.</i>	175
47	<i>Of Parents and Children.</i>	184
48	<i>Of Lords and slaves, Masters and seruants.</i>	187
49	<i>Of the State, Souereigntie, and Soueraignes.</i>	189
50	<i>Of Magistrates.</i>	196
51	<i>Of Lawyers, Doctors and Teachers.</i>	197
52	<i>Of the people or vulgar sort.</i>	198
	<i>The fourth distinction & difference of men drawn from their diuers professions and conditions of life. The Preface.</i>	201
53	<i>A distinction and comparison of the three sorts and degrees of life.</i>	202
54	<i>A comparison of the ciuill & sociable life with the solitary.</i>	203
55	<i>A comparison betwixt the life led in common and in priuate.</i>	205
56	<i>A comparison betwixt the countrey life and the citizens.</i>	206
57	<i>Of the militarie profession.</i>	207
	<i>The fift and last distinction and difference of men drawn from the fauors and disfauors of Nature and Fortune. Preface.</i>	209
58	<i>Of Libertie and seruitude.</i>	209
59	<i>Of Nobilitie.</i>	210
60	<i>Of Honour.</i>	213
61	<i>Of Science.</i>	215
62	<i>Of Riches and Pouertie.</i>	217

THe Second Booke, conteining the instructions and generall rules of Wisdome.

The Preface, wherein is contained a generall description of Wisdome, and the summe of this Booke.

219

I An

T H E T A B L E.

CHAP.		PAGE.
1	A N exemption and freedom from errors & the vices of the world & of passions. The first disposition to wisdom. 223	223
2	An vniversall and plaine libertie of spirit, both in iudgement and will. The second disposition unto wisdom. 230	230
3	A true and essentiall honestie, the first and fundamentall part of wisdom. 252	252
4	To haue a certaine end and forme of life, the second foundation of wisdom. 271	271
5	To studie true pietie, the first office of wisdom. 274	274
6	To gouerne his desires and pleasures, the second office of wisdom. 290	290
7	To carrie himselfe moderately and equally in prosperitie and aduersitie, the third office of wisdom. 296	296
8	To obey and obserue the lawes, customes and ceremonies of the countrey, how and in what sense, the fourth office of wisdom. 305	305
9	To carrie himselfe well with another, the fift office of wisdom. 316	316
10	To carrie himself wisely in his affaires, the sixt office of wisdom. 320	320
11	To keepe himselfe alwayes ready for death, a fruit of wisdom. 328	328
12	To maintaine himselfe in true tranquillitie of Spirit, the fruit and crowne of wisdom, and conclusion of this Booke. 346	346
T He Third Booke, wherein are handled the particular documents of wisdom by the foure morall vertues.		
	The Preface. 349	349
	Of Prudence, the first vertue.	
1	O F Prudence in generall. 350	350
	Of the politike Prudence of a Souereigne to gouerne a State. The Preface. 353	353
2	The first part of this politike Prudence and gouernment of a State, which is Prouision. 354	354
3	The second part of this politike Prudence and gouernment of a State, which concerneth the action and gouernment of the Prince. 378	378
	4. Of	18

THE TABLE.

CHAP.	PAGE.
4	Of that Prudence which is required in difficult affaires and ill accidents, publike and private. Preface. 403
1	Of the evils and accidents which threaten vs. 404
2	Of evils and accidents present, pressing & extreame. 404
3	Doubtfull and ambiguous affaires. 406
4	Difficult and dangerous affaires. 406
5	Coniurations. 407
6	Treason. 409
7	Popular commotions. 410
8	Faction and confederacie. 411
9	Sedition. 412
10	Tyrannie and rebellion. 414
11	Ciuill warres. 415
12	Aduisements for particular persons touching the foresayd publike diuisions. 416
13	Of priuate troubles and diuisions. 419
	Of Iustice the second vertue.
5	Of Iustice in generall. 419
6	Of the Iustice and dutie of a man towards himselfe. 422
	Of the Iustice and dutie of a man towards man, with an Advertisement. 428
	<u>The first part, which is of the generall and common duties of all towards all, and first</u>
7	Of Loue or friendship. 429
8	Of Faith, fidelitie, treacherie, secrecie. 436
9	Veritie and free admonition. 439
10	Of flattery, lying and dissimulation. 441
11	Of benefits, obligation, and thankfulness. 446
	<u>The second part, which concerneth the speciall duties of certeine men towards certeine men, by certeine and speciall obligation. The Preface.</u> 453
12	The dutie of married folke. 454
13	Householde husbandrie. 456
14	The duty of Parents and children. 457
15	The duty of Masters and seruants. 486
16	The duty of Soueraignes and subiects. 488
17	The duty of Magi st rates. 491
18	The duty of great and small. 497
	Of

THE TABLE.

CHAP.	PAGE.
<i>Of Fortitude, the third vertue. Preface.</i>	498
19 <i>Of Fortitude or valour in generall,</i>	499
<i>Of Fortitude or valour in particular.</i>	503
20 <i>The first part of outward euils.</i>	504
21 <i>Of outward euils considered in their effects and fruits.</i>	509
<i>Of outward euils in themselves and particularly. An Advertisement.</i>	510
22 <i>Of Sicknesse and grieve.</i>	511
23 <i>Of Captiuitie and imprisonment.</i>	513
24 <i>Of Banishment and exile.</i>	515
25 <i>Of Pouertie, want, losse of goods.</i>	516
26 <i>Of Infamie.</i>	518
27 <i>Of the losse of friends.</i>	519
<i>Of Death.</i>	520
<i>The second part of inward euils, &c. The Preface.</i>	520
28 <i>Against Feare.</i>	521
29 <i>Against Sorrow.</i>	522
30 <i>Against Compassion and mercy.</i>	523
31 <i>Against Choler.</i>	524
32 <i>Against Hatred.</i>	528
33 <i>Against Enuie.</i>	528
34 <i>Against Renenge.</i>	529
35 <i>Against Icalousie.</i>	530
<i>Of Temperance the fourth vertue.</i>	
36 <i>Of Temperance in generall.</i>	532
37 <i>Of Prosperitie, and counsell thereupon.</i>	533
38 <i>Of Pleasure, and aduice thereupon.</i>	534
39 <i>Of Eating and drinking, Abstinence and sobriety.</i>	539
40 <i>Of Riot and excesse in apparell and ornaments, and of frugality.</i>	541
41 <i>Carnall pleasure, chastitie, continencie.</i>	542
42 <i>Of Glory and ambition.</i>	545
43 <i>Of Temperancie in speech, and of Eloquence.</i>	547

The end of the Table.

OF



OF WISDOME

Three Books.

THE PREFACE:

*Where the Name, Subiect, Purpose, and
Method of this Worke is set downe,
with an Aduertisement to
the Reader.*



It is required at the first entrie in-
to this Worke, that wee know
what this Wisdome is; and since
it beareth that name and title,
how we purpose to speake there-
of. All men in generall at the first
view of the simple word it selfe,
doe easily conceiue and imagine it to be some qualitie,
sufficiencie, or habit, not common or vulgar, but ex-
cellent, singular, and eleuated aboue that which is
common and ordinarie, be it good or euill: For it is
taken and vsed (though perhaps improperly) in both
kinds: *Sapientes sunt ut faciant mala:* and signifieth not

^I
Of y word
Wisdome.

Hierem. 4.

Arist. lib. 3.

Metaphy.

A

properly

The Preface.

properly a good and laudable qualitie, but exquisite, singular, excellent in whatsoeuer it be. And therefore we doe as well say, A wise Tyrant, Pirat, Theefe; as A wise King, Pilot, Captaine: that is to say, Suffici-ent, prudent, aduised; not simply and vulgarly, but excellently: For there is opposite vnto Wisdome not onely follie, which is an irregularitie or loosenesse of life, and Wisdome a regularitie or moderation, well measured and proportioned: but also common base-nesse and vulgar Simplicite: For Wisdome is high, strong, and excellent; yea, whether it be in good or euill it conteineth two things: Sufficiencie, that is, Prouision or furniture for whatsoeuer is required and necessarie; and that it be in some high degree of excel-lencie. So that you see what the simpler sort imagine Wisdome to be at the first view and the simple sound of the word; whereby they conclude, That there are few wise men, that they are rare as euery excellencie is; and that to them by right it apperteineth to command and gouerne others; that they are as Oracles: from whence is that saying, *Beleeue others, and referre thy selfe to the wise.* But well to define this thing and ac-cording to trueth, and to distinguish it into his true parts, all men know not, neither are they of one ac-cord, nor is it easie; for otherwise doe the common people, otherwise the Philosophers, otherwise the Di-uines speake thereof. These are the three floores and degrees of the world. The two latter proceed by or-der, and rules, and precepts: the former confusedly and very imperfectly.

2
The diuifi-
on of Wis-
dome.

Now then we may say, That there are three sorts and degrees of wisdom, Diuine, Humane, Mundane, which correspond vnto God; Nature pure and entire; Nature

The Preface.

Nature vitiated and corrupted. Of all these sorts and euerie of them doe all these three orders of the world, which before we speake of, write and discourse, euerie one according to his owne maner and fashion; but properly and formally the common sort, that is to say, the world of worldly wisdom, the Philosopher of humane, the Diuine of diuine wisdom.

Worldly wisdom, and of the three the more base, (which is diuers according to the three great Capitaines and Leaders of this inferiour world, Opulencie, Pleasure, Glorie, or rather Auarice, Luxurie, Ambition: *Quicquid est in mundo est concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, superbia vite*; for which cause it is called by S. Iames, *Terrena, Animalis, Diabolica*) is reprooued by Philosophie and Diuinitie, which pronounceth it follie before God: *Stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi*. Of this wisdom therefore we speake not in this Booke, except it be to dispraise and condemne it.

3
Worldly
wisdom.

1. Iohn 3.

Iames 3.

1. Cor. 1.

Diuine wisdom, and of the three the highest, is defined and handled by Philosophers and Diuines, but somewhat diuersly. As for the common or worldly wisdom I disdain it, and passe by whatsoever may be spoken thereof as prophane and too vnworthy in this Treatise to be read. The Philosophers make it altogether Speculative, saying, That it is the knowledge of the principles, first causes, and highest power to iudge of all things, euen of the most Soueraigne, which is God himselfe: and this wisdom is Metaphysicall, and resideth wholly in the vnderstanding, as being the chiefe good and perfection thereof: it is the first and highest of the five intellectuall vertues, which may be without either honestie, action, or other morall vertue,

4
Diuine
wisdom.

Thom. 1. 2.

quest. 57. 2.

2. 9. 19.

tue,

The Preface.

tue. The Diuines make it not altogether so speculatiue, but that it is likewise in some sort Practique; for they say, That it is the knowledge of Diuine things, from which there ariseth a iudgement and rule of humane actions; and they make it two-folde, The one acquired by studie, and comes neere to that of the Philosophers; which I am to speake of: The other infused and giuen by God, *De sursum descendens*. This is the first of the seuen gifts of the Holy Ghost, *Spiritus Domini, spiritus sapientia*, which is not found but only in those that are iust and free from sinne, *In maleuolam animam non introibit sapientia*. Of this Diuine wisdom likewise our purpose is not heere to speake, it is after some sort and measure handled in my first Veritie, and in my Discourses of Diuinitie.

Sap. 1.

5
Humane.

Wisdom
according
to the com-
mon sort.

It followeth therefore, that it is Humane wisdom which in this Booke we are to deliuer vnto you, and whereof it takes the name, and of which in this place we must giue some brieft and generall view, which may be as an Argument and Summarie of this whole Worke. The common descriptions are diuers and insufficient; Some and the greatest part thinke that it is only a wisdom, discretion, and aduised carriage in a mans affaires and conuersation. This may well be called common, as respecting nothing but that which is outward and in action, and considereth not at all any other thing than that which outwardly appeareth. It is altogether in the eyes and eares of men, without any respect or very little of the inward motions of the minde: so that according to their opinion wisdom may be without essentiall pietie or probitie, that is, a beautifull cunning, a sweet and modest subtiltie. Others thinke that it is a rude, vnreasonable, rough singularity,

The Preface.

laritie, a kinde of sullen frowning and frampole austeritie in opinions, maners, words, actions and fashion of life; and therefore they call them that are wounded and touched with that humor Philosophers, that is to say, in their counterfeit language, fantastickall, diuers, different and declining from the customes of other men.

Now this kinde of wisdom according to the doctrine of our booke is rather a follie and extrauagancie. You must therefore know, that this wisdom whereof we speake is not that of the common people, but of Philosophers and Diuines, whereof both haue written in their morall learnings. The Philosophers more at large, and more professedly as being their true and proper dish they feed on, and for all subiect they write of, because they applie themselves to that which concerneth Nature and Action. Diuinitie mounteth much higher, and is occupied about vertues infused, Contemplatiue and Diuine, that is to say, about Diuine wisdom and Beleefe. So that Philosophers are more stayed, dispersed more certeine, and more common, ruling and instructing not onely the particular knowledge or actions of men, but the common and publike, teaching that which is good and profitable to Families, Corporations, Common-weales, Empires. Diuinitie is more sparing and silent in this point, looking principallie into the eternall good and saluation of euery one. Againe, the Philosopher handleth this subiect more sweetly and pleasingly, the Diuine more austerely and drily. Againe, Philosophie which is the elder (for Nature is more ancient than Grace, and the Naturall than the Supernaturall) seemeth to perswade gratiouly, as being willing to please in profiting, as the Poet speaketh:

According to Philosophers and Diuines.

A comparison betwixt Diuinitie & Philosophie.

The Preface.

Horace.

*Simul & incunda & idonea dicere vita
Lectorem dalectando, pariterq; morando.*

It is enriched with discourses, reasons, inuentions, examples, similitudes, decked with speeches, Apophthegmes, sententious mots, adorned with Eloquence and Arte. Theologie, which came after, altogether austere, it seemeth to command and imperiously like a Master to enioyne. And to conclude, the vertue and honestie of Diuines is too anxious, scrupulous, deiect, sad, fearefull and vulgar. Philosophie, such as this Booke teacheth, is altogether pleasant, free, buxdom, and if I may so say, wanton too; and yet notwithstanding, puissant, noble, generous, and rare. Doubtesse the Philosophers haue heerin been excellent, not only in writing and teaching, but in the rich and lively representation thereof in their honourable and heroicall liues. I vnderstand heere by Philosophers and Wise men, not onely those that haue carried the name of Wise men, such as *Thales*, *Solon*, and the rest of that ranke, that liued in the time of *Cyrus*, *Cnesus*, *Pisistrates*; nor those that came afterwards, and haue publickly taught it, as *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Aristippus*, *Zenon*, *Antisthenes*, all chiefe Professours apart, and many other their Disciples different and diuided in sects; but also all those great men who haue made singular and exemplary profession of vertue and wisdom, as *Phocion*, *Aristides*, *Pericles*, *Alexander*, whom *Plutarch* called as well a Philosopher as a King, *Epaminondas*, and diuers other Grecks: The *Fabricij*, *Fabij*, *Camilli*, *Caton*, *Torquati*, *Reguli*, *Lelij*, *Scipioni*, Romans, who for the most part haue beene Generals in armies. And these are the reasons why in this my Booke I doe more willingly and ordinarily follow
the

The Preface.

the aduice and sayings of Philosophers ; not in the
meane time omitting or reiecting those of the Diuines :
For both in substance they doe all agree , and are verie
seldome different , and Diuinitie doth nothing disdain
to employ , and to make good vse of the wise sayings
of Philosophie. If I had vndertaken to instruct the
cloister , and the retired life , that is , that profession
which attendeth the secrets Euangelicall ; I must ne-
cessarily haue followed *adamus* the aduice of the
Diuines : but our Booke instructeth a ciuill life , form-
eth a man for the world , that is to say , to humane wis-
dome , not diuine.

We say then naturally and generally both with the
Philosopher and the Diuine , that this humane wis-
dome is a kinde of law or reason , a beautifull and noble
composition of the entire man , both in his inward
part and his outward , his thoughts , his words , his acti-
ons , and all his motions. It is the excellencie and per-
fection of man as he is man , that is to say , according
to that which the first fundamentall and naturall law
doth require ; as wee say , That that worke is well
wrought and excellent , that is compleat and perfect in
all the parts thereof , and wherein all the rules of Arte
haue beene obserued ; that man is accounted a wise
man , that best knoweth after the best and most excel-
lent maner to play the man , that is to say , (to giue a
more particular picture thereof) that knowing him-
selfe and the condition of man , doth keepe and pre-
serue himselfe from all vices , errours , passions and de-
fects as well inward and proper to himselfe , as outward
and common to other men , mainteining his spirit
pure , free , vniuersall , considering and iudging of all
things without band or affection , alwayes ruling and
directing

6

A generall
descripti-
on of hu-
mane wis-
dome.

The Preface.

directing himself in all things according to nature, that is to say, that first reason and vniuersall law and light inspired by God, and which shineth in vs, vnto which he doth apply and accommodate his owne proper and particular light, living in the outward view of the world, and with all men according to their lawes, customes and ceremonies of the countrey where he is, without the offence of any, carrying himselfe wisely and discreetly in all affaires, walking alwaies vprightly, constant, comfortable, and content in himselfe, attending peaceably whatsoever may happen, and at the last death it selfe. All these parts or qualities, which are many, for our better ease and facilitie may be drawn to foure principall heads; Knowledge of our selues, Libertie of spirit pure and generous, Imitation of Nature, (this hath a very large field, and alone might almost suffice) True contentment. These can no where be found but in him that is wise: and he that wanteth any of these cannot be wise. He that hath an erroneous knowledge of himselfe, that subiecteth his minde to any kinde of seruitude, either of passions or popular opinions, makes himselfe partiall; and by enthralling himselfe to some particular opinion is deprived of the libertie and iurisdiction of discerning, iudging and examining all things. Hee that striueth against Nature, vnder what pretence soeuer it be, following rather opinion or passion than reason; he that carrieth himselfe troubledly, disquietly, malcontent, fearing death, is not wise. Beholde heere in a few words the picture of Humane wisdom and folly, and the sum of that which I purpose to handle in this Worke, especially in the Second Booke, which expressly containeth the rules, treatise, and offices of Wisdom, which is more mine than

The Preface.

than the other two, and which I once thought to haue published by it selfe. This verball description of Wifdome is represented vnto the eye euen at the entrance or threshall of this Booke by a woman all naked, in a place void and empty, resting her selfe vpon nothing, in her pure and simple nature beholding her selfe in a glasse, her countenance cheerefull, merry and manly, vpright, her feet close ioyned, vpon a square pillar, and imbracing herselfe, hauing vnder her feet inchained foure other women as slaues vnto her, that is to say, *Passion* with a changed and hideous countenance; *Opinion* with wandering eyes, inconstant, giddy, borne vpon the heads of the people; *Superstition*, astonished and in a trance, and her hands fastened the one to the other; *Vertue* or Honestie and Pedanticall Science with a fullen visage, her eye-lids eleuated reading in a Booke, where was written, *Yea, No*. All this needs no other explication, than that which heereafter followeth, but heereof more at large in the Second Booke.

To attaine vnto this wifdome there are two meanes, the first is in the originall forming and first temper, that is to say, in the temperature of the seed of the Parents, the milke of the Nurse, and the first education; whereby a man is sayd to be either well borne, or ill borne, that is to say, either well or ill formed and disposed vnto wifdome. A man would little thinke of what power and importance this beginning is, for if men did know it, there would be more care taken, and diligence vsed therein than there is. It is a strange and lamentable thing, that so reachlesse a carelesnesse should be in vs of the life and good life of those whom we desire to make our other selues, when in matters of lesse importance we take more care, vse more diligence,

7
Two ways
to attaine
this wif-
dome.

The Preface.

more counsell than we should, neuer thinking of our greatest affaires and most honourable, but by hazzard and peradventure. Who is he that taketh counsell with himselfe, or endeuoureth to do that which is required for the preserving and preparing of himselfe as he ought to the generation of male-children, healthfull of spirit, and apt for wisdom? For that which serueth for the one, serueth for the other, and Nature after one maner attendeth them all. This is that which men thinke of least, yea little or not at all (in the act of generation) doth it enter into their thoughts to frame a new creature like themselves, but only like beasts to satisfie their lustfull pleasures. This is one of the most important faults and of greatest note in a Common weale, whereof there is not one that thinketh or complaineth, neither is there concerning it either law, or rule, or publike aduice. It is most certaine, that if men did heerein carrie themselves as they ought, we should haue other men, of more excellent spirit and condition than we haue amongst vs. What is required heerein, and to the first nourishment and education, is briefly set downe in our Third Booke, *Chap. 14.*

8
Acquired.

The second meanes to attaine wisdom is the studie of Philosophie, I meane not of all the parts thereof, but Morall (yet not forgetting the Naturall) which is the light, the guide, the rule of our life, which explaineth and representeth vnto vs the law of Nature, instructeth man vniuersally in all things, both publike and priuate, alone and in companie, in all domesticall and ciuill conuersation, taketh away all that sauage nature that is in vs, sweetneth and tames our naturall rudenesse, crueltie and wildnesse, and worketh and fashioneth it to wisdom. To be brieft, it is the true science

The Preface.

ence of man ; all the rest in respect of it is but vanitie, or at the leastwise not necessarie or little profitable : for it giueth instructions to liue and to die well , which is all in all ; it teacheth vs perfect wisdome, an apt iudicious well aduised honesty. But this second meane is almost as little practised and as ill employed as the first : for no man careth greatly for this wisdome, so much are all giuen to that which is worldly. Thus you see the two principall meanes to attaine to wisdome, the Naturall and Acquired. He that hath beene fortunate in the first, that is to say, that hath been fauourably formed by Nature, that is, of a good and sweet tempera-
ture, which bringeth forth a great goodnesse in nature, and sweetnes in maners, hath made a faire march without great paine to the second : But that man with whom it is otherwise, must with great and painfull studie of the second beautifie and supplie that which is wanting, as *Socrates* one of the wisest sayd of himselfe, That by the studie of Philosophie he had corrected and reformed his naturall infirmities.

There are contrariwise two formall lets or hindrances to wisdome, and two counter-meanes or powerfull wayes vnto follie, Naturall and Acquired. The first, which is naturall, proceedeth from the originall temper and temperature, which maketh the braine either too soft, moist, and the parts thereof grosse and materiall, whereby the spirits remaine sottish, feeble, lesse capable, plaine diminished, obscure, such as that is, for the most part, of the common sort of people ; or too hot, ardent, and drie, which maketh the spirits foolish, audacious, vitious. These are the two extremes, *Sottishnesse* and *Follie*, Water and Fire, Lead and Mercurie, altogether improper or vnapt to wisdom, which

9
The lets to
Wisdome,
and means
to folly are
two.

I
Naturall.

The Preface.

requireth a spirit full of vigor and generous, and yet sweet, pliant, and modest: but the second is more easily amended by discipline than the former.

2
Acquired.

The second, which is Acquired, proceedeth either from no culture and instruction, or from that which is euill, which amongst other things consisteth in an obstinate and sworne preiudicate preuention of opinions, wherewith the minde is made drunken, and taketh so strong a tincture, that it is made vnapt and vncapable to see or to finde better whereby to raise and enrich it selfe. It is sayd of these kinde of men, That they are wounded and stricken, that they haue a hurt or blow in the head: vnto which wound if likewise learning be ioined, because that puffeth vp, it bringeth with it presumption and temeritie, and somtimes armes to maintaine and defend those anticipated opinions: it altogether perfecteth the forme and frame of follie, and maketh it incurable. So that naturall weaknesse, and acquired preuention are two great hinderances; but science, if it do not wholly cure them, which seldome it doth, strengtheneth them and maketh them inuincible, which turneth not any way to the dishonour of learning (as a man may well thinke) but to the greater honour thereof.

10
Of Learning.

See heerof
Li. 3. ca. 14.

Science or Learning is a very good and profitable staffe or waster, but which will not be handled with all hands; and he that knowes not well how to rule it, receiueth thereby more hurt than profit. It besotteth and maketh foolish (saith a great learned writer) the weak and sicke spirit, it polisheth and perfecteth the naturally strong and good. The feeble spirit knowes not how to possesse science, how to handle it, and how to make vse thereof as he should; but contrariwise is possessed
and

The Preface.

and ruled by it, whereby he submits himselfe and remains a slave to it, like a weake stomacke overcharged with more victuals than it can digest. A weake arme wanting power and skill well to weld a waster or staffe that is somewhat too heauie for it, wearie it selfe and fainteth. A wise and courageous spirit overmastereth his wisdom, enioyeth it, vseth it, and employeth it to his best aduantage, enformeth his owne iudgement, rectifieth his will, helpeth and fortifieth his naturall light, and maketh himselfe more quicke and actiue; whereas the other is made thereby more sottish, more vnapt, and therewithall more presumptuous: so that the fault or reproch is not in learning, no more than that wine or other good drugge is faultie which a man knoweth not how to apply and accommodate to his owne needs: *Non est culpa vini, sed culpa bibentis.* Now then against such spirits weake by nature, preoccupied, puffed vp, and hindred by acquired wisdom I make open warre in this Booke, and that often times vnder the word *Pedante*, not finding any other more proper, and which by many good Authours is vsed in this sense. In it owne Greeke Originall it was taken in the better sense, but in other later languages, by reason of the abuse, and bad carriage of such men in the profession of their learning, it is accounted base, vile, questionous, contentious, opinatiue, vain-glorious and presumptuous, by too many practised, and vsed but by way of iniurie and derision, and is in the number of those words that by continuance of time haue changed their signification, as *Tyrant*, *Sophister*, and diuers other. *Le sieur de Bellay*, after the rehearfall of many notorious vices, concludeth as with the greatest, *But of all the rest, Knowledge pedanticall I detest.* And in another place:
Said

Of y word
Pedante or
Schoole-
master.

The Preface.

Sayd I thou didst liue but to eat and drinke,
Then poore were my reuenge, thy faults scantie :
But that which most doth make thy name to stinke,
Is, to be short, thou art a Pedantie.

An aduer-
tisement.

It may be some will take offence at this word, thinking it likewise toucheth them, and that I thereby haue a will to tax or scoffe the Professors and Teachers of learning; but let them be pleased to content themselves with this free and open declaration which I here make, That it is no part of my meaning to note by this word any gown-men or learned profession whatsoever: yea I am so farre from it, that Philosophers are in so high esteeme with me, that I should oppose my selfe against my selfe, because I account my selfe one of them, and professe the same learning: only I touch a certaine degree and qualitie of spirits, before desciphered, that is, such as haue naturall capacitie and sufficiencie after a common and indifferent maner, but afterwards not well tilled, preoccupied, possessed with certaine opinions; and these are men of all fortunes, all conditions, and goe as well in short garments as in long gownes: *Vulgum tam chlamidatos, quàm coronam voco.* If any man can furnish me with any other word as significant as this to expresse these kinde of spirits, I will willingly forgo this. After this my declaration, he that findeth himselfe agrieved, shall but accuse and shew himselfe too scrupulous. It is true that a man may finde other opposites to a wise man besides a *Pedante*, but it is in some particular sense, as the common, prophane, vulgar sort of people; and often times I vse these opposits: but this is as the low is opposite to the high, the weak to the strong, the valley to the hill, the common to the rare, the seruant to the master, the prophane to the holy;

The Preface.

holy ; as also a foole , which indeed according to the true sound of the word, is his truest opposite : but this is a moderate man to an immoderate , a glorious opinionative man to a modest, the part to the whole, the pre-iudicate and tainted to the neat and free , the sicke to the sound : but this word *Pedante* in that sense we take it, comprehendeth all these and more too, for it noteth and signifieth him that is not only vnlike & contrary to a wise man, as those before mentioned, but such a one as arrogantly and insolently resisteth it to the face, and as being armed on all sides raiseth himselfe against it, speaking out of resolution and authoritie. And forasmuch as after a sort he feareth it, by reason that he seeth himselfe discovered euen from the top to the bottome, and his sport troubled by it , he persecuteth it with a certaine intestine hatred , he taketh vpon him to censure it , to defame it, to condemne it , accounting and carrying himselfe as the truly wise , though he be a foole without peere and an ignorant selfe-conceited Gull.

After the purpose and argument of this Worke, we come to the order and method thereof. There are ^{II} three Books : The First is wholly in the knowledge of ^{The method of this book.} our selues and humane condition , as a preparatiue vnto wisdom, which is handled at large by five maine and principall considerations , ech one including in it diuers others. The Second Booke containeth in it the treatises , offices , and generall and principall rules of wisdom. The Third , the particular rules and instructions of wisdom, and that by the order and discourse of foure principall and morall vertues, *Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, Temperance* ; vnder which foure is comprised the whole instruction of the life of man, and all the parts.

The Preface.

parts of dutie and honestie. Finally, I heere handle this matter, not Scholarlike or Pedantically, nor with enlarged discourse, and furniture of Eloquence or other Arte; (For wisdom *(quæ si oculis ipsis cerneretur mirabiles excitaret amores sui)* needs no such helps to commend it selfe, being of it selfe so noble and glorious) but rudely, openly, and ingeniously, which perhaps will not please all. The propositions and verities are compact, but many times drie and sower, like Aphorismes, ouertures and seeds of discourse.

12
An Aduer-
tisement
& Apolo-
gie to the
Reader.

I

Some thinke this Booke too foole-hardie and free to contradict and wound the common opinions, and are offended therewith, whom in foure or fve words I thus answer: First, that wisdom which is neither common nor vulgar hath properly this libertie and authoritie, *Iure suo singulari*, to iudge of all, (it is the priuiledge of a wise and spirituall man, *spiritualis omnia dijudicat, & a nemine iudicatur*) and in iudging to censure and condemne (as for the most part erroneous) common and vulgar opinions. What then should she doe? for the case standing thus, it cannot be, but she must incurre the disgrace and enuie of the world. In another place I complaine of these kinde of men, and reprove their popular weaknesse and feminine daintinesse as vnworthy, being ouer-tender and delicate, to vnderstand any thing of worth, and altogether vn capable of wisdom. The hardest and hardiest propositions are best besitting a hardie and eleuated spirit, and there can nothing seeme strange vnto him that doth but know what the world is. It is weaknesse to be astonished at any thing, we must rowze vp our hearts, confirme and strengthen our mindes, harden and inure our selues to heare, to know, to vnderstand, to iudge
of

The Preface.

of all things seeme they neuer so strange. All things are agreeing and well besitting the palat of the spirit, so a man be not wanting vnto himselfe, and neither do any thing, or yeeld his consent to whatsoever is not good and truly faire, no though the whole world perswade him vnto it. A wise man sheweth equally in them both his courage, his delicates are not capable of the one or the other, there being a weaknesse in them both.

Thirdly, in all that I shall propose, my meaning is not to binde any man vnto it, I only present things, and lay them out as it were vpon a stall; I grow not into choler with any man that giues me no credit, or dislikes my ware, that were to play the *Pedante*. *Passion* witnesseth that it is not reason so to do, and he that out of passion doth any thing out of reason can not doe it. But why are they angrie with me? Is it because I am not altogether of their opinion? Why, I am not angry with them because they are not of mine. Is it because I speake something which is not pleasing to their taste, or to the palat of the vulgar sort? Why therefore I speake it. I speake nothing without reason, if they knew how to vnderstand it, how to relish it. If they can bring better reason to disproue mine, I will hearken vnto it with delight and thanks to him that shall shew it me. But yet let them not thinke to beat me downe with authorities, multitudes, and allegations of other men, for these haue but small credit in my iurisdiction, saue in matter of Religion, where only authoritie preuailes without reason. This is authorities true Empire, reason onely bearing sway in all other Arts without it, as *S. Augustine* doth very well acknowledge. For it is an vniust tyranny and an iraged
follic

The Preface.

follic to subiect and inthrall our spirits to beleue and to follow whatsoeuer our Ancestours haue sayd, and what the vulgar sort holde to be true, who know neither what they say, nor what they do. There are none but fooles that suffer themselves to be thus led by the noses: and this Booke is not for such, which if it should popularlie be receiued and accepted of the common sort of people, it should faile much in its first purpose and designment. We must heare, consider, make account of our ancient Writers, not captiuate our selues vnto them but with reason. And if a man would follow them, what should he doe? for they agree not among themselves. *Aristotle* who would seeme to be the most sufficient amongst them, and hath aduentured to challenge & to censure all that went before him, hath vttered more grosse absurdities than them all, and is at no agreement with himselfe, neither doth he know many times where he is; witnesse his Treatises of the Soule of man, of the Eternitie of the world, of the Generation of the windes and waters, and so forth. It is no cause of wonder or astonishment, that all men are not of one opinion; but it were rather strange and woonderfull, that all men were of one opinion: for there is nothing more befitting Nature and the spirit of man than varietie. That wise Diuine *S. Paul* giueth vs this libertie, in that he willethe euery man to abound in his owne vnderstanding, not iudging or condemning that man that doth otherwise, or thinke otherwise. And he speaketh it in a matter of greater moment and more ticklish, not in that which consisteth in outward action and obseruation, wherein we say we are to conforme our selues to the common sort, and to that which is prescribed and accustomed

ROM. 14.

The Preface.

accustomed to be done, but also in that which concerneth Religion, that is, the religious observance of ordinances and dayes: whereas all that libertie and boldnesse of speech which I challenge vnto my selfe, is but in thoughts, iudgements, opinions, in which no man is quarter-master but he that hath them, euery man about himselfe.

Notwithstanding all this, many things which may seeme too harsh and brieft, too rude and difficult for the simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser haue stomachs warme enough to concoct and digest all) I haue for the loue of them explicated, enlightned and sweetned in this second Edition, reuiewed, and much augmented.

I would willingly aduertise the Reader that shall vndertake to iudge of this Worke, to take heed that he fall not into any of these seuen ouersights, as some others haue done; that is: To referre that vnto law and dutie, which is proper vnto action; that vnto action, which is onely to be censured; that to resolution and determination, which is only proposed, consulted of, and problematically and Academically disputed; that to me and mine opinions, which I deliuer from report, and is the opinion of another man; that to the outward state, profession, and condition, which is proper to the spirit and inward sufficiencie; that to religion and faith, which is but the opinion of man; that to grace and supernaturall inspiration, which is proper to naturall and morall vertue and action. All passion and preoccupation being taken away, hee shall finde in these seuen points well vnderstood how to resolve himselfe in his doubts, how to answer all obiections, made by himselfe or by others, and informe himselfe touching

The Preface.

touching my intention in this worke. And if neuer-
thelesse after all this, he will neither rest satisfied and
contented, nor approue what I haue written, let him
boldly and speedily disproue it (for onely to speake ill,
to bite, to slander the name of another man, though it
be easie enough, yet it is base and pedanticall) and
he shall as speedily receiue either a free confes-
sion and assent, (for this Booke doth glory
and feast it selfe in the truth and inge-
nuitie thereof) or an examina-
tion of the impertinen-
cies and follies
thereof.

F I N I S.



OF

gen
for
him
him



OF
WISDOME,
THE
FIRST BOOKE,

*Which is the knowledge of our selues
and our humane condition.*

An exhortation to the studie and
knowledge of our selues.

THE PREFACE TO THE
First Booke.



HE most excellent and diuine counsell,
the best and most profitable aduertise-
ment of all others, but the least practi-
fed, is to study and learne how to know
our selues: This is the foundation of
Wisdom and the high way to whatso-
euer is good; and there is no folly com-
parable to this, To be painfull and dili-

gent to know all things els whatsoeuer rather than our selues:
for the true science and studie of man, is man himselfe.

God, Nature, the wise, the world, preach man, and exhort
him both by word and deed to the studie and knowledge of
himselfe. God eternally and without intermission behold-
eth

*The know-
ledge of our
selues, the
first thing.*

*Enioyned
to all by all
reason.*

see pag. 223.

eth, considereth, knoweth himselfe. The world hath all the lights thereof contracted and vnited within it selfe, and the eyes open to see and behold it selfe. It is as necessarie for man to learne how to know himselfe, as it is naturall vnto him to thinke, or to be neere vnto himselfe: Nature hath enioyned this worke vnto all. To meditate & to entertain our thoughts therein is a thing aboue all things easie, ordinarie, naturall; it is the food, sustentation, life of the spirit, *Cuius viuere est cogitare.* Now where can a man begin, or continue his meditations more truly, more naturally than with himselfe? Is there any thing that toucheth him more neerely? Doubtlesse, to studie other learnings, and to forget our selues, is a thing both vnnaturall and vniust. The true and principall vacation of euery man is to imploy his thoughts vpon himselfe, and to tie himselfe to himselfe; for so doth euery thing els, setting bounds and limits to their other businesse and desires. And thou man which wilt seeme to containe the whole vniuers, to know all things, to controule, to iudge, neither knowest nor endeouorest the knowledge of thy selfe; and so going about to make thy selfe skilfull and a Iudge of Nature, thou proouest the only foole of the world: thou art of all other the most beggerly, the most vaine and miserable; and yet most proud and arrogant. Looke therefore into thy selfe, know thy selfe, hold thy selfe to thy selfe; thy spirit and will which is els where imployed, reduce it vnto thy selfe. Thou forgettest thy selfe, and lovest thy selfe about outward things; thou betrayest and disrobest thy selfe; thou lookest alwaies before thee; gather thy selfe vnto thy selfe, and shut vp thy selfe within thy selfe: examine, search, know thy selfe.

Nosce teipsum: nec te quasinueris extra.

Respue quod non es.

Tecum habita & noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.

Tu te consule.

Teipsum concute, nunquid vitiorum

Inseuerit olim natura, aut etiam consuetudo mala.

3
The ladder
to the know-
ledge of the di-
uine nature.

By the knowledge of himselfe man ariueeth sooner and better to the knowledge of God, than by any other meanes, both because he findeth in himselfe better helps, more marks and footsteps of the diuine nature, than in whatsoeuer besides he can

can any way know, and because he can better vnderstand and know that which is in himselfe than in another thing.

Formasti me & posuisti super me manum tuam, ideo mirabilis facta est scientia tua, id est, tui, ex me : And therefore there was engrauen in letters of gold ouer the Porch of the Temple of *Apollo* the god (according to the *Panims*) of Knowledge and Light, this sentence, KNOW THY SELFE, as a salutation and aduertisement of God vnto all; signifying vnto them, that he that would haue accessse vnto that *Diuinitie*, and entrance into that Temple, must first know himselfe, and could not otherwise be admitted. *Si te ignoras o pulcherrima egredere, & abi post haedos tuos.* Psalm. Cantic.

To become truly wise, and to leade a life more regular and pleasant, there needs no other instruction but from our selues: and doubtlesse, if we were good scholars, there are no books could better instruct vs, than we teach our selues. He that shall call to mind, and consider the excesse of his passed chol-
 4 *Disposition vnto wise- dome.*
 ler, euen how farre this feuer and frensie hath caried him, shall better be perswaded of the foule deformitie of this passion, than by all the reason that *Aristotle* or *Plato* can alledge against it: and so of all other passions and motions of the foule whatsoeuer. He that shall call to minde how often he hath miscaried in his iudgement, and been deceiued by his memorie, shall learne thereby to trust it no more. He that shall note how often he hath held an opinion; and in such sort vnderstood a thing euen to the engaging of his owne credit, and the satisfiing of himselfe and any other therein, and that afterwards time hath made him see the truth euen the contrarie to that he formerly held, may learne to distrust his owne iudgement, and to shake off that importunate arrogancie and querulous presumption; a capitall enemy to discipline & trueth. He that shall wel note and consider all those euils that he hath run into, that haue threatened him; the light occasions that haue altered his courses and turned him from one estate to another; how often repentances and mislikes haue come into his head; will prepare himselfe against future changes, learne to know his owne conditon; will preserve his modestie, containe himselfe within his owne ranke, offend no man, trouble nothing, nor enterprise any thing that may passe his owne forces :

forces : And what were this but to see *justice* and *peace* in eue-
ry thing ? To be brieft, we haue no cleerer looking glasse,
no better booke than our selues, if as we ought we doe studie
our selues, alwayes keeping our eyes open ouer vs, and pry-
ing more narrowly into our selues.

^s But this is that which we thinke least of, *Nemo in se tentat*
descendere : whereby it commeth to passe that we fall many
Against such times to the ground, and tumble headlong into the same fault,
as misknow neither perceiuing it, nor knowing to what course to betake
themselves. vs : we make our selues fooles at our owne charges. Difficul-
ties in euey thing are not discerned, but by those that know
them : and some degree of vnderstanding is necessarie euen in
the marking of our owne ignorance. We must knocke at the
doore to know whether the doore be shut : for when men see
themselves resolved & satisfied of a thing, and think they suf-
ficiently vnderstand it, it is a token they vnderstand nothing
at all : for if we know our selues well, we would prouide farre
better for our selues and our affaires ; nay, we should be asha-
med of our selues and our estate, and frame our selues to be
others than we are. He that knowes not his owne infirmities,
takes no care to amend them ; he that is ignorant of his owne
wants, takes as little care to prouide for them ; he that feeles
not his owne euils and miseries, aduiseeth not with himselfe of
helps, nor seeks for remedies. *Deprehendas te oportet priusquam*
emendes : sanitatis initium sentire sibi opus esse remedio. And
heere beholde our unhappinesse : for we thinke all things
goes well with vs, and we are in safetie, and we liue in content
with our selues, and so double our miseries. *Socrates* was ac-
counted the wisest man of the world, not because his know-
ledge was more compleat, or his sufficiencie greater than o-
thers, but because his knowledge of himselfe was better than
others ; in that he held himselfe within his owne ranke, and
knew better how to play the man. He was the king of men,
as it is said, that he that hath but one eye is a king in respect of
him that hath neuer an eye ; that is to say, doubly deprived of
his sense : for they are by nature weake and miserable, and
therewithall proud, and feele not their miserie. *Socrates* was
but purblind, for being a man as others were, weake and mi-
serable, he knew it, and ingeniously acknowledged his con-
dition,

dition, and liued, and gouerned himselfe according vnto it. This is that which the Truth it selfe spake vnto those which were full of presumption, and by way of mockery said vnto him, Are we blind also? If ye were blind, saith he, that is, if Ioh. 9. you thought your selues blind, you should see, but because ye thinke ye see, therefore you are blind; therefore your sinne remaineth. For they that in their owne opinion see much, are in truth starke blinde; and they that are blinde in their owne opinion see best. It is a miserable thing in a man, to make himselfe a beast by forgetting himselfe to be a man. *Homo enim cum sis, id fac semper intelligas.* Many great personages as a rule or bridle to themselves haue ordained that one or other should euer buz into their eares that they were men. O what an excellent thing was this, if it entred aswel into their hearts, as it sounded in their eares? That Mot of the *Atheniens* to *Pompey* the Great, Thou art so much a God, as thou acknowledgedst thy selfe to be a man, was no ill saying: for at the least to be an excellent man, is to confesse himselfe to be a man.

The knowledge of our selues (a thing as difficult and rare as to misdeeme and deceiue our selues easie) is not obtained by any other, that is to say, by the comparison, rule, or example of another;

6

*False means
to know our
selues.*

Plus alijs de te quam tu tibi credere noli.

much lesse also by our speech and iudgement, which oftentimes commeth short to discern, and we disloyall and fearefull to speake: nor by any singular act, which sometimes vnawares hath escaped a man, pricked forward by some new, rare, and accidentall occasion, and is rather a trick of *Fortune*, or an eruption of some extraordinary lunacy than any production of fruit truly ours. A man iudgeth not of the greatness or depth of a riuer, by that water which by reason of some sudden inundation of neighbour riuers ouerfloweth the bankes. One valiant act makes not a valiant man, nor one iust a iust man. The circumstances and source of occasions doth import much and alter vs, and oftentimes a man is prouoked to doe good by vice it selfe: So hard a thing is it for man to know man. Nor likewise by all those outward things that are outwardly adiacent vnto vs, as offices, dignities, riches, nobilitie, grace, and applause of the greatest

peeres and common people. Nor by the cariages of a man in publicke places is a man knowen; for as a king at chesse so he standeth vpon his guard, he bridleth and contracteth himselfe; feare, and shame, and ambition, and other passions make him play that part that you see: But truly to know him we must looke into his inward part, his priuy chamber, and there not how to day, but euery day he carieth himselfe. He is many times a different man in his house from that he is in the countrey, in the palace, in the market place; another man amongst his domesticall friends from that he is amongst strangers: when he goeth foorth of his house into some publicke place, he goeth to play a Comedy, and therefore stay not thou there, for it is not himselfe that plaieth, but another man, and thou knowest him not.

7 *True means.* The knowledge of a mans selfe is not acquired by all these foure meanes, neither must we trust them, but by a true, long, and daily study of himselfe, a serious and attentiu examination not only of his words, and actions, but of his most secret thoughts (their birth, progresse, continuance, repetition) and whatsoeuer is in him, euen his nightly dreames, prying narrowly into him, trying him often and at all howres, pressing and pinching him euen to the quicke. For there are many vices hid in vs and are not felt for want of force and meanes; so that the venemous serpent that is benumbed with cold, suffereth himselfe to be handled without danger: neither doth it suffice afterwards to acknowledge the fault by tale or peecemeale, and so thinke to mend it by marring it, but he must in generall reacknowledge his weaknesse, his misery, and come to a vniuersall amendment and reformation.

8 *The Proposition & diuision of this Booke.*

Now if we will know man we must take more than ordinary paines in this first booke, taking him in all senses, beholding him with all visages, feeling his poulse, sounding him to to the quicke, entring into him with a candle and a snuffer, searhing and creeping into euery hole, corner, turning, closet, and secret place, and not without cause. For this is the most subtile and hypocriticall couert and counterfait of all the rest, and almost not to be knowen. Let vs then consider him after fiue manners set downe in this table, which is the summe of the booke:

There

The first, Naturall, of all the parts whereof he is composed, and their appurtinances.

The second, Naturall and Morall, by comparison of man with beasts.

The third, of his life in declining state.

There are
five consi-
derations
of man &
humane
condiion:

The fourth, Morall, of his man-
ners, humours, conditions,
which are referred to five
things:

- 1 Vanity.
- 2 Weaknesse.
- 3 Inconstancie.
- 4 Misery.
- 5 Presumption.

The fifth, Natu-
rall and Mo-
rall, of the dif-
ferences that
are betweene
men in their

- 1 Natures.
- 2 Spirits and sufficiencies.
- 3 Charges and degrees of superio-
rity, inferiority.
- 4 Professions and conditions of life
advantages and
disadvantages

Naturall.
Acquired.
Casuall.

The first Consideration of Man, which is naturall, by all the parts and members whereof he is composed.

CHAPTER I.

Of the frame or formation of Man.



It is twofold and to be considered after a twofold maner, the first and originall, once immediately by God in his supernaturall creation, the second and ordinary in his naturall generation. According to that description which *Moyſes* setteth downe touching the workmanship and creation of the world (the boldest and richest peece of worke that euer man brought vnto light, I meane the historie of the nine first chapters of *Genesis*, which is of the world newly borne and reborne) man

I
Man made
laſt.
Gen. 1. 2.
&c.

was made of God not onely after all other creatures as the most perfect, the master and superintendent of all, *Vt præsiti piscibus maris, volatilibus cœli, bestiis terra.* And in the selfe same day wherein the fowre-footed beasts of the earth that come neereſt vnto him were created (although those two that reſemble him moſt are for the inward parts the Swine, for the outward the Ape) but alſo after all was done and ended, as the cloſing vp, ſeale, and ſigne of his workes, he hath alſo there imprinted his armes, and his pourtrait, *Exemplumque Dei quifque eſt in imagine parua. Signatum eſt ſuper nos lumen vultus tui,* As a Summary recapitulation of all things, and an Epitome of the world, which is all in man, but gathered into a ſmall volume, whereby he is called the little world, as the whole vniuers may be called the great man: as the tie and ligament of Angels and beaſts, things heauenly and earthly ſpirituall and corporall: and in one word, as the laſt hand, the accompliſhment, the perfection of the worke, the honor and miracle of Nature. The reaſon is becauſe God hauing made him with deliberation, counſell and preparation, & *dixit faciamus hominem ad imaginem & ſimilitudinem noſtram,* he reſted. And this reſt alſo was made for man, *Sabbatum propter hominem, non contra.* And afterwards he had nothing to make new, but to make himſelfe man, and that he did likewiſe for the loue of man, *propter nos homines & propter noſtram ſalutem.* Whereby wee ſee that in all things God hath aimed at man, finally in him and by him, *brevi manu,* to accommodate all vnto himſelfe, the beginning and end of all.

2
Naked.

Secondly, he was created all naked, becauſe more beautiful than the reſt, being pure, neat, and delicate, by reaſon of his thin humours well tempered and ſeaſoned.

3
Vpright.

Thirdly vpright, but little touching the earth, his head directly tending vnto heauen, whereon he gazeth, and ſees and knowes himſelfe as in a glaſſe, quite oppoſite vnto the plant, which hath it head and root within the earth, ſo that man is a diuine plant that flouriſheth & growes vp vnto heauen: a beaſt as in the middle betwixt a man and a plant, goes as it were athwart hauing his two extreames towards the bounds or extremities of the *Horizon* more or leſſe. The cauſe of this vprightneſſe in man beſides the will of his Maſter-workman,

workman, is not properly the reasonable soule, as we see in those that are crookbacked, crupshouldered, lame, nor in the straight line of the back-bone, which is likewise in serpents, nor in the naturall or vitall heat, which is equalled or rather greater in diuers beasts, although all these may perhaps serue to some purpose; but this vpright gate is due and belonging to man, both as he is man the holiest & diuine creature,

Sanctius his animal mentisq, capacius alia:

and as king in this lower region. To small and particular roialties there belong certaine markes of Maiesty, as we see in the crowned Dolphin, the Crocadile, the Lion with his collar, the colour of his haire, and his eies; in the Eagle, the king of the Bees: so man the vniuersall king of these lower parts walketh with an vpright countenance as a master in his house ruling, and by loue or force taming euery thing.

His body was first framed of virgin earth, and red, from whence he tooke his proper name, *Adam* for the appellatiue was *Is*: And that being not yet moistned with raine, but with the water of the fountaine

4
How framed.
Gen. 2.

— *Mixtam fluminalibus undis*

Finxit in effigiem.

By reason the body is the first born or elder than the soule, as the matter than the forme; the house must bee made and trimmed before it be inhabited, the shoppe before the workman can vse it. Afterwards the *Soule* was by diuine inspiration infused, and so the body by the soule made a liuing creature, *inspirauit in faciem eius spiraculum vite &c.*

In that ordinary and naturall generation and formation, which is made of the seed in the wombe of the woman, the selfe same order is obserued: The body is first formed as well by the elementary force of the *Enargie* and forming vertue which is in the seed, aiding in some sort the heat of the matrix, as the celestiall, which is the influence and vertue of the Sunne, *Sol & homo generant hominem*, In such order that the seuen first daies the seed of the father and mother do mingle, vnite, and curdle together like creame, and are made one body, which is the conception, *Nonne sicut lac mulisti me, & sicut caseum me coagulasti*. The next seuen daies this seed is concocted, thickned, and changed into a masse of flesh and indigested

5
He is made in the matrix.

Conceined of coagulated seed.

Changed.

Formed in
grosse.

Jointed, or-
ganized.
First furni-
shed with fit
instruments
for sense.

Indowed
with soule,
motion.
Brought
forth.

gested formlesse blood, which is the proper matter of a humane bodie. The third seuen dayes following, of this masse or lumpe is made and fashioned the bodie in grosse; so that about the twentieth day are brought foorth the three noble and heroicall parts, the *Liu*er, *Heart*, *Braine*, distant an ouall length, or as the *Hebrewes* say, holding themselves by thin *commisures* or ioyns, which afterwards fill themselves with flesh after the fashion of an ant, where there are three grosser parts ioyned by two thin. The fourth seuen dayes which end neere thirtie, the whole body is ended, perfected, ioyned, organized; and so it beginnes to be no more an *Embrion*, that is, vnperfect in shape, but capable, as a matter prepared to it forme, to receiue the soule; which faileth not to insinuate and inuest it selfe into the bodie towards the seuen and thirtieth or fortieth day after the five weeks ended. Doubling this terme, that is to say, at the third moneth, this infant indowed with a soule, hath motion and sense, the haire and nailes begin to come. Tripling this terme, which is at the ninth moneth, he commeth foorth, and is brought into the light. These termes or times are not so iustly prefixed, but that they may either be hastened or prolonged according to the force or feeblenesse of the heat both of the seed and of the matrix; for being strong it hasteneth, being weake it sloweth: whereby that seed that hath lesse heat and more moisture, whereof women for the most part are conceiued, requireth longer time, and is not endowed with a soule vntill the fortieth day or after, and mooueth not till the fourth moneth, which is neere by a quarter more late than that of the male children.

CHAP. II.

The first and generall distinction of man.

I
The diuision
of man in
two parts.

MAN as a prodigious creature is made of parts quite contrarie and enemies to themselves. The soule is a little god, the bodie as a beast, as a dunghill. Neuerthelesse, these two parts are in such sort coupled together, haue such need the one of the other to performe their functions, *Alterius sic altera poscit opem res, & coniurat amice*, and do so with all their complaints

THE FIRST BOOKE. II

complaints embrace ech other, that they neither can continue together without warres, nor separate themselves without griefe and torment; and as holding the Wolfe by the eares, ech may say to other, I can neither liue with thee nor without thee, *Nec tecum nec sine te.*

But againe, forasmuch as there are in this soule two parts very different, the high, pure, intellectuall, and diuine, wherein the beast hath no part, and the base, sensitiue, and brutish, which hath bodie and matter, and is as an indifferent meane betwixt the intellectuall part and bodie; a man may by a distinction more morall and politike, note three parts and degrees in man: The *Spirit*, the *Soule*, the *Flesh*: where the *Spirit* and *Flesh* holde the place of the two extreames, as heauen and earth; the *Soule* the middle region, where are ingendred the Metheors, tumults and tempests. The *Spirit* the highest and most heroicall part, a diminutiue, a sparke, an image, and deaw of the Diuinitie, is in man as a King in his Commonweale, it breatheth nothing but good, and heauen to which it tendeth; the *Flesh* contrariwise as the dregs of a people besorted and common sinke of man tendeth alwaies to the matter and to the earth; the *Soule* in the middle, as the principall of the people betwixt the best and the worst, good and euill, is continually sollicitied by the spirit and the flesh, and according vnto that part towards which it applieth it selfe, it is either spirituall and good, or carnall and euill. Heere are lodged all those naturall affections, which are neither vertuous nor vicious, as the loue of our parents and friends, feare of shame, compassion towards the afflicted, desire of good reputation.

This distinction will helpe much to the knowledge of man, and to discerne his actions, that he mistake not himselfe as it is the maner to doe, iudging by the barke and outward appearance, thinking that to be of the Spirit which is of the Soule, nay, of the flesh; attributing vnto vertue that which is due vnto nature, nay, vnto vice. How many good and excellent actions haue beene produced by passion, or at least by a naturall inclination, *Vt seruiant genio, & suo indulgeant animo?*

C H A P. I I I.

*Of the bodie, and first of all the parts thereof
and their places.*

1
*The diuision
of the body.*

THe body of man consisteth of a number of parts inward and outward, which are all for the most part round and orbicular, or comming neere vnto that figure.

2
*Inward and
many.*

The inward are of two sorts: the one in number and quantitie spread thorow the whole body, as the *bones*, which are as the bases and vpholding pillars of the whole building, and within them for their nourishment the *marow*; the *muscles* for motion and strength; the *veines* issuing from the *liuer* as chanelles of the first and naturall blood; the *arteries* comming from the heart as conduits of the second blood more subtile and vitall. These two mounting higher than the *liuer* and the *heart* their originall sources, are more strait than those that go downwards, to the end they should helpe to mount the blood, for that narrownesse more straitned, serues to raise the *humours*, the *sinewes* proceeding by couples, as instruments of sense, motion, and strength of body, and conduits of the animall spirits, whereof some are soft, of which there are seuen paires which serue the senses of the head, *Sight*, *Hearing*, *Taste*, *Speech*; the other are hard, whereof there are thirtie couples, proceeding from the reines of the backe to the muscles; The *Tendrels*, *Ligaments*, *Gristels*; The foure *Humours*, *Blood*, *Choler* which worketh, prouoketh, penetrateth, hindreth obstructions, casteth forth the excrements, bringeth cheerefulnesse; *Melancholy* which prouoketh an appetite to euery thing, moderateth sudden motions; *Fleame* which sweetneth the force of the two *Cholers*, and all other heats; The *Spirits* which are as it were the fumigations that arise from the naturall heat and radicall humor, and they are in three degrees of excellencie, the *Naturall*, *Vitall*, *Animall*; The *Fat* which is the thickest and grossest part of blood.

3
*Singular.
Foure regi-
ons of the
bodie.*

The other are singular (saue the kidneys and stones, which are double) and assigned to a certaine place. Now there are foure places or regions, as degrees of the bodie, shops of nature, where she exerciseth her faculties and powers. The first and lowest is for generation, in which are the priuy parts
seruing

2
 feruing thereunto. The second neere vnto that, in which are the intralles, *viscera*, that is to say, the *stomacke* yeelding more to the left side, round, straiter in the bottome than at top, hauing two orifices or mouthes, the one aboue to receiue, the other beneath, which answereth the bowels, to cast forth and discharge it selfe. It receiueth, gathereth together, mingleth, concocteth the victuals and turnes them into *Chyle*, that is to say, a kinde of white *Suc* fit for the nourishment of the bodie, which is likewise wrought within the *Meseraique* veines by which it passeth vnto the Liuer. The *Liuer* hot and moist inclining towards the right side, the store-house of blood, the chiefe or rather fountaine of the veines, the seat of the naturall nourishing faculty, or vegetatiue soule, made and ingendred of the blood of that *Chyle*, which it draweth from the *Meseraique* veines, and receiueth into it lap by the *vena porta*, which entreth into the concauities thereof, and afterwards is sent and distributed thorow the whole body by the helpe of the great *vena cava*, which ariseth from the bunch and branches thereof, which are in great number as the riuers of a fountaine. The *Spleene* towards the left side which receiueth the discharge and excrements of the Liuer: The *Reines*, the *Entralles* which though they are all in one, yet are distinguished by six differences and names, equalling seuen times the length of a man, as the length of a man is equalled by seuen foot. In these two first parts or degrees which some take to be but one (although there are two faculties very different, the one generatiue for the continuance of the kinde, the other nutritiue for euery particular person, and they make it to answer to the lowest and elementary part of the world, the place of generation and corruption) is the concupiscible soule.

3
 The third degree compared to the *Aetherian* region, separated from the former by the *Diaphragma* or *Midrise*, and from that aboue by the narrowness of the throat; in which is the irascible soule, and the pectorall parts *Præcordia*, that is to say, the *Heart*, very hot, placed about the fift rib, hauing his point vnder the left pap or dug, the originall fountaine of the *Arteries*, which are alwayes mooued, and cause the *Pulse* to beat, by which as by channels it sendeth and distributeth

buteth thorow the whole bodie the vitall blood which it hath concocted, and by it the spirit and vertue vitall. The *Lungs*, of substance very soft and spongy, supple to draw to and inforce forth like a paire of bellows, instruments both of respiration whereby the heart is refreshed, drawing vnto it the blood, the spirits, the aire, and disburthening it selfe of those fumes and excrements which oppresse it, and of the voice by meane of the rough *Arterie*.

4 The fourth and highest, which answereth to the celestiall region, is the head which containeth the *Braine*, colde and spongy, wrapped within two skinned, the one more hard and thicke which toucheth the brainpan, *Dura mater*; the other more easie and thin which includeth the Braine, *Pia mater*: from it do issue & are deriued the *Sinowes* and marow that descendeth and falleth downe into the reines of the backe. This *Braine* is the seat of the reasonable soule, the source of sense and motion, and of the most noble animall spirits, composed of the vitall, which being raised from the heart by the *Arteries* vnto the braine are concocted and reconcocted, elaborated and made subtile by the helpe of the multiplicite of small *Arteries*, as fillets diuersly wouen and interlaced by many turnings and windings, like a labyrinth or double net, *Rete mirabile*; within which this vitall spirit being retained and sojourning, often times passing and repassing, is refined and perfected, and becomes a creature, spirituall in an excellent degree.

3
Outward
parts singular.

The outward and visible parts, if they be single, are in the middle as the *Nose* which serueth for respiration, smell, and the comfort of the braine, and the disburthening thereof, in such sort that by it the aire entereth and issueth both downe into the lungs and vp into the braines. The *Mouth* which serueth to eat and to speake, and therefore hath many parts seruice-able thereunto; without, the lips; within, the tongue soft and very subtile which iudgeth of fauors; the *Teeth* which bruise and grinde the victuals; the *Nanell*, the two sinke or wayes to ease and disburden the bodie.

4
Double and
equall.

If they be double and alike, they are collaterals and equall, as the two *eyes*, planted in the highest stage as centinels, composed of many and diuers parts; three *humors*, seuen *tunics*, seuen

seven *muscles*, diuers colours, of many fashions and much art. These are the first and most noble outward parts of the bodie, in beautie, vtilitie, mobilitie, actiuitie, yea in the action of loue *ὡς ἰδὼν ὡς ἐμπαθεῖν*, they are to the visage that which the visage is to the bodie, they are the face of the face: and because they are tender, delicate and precious, they are fenced and rampaired on all parts with *skinnes, lids, browes, haire*. The *eares* in the selfe same height that the eyes are, as the scouts of the body, Porters of the spirit, the Receiuers and Iudgers of sounds which alwayes ascend; they haue their entrance oblique and crooked, to the end the aire and the sound should not enter at once, whereby the sense of hearing might be hindered and iudge the woorse. The *armes and hands*, the worke-masters of all things and vniuersall instruments. The *legs and feet*, the props and pillars of the whole building.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the singular properties of the body of man.

THE body of man hath many singularities, and some peculiar and proper vnto themselues, not common with other creatures. The first and principall are speech, vpright stature, the forme or feature, the port or cariage, whereof the wise, yea the Stoicks themselues made such account, that they were wont to say, That it was better to be a foole in a humane shape, than wise in the forme of a beast. The hand is a miracle (that of the Ape is not to be termed a hand.) His naturall nakednesse, laughter, crying. The *Sense* of tickling, haire on the lower lid of the eye, a visible nauell, the point of the heart on the left side. The toes of the feet not so long as the fingers of the hand. Bleeding at nose, a strange thing considering that he carieth his head vpright, and a beast downwards. To blush for shame, wax pale for feare. To be an ambidexter; disposed at all times to the sports of *Venus*. Not to moue the eares, which bewrayeth in beasts the inward affections, but man doth sufficiently make them knowen, by his blushing, palenesse, motion of the eyes and nose.

The other properties are likewise peculiar vnto man, but not wholly but by way of excellencie; for they are also in beasts,

1
Peculiar
properties
in the body
of man.

2
Peculiar
properties

by way of
excellency.

beasts, but in a lesse degree, that is to say, multitude of muscles and haire in the head. The pliant facility of the body and the parts thereof to all motion and euery sense. The eleuation of the breasts. The great abundance of the braine. The greatnesse of the bladder. The forme of the foot long forward, short backward. The quantity and pure subtility of the blood. The mobility and agility of the tongue. The multitude and variety of dreames, insomuch that he seemeth the only dreamer. Sneezing. And to be short, the many motions of the eyes, the nose, the lips.

3
Diuers habits.

There are also habits proper and peculiar, but different; some are gestures, motions, and artificiall and affected countenances; others are so proper and naturall, that they that haue them neither feele them nor know them in themselves, as to go stooping: but all haue that which proceedeth not so much from reason, as a pure, naturall and ready impulsion, that is, to put forth a mans hands before him when he falleth.

CHAP. V.

Of the goods of the bodie: Health, Beautie, &c.

I
The praise
of Health.

THE goods of the body are Health, Beauty, Cheerfulness, Strength, Vigor, a prompt readinesse and disposition: but of all these Health is the first, and passeth all the rest. Health is the most beautifull and rich present that Nature can bestow vpon vs, and aboue all other things to be preferred, not only Science, Nobility, Riches, but Wisdome it selfe, which the austereſt amongst the wise doe affirme. It is the only thing that deserueth our whole imploiment, yea our life it selfe to attaine vnto it; for without it life is no life, but a death, vertue and wisdome grow weake and faint. What comfort can all the wisdome of the world bring to the greatest man that is, if he be thorowly stricken with an *Apoplexie*? Doubtlesse there is nothing to be preferred before this bodily health, but *Honestie* which is the health of the *Soule*. Now it is common vnto vs with beasts, yea many times it is greater and far more excellent in them than in vs: and notwithstanding it be a gift of Nature, *gaudeant bene nati*, giuen in the first formation, yet that which afterward followeth, The milke,

milke, Good gouernment, which consisteth in sobrietie and moderate exercises, lightnesse of heart, and a continuall auoidance of all passions do preferue it much. Griefe and sicknesse are the contraries vnto it, which are the greatest if not the only euils that follow man, whereof we shall speake hereafter. But in the preservation hereof, beasts likewise simply following nature which hath giuen them health do farre exceed men, they often times forgetting themselves, though afterwards they pay dearly for it.

Next followeth Beautie, a good of great account in the society of men. It is the first meane of reconciling or vniting one to another, and it is very likely that the first distinction that hath beene of one man from another, and the first consideration that giueth preheminance to one aboue another, hath beene the aduantage of beauty. It is likewise a powerfull quality, there is none that surmounteth it in credit, or that hath so great a part in the societie of men; for there is none so barbarous, none so resolute, that hath not been beaten by it. It presenteth it selfe vnto the view, it seduceth and preoccupateth the iudgement, it makes deepe impressions, and presseth a man with great authority; and therefore *Socrates* called it a short tyranny, and *Plato* the priuiledge of Nature: for it seemeth that he that carieth in his countenance the fauours of Nature imprinted in a rare and excellent beautie, hath a kinde of lawfull power ouer vs, and that we turning our eies towards him, he likewise turneth our affections, and enthrawleth them in despight of our selues. *Aristotle* sayth that it apperteineth to those that are beautifull to command; that they are venerable next to the gods themselves; that there are none, but such as are blinde, but are touched with it. *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cesar*, three great Commanders, haue made great vse thereof in their greatest affaires, yea *Scipio* the best of them all. *Faire* and good are neere neighbours, and are expressed by the selfe same words both in *Greeke* and in the Scriptures. Many great Philosophers haue attained to their wisdom, by the assistance of their beauty. It is likewise considerable and much required in beasts themselves.

There are in Beauty diuers things to be considered: That of men is properly the forme and feature of the bodie, as for other

other beauties they belong vnto women. There are two sorts of beauties, the one settled which moueth not at all, and it consisteth in the due proportion and colour of the members, a body that is not swolne or puffed vp, wherein the finewes and veines appeare not from far, nor the bones presse not the skin, but full of bloud and spirits, and in good state, hauing the muscles eleuated, the skin smooth, the colour vermillion: the other moueable, which is called a good grace, and is the true guiding or cariage of the motion of the members, and aboue all, the eyes. The former beauty of it selfe is as it were dead, this actiue and full of life. There are beauties that are rude, fierce, sowre, others that are sweet, yea though they be fading.

4
Of the vi-
sage.

Beauty is properly to be considered in the visage. There is nothing more beautifull in man than his soule; and in the body of man than his visage, which is as it were the soule abreuiated, that is, the paterne or image of the soule, that is, her Escuchion with many quarters, representing the collection of all her titles of honour, planted and placed in the gate and forefront, to the end that men may know that heere is her abode and her palace. By the countenance it is that we know the person of a man; and therefore arte which imitateth nature, takes no care to represent the person of man, but only to paint or carue the visage.

5
Seuen singu-
larities in
the visage
of man.

1

2

3

4

There are many speciall singularities in the visage of man, which are not in beasts (for to say the truth they haue no visage) nor in the rest of the body of man; As the number and diuersitie of the parts and formes of them, in beasts there is neither chin, nor cheeks, nor forehead, much lesse any forme or fashion of them. Variety of colours, as in the eye onely there is blacke, white, Greene, blew, red, cristalline. Proportion, for the senses are there double, answering the one to the other, and in such a maner, that the greatnesse of the eye is the greatnesse of the mouth, the largenesse of the forehead the length of the nose, the length of the nose that of the chin and lips. An admirable diuersitie of countenances, and such, that there are hardly found two faces in all respects like one another: this is a chiefe point of workmanship, which in no other thing can be found. This variety is very profitable,

yea

yea necessary for humane society ; first to know one another, for infinite euils , yea the dissipation of humane kinde must needs follow , if a man should mistake himselfe by the semblance and similitude of diuers visages , yea it would be a confusion worse than that of *Babel*. A man would take his daughter for his sister, for a stranger, his enemy for his friend. If our faces were all alike, we should not discerne a man from a beast ; and if they were not all vnlike one another, we could not know how to discerne a man from a man. Besides, it was an excellent arte of Nature to place in this part some secret that might giue contentment to one another thorow the whole world : for by reason of this varietie of faces, there is not a person that in some part is not beautifull. The dignity and honour of it round figure , forme vpright and eleuated on high, naked and vncovered without haire, feathers, scales, as in other creatures, looking vp vnto heauen. Grace, sweetnesse, a pleasant and decent comlineesse, euen to the giuing vp of a mans *Soule* , and the rauishing of his will, as hath beene shewed before. To be brieft, the visage is the throne of beautie and loue ; the seat of laughter and kissing, two things very proper and agreeable vnto man, the true and most significant symboles of amitie and good discretion. Finally, it is apt for all alterations , to declare the inward motions and passions of the soule, as Ioy, Heauinesse, Loue, Hatred, Enuie, Malice, Shame, choler, Iealousie, & so forth. It is as the hand of a diall, which noteth the houres and moments of time, the wheelles and motions themselues being hid within. And as the aire which receiueth all the colours & changes of the time, sheweth what the weather is, so saith one, the aire of a mans countenance. *Corpus animum tegit & detegit, in facie legitur homo.*

The beauty of the face consisteth in a large, square, well extended and cleere front, eye-browes well ranged, thin and subtile, the eye well diuided, cheerefull, sparkling : as for the colour I leaue it doubtfull, the nose leane, the mouth little, the lips coralline, the chinne short and dimpled, the cheekes somewhat rising and in the middle the pleasant *gelasin*, the eares round and well compact , the whole countenance with a liuely tincture white and vermillion. Neuerthelesse, this description of Beauty is not generally receiued, the opinions

of Beauty are different according to the diuersity of nations. With the Indians the greatest Beautie consisteth in that which we account the greatest deformitie, that is, in a tawny colour, thicke and swollen lips, a flat and large nose, teeth spotted with blacke or red, great eares and hanging, a little low forehead, dugs great and pendant, to the end they may giue their little ones sucke ouer their shoulders, and to attaine to this forme of beautie, they vse all maner of arte. But not to wander so farre, in *Spaine* the chiefeft beautie is leane and neatly compt; in *Italie* fat, corpulent and solid: the soft, and delicate, and flattering please the one; the strong, vigorous, fierce, and commanding the other.

7
The beautie
of the soule
and body.

The Beauty of the body, especially the visage, should in all reason demonstrate and witnesse the beauty of the soule, (which is a qualitie and rule of opinions and iudgements, with a certaine stedfastnesse and constancie) for there is nothing that hath a truer resemblance, than the conformity and relation of the body to the spirit: and when this is not, wee must needs thinke, that there is some accident that hath interrupted the ordinary course, as it comes to passe, and wee often times see it: for the milke of the Nurse, the first institution, conuersation bring great alterations to the originall nature of the soule, whether in good or euill. *Socrates* confessed that the deformitie of his bodie did iustly accuse the naturall deformitie of his soule, but that by industrie and institution he had corrected that of the soule. This outward countenance is a weake and dangerous suretie, but they that belie their owne physiognomie, are rather to be punished than others, because they falsifie and betray that good promise that Nature hath planted in their front, and deceiue the world.

CHAP. VI.

Of the vestments of the Bodie.

Nakednesse
is naturall.

There is great likelihood that the custome or fashion of going naked, as yet continued in a great part of the world, was the first and originall amongst men, and that of couering and adorning the bodie with garments was artificiall, and inuented to helpe and inlarge nature, as they which
by

by artificiall light goe about to increase the light of the day : for Nature hauing sufficiently prouided for all other creatures a couering, it is not to be beleeued that she hath handled man worse than the rest, and left him only indigent, and in such a state that he could not helpe himselfe without forren succours, and therefore those reproches that are made against Nature as a stepmother, are vniust. If men from the beginning had beene clothed, it is not likely that they would euer haue disrobed themselues and gone naked, both in regard of their health, which could not but be much offended with that change, and shame it selfe : and neuerthelesse, it is done and obserued amongst many nations. Neither can it be alledged that we clothe our selues either to couer our nakednesse or priuy parts, or to defend vs against colde (for these are the two reasons pretended; for against heat there is no appearance of reason) because Nature hath not taught vs, that there is any thing in our nakednesse that we should be ashamed of; it is we that by our owne fault and fale haue tolde it our selues : *Quis indicauit tibi quod nudus esses, nisi quod ex ligno quod praeceperam tibi ne comederes comedisti* : and Nature hath already sufficiently hid them, put them farre from our eies, and couered them. And therefore it is lesse needfull to couer those parts only, as some doe in those countreys where they goe all naked, and ordinarily are not couered : for why should he that is the lord of all other creatures, not daring to shew himselfe naked vnto the world, hide himselfe vnder the spoiles of another, nay adorne himselfe ? As for colde and other particular and locall necessities, wee know that vnder the selfe same aire, the selfe same heauen, one goes naked, another apparelled; and we haue all the most delicate part vncovered : and therefore a wandring person being asked, How he could go so naked in Winter, answered, That our faces are alwayes naked, and he was all face : Yea, many great personages haue euer gone with their heads vncovered, *Massinissa, Caesar, Hannibal, Seuerus*, and many nations there are, which go to the warres and fight all naked : and the counsell that *Plato* giueth for the continuance of health is, neuer to couer either head or feet. And *Varro* sayth, That when it was first ordained that men should vncover their heads in the

presence of the gods and of the magistrate, that it was rather for healths sake, and to harden themselves against the iniuries of the times, than for reuerence. Lastly, the inuention of couers and houses against the iniuries of heauen and men, is more ancient, more naturall, more vniuersall, than of garments, and common with many creatures, but an industrious search for victuall more naturall than either. Of the vse of garmens and aliment heercafter.

Lib.3.c.43.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Soule in generall.

The Preface.

BEholde here a matter of all others most difficult, handled and discoursed by the wisest of all Nations, especially *Egyptians, Greeks, Arabians* and *Latines*, by our latter Writers more shallowly as all other Philosophy, but with great diuersitie of opinions, according to the diuersitie of Nations, Religions, Professions, without any certaine accord or resolution. The generall knowledge and discourse thereof may be referred to these ten points: The Definition, Essence or Nature, Faculties and Actions, Vnitie or Pluralitie, Source, Entrance into the bodie, Residence therein, Seat, Sufficiencie to exercise her functions, the End and Separation from the bodie.

I
The Definition
is
difficult.

It is first very hard to define, or truly to say what the soule is, as generally all other formes because they are things relative which subsist not of themselves, but are parts of a whole: and this is the reason why there is such and so great diuersity of definitions of them, whereof there is not any receiued without contradiction. *Aristotle* hath confuted twelue that were before him, and could hardly make good his owne.

2
Easie to say
what it is
not.

It is easie to say what it is not: That it is not *Fire*, *Aire*, *Water*; Nor the temperature of the foure Elements, or qualities, or humors, which is alwaies changeable, without which a creature is and liues; and besides that, this is an accident, the *Soule* a substance. Againe, Mettals and things inanimate haue likewise a temperature of the foure Elements and first qualities. Neither is it blood, (for there are many things animate and liuing without blood, and many creatures die without the shedding of a drop of blood.) Nor the beginning and
cause

cause of motion (for diuers things inanimate moue, as the adamant moues the iron, amber or iet straw; medicins and roots of trees being cut and dried draw and moue.) Neither is it the act, or life, or *Enargie*, or perfection (for that word *Entelechia* is diuersly taken and interpreted) of a liuing body: for all this is but the effect or action of the *Soule*, and not the *Soule* it selfe, as to liue, to see, to vnderstand is the action of the *Soule*. And it would likewise follow, that the *Soule* should be an accident not a substance, and could not subsist without that bodie whereof it is the act and perfection, no more than the couer of an house may be without the house, and a relative without his correlative. To be brieft, it is to say what the soule doth and is to another, not what it is in it selfe.

But to say what the *Soule* is, is very difficult: A man may simply say that it is an essentiall quickning forme, which giueth to the plant the vegetatiue or growing life; to a beast a sensible life, which comprehendeth the vegetatiue; to a man an intellectuall life, which comprehendeth the other two, as in numbers the greater conteines the lesse, and in figures the *Pentagone* conteines the *Tetragone*, & this the *Trigone*. I call it the intellectuall soule rather than the reasonable, which is comprehended in the intellectuall as the lesse in the great: for the reasonable in some sense and measure, according to the opinion of the greatest Philosophers and experience it selfe, is likewise in beasts; but not the intellectuall as being more high. *Sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus*. The *Soule* then is not the beginning or source, that word doth properly belong to the soueraigne first author, but an inward cause of life, motion, sense, vnderstanding. It moueth the body, & it selfe is not moued; as contrarily, the body is moued, and moueth not at al: it moueth I say the body, & not it selfe, for nothing but God moueth it selfe; and whatsoeuer moueth it selfe is eternall and Lord of it selfe: and in that it moueth the bodie it hath it not of it selfe, but from an higher cause.

Concerning the nature and essence of the *Soule*, I meane a humane *Soule* (for the *Soule* of a beast is without all doubt corporall, materiall, bred and borne with the matter, and with it corruptible) there is a question of greater importance than it seemeth: for some affirme it to be corporall, some in-

In homil. 1.
de spir. l. 3.
de lib. arb.
Hom. de
Epith.

corporall : and this is very agreeable to reason, if a man be not opinatiue. That it is corporall, see what the grounds are, *Spirits* and *Diuels*, good and ill, which are wholly separated from all matter are corporall, according to the opinion of all Philosophers and our greatest Diuines, *Tertullian*, *Origen*, *S. Basil*, *Gregorie*, *Augustine*, *Damasce*; how much more the *Soule* of man, which hath societic and is vnited to a matter : Their resolution is, that whatsoeuer is created, being compared vnto God, is grosse, corporall, materiall, and only God is incorporall ; that euery spirit is a bodie and hath a bodily nature. Next vnto authoritie almost vniuersall the reason is irrefragable. Whatsoeuer is included in this finite world is finite, limited both in vertue and substance, bounded with a superficies, inclosed and circumscribed in a place, which are the true and naturall conditions of a bodie : for there is nothing but a bodie which hath a superficiall part, and is barred and fastened in a place. God only is wholly infinite, incorporall, the ordinarie distinctions, *circumscrip*tiue, *definit*ive, *effect*ive, are but verball, and in nothing either helpe or hurt the cause : for it alwayes stands good that spirits are in such sort in a place, that at the selfe same time that they are in a place they can not be elsewhere; and they are not in a place either infinite, or very great, or very little, but equall to their limited and finited substance and superficies. And if it were not so, spirits could not change their place, nor ascend or descend, as the Scripture affirmeth that they doe : and so they should be immouable, indiuisible, indifferently in all. Now if it appeare that they change their place, the change conuicteth that they are moueable, diuisible, subiect vnto time and to the succession thereof, required in the motion and passage from one place to another, which are all the qualities of a bodie. But because many simple men vnder this word corporall, do imagine visible, palpable, and thinke not that the pure aire, or fire without the flame or coale are bodies, haue therefore likewise affirmed, That spirits both separated and humane are not corporall, as in trueth they are not in that sense : for they are of an inuisible substance, whether airie as the greatest part of Philosophers and Diuines affirm, or celestiall as some *Hebremes* and *Arabiques* teach, calling
by

by the selfe same name both the heauen and the spirit an essence proper to immortalitie; or whether (if they will haue it so) of a substance more subtile and delicate, yet they are alwayes corporall, since limited by place, moouable, subiect to motion and to times. Finally, if they were not corporall, they should not be passible and capable of suffering as they are: the humane receiueth from his bodie pleasure and displeasure, sorrow and delight in his turne, as the bodie from the spirit and his passions many good qualities, many bad, vertues, vices, affections, which are all accidents: and all as well the spirits separated and Diuels, as humane, are subiect to punishment and torments. They are therefore corporall: for there is nothing passible, that is not corporall, and it is only proper vnto bodies to be subiect to accidents.

Now the *Soule* hath a great number of vertues and faculties, as many almost as the body hath members: There are ³ *The faculties and actions of the Soule.* some in plants, more in beasts, most in man, to know, to liue, to feele, to mooue, to desire, to allure, to assemble, to retaine, to concoct, to digest, to nourish, to grow, to reiect, to see, to heare, to taste, to smell, to speake, to breath, to ingender, to thinke, to reason, to contemplate, to consent, dissent, to remember, iudge; all which are no parts of the *Soule*: for so it should be diuisible, and should consist vpon accidents, but they are her naturall qualities. The actions come after and follow the faculties, and so there are three degrees, according to the doctrine of great *S. Denys* followed of all, that is, we must consider in spirituall creatures three things, *Essence, Facultie, Operation*: By the latter which is the action we know the facultie, and by it the essence. The actions may be hindered and wholly cease without any preiudice at all vnto the soule, and her faculties, as the *Science* and facultie of Painting remaineth entire in the Painter, although his hands be bound, and so be made vnable to paint: But if the faculties themselves perish, the *Soule* must needs be gone, no otherwise then *Fire* is no longer fire hauing lost the facultie of warming.

The essence and nature of the *Soule* being after a sort explicated, one of the busiest questions that belongeth vnto the *Soule* offereth it selfe to our consideration, that is, whether ^{*The vnitie of the soule.*} there

there be in a creature especially in man one soule or manie? Touching which point there are diuers opinions, but may be reduced into three. Some of the *Greekes*, and almost all the *Arabiques* imitating them, haue thought (not onely in euery particular man, but generally in all men) that there was but one immortall *Soule*. The *Egyptians* for the most part held an opinion quite contrarie, that there was a pluralitie of soules in euery creature, all diuers and distinct, two in euery beaſt, and three in man, two mortal, the vegetatiue & sensible, and the third intellectuall, immortall. The third opinion as the meane betwixt the two former, and most followed, being held by many of all nations is, that there is but one *Soule* in euery creature, not more. In euery of these opinions there is some difficultie. I leaue the first as being already sufficiently confuted and reiected. The pluralitie of soules in euery creature and man, on the one side seemeth verie strange and absurd in Philosophie, for that were to giue many formes to one and the same thing, and to say that there are many substances and subiects in one, two beaſts in one, three men in one; on the other side it giueth credit and helpeth much our beleefe touching the immortalitie of the intellectuall *Soule*; for there being three soules, there can follow no inconuenience, that two of them should die, and the third continue immortall. The vnitie of the *Soule* seemeth to resist the immortalitie thereof; for how can one and the same indiuisible, be in a mortall part and an immortall? as neuerthelesse *Aristotle* would haue it. Doubtlesse it seemeth that of necessitie the *Soule* must be either altogether mortall, or altogether immortall, which are two very foule absurdities. The first aboliseth all religion and sound Philosophie: the second maketh beaſts likewise immortall. Neuerthelesse it seemes to be more true that there is but one *Soule* in euery creature, for the pluralitie and diuersitie of faculties, instruments, actions, neither derogateth any thing at all, nor multiplieth in any thing this vnitie; no more than the diuersitie of riuers the vnitie of one spring or fountaine, nor the diuersitie of effects in the Sunne, to heat, to enlighten, to melt, to drie, to whiten, to make blacke, do dissipate the vnitie and simplicitie of the Sunne; for should they, there would be a great number

number of soules in one man and Sunnes in one world. Neither doth this essentiall vnitie of the *Soule* any thing hinder the immortalitie of the humane *Soule* in her essence, notwithstanding the vegetatiue and sensitiue faculties, which are but accidents, die, that is to say, cannot be exercised without the body, the *Soule* not hauing a subiect or instrument whereby to doe it, but the third intellectuall *Soule* is alwaies well, because for it there is no need of the bodie, though whilest it is within it, it make vse thereof to exercise it selfe; insomuch that if it did returne vnto the bodie, it were onely againe to exercise hir vegetatiue and sensitiue faculties, as we see in those that are raised vnto life to liue heere below, not in those that are raised to liue elsewhere, for such bodies need not to liue by the exercise of such faculties: Euen as there is no want or decay in the Sunne, but it continueth in it selfe wholly the same, though during a whole ecclips it neither shine nor warme, nor performe his other effects in those places that are subiect vnto it.

Hauing shewed the vnitie of the soule in euery subiect, let *The source*
vs see from whence it commeth, and how it entreth into the *of the soule.*
body. The originall beginning of soules is not held to be the same of all, I meane of humane soules; for the vegetatiue and sensitiue, of Plants and Beasts, is by the opinion of all, altogether materiall, and in the seed, for which cause it is likewise mortall. But concerning the *Soule* of man there are foure celebrated opinions. According to the first which is of the *Stoicks*, held by *Philo Iudeus*, and afterward by the *Maniches*, *Priscilianists*, and others, it is transferred and brought foorth as a part or parcell of the substance of God, who inspireth it into the bodie, alleaging to their best aduantage the words of *Moyse*, *Inspirauit in faciem eius spiraculum vite*. The second opinion, held by *Tertullian*, *Apollinaris*, the *Luciferians* and other Christians, affirmeth that the *Soule* proceedeth and is deriued from the soules of our parents with the seed, as the *Soule* of a beast. The third opinion which is that of the *Pythagorians* and *Platonists* held by many *Rabins* and Doctors of the Iewes, and afterwards by *Origen* and other Doctors, teacheth that the soules of men haue beene from the beginning all created of God, made of nothing and reserved.

referred in heaven, afterwards to be sent into the lower parts, as need should require, and that the bodies of men are formed and disposed to receive them; and from hence did spring the opinion of those that thought that the soules of men heere below, were either well or ill handled, and lodged in bodies either sound or sicke, according to that life which they hadled aboue in heaven, before they were incorporate. And truly the master of Wisdome himselfe sheweth, that the *Soule*, of the two, was the elder, and before the bodie, *Ex am puer, bonam indolem sortitus, imo bonus cum essem, corpus incontaminatum reperi.* The fourth opinion received and held through all Christendome is, that they are all created of God, and infused into bodies prepared, in such maner that the creation and infusion is done at one and the same instant. These foure opinions are all affirmatiue, but there is a fift much reteined which determineth nothing, and is content to say, that it is a secret vnknewen vnto men; of which opinion was *S. Austin, Greg.* and others, who neuerthelesse thought the two latter affirmatiue opinions more like to be true than the former.

De orig.
Epl. 28.
157.

6
The entrance
of the soule
into the bo-
die.

Let vs now see when and how the *Soule* entreth into the bodie, whether altogether at one instant, or successiuelly; I meane the humane *Soule*: for of that of a beast there is no doubt, since it is naturall in the seed, according to *Aristotle* (whom most do follow) that is by succession of times and by degrees, as an artificiall forme which a man maketh by pieces, the one after the other; the head, afterwards the throat, the bellie, the legs: infomuch that the vegetatiue and sensitiue *Soule* altogether materiall and corporall, is in the seed, and with the descent of the parents, which fashioneth the bodie in the matrix: and that done, the reasonable *Soule* arriueth from without. And therefore there are neither two nor three soules; neither together nor successiuelly, neither is the vegetatiue corrupted by the arriual of the sensitiue, nor the sensitiue by the arriual of the intellectuall; but it is but one *Soule* which is made, finished and perfected in that time which nature hath prescribed. Others are of opinion, that the soule entreth with all her faculties at one instant, that is to say then, when all the bodie is furnished with organs, formed, and wholly

wholly finished, and that vntill then there was no *Soule*, but only a naturall vertue and *Enargie*, an essentiall forme of the seed, which working by the spirits which are in the sayd seed, with the heat of the matrix and materiall blood, as with instruments, do forme and build vp the body, prepare all the members, nourish, mooue, and increasethem: which being done, this *Enargie* and seminall forme vanislieth, and is quite lost, so that the seed ceaseth to be seed, losing it forme, by the affriuall of another more noble, which is the humane *Soule*, which causeth that which was seed, or an *Embryon*, that is, a substance without shape, to be no longer seed but a man.

The *Soule* being entred into the bodie, we are likewise to know what kinde of existence therein it hath, and how it is there resident. ⁷ Some Philosophers not knowing what to say, *The resi-* or how to ioyne and vnite the *Soule* with the bodie, make it *dence of the* to abide and reside therein, as a Master in his house, a Pilot in his ship, a Coach-man in his coach: but this were to destroy all, for so the *Soule* should not be the forme, nor inward and essentiall part of a creature, or of a man, it should haue no need of the members of the bodie to abide there, nor any feeling at all of the contagion of the bodie, but it should be a substance wholly distinct from the bodie, of it selfe subsisting, which at it pleasure might come and goe, and separate it selfe from the body, without the distinction, and diminution of all the functions thereof, which are all absurdities. The *Soule* is in the bodie as the forme in the matter, extended and spread thorowout the body, giuing life, motion, sense to all the parts thereof, and both of them together make but one *Hypostasis*, one intire subiect, which is the creature, and there is no mean or middle that doth vnite and knit them together: for betwixt the matter and the forme, there is no middle, according to all Philosophie. The *Soule* then is all, in all the bodie; I adde not (though it be commonly sayd) and all in euery part of the bodie: for that imp'iet a contradiction, and diuideth the *Soule*. *Soule in the Bodie.*

Now notwithstanding the *Soule*, as it is sayd, be diffused and spread thorow the whole bodie, yet neuerthelesse, to excite and exercise it faculties, it is more specially and expressely ⁸ in some parts of the bodie, than in others; in which it is sayd *The seat & instruments of the soule.* to

to haue place, yet not to be wholly there, lest the rest should be without Soule without forme. And as it hath foure principall and chiefe faculties, so men giue it foure seats, that is, those foure regions, which we haue noted before in the composition of the body, the foure first principall instruments of the soule, the rest referre themselues vnto them, as also all the faculties to these, that is to say, the engendring faculty to the ingendring parts, the naturall to the liuer, the vitall to the heart, the animall and intellectuall to the braine.

9
The suffici-
ency of the
Soule for the
exercise of
hir faculties.

We are now come to speake in generall of the exercise of the faculties of the *Soule*, whereunto the soule of it selfe is wise and sufficient, insomuch that it faileth not to produce that which it knoweth, & to exercise it functions, as it ought, if it be not hindered, and that the instruments thereof be well disposed. And therefore it was well and truly said of the wise, that Nature is wise, discreet, industrious, a sufficient mistrisse which maketh a man apt to all things: *In sita sunt nobis omnium artium, ac virtutum semina, magisterque ex occulto Deus producit ingenium*: which is easily shewed by induction. The vegetatiue soule without instruction formeth the body in the matrix with excellent arte, afterwards it nourisheth it, and makes it grow, drawing the victuall vnto it, retaining and concocting it, afterwards casting out the excrements, it ingendreth and reformeth the parts that faile; these are things that are seene in plants, beasts, and men. The sensitiue Soule of it selfe without instruction, maketh both beasts and men to moue their feet, their hands, and other members, to stretch, to rub, to shake, to moue the lips, to presse the dug, to crie, to laugh. The reasonable of it selfe, not according to the opinion of *Plato* by the remembrance of that which it knew before it entred into the body, nor according to *Aristotle* by reception and acquisition, comming from without by the senses, being of it selfe, as a white paper void of impression, although that serue to good purpose, but of it selfe without instruction, imagineth, vnderstandeth, retaineth, reasoneth, discourseth. But because this of the reasonable *Soule* seemeth to be more difficult than the other, and woundeth in some sort *Aristotle* himselfe, it shall be handled again in his place, in the discourse of the intellectuall *Soule*.

It remaineth that wee speake of the last point, that is, of the separation of the *Soule* from the body, which is after a diuers sort and maner; the one, and the ordinarie is naturall by death, and this not the same in beasts and men: for by the death of beasts, the *Soule* dieth, and is annihilated, according vnto that rule, by the corruption of the subiect the forme perissheth, the matter remaineth: by the death of man the *Soule* is separated from the body, but is not lost, but remaineth in as much as it is immortall.

10

The separation of the body two-fold.

1. Naturall and ordinarie.

The immortalitie of the *Soule* is a thing vniuersally, religiously, (for it is the principall foundation of all religion) and peaceably receiued and concluded vpon throughout the world, I meane by an outward and publique profession; seriously and inwardly, not so, witnesse so many Epicures, Libertines, and mockers in the world: yea the *Saduces*, the greatest Lordes of the Iewes, did not sticke with open mouth to denie it; though a thing profitable to be beleueed, and in some sort proued by many naturall and humane reasons, but properly and better established by the authority of religion than any other way. It seemeth that there is in a man a kinde of inclination and disposition of nature to beleue it, for man desireth naturally to continue and perpetuate his being, from whence likewise proceedeth that great, yea furious care and loue of our posterity and succession. Again two things there are that giue strength thereunto, and make it more plausible, the one is the hope of glory and reputation, and the desire of the immortalitie of our name, which how vaine soeuer it be, carrieth a great credit in the world: the other is an impression, that vice which robbeth a man of the view and knowledge of humane iustice, remaining alwaies opposite to the diuine iustice, must thereby be chastised, yea after death: so that besides that a man is altogether carried and disposed by nature to desire it, and consequently to beleue it, the Iustice of God doth conclude it.

2. The immortalitie of the Soule.

From hence we are to learne that there are three differences and degrees of *Soules*, an order required euen to the perfection of the vniuerse. Two extreames, the one is that which being altogether materiall, is plunged, and ouerwhelmed in the matter, and inseparable from it, and therewithall corruptible,

3

The proofes.

corruptible, which is the *Soule* of a beast : the other quite contrary, is that which hath not any commerce, or societie with the matter or body, as the soule of immortall Angels or Diuels. In the middle as the meane betwixt these two, is the humane soule, which is neither wholly tied to the matter, nor altogether without it, but is ioyned with it, and may likewise subsist and liue without it. This order and distinction is an excellent argument of immortalitie; for it were a *vacuum*, a defect, a deformitie too absurd in nature, dishonourable to the authour, and a kinde of ruine to the world, that betwixt two extreames, the corruptible and incorruptible, there should be no middle; that is, partly the one and partly the other : there must needs be one that ties and ioynes the two ends or extreames together, and that can be none but man. Below the lowest and wholly materiall, is that which hath no *Soule* at all, as stones; aboue the highest and immortall, is the eternall only God.

4
2. Not natural.

The other separation not natural nor ordinary, and which is done by strange impulsions and at times, is very difficult to vnderstand, and perplex. It is that which is done by extasies and rauishments, which is diuers and done by different meanes : for there is a separation that is diuine, such as the Scripture reporteth vnto vs, of *Daniel, Zachary, Esdras, Ezechiel, S. Paul*. There is another that is demoniacall, procured by diuels, and good spirits and bad, as we reade of many, as of *John D'uns*, called *Lescot*, who being in his extasie a long time held for dead, was carried into the aire, and cast downe vpon the earth; but so soone as he felt the blow that he receiued by the fall, he came to himselfe : but by reason of the great store of blood which he lost, his head being broken, he died outright. *Cardan* telleth it of himselfe, and of his father, and it continueth autentiquely verified in many and diuers parts of the world, of many, and those for the most part of the vulgar sort, weake and women possessed, whose bodies remaine not only without motion, and the beating of the heart and arteries, but also without any sense or feeling of the greatest blowes, either with iron or fire, that could be giuen them, and afterwards their soules being returned they haue felt great paine in their limmes, and recounted that

which

which they haue seene and done in places far distant. Thirdly, there is a humane separation, which proceedeth either from that maladie which *Hipocrates* calleth *Sacer*, commonly called The falling sicknes, *Morbus comitialis*, the signe whereof is a foaming at the mouth, which is not in those that are possessed; but instead thereof they haue a stinking sauor, or it is occasioned by stiptickes, stupifying and benumbing medicines; or ariseth from the force of imagination, which enforcing and bending it selfe with too deepe an attention about a thing, carrieth away the whole strength and power of the Soule. Now in these three kindes of extasies or rauishments, *Diuine*, *Diabolicall*, *Humane*, the question is, Whether the Soule be truely and really separated from the body; or if remaining in it, it be in such sort employed and busied about some outward thing which is forth of the bodie, that it forgetteth it owne bodie; whereby followeth a kinde of intermission and vacation of the actions and exercise of the functions thereof. Touching the diuine extasie, the *Apostle* speaking of himselfe and his owne act; dares not define any thing, *Si in corpore vel extra corpus nescio, Deus scit*. An instruction that may serue for all others, and for other separations of lesse qualitie. Touching the *Demoniacall* extasie, as not to feele a blow be it neuer so great, to report what hath been done two or three hundred leagues off, are two great and violent coniectures of a true separation from the bodie, but not altogether necessarie: for the diuell can so alienate and occupie the soule within the body, that it shall not seeme to haue any action or commerce with the bodie for some certaine time, and in that time so besotteth the soule by presenting things vnto the imagination that haue beene done a farre off, that a man may speake and discourse thereof: for to affirme that certainly the Soule doth wholly depart and abandon the bodie, Nature is too bolde and foole-hardie: to say that it doth not wholly depart, but that the imaginative or intellectuall is carried out, and that the vegetatiue soule remaineth, were more to intangle our selues; for so the Soule in it essence should be diuided, or the accident only should be carried out, and not the substance. Touching the humane extasie, doubtlesse there is no separation of the Soule, but only a suspension

sion of the patent and outward actions thereof.

II
The estate
of the Soule
after death.

What becomes of the *Soule*, and what the state thereof is after the naturall separation by death, diuers men thinke diuersly: and this point belongeth not to the subiect of this booke. The *Metempsychose* and transanimation of *Pythagoras* hath in some sort been embraced by the *Academicks*, *Stoicks*, *Egyptians*, and others; but yet not of all in the same sense: for some doe admit it only for the punishment of the wicked, as we reade of *Nebuchadnezzar*, who was changed into a beast by the iudgement of God. Others, and some great, haue thought that good soules, being separated, become Angels, the wicked, Diuels. It had beene more pleasing to haue sayd Like vnto them; *Non nubent, sed erant sicut Angeli*. Some haue affirmed, that the soules of the wicked, at the end of a certaine time, were reduced to nothing. But the trueth of all this we must learne from Religion and Diuines, who speake heereof more cleerely.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Soule in particular; and first of the vegetatiue facultie.

I
The faculties of the Soule.

AFTER this generall description of the *Soule*, in these ten points we must speake thereof more particularly, according to the order of the faculties thereof, beginning at the basest, that is, the Vegetatiue, Sensitiue, Apprehensible or Imaginatiue, Appetible, Intellectiue, which is the soueraign *Soule* and truly humane. Vnder euery one of these there are diuers others which are subiect vnto them, and as parts of them, as we shall see, handling them in their ranke.

2
Of the vegetable & her subalternals.

Of the vegetable and basest *Soule*, which is euen in plants, I will not speake much; it is the proper subiect of Physitians, of health and sicknesse. Let me only say, that vnder this there are contained other three great faculties, which follow one the other: for the first serueth the second, and the second the third; but the third neither of the former. The first then is the nourishing facultie, for the conseruation of the *Individuum* or particular person, which diuers others doe serue, as the *Attractive* of the victuall, the *Concoctiue*, the *Digestiue*, separating

separating the good & proper, from the naught and hurtfull; the *Retentive* and the *Expulsive* of superfluities: The second, the increasing or growing facultie, for the perfection and due quantitie of the *Individuum*: The third, is the *Generative*, for the conseruation of the kinde. Whereby we see, that the two first are for the *Individuum*, and worke within in the bodie; the third is for the kinde, and hath it effect and operation without in another bodie, and therefore is more worthy than the other, and commeth neerer to a faculty more high, which is the *Sensitive*. This is a great height of perfection, to make another thing like it selfe.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Sensitive facultie.

IN the exercise of this facultie and function of the Senses these six things do concur, whereof foure are within and two without. That is to say, the *Soule*, as the first efficient cause. The facultie of *Sense* (which is a qualitie of the *Soule*, and not the *Soule* it selfe) that is, of perceiuing and apprehending outward things; which is done after a fiue-folde maner, which we call *The fiue Senses* (of this number we shall speake hereafter) that is to say, *Hearing, Seeing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching*. The corporall instrument of the *Sense*, whereof there are fiue, according to the number of the *Senses*; the Eye, the Eare, the high concauitie of the Nose, which is the entrance to the first ventricles of the braine, the Tongue, the whole Skin of the bodie. The *Spirit* which ariseth from the braine the fountaine of the sensitive *Soule*, by certaine sinewes in the sayd instruments, by which spirit and instrument the soule exerciseth her facultie. The *sensible Species*, or obiekt offered vnto the instruments, which is different according to the diuersitie of the sense. The obiekt of the eye or sight according to the common opinion is colour, which is an adherent quality in bodies, whereof there are six simple, as White, Yellow, Red, Purple, Greene and Blew; some adde a seuenth, which is blacke; but to say the trueth, that is no colour, but a priuation, being like vnto darkenesse, as the other colours more or lesse vnto the light. Of compound colours the number

Six things
required to
the exercise
of this fa-
cultie.

1

2

3

4

5

ber is infinite : but to speake more truely , the true obiect is light, which is neuer without colour, and without which the colours are inuisible. Now the light is a qualitie which cometh forth of a luminous body, which makes both it selfe visible and all things els ; and if it be terminated and limited by some solide bodie , it reboundeth and redoubleth it beames : otherwise if it passe without any stop or termination , it can not be seene except it be in the root of that light or luminous bodie from whence it came , nor make any thing els to be seene. Of the Eare or Hearing , the obiect is a sound, which is a noise proceeding from the encounter of two bodies , and it is diuers : the pleasant and melodious sweeteneth and appeaseth the spirit , and for it sake the bodie too, and driues away maladies from them both : the sharpe and penetrant doth contrariwise trouble and wound the spirit. Of Tasting, the obiect is a fauour or smacke, whereof there are six diuers simple kindes, *Sweet, Sawre, Sharpe, Tart, Salt, Butter* ; but there are many compounds. Of Smell, the obiect is an odour or sent, which is a fume rising from an odoriferous obiect ascending by the nose to the first ventricles of the braine : the strong and violent hurteth the braine, as an ill sound the eare : the temperate and good doth contrariwise reioyce, delight and comfort. Of the sense of Touching , the obiect is heat, colde, drouth, moisture either pleasant and polite, or sharpe and smarting, motion, rest, tickling.

6 The middle or space betwixt the obiect and the instrument, which is the Aire neither altered nor corrupted, but such as it ought to be.

2 So that sense is made, when the sensible species presenteth it selfe by the middle to an instrument sound and well disposed, and that therein the spirit assisting, receiueth it and apprehendeth it in such sort, that there is there both action and passion ; and the senses are not purely passiue : for notwithstanding they receiue, and are stricken by the obiect, yet neuerthelesse in some sense and measure they doe worke or react in apprehending the species and image of the obiect proposed.

3 In former times and before *Aristotle* , they did make a difference betwixt the sense of *Seeing* and the rest of the senses, and

and they all held, that the sight was active, and was made by emitting or sending forth of the eye, the beames thereof vnto the outward objects, and that the other senses were passive, receiving the sensible object: but after *Aristotle*, they are made all alike, and all passive, receiving in the organ or instrument, the kinds and images of things, and the reasons of the Ancients to the contrary are easily answered. There is more and more excellent matter to be delivered of the senses hereafter.

Now besides these five particular senses which are without, there is within, the common sense; where all the diuers objects apprehended by it, are assembled and gathered together, to the end they may afterward be compared, distinguished, and discerned the one from the other, which the particular senses could not doe, being euery one attentive to his proper object, and not able to take knowledge thereof, of his companion.

CHAP. X.

Of the senses of Nature.

ALL knowledge is begun in vs by the senses; so say our Schoole-men: but it is not altogether true, as we shall see heereafter. They are our first masters: it beginneth by them, and endeth with them: they are the beginning and end of all. It is not possible to recoil farther backe: euery one of them is a captaine and soueraigne lord in his order, and hath a great command, carrying with it infinite knowledges. The one dependeth not, or hath need of the other, so are they equally great, although the one haue a farre greater extent, and traine, and affaires, than the other, as a little king is as well a soueraigne in his little narrow command, as a great in his great estate.

It is an opinion amongst vs, that there are but five senses of Nature, because wee marke but five in vs; but yet there may very well be more, and it is greatly to be doubted that there are; but it is impossible for vs to know them, to affirme them, or to denie them, because a man shall neuer know the want of that sense which he hath neuer had. There are many

beasts which liue a full and perfect life, which want some one of our fiue senses; and a creature may liue without the fiue senses, saue the sense of *Feeling*, which is only necessary vnto life. We liue very commodiously with fiue, and yet perhaps we do want one, or two, or three, and yet it can not be known. One sense can not discouer another: and if a man want one by nature, yet he knowes not which way to affirme it. A man borne blinde can neuer conceiue that he seeth not, nor desire to see, nor delight in his sight: it may be he will say that he would see, but that is because he hath heard say and learned of others, that it is to be desired: the reason is because the senses are the first gates, and entrances to knowledge. So man not being able to imagine more than the fiue that he hath, he can not know how to iudge whether there be more in Nature; yet he may haue more. Who knoweth whether the difficulties that we finde in many of the works of Nature, and the effects of creatures, which we can not vnderstand, doe proceed from the want of some sense that wee haue not? Of the hidden properties which we see in many things, a man may say that there are sensible faculties in Nature proper to iudge and apprehend them; but yet he must confesse that we haue them not, and that the ignorance of such things proceedeth from our owne default. Who knoweth whether it be some particular sense, that discouereth in the Cocke the houre of mid-night and morning, and that moues him to crow? Who taught some beasts to chuse certaine herbes for their cure, and many such like woonders as these are? No man can affirme or denie, say this it is, or that it is.

3
Their suffi-
ciencie.

Some haue assayed to giue a reason of this number of the fiue senses, and to prooue the sufficiencie of them, by distinguishing and diuersly comparing their outward obiects; which are, either all neere the bodie or distant from it: if neere but yet remaining without, it is the sense of Touching; if they enter, it is Taste; if they be more distant and present by a right line, it is the Sight; if oblique and by reflexion, it is the Hearing. A man might better haue sayd thus, That these fiue senses being appointed for the seruice of an entire man, some are entirely for the bodie, that is to say, *Taste* and *Touching*;

Touching; that, in that it entreth; this, in that it remaines without. Others first and principally for the soule, as sight and hearing: the Sight for inuention, the Hearing for acquisition and communication, and one in the middle, for the middle spirits, and ties of the soule and body, which is the *Smell*. Againe, they answer to the foure Elements, and their qualities: The sense of *Feeling* to the earth; of *Hearing* to the aire; of *Taste* to the water and moisture; the *Smell* to the fire. The *Sight* is a compound, and partakes both of water and fire, by reason of the bright splendor of the eie. Againe they say that there are so many senses, as there are kinds of sensible things, which are colour, sound, odour, taste or saour, and the fift which hath no proper name, the obiekt of *Feeling*, which is heat, cold, rough, plaine, and so foorth. But men deceiue themselves, for the number of the senses is not to be iudged by the number of sensible things, which are no cause that there are so many. By this reason there should bee many more, and one and the same sense should receiue many diuers heads of obieks, and one and the same obiekt be apprehended by diuers senses: so that the tickling of a feather, and the pleasures of *Venus* are distinguished from the fise Senses, and by some comprehended in the sense of *Feeling*: But the cause is rather, for that the spirit hath no power to attaine to the knowledge of things, but by the fise Sences, and that Nature hath giuen it so many, because it was necessary for it end and benefit.

Their comparisens are diuers in dignity and nobility. The *Sense of Seeing* excelleth all the rest in fise things: It apprehendeth farther off, and extendeth it selfe euen to the fixed starres. It hath more variety of obieks, for to all things & generally in all there is light and colour the obieks of the eie. It is more exquisit, exact and particular euen in the least and finest things that are. It is more prompt and sudden, apprehending euen in a moment and without motion, euen the heauens themselves: in the other senses there is a motion that requireth time. It is more diuine, and the markes of Diuinity are many. Liberty incomparable aboue others, whereby the eie seeth, or seeth not, and therefore it hath lids ready to open and to shut: power not to turmoile it selfe, and not to suffer it selfe to bee

4
Comparison.

scene; Actiuitie and abilitie to please or displease, to signifie and insinuate our thoughts, willes and affections: for the eye speaketh and striketh, it serueth for a tongue and a hand; the other Senses are purely passiue. But that which is most noble in this Sense is, that the priuation of the obiekt thereof, which is darknesse, brings feare, and that naturally; and the reason is, because a man findeth himselfe robbed of so excellent a guide: and therefore whereas a man desireth company for his solace, the Sight in the light is in place of companie. The sense of Hearing hath many excellent singularities, it is more spirituall, and the seruice thereof more inward. But the particular comparison of these two, which are of the rest the more noble, and of speech, shall be spoken in the Chapter following. As for pleasure or displeasure, though all the Senses are capable thereof, yet the Sense of Feeling receiueth greatest griefe, and almost no pleasure; and contrarily the Taste great delight, and almost no griefe. In the organ and instrument, the Touch is vniuersall, spread thorow the whole bodie, to the end the bodie should feele heat and colde; the organs of the rest are assigned to a certaine place & member.

5
The weaknesse and
uncertainnesse of the
Senses.

From the weaknesse and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, error and mistakings: for sithens that by their meanes and mixture we attaine to all knowledge, if they deceiue vs in their report, we haue no other helpe to sticke vnto. But who can say, or accuse them, that they do deceiue vs, considering that by them we begin to learne and to know? Some haue affirmed that they do neuer deceiue vs, and when they seeme to doe it, the fault proceedeth from some thing els; and that wee must rather attribute it to any other thing than to the senses. Others haue sayd cleane contrarie, that they are all false, and can teach vs nothing that is certaine. But the middle opinion is the more true.

6
The mutuall
deceit of the
spirit and
senses.

Now whether the Senses be false or not, at the least it is certaine that they deceiue, yea ordinarily enforce the discourse, the reason, and in exchange are againe mocked by it. Do then but consider what kinde of knowledge and certaintie a man may haue, when that within, and that without is full of deceit and weakenesse, and that the principall parts thereof, the essentiall instruments of science do deceiue one another

another. That the senses doe deceiue and enforce the vnderstanding, it is plaine in those senses whereof some do kindle with furie, others delight & sweeten, others tickle the *Soule*. And why doe they that cause themselves to be let blood, lanced, cauterised and burnt, turne away their eies, but that they do well know that great authoritie that the Senses haue ouer their reason? The sight of some bottomlesse depth, or precipitate downfall, astonisheth euen him that is settled in a firme and sure place: and to conclude, doth not the Sense vanquish and quite ouercome all the beautifull resolutions of vertue, and patience? So on the other side, the senses are likewise deceiued by the vnderstanding, which appeareth by this, that the *Soule* being stirred with Choler, Loue, Hatred, or any other passion, our senses doe see, and heare euery thing others then they are, yea sometimes our senses are altogether dilled by the passions of the *Soule*, and it seemeth that the *Soule* retireth and shutteth vp the operation of the Senses, and that the spirit being otherwise employed, the eie discerneth not that which is before it, and which it seeth: yea the sight and the reason iudge diuersly of the greatnesse of the Sunne, the starres, nay of the figure of a staffe any thing distant.

In the Senses of Nature the beasts haue as well part, as we, and sometimes excell vs: for some haue their hearing more quicke than man, some their sight, others their smell, others their taste: and it is held, that in the sense of Hearing, the Hart excelleth all others; of Sight, the Eagle; of Smell, the Dogge; of Taste, the Ape; of Feeling, the Tortois: neuerthelesse, the preheminance of that sense of Touch is giuen vnto man, which of all the rest is the most brutish. Now if the Senses are the meanes to attaine vnto knowledge, and that beasts haue a part therein, yea sometimes the better part, why should not they haue knowledge?

7
The senses
common to
man and
beast, but
diuersly.

But the Senses are not the only instruments of knowledge, neither are our Senses alone to be consulted or beleued: for if beasts by their Senses iudge otherwise of things than we by ours, as doubtlesse they do; who must be beleued? Our spetle cleanseth and drieth our wounds, it killeth the Serpent; What then is the true qualitie of our spetle? To drie and

8
The iudgement of the
Senses hard
and dangerous.

and to cleanse, or to kill? To iudge well of the operation of the senses, we must be at some agreement with the beasts, nay with our selues: for the eie pressed downe and shut, seeth otherwise than in it ordinary state; the eare stopt, receiue the objects otherwise than when it is open: an infant seeth, heareth, tasteth, otherwise than a man; a man than an olde man; a sound than a sicke; a wise than a foole. In this great diuersitie and contrarietie what shall we holde for certaine? Seeing that one sense belieeth another, a picture seemeth to be held vp to the view, and the hands are folded together.

C H A P. X I.

Of Sight, Hearing and Speech.

1
A comparison
of the
three.

THese are the three most rich and excellent iewels of all those that are in this muster, and of whose preheminentie it is disputed. Touching their Organes, that of the Sight in it composition and forme is admirable, and of a liuely and shining beautie, by reason of the great varietie and subtiltie of so many small parts or pieces; and therefore it is sayd that the eye is one of those parts of the bodie which doe first begin to be formed, and the last that is finished: and for this verie cause it is so delicate, and said to be subiect to six score maladies. Afterwards comes that of Speech, which helpeth the sense of Hearing to many great aduantages. For the seruice of the bodie, the Sight is most necessarie, and therefore doth more import a beast than Hearing. But for the spirit, the Hearing challengeth the vpper place. The Sight serueth well for the inuention of things, which by it haue almost all beene discouered, but it bringeth nothing to perfection. Againe, the Sight is not capable but of corporall things and particular, and that only of their crust or superficial part, it is the instrument of ignorant men and vnlearned, *qui monentur ad id quod adest, quodque praesens est.*

2
The preheminentie
of
hearing.

The Eare is a spirituall Sense, it is the Intermedler, and Agent of the vnderstanding, the instrument of wise and spirituall men, capable not only of the secrets and inward parts of particular bodies, whereunto the Sight arriueth not, but also of the generall kindes, and of all spirituall things and diuine,

in

in which the Sight serueth rather to disturbe than to helpe: and therefore we see not only many blinde, great and wise, but some also that are deprived of their sight to become great Philosophers: but of such as are deafe we neuer heard of any. This is the way by which a man entreth the fortresse, and makes himselfe master of the place, and imploiethe his spirit in good or ill; witnesse the wife of King *Agamemnon*, who was contained in her dutie of chastitie by the sound of a Harpe: and *Dauid* by the selfe same meane chased away the euill spirit from *Saul*, and restored him to health: and that skilfull player on the Flute, that sweetned the voice of that great Oratour *Gracchus*. To be brieft, Science, Trueth, and Vertue haue no other entrance into the Soule, but by the Eare: Christianitie it selfe teacheth that faith and saluation cometh by Hearing, and that the Sight doth rather hurt, than helpe thereunto; that faith is the beliefe of those things that are not seene, which beliefe is acquired by hearing; and it calleth such as are apprentices or nouices therein, *Auditors*, *κατακλιμαίους*, catechised. Let me adde this one word, that the Hearing giueth succour and comfort in darknesse, and to such as are asleepe, that by the sound they may be awaked, and so prouide for their preservation. For all these reasons haue the wisest so much commended Hearing, the pure and virgin gardian from all corruption, for the health of the inward man, as for the safetie of a Citie, the gates and walles are garded that the enemy enter not.

Speech is peculiarly giuen vnto man, an excellent present and very necessary, in regard of him from whom it proceedeth: it is the interpreter and image of the soule, *animi index*, *& speculum*, the messenger of the heart, the gate by which all that is within issueth forth, and committeth it selfe to the view, all things come forth of darknesse and secret corners into the light, and the spirit it selfe makes it selfe visible: and therefore an ancient Philosopher said once to a child, Speake that I may see thee, that is to say, the inside of thee. As vessels are known whether they be broken or whole, full or emptie, by the sound, and mettals by the touch; so man by his speech. Of all the visible parts of the body which shew themselves outward, that which is neere the heart is the tongue

3
The force &
authoritie of
Speech.

tongue by the root thereof; so that which comes neereſt vn-
to our thought, is our ſpeech : for from the abundance of the
heart the mouth ſpeaketh. In regard of him which receiueth
it, it is a powerfull maſter, an imperious commander, which
entrencheth the fortrefle, poſſelleth it ſelfe of the poſſeſſor, ſtir-
reth him vp, animateth, exaſperateth, appeaſeth him, ma-
keth him ſad, merrie, imprinteth in him whatſoeuer paſſion,
it handleth and feedeth the Soule of the hearer, and makes it
pliable to euery ſenſe ; it makes him bluſh, wax pale, laugh,
crie, tremble for feare, mad with choler, to leape for ioy, and
pierceth him thorow with paſſion. In regard of all, Speech is
the hand of the ſpirit, wherewith, as the bodie by his, it ta-
keth and giueth, it asketh counſell and ſuccour and giueth it.
It is the great Intermedler and Huckſter : by it we trafficke,
Merx a Mercurio peace is handled, affaires are managed,
Sciences and the goods of the ſpirit are diſtributed, it is the
band and cement of humane ſociety (ſo that it be vnderſtood:
For, ſaith one, a man were better to be in the companie of a
dog that he knoweth, than in the companie of a man whoſe
language he knoweth not, *ut externus alieno, non ſit hominis*
vice.) To be briefe, it is the inſtrument of whatſoeuer is good
or ill, *vita & mors in manibus lingua* : there is nothing better,
nothing worſe than the tongue. The tongue of a wiſe man is
the doore of a royall Cabinet, which is no ſooner opened, but
incontinently a thouſand diuerſities preſent themſelues to
the eie, euery one more beautifull than other, come from the
Indies, Peru, Arabia ; So a wiſe man produceth and rangeth
them in good order, ſentences, and Aphoriſmes of Philoſo-
phie, ſimilitudes, examples, hiſtories, wiſe ſayings drawn
from all the mines, and treaſuries olde and new, *qui profert de*
thesauro ſuo noua & vetera, which ſerue for a rule of good
maners, of policie, and all the parts both of life and of death,
which being applied in their times and to good purpoſe,
bring with it great delight, great beautie and vtilitie, *mala au-*
rea in lectis argenteis, verba in tempore ſuo. The mouth of a
wicked man is a ſtincking and contagious pit, a ſlanderous
tongue murdereth the honour of another, it is a ſea and Vni-
uerſitie of euils, worſe than fetters, fire, poiſon, death, hell,
Vniuerſitas iniquitatis, malum inquietum, venenum mortiferum,
ignis

Of a good &
euill tongue.

Proverb.

ignis incendens omnia, mors illius nequissima, utilis potius infernis quam illa.

Now these two, Hearing and Speech answer and are accommodated the one to the other, there is a great alliance betwixt them, the one is nothing without the other, as also by nature in one and the same subiect, the one is not without the other. They are the two great gates, by which the soule doth trafficke, and hath her intelligence: By these two, the soules are powred the one into the other, as vessels when the mouth of the one is applied to the enterie of the other: So that if these two gates be shut, as in those that are deafe and dumbe, the spirit remaineth solitary and miserable: Hearing is the gate to enter, by it the spirit receiueh all things from without, and conceiueh as the female: Speech is the gate to goe foorth, by it the spirit acteth and bringeth foorth as the male. From the communication of these two, as from the stroke of two flints or irons together, there comes foorth the sacred fire of truth, for they rubbing and polishing the one the other, they shake off their rust, and purifie and cleanse themselves, and all maner of knowledge comes to perfection. But Hearing is the first, for there can nothing come foorth of the soule, but that which first entered, and therefore he that by nature is altogether deafe, is likewise dumbe. It is necessary that first the spirit be furnished with moueables and vtinseles, by the sense of Hearing, to the end it may by speech distribute them, so that the good and ill of the tongue and almost of the whole man, dependeth vpon the eare: He that heares well, speakes well, and he that heares ill speakes ill. Of the vse and gouernment of the tongue heereafter. *Lib. 3. Chap. 43. p. 547.*

4
The corres-
pondency of
Hearing and
Speech.

CHAP. XII.

Of the other faculties, Imaginative, Memorative, Appetitive.

THE fantasticke or imaginative facultie, hauing recollected, and withdrawne the kindes and images apprehended by the senses, retaineth and reserueth them; in such sort that the obiects being absent and far distant, yea a man sleeping, and his senses being bound and shut vp, it presenteth them

them to the spirit and thought, *Phantasmata idola, seu imagines dicuntur*, and doth almost worke that within in the vnderstanding, which the obieſt doth without in the ſenſe.

2 The memoratiue faculty is the Gardian and Register of all the ſpecies or kindes and images, apprehended by the ſenſe, retired and ſealed vp by the imagination.

3 The Appetitiue faculty ſeeketh and purſueth thoſe things, which ſeeme good and conuenient.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Intellectiue faculty and truly humaine.

1 **T**WO things are to be knowen, before we enter into this diſcourſe, the ſeat or inſtrument of this intellectiue faculty, and the Aſtion. The ſeate of the reaſonable ſoule, *ubi ſedet pro tribunali*, is the braine and not the heart, as before *Plato* and *Hippocrates* it was commonly thought, for the heart hauing feeling and motion, is not capable of wiſdome.

The ſeate
and inſtru-
ment of the
reaſonable
Soule.

Now the braine which is farre greater in man then in all other creatures, if it be well and in ſuch maner made and diſpoſed, that the reaſonable ſoule may worke and exerciſe it powers, it muſt come neere vnto the forme of a ſhip, and muſt not be round, nor too great nor too little, although the greater be leſſe vitious. It muſt be compoſed of a ſubſtance and parts ſubtile, delicate and delicious, well ioyned and vnited without ſeparation, hauing foure little chambers or ventricles, whereof three are in the middle, ranged in front, and collaterals betweene and behinde them, drawing towards the hinder part of the head; the fourth is alone, wherein is framed the preparation and coniunction of the vitall ſpirits, afterwards to be made animall and caried to the three ventricles before; wherein the reaſonable ſoule doth exerciſe it faculties, which are three, *Vnderſtanding, Memory, Imagination*, which doe not exerciſe their powers apart and diſtinctly, each one in each ventricle, as ſome haue commonly thought, but in common all three together in all three, and in euery of them, according to the maner of the outward ſenſes, which are double and haue two ventricles, in each of which the ſenſes do

do wholly worke; whereby it comes to passe that hee that is wounded in one or two of these ventricles (as he that hath the palsie) ceaseth not neuerthelesse to exercise all the three; though more weakly, which he could not doe, if every facultie had his chamber or ventricle apart.

Some hauethought that the reasonable *Soule* was not organically, that is, had no need of any corporall instrument to exercise it functions, thinking thereby the better to proue the immortality of the *Soule*: But not to enter into a labyrinth of discourse, ocular and ordinarie experience disproueth this opinion, and conuinceth the contrary; For it is well knowen that all men vnderstand not, nor reason not alike and after one maner, but with great diuersitie; yea one and the same man, may bee so changed, that at one time hee may reason better than at another; in one age, one estate and disposition better than in another; such a one better in health than in sicknesse, and another better in sicknesse than in health; one and the same man, at one and the same time, may bee strong in iudgement and weake in imagination. From whence can these diuersities and alterations proceed, but from the change and alteration of the state of the organ or instrument? From whence commeth it that drunkennes, the bite of a mad dog, a burning feuer, a blow on the head, a fume rising from the stomacke, and other accidents peruert and turne topsie turuy the iudgement, intellectuall spirit, and all the wisedome of Greece, yea constraîne the *Soule* to dislodge from the body? These accidents being purely corporall cannot touch nor ariue to this high spirituall facultie of the reasonable soule, but only to the organs or instruments, which being corrupted, the *Soule* cannot well and regularly act & exercise it functions, & being violently inforced, is constrained either to absent it selfe, or depart from the body. Againe, that the reasonable soule should haue need of the seruice of the instruments, doth no way preiudice the immortality thereof: for God maketh vse therof, & accommodates his actions; & as according to the diuersitie of the aire, region and climate, God brings foorth men very diuers in spirit and naturall sufficiency, as in *Greece* and *Italy* men more ingenious, than in *Muscovy* and *Tartarie*: So the spirit according to the diuersitie of the organically

2
The reasonable Soule is organically.

ganicall dispositions, and corporall instruments, discourseth better or worse. Now the instrument of the reasonable *Soule*, is the braine, and the temperature thereof, whereof wee are to speake.

3
Of the Temperature of the braine, and the faculties thereof.

The vnderstanding dry. Old age.

Southernes.

2
The Memorie moist. Infancie. Septentrionals.

3
The imagination hot. Youth.

Temperature is the mixture and proportion of the foure first qualities, Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist, and it may be a fift besides, which is the Harmonie of these foure. Now from the Temperature of the braine proceedeth all the state and action of the reasonable *Soule*, but that which is the cause of great misery vnto man, is, that the three faculties of the reasonable *Soule*, Vnderstanding, Memorie, Imagination, do require and exercise themselves by contrarie temperatures. The temperature which serueth, and is proper to the vnderstanding is drie, whereby it comes to passe that they that are stricken in yeeres, doe excell those in their vnderstanding that are yoong, because in the braine as yeeres increase, so moisture decreaseth. So likewise melancholicke men, such as are afflicted with want, and fast much (for heauinesse and fasting are driers) are wise and ingenious, *Splendor siccus, animus sapientissimus, vexatio dat intellectum*: And beasts that are of a drie temperature, as *Ants, Bees, Elephants*, are wise and ingenious, as they that are of a moist temperature are stupid and without spirit, as *Swine*: And the Southerne people of the world are drie, and moderate in the inward heat of the braine, by reason of their violent outward heat.

The temperature of the memorie is moist, whereof it is that infants haue better memorie than old men, and the morning after that humidity that is gotten by sleepe in the night, is more apt for memorie, which is likewise more vigorous in Northerne people. I heere vnderstand a moisture that is not waterish or distilling, wherein no impression may bee made, but arie, viscus, fat, and oily, which easily receiue, and strongly retaineth, as it is seene in pictures wrought in oile.

The temperature of the imagination is hot, from whence it commeth that franticke men, and such as are sicke of burning maladies, are excellent in that that belongs to imagination, as *Poetry, Divination*, and that it hath greatest force in yoong men, and of middle yeeres (Poets and Prophets haue flourished

flourished in this age) and in the middle parts betwixt North and South. *The middle region.*

By this diuersitie of temperatures it commeth to passe, that a man may be indifferent in all the three faculties, but not excellent; and that he that is excellent in any one of the three, is but weake in the rest: that the temperatures of the memorie and vnderstanding are very different and contrary, it is cleere, as drie and moist; as for the imagination, it seemeth not to be so contrary from the others, because heat is not incompatible with drouth and moisture: and yet notwithstanding experience sheweth, that they that excell in imagination, are sicke in vnderstanding and memorie, and held for fooles and madde men: but the reason thereof is, because the great heat that serueth the imagination, consumeth both the moisture which serueth the memorie, and the subtiltie of the spirits and figures which should be in that drinesse which serueth the vnderstanding, and so it is contrary, and destroyeth the other two. *4 A comparison of the temperatures.*

By that which hath beene spoken it appeareth, that there are but three principall temperatures, which serue and cause the reasonable Soule to worke, and distinguish the spirits, that is to say, Heat, Drinesse, Moisture: Colde is not actiue, nor serueth to any purpose, but to hinder all the motions and functions of the Soule: and when we finde in some authors, that Colde serueth the vnderstanding, and that they that haue colde braines, as Melancholike men and the Southerne, are wise and ingenious; there Colde is taken not simply, but for a great moderation of heat: for there is nothing more contrary to the vnderstanding and to wisdom, than great heat, which contrariwise serueth the imagination. According to the three temperatures, there are three faculties of the reasonable Soule; but as the temperatures, so the faculties receiue diuers degrees, subdivisions and distinctions. *5 Three only temperatures.*

There are three principall offices and differences of vnderstanding, to Infer, to Distinguish, to Chase: these Sciences which appertaine to the vnderstanding, are Schoole-Diuinitie, the Theorike of Physicke, Logicke, Philosophie naturall and morall. There are three kindes of differences of memorie, easily to receiue and lose the figures, easily to receiue and hardly *6 Subdivision of the faculties.*

hardly to lose, hardly to receive and easily to lose. The Sciences of the memory are Grammar, the Theorike of the Law, Positiue Diuinitie, Cosmographie, Arithmeticke. Of the imagination there are many differences, and a farre greater number than either of the memorie or vnderstanding: to it doe properly appertaine, Inuentions, Merry-conceits and Iests, Tricks of subtilty, Fictions and Lies, Figures and comparisons, Neatnesse, Elegancie, Gentilitie: because to it appertaine, Poetrie, Eloquence, Musicke, and generally whatsoever consisteth in Figure, Correspondencie, Harmonie and Proportion.

7
The propri-
tie of the fa-
culties and
their order.

Hereby it appeareth that the viuacitie, subtiltie, promptitude, and that which the common sort call wit, belongs to a hot imagination; soliditie, maturitie, veritie, to a drie vnderstanding. The imagination is actiue and stirring, it is it that vndertaketh all, and sets all the rest a worke: the vnderstanding is dull and cloudie: the memorie is purely passiue, and see how: The imagination first gathereth the kinds and figures of things both present, by the seruice of the fiue senses, and absent by the benefit of the common sense: afterwards it presenteth them, if it will, to the vnderstanding, which considereth of them, examineth, ruminateth, and iudgeth; afterwards it puts them to the safe custodie of the memorie, as a Scriuener to his booke, to the end he may againe, if need shall require, draw them forth (which men commonly call *Reminiscentia*, Remembrance) or els, if it will, it commits them to the memorie before it presents them to the vnderstanding: for to recollect, represent to the vnderstanding, commit vnto memorie, and to draw them forth againe, are all works of the imagination; so that to it are referred, the common Sense, the Fantasie, the Remembrance, and they are not powers separated from it, as some would haue it, to the end they may make more than three faculties of the reasonable Soule.

8
Their com-
parison in
dignitie.

The common sort of people, who neuer iudge aright, doe more esteeme of memorie, and delight more in it, than in the other two, because they haue much vse of counting, and it makes greater shew and stirre in the world; and they thinke, that to haue a good memorie is to be wise, esteeming more of
Science

Science than of Wisdome; but yet of the three it is the least, being such as may be euen in fooles themselves: for very seldom is an excellent memorie ioyned with vnderstanding and wisdome, because their temperatures are contrary. From this error of the common people comes that ill course, which euery where we see, in the instruction of our youth, who are alwayes taught to learne by heart (so they terme it) that which they reade in their books, to the end they may afterwards be able to repeat it; and so they fill and charge the memorie with the good of another, and take no care to awaken and direct the vnderstanding, and to forme the iudgement, whereby he may be made able to make vse of his owne proper good, and his naturall faculties, which may make him wise and apt to all things: so that wee see that the greatest scholars, that haue all *Aristotle* and *Cicero* in their heads, are the veriest fots, and most vnskillfull in publike affaires, and the world is gouerned by those that know nothing. It is the opinion of all the wisest, that the vnderstanding is the first, the most excellent and principall piece of harnesse: if that speed well, all goes well, and a man is wise; and contrariwise, if that miscarrie, all goes acrosse. In the second place is the imagination: the memorie is the last.

See of this
lib. 3. c. 14.

All these differences, it may be, will be better vnderstood by this similitude, which is a picture or imitation of the reasonable Soule. In euery Court of iustice there are three orders or degrees; the highest are the Iudges, with whom there is little stire but great action, for without the mouing or stirring of themselves, they iudge, decide, order, determine of all things: this is the image of iudgement the highest part of the Soule. The second are the Aduocates and Proctors, in whom there is great stire and much adoe, without action, for it lies not in their power to dispatch or order any thing, only they hatch and prepare the businesse; this is the picture of the imagination, an vndertaking, vnquiet facultie, which neuer resteth, no not in the profoundest sleepe; and it makes a noise in the braine, like a pot that seetheth, but neuer setteth. The third and last degree is the Scribe or Register of the Court, with whom there is no stire nor action, but pure

9

An image of
the three fa-
culties of
the Soule.

passion, as the Gardian or Custos of all things : and this re-
presenteth the memorie.

10
The action
of the reason-
able Soule.

The action of the reasonable Soule is the knowledge and
vnderstanding of all things : The Spirit of man is capable of
vnderstanding all things, visible, inuisible, vniuersall, par-
ticular, sensible, insensible, *intellectus est omnia* : but it selfe ei-
ther it vnderstands not at all, as some are of opinion (witnessle
so great and almost infinite diuersitie of opinions thereof, as
wee haue seene before by those doubts and obiections that
haue alwayes crossed it) or very darkly, imperfectly, and in-
directly, by reflexion of the knowledge of things vpon
themselves, by which it perceiueth and knoweth that it vn-
derstandeth, and hath power and facultie to vnderstand : this
is the maner whereby the spirit knowes it selfe. The first so-
ueraigne Spirit, G O D, doth first know himselfe, and after-
wards in himselfe all things ; the latter Spirit, Man, quite con-
trarie, all other things rather than himselfe, and is in them as
the eye in a glasse : how then should it act or worke in it selfe
without meane, and by a strait line ?

11
The meane
whereby it
worketh.

But the question is concerning the meane whereby it
knoweth and vnderstandeth things. The common receiued
opinion that came from *Aristotle* himselfe is, that the Spirit
knoweth and vnderstandeth by the helpe and seruice of the
Senses ; that it is of it selfe as a white emptie paper, that no-
thing commeth to the vnderstanding, which doth not first
passe the Senses, *Nilest in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in
sensu*. But this opinion is false : first because (as all the wisest
haue affirmed, and hath beene before touched) the seeds of
all sciences and vertues are naturally disperfed and insinuated
into our spirits, so that they may be rich and merry with their
owne : and though they want that tillage that is fit, yet then
they sufficiently abound. Besides it is iniurious both to God
and Nature : for this were to make the state of the reasonable
Soule worse than that of other things, than that of the vege-
tatiue and sensitiue, which of themselves are wise enough to
exercise their functions, as hath beene sayd ; for beasts with-
out the discipline of the senses know many things, the vni-
uersals by the particulars, by the sight of one man they know
all

all men, and are taught to auoid the danger of things hurtfull, and to seeke and to follow after that which is fit for them and their little ones. And it were a thing shamefull and absurd, that this so high and so diuine a facultie should begge it good of things so vile and corruptible as the senses, which do apprehend only the simple accidents, and not the formes, natures, essence of things, much lesse things vniuersall, the secrets of Nature, and all things insensible. Againe, if the Soule were made wise, by the aide of the senses, it would follow, that they that haue their senses most perfect and quicke, should be most wittie, most wise; whereas many times we see the cleane contrary, that their spirits are more dull, and more vnapt, and that many haue of purpose depriued themselves of the vse of some of them, to the end the soule might better, and more freely execute it owne affaires. And if any man shall obiect, that the soule being wise by nature, and without the helpe of the senses, all men must necessarilie be wise, and alwayes vnderstand and reason alike: which being so, how commeth it about that there are so many dull pates in the world, and that they that vnderstand, exercise their functions more weakly at one time than at another, the vegetatiue soule farre more strongly in youth, the reasonable soule more weakly than in olde age, and in a certaine state of health or sicknesse than at another time? I may answer, that the argument is not good: for as touching the first, that is, That all men must be wise: I say that the facultie and vertue of vnderstanding is not giuen alike vnto all, but with great inequality, and therefore it is a saying as ancient as honorable, euen of the wisest, that the acting vnderstanding was giuen but to few; and this inequality proueth that Science comes not of sense: for as it hath been sayd, they that excell others in their senses, come short of others in their vnderstanding and Science. Touching the second, The reason why a man doth not exercise his functions alwayes after one maner, is because the instruments whereby the Soule must necessarily worke, can not alwayes be disposed as they should; and if they be for some speciall kinde of faculties or functions, yet not for others. The temperature of the braine, by which the Soule worketh, is diuers and changeable; being hot and moist, in

youth it is good for the vegetatiue, naught for the reasonable; and contrarily, being colde and drie, in olde age it is good for the reasonable, ill for the vegetatiue. The braine by a hot and burning maladie being heated and purified, is more fit for inuention and diuination, vnfit for maturitie and soundnesse of iudgement and wisdom. By that which hath beene spoken let no man thinke, that I affirme that the spirit hath no seruice from the senses, which I confesse to be great especially in the beginning, in the discouerie and inuention of things: but I say in the defence of the honor of the spirit, that it is false that it dependeth vpon the senses, and that we can not know any thing, vnderstand, reason, discourse without the sense: for contrariwise all knowledge comes from it, and the senses can do nothing without it.

12

The Spirit in this vnderstanding facultie proceedeth diuersly, and by order: It vnderstandeth at the first instant, simply and directly a Lion to be a Lion, afterwards by consequents that hee is strong: for seeing the effects of his strength, it concludeth that he is strong. By diuision or negative, it vnderstandeth a Hare to be fearefull; for seeing it flie and hide it selfe, it concludeth that a Hare is not strong, because fearefull. It knoweth some by similitude, others by a collection of many things together.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reason, inuention, veritie thereof.

THis humane Spirit, and *Oeconomie* of this great and high intellectuall part of the soule, is a depth of obscuritie, full of creeks and hidden corners, a confused and inuolued labyrinth, and bottomlesse pit, consisting of many parts, faculties, actions, diuers motions, hauing many names, doubts and difficulties.

The first office thereof, is simply to receiue and apprehend the images and kindes of things, which is a kinde of passion and impression of the Soule, occasioned by the obiects and the presence of them: this is imagination and apprehension.

2

The force and power thereof, to feed, to handle, to stirre,

to

to concoct, to digest the things receiued by the imagination, this is reason, λόγος.

The action and office, or exercise of this force and power, which is to assemble, conioyne, separate, diuide the things receiued, and to adde likewise others: this is discourse, reasoning, λόγισμος & διανοία, quasi διάνευν.

The subtile facilitie, and cheerefull readinesse to doe all these things, and to penetrate into them, is called Spirit, *Ingenium*; and therefore to be ingenious, sharpe, subtile, piercing, is all one.

The repetition and action of ruminating, reconcocting, trying by the whetstone of reason, and reworking of it, to frame a resolution more solide: this is iudgement.

The effect in the end of the vnderstanding: this is knowledge, intelligence, resolution.

The action that followeth this knowledge and resolution, which is to extend it selfe, to put forward, and to aduance the thing knowen: this is will. *Intellectus extensus & promotus*.

Wherefore all these things, *Vnderstanding, Imagination, Reason, Discourse, Spirit, Iudgement, Intelligence, Will*, are one and the same Essence, but all diuers in force, vertue and action: for a man may be excellent in one of them, and weake in another: and many times he that excelleth in Spirit and subtiltie, may be weake in iudgement and soliditie.

I let no man to sing, and set forth the praises and greatnesse of the Spirit of man, the capacitie, viuacitie, quickenesse thereof: let it be called the image of the liuing God, a taste of the immortall substance, a streame of the Diuinitie, a celestiall ray, whereunto God hath giuen reason, as an animated sterne to moue it by rule and measure, and that it is an instrument of a compleat harmonie; that by it there is a kinde of kindred betwixt God and man, and that he might often remember him, he hath turned the root towards the heauens, to the end he should alwayes looke towards the place of his natiuitie: to be brieve, that there is nothing great vpon the earth but man, nothing great in man but his spirit: if a man ascend to it, he ascendeth aboue the heauens. These are all pleasing and plaufible words whereof the Schooles do ring.

3
The dis-
praise.

But I desire that after all this we come to sound and to study how to know this spirit, for wee shall finde after all this, that it is both to it selfe and to another a dangerous instrument, a ferret that is to be feared, a little trouble-feast, a tedious and importune parasite, and which as a Iugler & plainer at fast and loose, vnder the shadow of some gentle motion, subtile and smiling, forgeth, inuenteth, and causeth all the mischiefs of the world: & the truth is, without it there are none.

4
Diuersitie of
distinctions
of the spirit.
See hereof
more Chap.
39.

There is farre greater diuersitie of spirits than of bodies, so is there likewise a larger field to enter into, more parts and more formes or fashions to be spoken of: we may make three classes or formes, wherof each one hath many degrees: The first which is the lowest are those weake, base, and almost brutish spirits, neere neighbours to beasts themselues, whether by reason of the first temper, that is to say, of the feede and temperature of the braine, either too cold or too moist, as amongst other creatures fishes are the lowest, or by reason that they haue not been in some sort remoued and reviewed, but suffered to rust, and grow dull and stupid. Of these wee make no great account, as being vnfit to be ordered and setled into any certaine and constant societie; because both for their owne particular they cannot possibly endure it, and it were necessary they should alwaies be vnder the tuition of another, this is the common and base people, *qui vigilans stertit; mortua cui vita est; prope iam vino atque videnti;* which vnderstands not, iudgeth not it selfe. The second which is the highest, are those great and rare spirits, rather diuels than ordinary men, spirits well borne, strong and vigorous. Of these kinde of people, there was neuer age yet could tell how to build a common-weale. The third which is the middle, are all those indifferent spirits, whereof there are infinite degrees: of these almost is the whole world composed. Of this distinction and others, heereafter more at large. But we are to touch more particularly the conditions and nature of this spirit, as hard to be knowne, as a countenance to be counterfeited to the life, which is alwaies in motion.

5
The particu-
lar descrip-
tion.
Agent per-
petuall.

First therefore it is a perpetuall agent, for the spirit cannot be without action, but rather then it will, it forgeth false and phantasticall

phantaſticall ſubiects, in earneſt deceiuing it ſelfe, euen to it owne diſcredit. As idle and vnmannured grounds, if they be fat and fertile, abound with a thouſand kinds of wilde and vnprofitable hearbs, vntill they be ſowed with other ſeeds; and women alone without the company of men, bring forth ſometimes great abundance of vnformed, indigeſted lumps of fleſh: ſo the *Spirit*, if it be not buſied about ſome certaine obiect, it runnes riot into a world of imaginations, and there is no folly nor vanity that it produceth not; and if it haue not a ſetled limit, it wandreth and loſeth it ſelfe. For to be euery where is to be no where. Motion and agitation is the true life and grace of the *Spirit*, but yet it muſt proceed from elſewhere, than from it ſelfe. If it be ſolitary, and wanteth a ſubiect to worke on, it creepeth along and languisheth; but yet it muſt not be enforced. For too great a contention and intention of the *Spirit* ouer bent, and ſtrained, deceiueth and troubleth the *Spirit*.

It is likewise vniuerſall, it medleth and mingleth it ſelfe with all, it hath no limited ſubiect or iuriſdiction. There is not any thing wherewith it plaieth not his part, as well to vaine ſubiects and of no account, as high and weighty, as well to thoſe we can vnderſtand, as thoſe we vnderſtand not: For to know that we cannot vnderſtand, or pierce into the marrow or pith of a thing, but that we muſt ſticke in the bone and barke thereof, is an excellent ſigne of iudgement; for ſcience, yea truth it ſelfe, may lodge nere vs without iudgement, and iudgement without them, yea to know our owne ignorance, is a faire testimony of iudgement.

Thirdly, it is prompt and ſpeedy running in a moment from the one end of the world to the other, without ſtay or reſt, ſtirring it ſelfe and penetrating through euery thing, *Nobilis & inquieta mens homini data eſt, nunquam ſe tenet; ſpargitur vaga, quietis impatiens, nouitate rerum letiſſima. Non mirum ex illo celeſti ſpiritu deſcendit, celeſtium autem natura ſemper in motu eſt.* This great ſpeed and quickneſſe, this agility, this twinkling of the eie, as it is admirable, and one of the greateſt wonders that are in the ſpirit, ſo it is a thing very dangerous, a great diſpoſition and propenſion vnto folly and madneſſe, as preſently you ſhall heare.

By

By reason of these three conditions of the spirit, that is, a perpetuall agent without repose, vniuersall, prompt and sudden, it hath beene accounted immortall, and to haue in it selfe some marke, and sparkle of diuinitie.

8
The action
of the Spi-
rit.

The action of the Spirit is alwayes to search, ferret, contriue without intermission; like one famished for want of knowledge, to enquire and seeke, and therefore *Homer* calles men *αλγεας*. There is no end of our inquisitions: the pursutes of the spirit of man are without limits, without forme: the food thereof is double ambiguitie; it is a perpetuall motion without rest, without bound. The world is a schoole of inquisition; agitation and hunting is it proper dish: to take, or to faile of the pray, is another thing.

9
It worketh
rashly.

But it worketh and pursueth it enterprises, rashly, and irregularly, without order, and without measure, it is a wandring instrument, moouable, diuersly turning; it is an instrument of leade and of wax, it boweth and straitneth, applieth it selfe to all, more supple and facill than the water, the aire, *flexibilis omni humore obsequentior, & ut spiritus qui omni materia facili- or ut tenuior*; it is the shoo of *Theramenes*, fit for all. The cunning is to finde where it is, for it goes alwayes athwart, and crosse, as wel with a lie, as with a truth: it sporteth it selfe and findeth a seeming reason for euery thing; for it maketh that which is impious, vniust, abominable in one place, pietie, iustice and honour in another: neither can we name any law or custome, or condition, that is either generally receiued of all, or reiected; the marriage of those that are neere of blood, the murther of infants, parents, is condemned in one place, lawfull in another. *Plato* refused an embrodered and perfumed robe offered him by *Dionysius*, saying that he was a man, and therefore would not adorne himselfe like a woman. *Aristippus* accepted of that robe, saying the outward acoutrement can not corrupt a chaste minde. *Diogenes* washing his colewarts and seeing *Aristippus* passe by, sayd vnto him, If thou knewest how to liue with colewarts, thou wouldest neuer follow the Court of a Tyrant. *Aristippus* answered him, If thou knewest how to liue with Kings, thou wouldest neuer wash colewarts. One perswaded *Solon* to cease from the bewailing the death of his sonnes, because his teares did neither profit

10
Reason hath
diuers faces.

nor

nor helpe him. Yea therefore, sayth he, are my teares iust, and I haue reason to weepe. The wife of *Socrates* redoubled her griefe, because the Iudges put her husband to death vniustly. What, saith he, wouldest thou rather be iustly condemned? There is no good, sayth a wise man, but that, to the losse whereof a man is alwayes prepared, *In equo enim est dolor amissa res, & timor amittende*. Quite contrary, saith another, we embrace and locke vp that good a great deale the more carefully, which we see lesse sure, and alwayes feare will be taken from vs. A Cynique Philosopher demanded of *Antigonus* the King, a dram of siluer. That, sayth he, is no gift fit for a King. Why then giue me a talent, sayth the Philosopher. And that, saith the King, is no gift fit for a Cynique. One sayd of a King of *Sparta* that was gentle and debonaire, Hee is a good man euen to the wicked. How should hee be good vnto the wicked, saith another, if he be not wicked with the wicked. So that we see that the reason of man hath many visages: it is a two-edged sword, a staffe with two pikes, *Ogni medaglia ha il suo verso*. There is no reason but hath a contrary reason, sayth the soundest and surest Philosopher.

Now this volubilitie and flexibilitie proceedeth from many causes; from the perpetuall alteration and motion of the bodie, which is neuer twice in a mans life in one and the same estate; from the objects which are infinite, the aire it selfe, and the serenitie of the heauen,

Tales sunt hominum mentes quali pater ipse

Inppiter auctiferas lastrant lampide terras,

and all outward things: inwardly from those shakings and tremblings which the Soule giues vnto it selfe by the agitation, and stirreth vp by the passions thereof: insomuch that it beholdeth things with diuers countenances; for whatsoeuer is in the world hath diuers lustures, diuers considerations. *Epictetus* sayd it was a pot with two hands. He might better haue sayd with many.

The reason heereof is, because it entangleth it selfe in it owne worke like the Silke-worme: for as it thinketh to note from farre, I know not what appearance of light, and imaginarie truth, and flies vnto it: there are many difficulties that crosse

II

12

The reason
of this in-
tanglement.

croſſe the way, new ſents that inebriate and bring it forth of the way.

13

*The end is
verity which
it can nei-
ther attaine
nor finde.*

*Reade before
Chap. 9.*

The end at which it aimeth is twofold, the one more common and naturall, which is Trueth, which it ſearcheth and purſueth; for there is no deſire more naturall than to know the trueth: we aſſay all the meanes we can to attaine vnto it, but in the end all our endeouours come ſhort; for Truth is not an ordinarie bootie, or thing that will ſuffer it ſelfe to be gotten and handled; much leſſe to be poſſeſſed by any humane Spirit. It lodgeth within the boſom of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knoweth not, vnderſtandeth not any thing aright, in puritie and in trueth as he ought: appearances doe alwayes compaſſe him on euery ſide, which are as well in thoſe things that are falſe as true. We are borne to ſearch the truth, but to poſſeſſe it, belongeth to a higher and greater power. Truth is not his that thruſts himſelfe into it, but his that runnes the faireſt courſe towards the marke. When it falles out that he hits vpon a trueth, it is by chance and hazzard, he knowes not how to holde it, to poſſeſſe it, to diſtinguiſh it from a lie. Errours are receiued into our ſoule, by the ſelfe ſame way and conduit that the truth is; the ſpirit hath no meanes either to diſtinguiſh or to chuſe: and as well may he play the ſot, that telles a trueth as a lie. The meanes that it uſeth for the diſcouerie of the truth, are reaſon and experience, both of them very weake, vncertaine, diuers, waue-
ring. The greateſt argument of truth, is the generall conſent of the world: now the number of fooles doth farre exceed the number of the wiſe, and therefore how ſhould that generall conſent be agreed vpon; but by corruption and an applauſe giuen without iudgement and knowledge of the cauſe, and by the imitation of ſome one that firſt began the dance.

14

*The ſecond
end Inuen-
tion.*

The other end leſſe naturall, but more ambitious, is Inuen-
tion, vnto which it rendeth as to the higheſt point of honor, to the end it may raiſe it ſelfe and preuaile the more: this is that which is in ſo high account, that it ſeemeth to be an image of the Diuinitie. From the ſufficiencie of this inuen-
tion, haue proceeded all thoſe works, which haue rauiſhed the whole world with admiration; which if they be ſuch as are
for

for the publike benefit, they haue deified their Authours. Those works that shew rather finenesse of wit than bring profit with them, are painting, caruing, Architecture, the art Perspective, as the vine of *Zeuxis*, the *Venus* of *Apelles*, the image of *Memnon*, the horse of *Arcan*, the wooden pigeon of *Architas*, the cow of *Myron*, the flie and the eagle of *Montroyall*, the spheare of *Sapor* King of the Persians, and that of *Archimides* with his other engins. Now art and inuention seeme not onely to imitate Nature, but to excell it, and that not only in the *indiuiduum* or particular (for there is not any bodie either of man or beast, so vniuersally well made, as by art may be shewed) but also many things are done by art, which are not done by nature: I meane besides those compositions and mixtures, which are the true diet, and proper subiect of art, those distillations of waters and oiles, made of simples, which Nature frameth not. But in all this there is no such cause of admiration as we thinke; and to speake properly and truly, there is no inuention but that which God reuealeth: for such as we account and call so, are but obseruations of naturall things, arguments and conclusions drawn from them, as Painting and the art Opticke from shadowes, Sundials from the shadowes of trees, the grauing of scales from precious stones.

By all this that hath before beene spoken, it is easie to see how rash and dangerous the spirit of man is, especially if it be quicke and vigorous: for being so industrious, so free and vniuersall, making it motions so irregularly, vsing it libertie so boldly in all things, not tying it selfe to any thing; it easily shaketh the common opinions, and all those rules whereby it should be bridled and restrained as an vniust tyranny: it will vndertake to examine all things, to iudge the greatest part of things plausibly receiued in the world, to be ridiculous and absurd; and finding for all an appearance of reason, will defend it selfe against all, whereby it is to be feared that it wandreth out of the way and loseth it selfe: and we can not but see that they that haue any extraordinary viuacity and rare excellency (as they that are in the highest rooofe of that middle *Classis* before spoken of) are for the most part lawlesse both in opinions and maners. There are very few of whose

The praise
of inuen-
tion.

It
The Spirit
very dan-
gerous.

whose guide and conduct a man may trust, and in the libertie of whose iudgements a man may wade without temeritie, beyond the common opinion. It is a miracle to finde a great and liuely spirit, well ruled and gouerned: it is a dangerous sword which a man knowes not well how to guide; for from whence come all those disorders, reuolts, heresies and troubles in the world; but for this? *Magni errores non nisi ex magnis ingenijs: nihil sapientia odiosius acumine nimio.* Doubtlesse that man liues a better time, and a longer life, is more happie and farre more fit for the gouernment of a Common-wealth, sayth *Thucydides*, that hath an indifferent spirit, or somewhat beneath a mediocritie, than he that hath a spirit so eleuated and transcendent, that it serues not for any thing but the torment of himselfe and others. From the firmest friendships do spring the greatest enmities, and from the soundest health the deadliest maladies: and euen so, from the rarest and quickest agitation of our soules the most desperate resolutions and disorderly frensies. Wisdome and follie are neere neighbors; there is but a halfe turne betwixt the one and the other; which we may easily see in the actions of madde men. Philosophie teacheth, that Melancholy is proper to them both. Whereof is framed the finest follie, but of the finest wit? And therefore, sayth *Aristotle*, there is no great spirit without some mixture of follie. And *Plato* telleth vs, that in vaine a temperate and sound spirit knocketh at the doore of Poetrie. And in this sense it is, that the wisest and best Poets doe loue sometimes to play the foole, and to leape out of the hindges. *Insanire incundum est, dulce desipere in loco: non potest grande & sublime quidquam nisi mota mens, & quamdiu apud se est.*

16
It must be
bridled, &
why.

Seneca.

And this is the cause why man hath good reason to keepe it within narrow bounds, to bridle and binde it with Religions, Lawes, Customes, Sciences, Precepts, Threatnings, Promises mortall and immortall, which notwithstanding yet we see, that by a lawlesse kinde of libertie it freeth it selfe, and escapeth all these; so vnruely is it by nature, so fierce, so opiniatiue: and therefore it is to be led by art, since by force it cannot. *Natura contumax est animus humanus, in contrarium atq; arduum nitens, sequiturq; facilius quam ducitur, ut generosi*

&

& nobiles equi melius facili franguntur. It is a surer way gently to tutor it, and to lay it asleepe, than to suffer it to wander at it owne pleasure: for if it be not well and orderly governed, (as they of the highest *classis* which before we spake of) or weake, and soft and pliant (as those of the lower ranke) it will lose it selfe in the libertie of it owne iudgement: and therefore it is necessary that it be by some meanes or other held backe, as hauing more need of lead than wings, of a bridle than of a spurre; which the great Lawyers and Founders of States did especially regard, as well knowing, that people of an indifferent spirit, liued in more quiet and content, than the ouer-quicke and ingenious. There haue been more troubles and seditions in ten yeeres in the only citie of *Florence*, than in fīue hundred yeeres in the countreys of the *Heluetians* and the *Retians*. And to say the trueth, men of a common sufficiencie are more honest, better citizens, more pliant, and willing to submit themselves to the yoke of the lawes, their superiours, reason it selfe, than those quicke and cleere fighted men, that can not keepe themselves within their owne skinnies. The finest wits are not the wisest men.

The *Spirit* hath it maladies, defects, tares or refuse as well as the body and much more, more dangerous and more incurable: but that wee may the better know them, we must distinguish them: Some are accidentall, and which come from elsewhere, and those arise from three causes; the disposition of the bodie, for it is manifest that the bodily maladie which alter the temperature thereof, do likewise alter the spirit and iudgement; or from the ill composition of the substance of the braine, and organs of the reasonable *Soule*, whether it be by reason of their first formation, as in those that haue their heads ill made, either too round, or too long, or too little, or by accident of some blow or wound. The second is the vniuersall contagion of vulgar and erroneous opinions in the world, wherewith the *Spirit* being preoccupied, tainted, and overcome, or which is worse, made drunken, and manacled with certain fantastickall opinions, it euer afterwards followeth & iudgeth according to them, without regard either of farther enquiry, or recoiling backe: from which dangerous

17

The defect
of the spirit.Accidental
proceeding
from three
causes.

1. The body.

2. The
world.

ous deluge all spirits haue not force and strength to defend themselves.

3. The passions.

The third much more neere, is the maladie and corruption of the will, and the force of the passions, this is a world turned topsie turvy: the wil is made to follow the vnderstanding as a guide and lampe vnto it; but being corrupted and sealed on by the force of the passions (or rather by the fall of our first father *Adam*) doth likewise perhaps corrupt the vnderstanding, and so from hence come the greatest part of our erroneous iudgements: Enuie, Malice, Hatred, Loue, Feare, make vs to respect, to iudge, to take things others than they are, & quite otherwise than we ought, from whence commeth that common crie, Iudge without passion. From hence it is that the beautifull and generous actions of another man are obscured by vile and base misconstructions, that vaine and wicked causes & occasions are feined. This is a great vice and a prooffe of a malignant nature and sicke iudgement, in which there is neither great subtiltie nor sufficiencie, but malice enough. This proceedeth either from the enuy they beare to the glorie of another man, or because they iudge of others according to themselves, or because they haue their taste altered and their sight so troubled, that they cannot discern the cleere splendour of vertue in it natie purity. From this selfe same cause and source it commeth, that we make the vertues and vices of another man to preuaile so much, and extend them farther than we ought, that from particularities wee draw consequents and generall conclusions: if he be a friend, all sits well about him, his vices shall be vertues: if he be an enemy or of a contrary faction, there is nothing good in him: insomuch that we shame our owne iudgement, to smoothe vp our owne passions. But this rests not heere, but goeth yet farther; for the greatest part of those impieties, heresies, errors in our faith and religion, if we looke well into it, is sprung from our wicked and corrupt willes, from a violent and voracious passion, which afterwards draweth vnto it the vnderstanding it selfe, *Sedit populus manducare & bibere &c. quod vult non quod est credit, qui cupit errare*: in such sort that what was done in the beginning with some scruple and doubt, hath beene

Exod. 31.

2. Paral. 15.

3. Reg. 15.

August. lib.

2. De ciui-

tate Dei.

beene afterwards held and maintained for a veritie and reuelation from heaven : that which was onely in the sensualitie, hath taken place in the highest part of the vnderstanding : that which was nothing els but a passion and a pleasure, hath beene made a religious matter and an article of faith : so strong and dangerous is the contagion of the faculties of the Soule amongst themselves. These are the three outward causes of the faults and miscariages of the Spirit, iudgement and vnderstanding of man, The body, especially the head, sicke, or wounded, or ill fashioned ; The world with the anticipated opinions and suppositions thereof ; The ill estate of the other faculties of the reasonable Soule, which are all inferiour vnto it. The first are pitifull, and some of them to be cured, some not : the second are excusable and pardonable : the third are accusable and punishable for suffering such a disorder so neere them as this is ; those that should obey the law, to take vpon them to giue the law.

There are other defects of the *Spirit*, which are more naturall vnto it, and in it. The greatest and the root of all the rest is pride and presumption (the first and originall fault of all the world, the plague of all spirits, and the cause of all euils) by which a man is only content with himselfe, will not giue place to another, disdaineth his counsels, reposes himselfe in his owne opinions, takes vpon him to iudge and condemne others, yea euen that which he vnderstands not. It is truly said, that the best and happiest distribution that God euer made, is of iudgement, because euery man is content with his owne, and thinkes he hath inough. Now this malady proceedeth from the ignorance of our selues. We neuer vnderstand sufficiently and truly the weaknesse of our spirit : but the greatest disease of the spirit is ignorance, not of Arts and Sciences, and what is included in the writings of others, but of it selfe, for which cause this first booke hath beene written.

18
Naturall.

CHAP. XV.

Of Memory.

Memory is many times taken by the vulgar sort for the sense and vnderstanding, but not so truly and properly:

F

ly : for both by reason (as hath beene said) and by experience, the excellency of the one is ordinarily accompanied with the weaknesse of the other, and to say the truth it is a faculty very profitable for the world, but yet comes far short of the vnderstanding and of all the parts of the Soule is the more delicate, and most fraile. The excellency thereof is not very requisite, but to three sorts of people : Merchants or men of Trade, great talkers, (for the storehouse of the memory is more full and furnished, than that of inuention, for hee that wants it comes short, and must be faine to frame his speech out of the forge of his owne inuention) and liars, *mendacem oportet esse memorem*. From the want of memory proceed these commodities : to lie feldome, to talke little, to forget offences. An indifferent memory sufficeth for all.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the imagination and opinion.

The effects
of the ima-
gination
marvellous.

I **T**He imagination is a thing very strong and powerfull, it is it that makes all the stirre, all the clatter, yea the perturbation of the world proceeds from it (as we haue sayd before, it is either the onely, or at least the most active and stirring facultie of the Soule). The effects thereof are marvellous and strange : it worketh not only in it owne proper bodie and Soule, but in that of another man, yea it produceth contrary effects : it makes a man blush, wax pale, tremble, dote, to wauer ; these are the least and the best : it takes away the power and vse of the ingendring parts, yea when there is most need of them, and is the cause why men are more sharpe and austere, not only towards themselves but others, witnesse those ties and bands whereof the world is full, which are for the most part impressions of the apprehension and of feare. And contrariwise, without endeuor, without obiect, & euen in sleepe it satisfieth the amorous desires, yea changeth the sex, witnesse *Lucius Cossitius*, whom *Pliny* affirmeth to haue scene to be changed from a woman to a man, the day of his mariage; and diuers the like : it marketh sometimes ignominiously, yea it killeth and makes abortiue the fruit within the wombe ; it takes away a mans speech, and giues it to him that neuer

neuer had it, as to the sonne of *Cræsus* : it taketh away motion, sense, respiration. Thus we see how it worketh in the bodie. Touching the Soule : it makes a man to lose his vnderstanding, his knowledge, iudgement ; it turnes him foole and mad-man, witnesse *Gallus Vibius*, who hauing ouer-bent his spirits in comprehending the essence and motions of follie, so dislodged and disioined his owne iudgement, that he could neuer settle it againe : it inspireth a man with the foreknowledge of things secret and to come, and causeth those inspirations, prædictions, and maruellous inuentions, yea it rauisheth with extasies : it killeth not seemingly but in good earnest, witnesse that man whose eyes being couered to receiue his death, and vncouered againe to the end he might reade his pardon, was found starke dead vpon the scaffold. To be brieue, from hence spring the greatest part of those things which the common sort of people call miracles, visions, enchantments. It is not alwayes the diuell, or a familiar spirit, as now adaies the ignorant people thinke, when they can not finde the reason of that they see ; nor alwayes the spirit of God (for these supernaturall motions we speake not of heere) but for the most part it is the effect of the imagination, or long of the agent who sayth & doth such things ; or of the patient and spectator, who thinks he seeth that he seeth not. It is an excellent thing and necessary in such a case, to know wisely how to discerne the reason thereof, whether it be naturall or supernaturall, false or true, *Discretio spirituum*, and not to precipitate our iudgements, as the most part of the common people do by the want thereof.

In this part and facultie of the soule doth opinion lodge, which is a vaine, light, crude and imperfect iudgement of things drawen from the outward senses, and common report, setting and holding it selfe to be good in the imagination, and neuer arriuing to the vnderstanding, there to be examined, sifted, and laboured ; and to be made reason, which is a true, perfect and solide iudgement of things : and therefore it is vncertaine, inconstant, fleeting, deceitfull, a very ill and dangerous guide, which makes head against reason, whereof it is a shadow and image, though vaine and vntrue. It is the mother of all mischiefs, confusions, disorders : from

it spring all passions, all troubles. It is the guide of fooles, fots, the vulgar sort, as reason of the wise and dexterious.

³
The world is lead by opinion. It is not the trueth and nature of things which doth thus stirre and molest our soules, it is opinion, according to that ancient saying; Men are tormented by the opinions that they haue of things, not by the things themselves. *Opinione sapius, quam re laboramus: plura sunt quae nos tenent, quam quae premunt.* The veritie and Essence of things entreth not into vs, nor lodgeth neere vs of it selfe, by it owne proper strength and authoritie: for were it so, all things should be receiued of all, all alike, and after the same fashon; all should be of like credit, and truth it selfe, which is neuer but one and vniforme, should be embraced thorowout the whole world. Now forasmuch as there is so great a varietie, yea contrarietie of opinions in the world, and there is not any thing concerning which all doe generally accord, no not the wisest and best borne and bred; it giueth vs to vnderstand, that things enter into vs by composition, yeelding themselves to our mercie and deuotion, and lodging themselves neere vnto vs, according to our pleasure, and humour and temper of our soules. That which I beleue, I can not make my companion beleue; but, which is more, what I doe firmly beleue to day, I can not assure my selfe that I shall beleue to morrow: yea it is certaine that at another time I shall iudge quite otherwise. Doubtlesse euery thing taketh in vs such place, such a taste, such a colour, as wee thinke best to giue vnto it, and such as the inward constitution of the soule is, *omnia munda mundis, immunda immundis.* As our apparell and accoutrements do as well warme vs, not by reason of their heat, but our owne, which they preserve, as likewise nourish the coldnesse of the ice and snow; we doe first warme them with our heat, and they in recompence thereof preserve our heat.

Almost all the opinions that wee haue, wee haue not but from authoritie: we beleue, we iudge, we worke, we liue, we die and all vpon credit, euen as the publike vse and custome teacheth vs; and we doe well therein: for we are too weake to iudge and chuse of our selues; no the wise do it not, as shall be spoken,

*Lib. 1. chap.
1. & 2.*

CHAP.

Of the Will.

THe Will is a great part of the reasonable soule, of verie great importance, and it standeth vs vpon aboue all things to studie how to rule it, because vpon it dependeth almost our whole estate and good.

The preeminence and importance of the will.

It only is truly ours, and in our power; all the rest, vnderstanding, memorie, imagination may be taken from vs, altered, troubled with a thousand accidents: not the will.

The comparison there of with the vnderstanding.

Secondly, this is that, that keepeth a man intire, and importeth him much: for he that hath giuen his will, is no more his owne man, neither hath he any thing of his owne.

Doubtfull, if not erroneous.

Thirdly, this is it whereby we are made and called good or wicked, which giueth vs the temper and the tincture.

ous.

As of all the goods that are in man, vertue or honestie is the first and principall, and which doth farre excell knowledge, dexteritie; so wee cannot but confesse, that the will where vertue and goodnesse lodgeth, is of all others the most excellent: and to say the trueth, a man is neither good nor wicked, honest nor dishonest, because he vnderstandeth and knoweth those things that are good, and faire, and honest, or wicked and dishonest; but because he loueth them, and hath desire and will towards them. The vnderstanding hath other preheminences: for it is vnto the will as the husband to the wife, the guide and light vnto the traueller, but in this it giueth place vnto the will.

The true difference betwixt these faculties is, in that by the vnderstanding things enter into the soule, and it receiue them (as those words, to apprehend, conceiue, comprehend, the true offices thereof doe import) but they enter not entire and such as they are, but according to the proportion and capacitie of the vnderstanding: whereby the greatest and the highest do recoile and diuide themselues after a sort, by this entrance, as the Ocean entreth not altogether into the *Mediterrane* sea, but according to the proportion of the mouth of the Strait of *Gibraltar*. By the will, on the other side, the soule goeth forth of it selfe, and lodgeth and liueth elsewhere in the thing beloued, into which it transformeth it

2

selfe; and therefore beareth the name, the title, the liuerie, being called vertuous, vitious, spirituall, carnall: whereby it followeth, that the will is enobled by louing those things that are high and woorthy of loue; is vilified, by giuing it selfe to those things that are base and vnwoorthy; as a wife honoureth or dishonoureth her selfe by that husband that she hath taken.

Experience teacheth vs, that three things do sharpen our will, Difficultie, Raritie, and Absence, or feare to lose the thing; as the three contrary dull it, Facilitie, Abundance, or Satiety, and dayly presence or assured fruition. The three former giue price and credit to things, the three latter ingender contempt. Our will is sharpened by opposition, it opposeth it selfe against deniall. On the other side, our appetite contemneth and letteth passe that which it hath in possession, and runnes after that which it hath not, *permissum fit vile nefas: quod licet ingratum est, quod non licet acius vrit*: yea it is seene in all sorts of pleasures, *omnium rerum voluptas ipso quo debet fugare periculo crescit*: insomuch that the two extreames, the defect and the abundance, the desire and the fruition do put vs to like paine. And this is the cause why things are not truely esteemed as they ought, and that there is no Prophet in his owne countrey.

How we are to direct and rule our willes, shall be sayd heereafter.

PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS.

An aduertisement.

Lib. 2. cap. 6.
& 7. lib. 3.
in the vertues of fortitude and temperance.

THe matter of the passions of the minde is very great and plentifull, and takes vp a great roome in this doctrine of Wisdome. To learne how to know them, and to distinguish them, is the subiect of this booke. The generall remedies to bridle, rule, and gouerne them, the subiect of the second booke. The particular remedies of euery one of them, of the third booke, following that method of this booke, set downe in the Preface. Now that in this first booke we may attaine the knowledge of them, we will first speake of them in generall in this first Chapter, afterward in the Chapters following

ing particularly of euery one of them. I haue not seene any that painteth them out more richly, and to the life, than *Le Sieur du Vair* in his little morall books, whereof I haue made good vse in this passionate subiect.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the passions in generall.

Passion is a violent motion of the *Soule* in the sensitiue part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the *Soule* thinketh to be good for it, or to flie that which it takes to be euill. 1
The description of passions.

But it is necessarie that we know how these motions are made, how they arise and kindle themselves in vs; which a man may represent by diuers meanes and comparisons: first in regard of their agitation and violence. The *Soule* which is but one in the bodie hath many and diuers powers, according to the diuers vessels wherein it is retained, the instruments whereof it maketh vse, and the objects which are presented vnto it. Now when the parts wherein it is inclosed, doe not retaine and occupie it, but according to the proportion of their capacitie, and as farre forth as it is necessarie for their true vse; the effects thereof are sweet, benigne, and well gouerned: but when contrariwise the parts thereof haue more motion and heat than is needfull for them, they change and become hurtfull; no otherwise than the beames of the Sunne, which wandering according to their naturall libertie, do sweetly and pleasingly warme; if they be recollected and gathered into the concauities of a burning glasse, they burne and consume that they were woont to nourish and quicken. Againe, they haue diuers degrees in their force of agitation; and as they haue more or lesse, so they are distinguished; the indifferent suffer themselves to be tasted and digested, expressing themselves by words and teares; the greater and more violent astonish the soule, oppresse it, and hinder the libertie of it actions. *Cura leues loquuntur, ingentes stupent.* 2
Their agitation.

Secondly, in regard of the vice, disorder, and iniustice that is in these passions, we may compare man to a Commonweale, and the state of the soule to a state royall, wherein the Soueraigne 3
Of their vice and irregularitie.

Soueraigne for the gouernment of so many people hath vnder-magistrates, vnto whom for the exercise of their charges he giueth lawes and ordinances, reseruing vnto himselfe the censuring of the greatest and most important occurrents. Vpon this order dependeth the peace and prosperitie of the state: and contrariwise, if the magistrates, which are as the middle sort betwixt the Prince and the people, shall suffer themselues either to be deceiued by facilitie, or corrupted by fauour; and without respect either of their Soueraigne, or the lawes by him established, shall vse their owne authoritie in the execution of their affaires, they fill all with disorder and confusion. Euen so in man, the vnderstanding is the Soueraigne, which hath vnder it a power estimatiue, and imaginatiue, as a magistrate, both to take knowledge, and to iudge by the report of the senses of all things that shalbe presented, and to moue our affections, for the better execution of the iudgements thereof: for the conduct and direction whereof in the exercise of it charge, the law and light of Nature was giuen vnto it: and moreouer, as a helpe in all doubts, it may haue recourse vnto the counsell of the superior and soueraigne, the vnderstanding. And thus you see the order of the happie state heereof: but the vnhappie is when this power which is vnder the vnderstanding, and aboue the senses, whereunto the first iudgement of things appertaineth, suffereth it selfe for the most part to be corrupted and deceiued, whereby it iudgeth wrongfully and rashly, and afterwards manageth and mooueth our affections to ill purpose, and filleth vs with much trouble and vnquietnesse. That which molesteth and corrupteth this power, are first the senses, which comprehend not the true and inward nature of things, but only the face and outward forme, carrying vnto the soule the image of things, with some fauourable commendation, and as it were a fore-iudgement and preiudicate opinion of their qualities, according as they finde them pleasing and agreeable to their particular, and not profitable and necessarie for the vniuersall good of man: and secondly, the mixture of the false and indifferent iudgement of the vulgar sort. From these two false aduise-
ments and reports of the Senses, and vulgar sort, is formed in the soule an inconsiderate

Opinion.

rate

rate opinion, which we conceiue of things, whether good or ill, profitable or hurtfull, to be followed or eschewed; which doubtlesse is a very dangerous guide, and rash mistresse: for it is no sooner conceiued, but presently without the committing of any thing to discourse and vnderstanding, it possesseth it selfe of our imagination, and as within a Citidell, holdeth the fort against right and reason, afterwards it descendeth into our hearts, and remooueth our affections, with violent motiues of hope, feare, heauinesse, pleasure. To be brieve, it makes all the fooles, and the seditions of the soule, which are the passions, to arise.

I will likewise declare the same thing, by another similitude of military policy. The *Senses* are the *Sentinels* of the *Soule*, watching for the preservation thereof, and messengers or scouts to serue as ministers and instruments to the vnderstanding the soueraigne part of the *Soule*. And for the better performance heereof, they haue receiued power to apprehend the things, to draw the formes, and to embrace or reiect them, according as they shall seeme agreeable or odious vnto their nature. Now in exercising their charge, they must bee content to know, and to giue knowledge to others of what doth passe, not enterprising to remoue greater forces, lest by that meanes they put all into an *alarm* and confusion. As in an army, the *Sentinels* many times by want of the watch word, and knowledge of the desseigne and purpose of the Captaine that commandeth, may be deceiued, and take for their succor their enemies disguised which come vnto them, or for enemies those that come to succour: So the Senses by not apprehending whatsoeuer is reason, are many times deceiued by an appearance, and take that for a friend which is our enemy. And when vpon this thought and resolution, not attending the commandement of reason, they go about to remoue the power concupiscible and irascible, they raise a sedition and tumult in our soules, during which time, reason is not heard, nor the vnderstanding obeied.

By this time we see their regiments, their rankes, their generall kindes and speciall. Euery passion is moued by the appearance and opinion, either of what is good, or what is ill. If by that which is good, and that the soule do simply so con-

sider

4
The distinction of the Passions according to their object and subject.

*Of the concupiscible
six.*

*In the irascible
five.*

sider of it, this motion is called Loue. If it be present and such whereof the *Soule* in it selfe taketh comfort, it is called pleasure and ioy : if it be to come, it is called desire : if by that which is euill, it is hate : if it be present in our selues, it is sorrow and grieve : if in another, it is pity : if it bee to come, it is feare. And these which arise in vs by the obiect of an apparant euill, which we abhor and flie from, descend more deeply into our hearts, and arise with greater difficulty. And this is the first band of that seditious rowt, which trouble the rest and quiet of our soules, that is, in the concupiscible part, the effects whereof notwithstanding they are very dangerous, yet they are not so violent as those that follow them: for these first motions formed in this parte, by the obiect which presenteth it selfe, do passe incontinently into the irascible part, that is to say, into that compasse where the soule seeketh the meanes to obtaine or auoid that which seemeth vnto it either good or ill. And then euen as a wheele that is alreadie in motion, receiuing another motion by a new force, turnes with farre greater speede; so the *Soule* being already mooued by the first apprehension, ioining a second endeouour to the first, carrieth it selfe with farre more violence than before, and is stirred vp by passions more puissant and difficult to be tamed; inasmuch as they are doubled, and now coupled to the former, vniting themselues, and backing the one the other by a mutuall consent: for the first passions, which are formed vpon an obiect of an appearing good, entring into consideration of meanes whereby to obtain it, stirre vp in vs either hope or despaire. They that are formed vpon an obiect of an euill to come, stirre vp in vs either feare, or the contrarie, which is audacitie; of a present euill, choler and courage: which passions are strangely violent, and wholly peruert the reason which they finde already shaken. Thus you see the principall windes from whence arise the tempests of our *Soule*, and the pit whereout they rise is nothing else but the opinion (which commonly is false, wandring, vncertaine, contrary to nature, veritie, reason, certaintie) that a man hath, that the things that present themselues vnto vs, are either good or ill: for hauing conceiued them to be such, we either folow them, or with violence flie from them. And these are our passions.

O F

An Aduertisement.

WE wil entreat of their natures, that we may thereby see their follies, vanitie, misery, iniustice, & that foulness that is in them, to the end we may know & learne how iustly to hate them. The counsell that is giuen for the auoidance of them is in the bookes following. These are the two parts of *Lib. 3. in the vertue of Fortitude & Temperance.* physicke, to shew the maladie, and to giue the remedy. It remaineth therefore that heere we first speake of all those that respect the appearing good, which are loue and the kindes thereof, desire, hope, despaire, ioy; and afterwards all those that respect the ill, which are many, choler, hatred, enuie, ienalouie, reuenge, crueltie, feare, sadnesse, compassion.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Loue in generall.

THE first and chiefe mistresse of all the passions is Loue, *The distinction of loue and comparison.* which consisteth of diuers subiects, and whereof there are diuers sorts and degrees. There are three principall kinds vnto which all the rest are referred (we speake of the vitious and passionate loue, for of the vertuous, which is Amitie, Charitie, Dilection, we will speake in the vertue of Iustice) *Lib. 3.* that is to say, Ambition or Pride, which is the loue of greatness and honour; Couetousnesse, the loue of riches; and voluptuous or carnall loue. Beholde heere the three gulfes, and precipitate steepes, from which, few there are that can defend themselves: the three plagues and infections of all that we haue in hand, the minde, bodie and goods: the armories of those three captaine enemies of the health and quiet of mankinde, the Diuell, the flesh, the world. These are in truth three powers, the most common and vniuersall passions: and therefore the Apostle hath diuided into these three, whatsoever is in the world, *Quicquid est in mundo, est concupiscentia oculorum, aut carnis, aut superbia vite.* Ambition, as more spirituall, so it is more high and noble than the others. Voluptuous loue, as more naturall and vniuersall (for it is euen in beasts themselves, where the rest are not) so it is more violent,

lent, and lesse vitious : I say simply violent, for sometimes Ambition excelles it : but this is some particular maladie. Couetousnesse of all the rest is the sickest and most sottish.

CHAP. XX.

Of Ambition.

1
The descrip-
tion.

Ambition (which is a thirst after honour and glorie, a gluttonous and excessiue desire of greatnesse) is a sweet and pleasing passion, which distilleth easily into generous spirits, but is not without paine got forth againe. We thinke it is our dueties to embrace what is good, and amongst those good things, we account of honour more than them all. See heere the reason, why with all our strength wee run vnto it. An ambitious man will alwayes be the first, he neuer looks backward, but still forward to those that are before him : and it is a greater grieve vnto him to suffer one to go beyond him, than it is pleasure vnto him, to leaue a thousand behind him.

Senec1.

Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio, non respicit. It is twofolde : the one of glory and honor, the other of greatnesse and command : that is profitable to the world, and in some sense permitted, as shall be proued : this pernicious.

2
It is natural.

The seed and root of ambition is naturall in vs. There is a prouerbe that saith, That Nature is content with a little : and another quite contrarie, That Nature is neuer satisfied, neuer content : but it still desireth, hath a will to mount higher, and to enrich it selfe, and it goeth not a slow pace neither, but with a loose bridle it runneth headlong to greatnesse and glorie. *Natura nostra imperij est auida, & ad implendum cupiditatem praecept.* And with such force and violence doe some men runne, that they breake their owne necks, as many great men haue done, euen at the dawning as it were, and vpon the point of entrance and full fruition of that greatnesse which hath cost them so deare. It is a naturall and very powerfull passion, and in the end is the last that leaueth vs : and therefore one calleth it, The shirt of the soule : because it is the last vice it putteth off. *Etiam sapientibus cupido gloria nouissima exuitur.*

Tacitus.

3

Ambition, as it is the strongest and most powerfull passion that

that is, so is it the most noble and haughty; the force and puissance thereof is shewed, in that it mastereth and surmounteth all other things, euen the strongest of the world, yea all other passions and affections, euen loue it selfe, which seemeth neuerthelessse to contend with it for the Primacy. As we may see in all the great men of the world, *Alexander, Scipio, Pompey*, and many other, who haue couragiously refused to touch the most beautifull damosels, that were in their power, burning neuerthelessse with ambition; yea that victory they had ouer loue, serued their ambition, especially in *Cesar*: For neuer was there a man more giuen to amorous delights, euen of all sexes, and all sorts of people, witnesse so many exploits both at *Rome* and in strange countries, nor more carefull and curious in adorning his person; yet ambition did alwaies so carry him, that for his amorous pleasures hee neuer lost an houre of time which he might employ to the enlargement of his greatnesse, for ambition had the soueraigne place in him, and did fully possesse him. We see on the other side that in *Marcus Antonius* and others, the force of loue hath made them to forget the care and conduct of their affaires. But yet both of them being weighed in equall ballance, ambition carieth away the price. They that hold that loue is the stronger, say that both the soule and the body, the whole man, is possessed by it, yea that health it selfe dependeth thereupon. But contrariwise it seemeth that ambition is the stronger, because it is altogether spirituall. And in as much as loue possesseth the body, it is therefore the more weake, because it is subiect to faciey, and therefore capable of remedies, both corporall, naturall and strange, as experience sheweth of many, who by diuers meanes haue alaiied, yea quite extinguished the force and fury of this passion; but ambition is not capable of faciey, yea it is sharpned by the fruition of that it desireth, and there is no way to extinguish it, being altogether in the soule it selfe and in the reason.

It doth likewise vanquish loue and robbeth it, not onlie of it health and tranquillity (for glory & tranquillity are things ⁴ that cannot lodge together) but also of it owne proper life, as *Agrippina* the mother of *Nero* doth plainly proue, who desiring and consulting with others to make hir sonne Emperour, and

*The force
and primacy
thereof.*

*The care
of life.*

and vnderstanding that it could not bee done, but with the losse of her owne life, she answered, as if ambition it selfe had spoken it, *Occidar modò imperet.*

5
The lawes.

Thirdly, Ambition enforceth all the lawes, and conscience it selfe; the learned haue said of ambition, that it is the part of euery honest man alwaies to obey the lawes, except it bee in a case of soueraignty for a kingdome which only deserueth a dispensation, being so dainty a morsell, that it cannot but breake a mans fast, *Si violandum est ius, regnandi causa violandum est, in ceteris pietatem colas.*

6
Religion.

1. Tim. 6.

It likewise trampleth vnder foote and contemnerh the reuerence & respect of religion, witnesse *Ieroboam, Mahumet*, who neuer tooke thought for religion, but tolerated all religions so he might raigne: and all those arch-hereticks who haue liked better to be chiefe leaders in errours and lies with a thousand disorders, than to be disciples of the trueth: and therefore saith the Apostle, that they that suffer themselues to bee puffed vp with this passion and affection, make shipwracke, and wander from the faith, piercing themselues thorow with many sorowes.

7
It enforceth
Nature.

To be short, it offereth violence euen to the lawes of Nature it selfe. This hath beene the cause of so many murders of parents, infants, brothers; witnesse *Absalon, Abimelech, Athalias, Romulus, Set* King of the *Persians*, who killed both his father and brother, *Soliman* the Great Turke his two brothers. So that nothing is able to resist the force of ambition, it beats all to the ground, so high and haughtie is it. It lodgeth only in great mindes, euen in the Angels themselues.

8
It is a losy
passion.

Ambition is not the vice or passion of base companions, nor of common or small attempts, and dayly enterprises: Renowne and glorie doth not prostitute it selfe to so base a price; it pursueth not those things that are simply and solely good and profitable, but those that are rare, high, difficult, strange and vnusuall. That great thirst after honour and reputation, that casts downe a man, and makes him a begger, and to ducke and stoop to all sorts of people, & by all means, yea the most abiect, at what base price soeuer, is vile and dishonourable: it is a shame and dishonour so to be honoured. A man must not be greedie of greater glorie than he is capable

ble of; and to swell and to be puffed vp for euery good and profitable action, is to shew his taile while hee lifts vp his head.

Ambition hath many and diuers waies, and is practised by diuers meanes: there is one way strait and open, such as *Alexander, Cesar, Themistocles* rooke; there is another oblique and hidden, which many philosophers and professors of pietie haue taken, who goe forwards by going backward, goe before others by going behind them, not vnlike to wicdrawers, who draw and goe backward; they would faine be glorious by contemning glory. And to say the trueth, there is greater glory in refusing and trampling glory vnder foot, than in the desire and fruition thereof, as *Plato* told *Diogenes*. And ambition is neuer better caried, better guided, than by wandering, and vnsuall wayes. 9 *It hath diuers waies.*

Ambition is a follie and a vanitie, for it is as much as if a man should run to catch the smoake in stead of the light, the shadow in stead of the bodie, to fasten the contentment of his minde vpon the opinion of the vulgar sort, voluntarily to renounce his owne libertie, to follow the passions of others, to enforce himselfe to displease himselfe; for the pleasure of the beholders, to let his owne affections depend vpon the eyes of another; so farre forth to loue vertue as may be to the liking of the common sort; to doe good not for the loue of good, but reputation. This is to be like vnto vessels when they are pierced, a man can draw nothing forth before hee giue them a vent. 10 *It is a folly.*

Ambition hath no limits, it is a gulfe that hath neither brinke nor bottome; it is that vacuitie which the Philosophers could neuer finde in Nature; a fire which encreaseth by that nourishment that is giuen vnto it. Wherein it truly paieth his master: for ambition is only iust in this, that it sufficeth for his owne punishment, and is executioner to it selfe. The wheele of Ixion is the motion of his desires, which turne and returne vp and downe, neuer giuing rest vnto his minde. 11 *It is insatiable.*

They that will flatter ambition, say it is a seruant or helpe vnto vertue, and a spurre to beautifull actions; for it quitteth a man of all other finnes, and in the end, of himselfe too; and all for vertue: but it is so farre from this, that it hideth some- 12 *The excuses of ambition vaine.*
times

times our vices, but it takes them not away, but it couereth or rather hatcheth them for a time vnder the deceitfull cinders of a malicious hypocrisie, with hope to set them on fire altogether, when they haue gotten authoritie sufficient to raigne publikely and with impietie. Serpents lose not their venom, though they be frozen with colde, nor an ambitious man his vices though with a colde dissimulation hee couer them: for when he is arriued to that pitch of height that he desired, he then makes them feelee what he is. And though ambition quit a man of all other vices, yet it neuer taketh away it selfe. An ambitious man putteth himselfe foorth to great and honourable actions, the profit whereof returneth to the publike good, but yet he is neuer the better man that performes them, because they are not the actions of vertue but of passion, no though that saying be often in his mouth, We are not borne for our selues but the weale publike. The meanes men vse to mount themselves to high estate, and their carriages in their states and charges, when they are arriued thereunto, do sufficiently shew what men they are, and their owne consciences telles the most that follow that dance, that howsoeuer the publike good be their outward colour, yet their owne particular is that they intend.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill you shall finde *Lib. 3. cap. 42. pag. 545.*

C H A P. XXI.

Of Couetousnesse and her counter-passion.

1
What it is.

TO loue and affect riches is couetousnesse; not only the loue and affection, but also euery ouer-curious care and industrie about riches; yea their dispensations themselves and libertie, with art and too much attention procured, haue a sent of couetousnesse: for they are not woorthie an earnest care and attention. *SEE p. 217.*

2
The force thereof.

The desire of goods and the pleasure we take in possessing of them is grounded only vpon opinion. The immoderate desire to get riches is a gangrene in our soule, which with a venomous heat consumeth our naturall affections, to the end it might fill vs with virulent humours. So loone as it is lodged

ged in our hearts, all honest and naturall affection which we owe either to our parents or friends, or our selues, vanisheth away. All the rest in respect of our profit seemeth nothing, yea we forget in the end, and contemne our selues, our bodies, our mindes, for this transitory trash, and as the Prouerbe is, We sell our horse to get vs hay.

Couetousnesse is the vile and base passion of vulgar fooles, who account riches the principall good of man, and feare pouertie as the greatest euill; and not contenting themselues with necessarie meanes, which are forbidden no man, weigh that is good in a Goldsmiths ballance, when nature hath taught vs to measure it by the ell of necessitie. For what greater follie can there be, than to adore that which Nature it selfe hath put vnder our feet, and hidden in the bowels of the earth as vnworthy to be seene, yea rather to be contemned, and trampled vnder foot? This is that that the only sinne of man hath torne out of the intrailes of the earth, and brought vnto light, to kill himselfe. *In lucem propter quæ pugnauerimus excuimus: non erubescimus summa apud nos haberi, quæ fuerunt ima terrarum.* Nature seemeth euen in the first birth of golde, and wombe from whence it proceedeth, after a sort to haue presaged the miserie of those that are in loue with it: for it hath so ordered the matter, that in those countreys where it groweth, there growes with it neither grasse, nor plant, nor other thing that is woorth any thing, as giuing vs to vnderstand thereby, that in those mindes where the desire of this mettall growes, there can not remaine so much as a sparke of true honour and vertue: for what thing can be more base, than for a man to disgrace, and to make himselfe a seruant and a slaue to that, which should be subiect vnto him? *Apud sapientem diuitie sunt in seruitute, apud stultum in imperio.* For a couetous man serues his riches, not they him, and he is sayd to haue goods as he hath a feuer, which holdeth and tyranniseth ouer a man, not he ouer it. What thing more vile than to loue that which is not good, neither can make a good man, yea is common, and in the possession of the most wicked of the world, which many times peruert good maners, but neuer amend them? Without which so many wise men haue made themselues happy, and by which many wicked men

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The follie &
miserie of
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in fine points

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There is another contrary passion to this, and vicious, to hate riches, and to spend them prodigally; this is to refuse the meanes to doe well, to put in practise many vertues, and to flie that labour which is farre greater in the true command and vse of riches, than in not hauing them at all; to gouerne himselfe better in abundance than in pouertie. In this there is but one kinde of vertue, which is, not to faint in courage, but to continue firme and constant. In abundance there are many, Temperance, Moderation, Liberalitie, Diligence, Prudence, and so forth. There, more is not expressed, but that he looke to himselfe: heere, that he attend first himselfe, and then the good of others. He that is spoiled of his goods hath the more libertie to attend the more weightie affaires of the spirit: and for this cause many, both Philosophers and Christians, out of the greatnesse of their courage, haue put it in practise. He doth likewise discharge himselfe of many duties and difficulties that are required in the good and honest gouernment of our riches, in their acquisition, conseruation, distribution, vse and emploiment: but he that quitteth himselfe of his riches for this reason, flieth the labour and businesse that belongs vnto them; and quite contrary doth it not out of courage, but cowardize: and a man may tell him, that he shakes off his riches, not because they are not profitable, but

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CHAP. XXII.

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foule, since naturall? In crying, laughing, champing, gaping, the visage is more distorted: Is it to the end it may serue as a bridle and a stay to such a kinde of violence? Why then doth Nature cause such a violence? Or contrariwise: Is it because shame serueth as a spurre, and as sulfure; or that the instruments thereof moue without our consent, yea against our willes? By this reason beasts likewise should be bashfull: and many other things moue of themselues in vs without our consent, which are neither vicious nor shamefull; not only inward and hidden (as the pulse & motion of the heart, arteries, lungs, the instruments and parts that serue the appetite, of eating, drinking, discharging the braine, the bellie, and their shuttings and openings, are besides, nay many times, against our willes, (witnesse those sneefings, yawnings, teares, hoquets and fluxions, that are not in our owne power, and this of the bodie: the spirit forgetteth, remembreth, beleeueth, misbeleeueth, and the will it selfe, which many times willeth that which we would it willed not) but outward and apparant: the visage blusherh, waxeth pale, wanne, the bodie groweth fat, leane, the haire turneth gray, blacke, white, growes, stands on end, without and against our consent. Is it that hereby the pouertie and weaknesse of man may be the more truely shewed? That is as well seene in our eating and drinking, our griefs, wearinesse, the disburdening of our bodies, death, whereof a man is not ashamed. Whatsoeuer the reason be, the action in it selfe and by nature is no way shamefull, it is truely naturall; so is not shame: witnesse the beasts. Why say I beasts? The nature of man, sayth Diuinitie, mainteining it selfe in it first originall state, had neuer knowen what shame was, as now it doth; for from whence commeth shame but from weaknesse, and weaknesse but from sinne, there being nothing in nature of it selfe shamefull? The cause then of this shame not being in nature, we must seeke it elsewhere. It is therefore artificiall. It is an inuention forged in the closet of *Venus* to giue the greater prise to the businesse, and to inkindle the desire thereof the more. This is with a little water to make the fire burne the cleerer, as Smithes vse to doe, to inflame the desire to see what it is that is hidden; to heare and know what it is that is muttered
and

and whispered. For to handle things darkly as if they were mysteries, and with respect and shame, giueth taste and estimation vnto them. Contrariwise, a loose, free and open permission and commoditie, derogateth from the worth, and taketh away the true relish and delight thereof.

This action then in it selfe, and simply taken, is neither shamefull nor vitious, since it is naturall and corporall, no more than other the like actions are: yea, if it be well ordered, it is iust, profitable, necessarie, at the least, as it is to eat and drinke. But that which doth so much discredit it, is, that moderation is seldome kept therein; and that to attaine thereunto, we make great stirres; and many times vse bad meanes, whereby it draweth after it, if it go not before, many euils all worse than the action it selfe. The charge riseth aboue the principall, and this is to fish (as it is sayd) with threeds of golde and purple. And all this is purely humane. Beasts that follow simple nature, are quit from all these troubles. But the art of man on the one side sets a strait gard about it, planteth at the gate shame to giue it a relish: on the other side (ô the cousinage of men!) it inflameth and sharpneth the desire, it deuifeth, remoueth, troubleth, turneth all topsieturue to attaine vnto it, (witness Poetrie, which sporteth not it selfe in any thing so much as in this subiect) and findeth euery entrance vnto it to be better, than by the gate, and the lawfull way, and followeth euery wandring way, rather than the common way of marriage. *see pag. 534, & 542.*

CHAP. XXII.

Desires, Concupiscence.

Here arise not so many billowes and waues in the sea, as desires in the heart of man: it is a bottomlesse depth, it is infinite, diuers, inconstant, confused, and irresolute, yea many times horrible and detestable, but ordinarily vaine, and ridiculous in it owne desires.

But first it shall not be amisse to distinguish them. Some are naturall, and they are iust and lawfull: they are likewise in beasts, they haue their limits and bounds, a man may see the end of them; and liuing according to those, there is no

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Not natu-
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Seneca.

man a begger. Of these shall be spoken heereafter more at large : for (to say the trueth) these are not passions. Others are besides nature proceeding from our opinion and fantasie, artificiall, superfluous, which we may, for distinctions sake, call Concupiscences or Lusts. These are purely humane, beasts know not what they are, only man is immoderate in his appetites : these are without limits, without end, and are naught els but confusion. *Desideria naturalia finita sunt, ex falsa opinione nascentia, ubi desinant non habent. Nullus enim terminus falso est : via eum aliquid extremum est error immensus est.* And therefore living according to these, there is no man can be rich and contented. Of these it is properly that wee haue spoken in the beginning of this Chapter, and that we farther intend in this matter of the passions. It is for these that a man sweats, and trauels, *ad supernacua sudatur*, that a man journeyeth by sea and by land, goeth to warre, killes himselfe, drownes, betrayes, loseth himselfe : and therefore it was well sayd, That concupiscence is the root of all euill. Now it falleth out many times (a iust punishment) that when a man seeketh how to satisfie his desires, and to glut himselfe with the goods and pleasures of Fortune, he loseth and is deprived of those of Nature : and therefore *Diogenes* hauing refused that money that *Alexander* offered him, desired him to giue him that he had taken from him, to go out of the Sunne. See pag. 293.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Hope, Despaire.

OUR desires and concupiscences gather heat and redouble their force by hope, which inflameth with the soft and gentle aire thereof our foolish desires, kindleth in our mindes a fire, from whence ariseth a thicke smoake, which blindeth our vnderstanding; carrieth with it our thoughts, holds them hanging in the clouds, makes vs dreame waking. So long as our hopes endure, or desires endure with them : it is a play-game wherewith Nature busieth our mindes. Contrariwise, when despaire is once lodged neere vs, it tormenteth our soules in such sort, with an opinion of neuer obtaining that we desire, that all businesse besides must yeeld vnto

vnto it. And for the loue of that which wee thinke neuer to obtaine, wee lose euen the rest of whatsoeuer wee possesse. This passion is like vnto little children, who to be reuenged of him that hath taken one of their play-games from them, cast the rest into the fire. It is angry with it selfe, and requirereth of it selfe the punishment of it owne follie and infelicitie. After those passions that respect the apparent good, come we to those that respect the euill.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Choler.

CHoler is a foolish passion which putteth vs wholly out of our selues, and with seeking the meanes to withstand and beat backe the euill which it threatneth vs, or hath already procured vs, maketh the blood to boile in our hearts, and stirreth vp furious vapors in our spirits, which blinde vs and cast vs headlong to whatsoeuer may satisfie the desire which we haue of reuenge. It is a short furie, a way to madnesse: by the prompt and readie impetuositie and violence thereof, it carrieth and surmounteth all passions. *Repentina & vis vniuersa eius est.*

The causes that dispose and mooue vnto choler are first weaknesse of spirit, as we see by experience in women, olde men, infants, sicke men, who are commonly more cholericke than others. *Inuolidum omne, natura querulum est.* A man deceiueth himselfe to thinke that there is courage where there is violence: violent motions are like the endeouours of children and olde men, who runne when they thinke to goe: for there is nothing more weake than an immoderate motion: and a great imbecillitie is it in a man to be cholericke. Secondly, the maladie of the minde, whereby it is made ouertender to beare blowes, as the vlcerate parts of the bodie, where the sound being interessed therein, are astonished and wounded with light matters. *Nusquam sine querela agram guntur.* The losse of a penie, or the omission of a gaine, puts into choler a couetous man; a laughter or glance of his wife stirres this passion in a ieaious man. Thirdly, lust, vaine nicesse, selfe-loue, which makes a man anxious and angry, puts him

him into choler for the least cause that may be. *Nulla res magis iracundiam alit quam luxuria.* This loue of trifles, of a glasse, a dogge, a bird, is a kinde of follie that troubleth vs much, and stirres vp this cholericke passion in vs. Fourthly, too much curiositie, *qui nimis inquirat, seipsum inquietat.* This is to seeke occasions, and out of the lightnesse of the heart to cast a man into choler, not attending any cause thereof. *Sape ad nos ira venit, sepius nos ad illam.* Fiftly, lightnesse in beleeuing what comes first to the eare. But the principall and formall cause is, an opinion of contempt and misusage, either by word, deed, countenance. These are the reasons whereby we pretend to iustifie our choler.

³
The signes. The signes and symptoms are very manifest, and more than of any other passion; and so strange, that they alter and change the whole estate of man, they transforme and disfigure him, *ut sit difficile utrum magis detestabile vitium, aut deforme.* Some of them are outward, the face red and deformed, the eyes fire, the looks furious, the eare deafe, the mouth foaming, the heart panting, the pulse beating, the veines swollen, the tongue stammering, the teeth gnashing, the voice loud and hoarse, the speech imperfect, and to be brieft, it puts the whole body into a fire and a feuer. Some haue broken their veines, suppress their vrine, whereby present death hath ensued. What then can the estate of the spirit be within, when it causeth so great a disorder without. Choler at the first blow driueth away and banisheth reason and iudgement, to the end it may wholly possesse the place; afterwards it fillles all with fire, and smoake, and darknesse, and noise, like vnto him that puts the master out of the house, and then sets fire and burnes himselfe alieue within; or like vnto a ship, that hath neither sterne, nor Pilot, nor sailes, nor oares, which commits it fortune to the mercie of the waues, windes, and tempest in the middest of a furious sea.

⁴
The effects. The effects thereof are great, many times miserable and lamentable. Choler first enforceth vs to iniustice, for it is kindled and sharpened by a iust opposition, and by the knowledge that a man hath of the little reason he hath to be angry. Hee that is moued to anger vpon a false occasion, if a man yeeld him any good reason why he should not be angry, he is presently

sently more incensed euen against the truth and innocency it selfe, *Pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas ira, quasi argumentū sit instē irascendi graniter irasci.* The example of *Piso* is very notable and prooues this true, who excelling otherwise in vertue (the history is very well knowen) being mooued to choler, did vniustly put three to death, and by a subtile accusation caused them to be found guilty, only because they acquitted one as vnguiltly whom hee by his former sentence had condemned. It is likewise sharpened by silence and cold replie, as gathering thereby that it proceedeth out of a contempt both of him and his choler; which is proper vnto women, who many times are angrie to the end they may stirre vp that passion in another, and increase their choler euen to fury, when they see that a man vouchsafeth not to nourish that humour in them, by chiding with them. So that *Choler* sheweth it selfe to bee more sauage than a beast, since neither by defence or excuse, nor by silence and patience without defence, it will not be woon nor pacified. The iniustice thereof is likewise in this, that it will be both a iudge and a party, that it will that all take part with it, and growes to defiance with as many as will seeme to contradict it. Secondly, forasmuch as it is inconsiderate and heady, it casteth vs headlong into great mischiefs, and sometimes euen into those which most flie, and doe wish and would willingly procure another man, *dat pœnas dum exigit*, or farre worse. This passion is fitly compared to great ruines, which burst themselues in pieces vpon that which they fall, it pursueth with such violence the ill of another, that it heeds not the auoiding of it owne. It intrappeth and intangleth vs, makes vs to speake and to do things, shamefull, vncomely, vnworthy our selues. Lastly, it carrieth vs so beyond our selues, that it makes vs to doe things scandalous, dangerous, and irreuocable, murders, poisonings, treasons, whereby follow great and too late repentances: witnesse *Alexander* the great after he had slaine *Cytus*, and therefore *Pythagoras* was wont to say, that the end of *Choler* was the beginning of repentance.

This passion feedes vpon it selfe, flattereth and tickleth it selfe, with a perswasion that it hath reason, that it is iust, excusing it selfe vpon the malice and indiscretion of another, but

but the iniustice of another cannot make that iust; nor the losse that wee receiue by another make that profitable vnto vs: it is too rash and inconsiderat to do any thing that is good: it would cure an euill with an euill; for to yeeld the correction of an offence to *Choler*, is to correct a vice by it selfe. Reason which should haue the command ouer vs, needs no such officers as of their owne heads execute lawes, not attending her ordinance; she would haue all things done according to nature by measure, and therefore violence doth no way besit it. But what, shall vertue see the insolencie of vice and not be angry with it? shall the libertie therof be so bridled as not to dare to bee moued against the wicked? vertue desires no indecent libertie, it needes not turne it owne strength against it selfe, nor that the wickednesse of another should trouble it: a wise man must as well beare the vices of a wicked man without choler, as his prosperitie without enuie. Hee must endure the indiscretions of rash and inconsiderate men, with the selfe same patience that Physitians do the iniuries of mad men. There is no greater wisdom, nor more profitable in the world, than to endure the follie of another, for otherwise by not suffering it with patience, we make it our owne. That which hath heeretofore beene spoken touching *Choler*, may likewise be spoken of these passions following, hatred, enuie, reuenge, which are made or formed *Cholers*.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill are

Lib. 3. cap. 31. p. 524.

CHAP. XXVI.

Hatred.

HAtred is a strange passion, which strangely and without reason troubleth vs: and to say the truth, what is there in the world that tormenteth vs more? By this passion we put our selues into the power of him that we hate, to afflict and vex vs; the sight of him mooueth our senses, the remembrance stirreth our spirits both waking and sleeping; yea we neuer present him to our memories but with despight and gnashing of teeth, which puts vs besides our selues, and teares our owne hearts; whereby we suffer in our selues, the punishment

ment of that euill we wish vnto another. He which hateth is the patient, he that is hated, the agent: contrary to the sound of the words, the hater is in torment, the hated in ease. But what do we hate? Men, or their matters and affaires? Doubtlesse wee hate nothing that wee should; for if there be any thing to be hated in this world, it is hate it selfe, and such like passions, contrary to that which should command in vs.

Particular considerations and remedies against this euill, are *Lib. 3. cap. 32. p. 528.*

CHAP. XXVII.

Enuie.

ENuie is cousen-germaine to Hatred; a miserable passion and outragious beast, which in torment excelleth hell it selfe. It is a desire of that good that another possesseth, which gnaweth our heart, and turneth the good of another man to our owne hurt. But how should it torment vs, since it is as well against that which is ill, as that which is good? Whilest an enuious man looketh obliquely vpon the goods of another man, he loseth what is good in himselfe, or at leastwise takes no delight in it.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are *Lib. 3. cap. 33. p. 528.*

CHAP. XXVIII.

Jealousie.

Jealousie is a passion like almost, both in nature and effect, vnto Enuie, but that it seemeth that Enuie considereth not what is good, but in as much as it is in the possession of another man, and that we desire it for our selues; and Jealousie concerneth our owne proper good, whereof wee feare another doth partake.

Jealousie is a weake maladie of the soule, absurd, vaine, terrible and tyrannicall, it insinuateth it selfe vnder the title of amitie; but after it hath gotten possession, vpon the selfe-same foundation of loue and good will, it buildeth an everlasting hate. Vertue, health, merit, reputation, are the incendiaries

¹ what it is.

² The weakness thereof.

diaries of this rage, or rather the fewell vnto this furie.

3
The venom
thereof.

It is likewise the Gaule that corrupteth all the Hony of our life : it is commonly mingled with the sweetest and pleasantst actions, which it maketh so sharpe and sower as nothing more : it changeth loue into hate, respect into disdain, assurance into diffidence : it ingendreth a pernicious curiosity and desire in a man to cleere himselfe of that euill, which being past remedie, by too much stirring stinketh the more : For what doth he but publish, put out of all doubt, bring into the light, sound with a trumpet his owne shame and miserie, and the dishonour of his owne children ?

Particular considerations and remedies against this euill, are *Lib. 3. cap. 35. p. 530.*

CHAP. XXIX.

Reuenge.

1
A cowardly
passion.

THE desire of Reuenge is first a cowardly and effeminate passion, proceeding from a base, weake and abiect mind, which experience telleth vs to be true : for we commonly see the weakest mindes the most malicious and reuengefull, as women and children. The valiant and generous mind doth little feele this passion, but contemneth and disdaineth it, either because the iniurie toucheth him not, or because he that offereth the iniurie is not worthy his reuenge, as not daining so farre to debase himselfe : *indignus Caesaris ira.* The haile, thunder, and tempests, and those fearefull motions that are in the aire, doe neither trouble nor touch the superior celestiall bodies, but only the weake and inferior : and euen so the indiscretions and childish brawles of fooles wound not great and high minds. All the great men of the world, *Alexander, Caesar, Epaminondas, Scipio,* haue been so farre from reuenge, that quite contrarie, they haue done good vnto their enemies.

2
Biting.

Secondly, it is a boiling and biting passion, and like a worme it gnaweth the hearts of those that are infected with it; it molesteth them by day, and by night keepes them awaked.

3
Iniust.

It is likewise full of iniustice, for it tormenteth the innocent,

cent, and addeth affliction. It is to make the party offending, to feele that euill and punishment, which the desire of reuenge giueth to a mans heart; and the partie offended goes to lay on the burthen, as if he had not already hurt enough by the iniurie receiued; in such sort, that many times and ordinarily, whilest he tormenteth himselfe to seeke meanes of reuenge, he that hath committed the offence laughs and makes himselfe merrie with it. But it is also farre more vniust in the meanes of the execution, which many times is wrought by treasons and villanous practises.

Lastly, the execution is not only painfull but dangerous too; for experience telleth vs, that he that seeks to be reuenged, doth not that which he would, and what his blow intendeth, but commonly that which he would not come to passe, and thinking to put out the eye of his enemy, he putteth out both his owne. The feare of iustice tormenteth him, and the care to hide him those that loue him.

Againe, to kill and to make an end of his enemy, is not reuenge, but meere crueltie, which proceedeth from cowardlineffe and feare. To be reuenged is to beat his enemy, to make him stoope; not to kill him: for by killing hee feeles not the power of his wrath, which is the end of reuenge. And this is the reason why a man cares not to be reuenged vpon a dogge or a beast, because he can no way taste or conceit his reuenge. In true reuenge there must be a kinde of pleasure and delight in the reuenger; and he vpon whom he is reuenged must feele the weight of his displeasure, suffer paine, & repent him of the cause, which being kild he cannot do: yea he is rather freed thereby from all miserie, and contrariwise he that is the reuenger endureth many times that torment & feare which he wished to his enemy. To kill then is a token of cowardlineffe and feare, lest his enemy feeling the force of his reuenge should liue to requite him with the like; which though it make an end of the quarrell, yet it woundeth his reputation, it is a tricke of precaution and not of courage, and is the way to proceed safely but not honorably. *Qui occidit longe non ulciscitur, nec gloriam assequitur.*

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are

Lib. 3. cap. 34. p. 529.

CHAP.

Crueltie.

CRueltie is a villanous and detestable vice, and against nature, and therefore it is likewise called Inhumanitie. It proceedeth from weaknesse, *omnis ex infirmitate feritas est*, and it is the daughter of cowardlinesse: for a valourous man doth alwayes exercise his strength against a resisting enemy, whom he hath no sooner at his mercie, but he is satisfied: *Romana virtus, parcere subiectis, debellare superbos*. Forasmuch therefore as cowardly weaknesse can not be of this ranke, to the end it may yet get the name of valour, it makes blood and massacres the prooffe thereof. Murders in victories are commonly executed by common people, and the officers of the baggage. Tyrants are bloody, because they feare, not knowing how to secure themselves, but by rooting out those that may offend them; and therefore they exercise their crueltie against all, euen women too, because they feare all, *cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timet*. Cowardlie dogges bite and teare with their teeth, within the house, the skinnies of those wild beasts, which in the open field they durst not looke vpon. What makes ciuill warres so cruell, but that tie wherewith the common people are led and linked, who like dogs that are backt by their master backe one another? The Emperour *Mauritius* being tolde that one *Phocas* a souldier should kill him, enquired what he was, and of what nature and condition; and being tolde by his sonne in law *Philip* that he was a base coward: Why then, saith he, no maruell if he be a murderer and cruell. It proceedeth likewise from the inward malignitie of the soule, which feedeth and delighteth it selfe with the hurt of another. Monsters, like *Caligula*.

C H A P. XXXI.

Sadnesse, or Heauinesse of heart.

.I
The descrip-
tion.

SAdnesse is a languishing feeblenesse of the spirit, and a skinde of discouragement ingendered by the opinion that we haue of the greatnesse of those euils that afflict vs. It is a dangerous enemy to our rest, which presently weakeneth
and

and quelleth our soules, if we take not good heede; and taketh from vs the vse of reason and discourse, and the means whereby to provide for our affaires, and with time it rusteth and fenoweth the soule, it corrupteth the whole man, brings his vertues asleepe, euen then when he hath most need to keepe them awaked, to withstand that euil which oppresseth them: but we must discouer the foulness and follie, the pernicious effects, yea the iniustice that is in this cowardly, base, and feeble passion, to the end wee may learne with all our might to flie and auoid it, as most vnworthy the wisest men, according to the doctrine of the Stoicks; which is not so easy to be done, because it excuseth and couereth it selfe with many beautifull colours of nature, pietie, goodnesse, yea the greatest part of the world it drawes to honour and fauour it, making it an ornament to wisdom, vertue, conscience.

First then it is so farre from being naturall (as it would make men beleue) that it is formall, and an enemie to nature, as may easily be prooued. Touching ceremonious sorrowes and publike mournings, so much affected and practised in former times, and likewise at this present (my meaning is not to touch the honestie and moderation of obsequies and funerals, nor that sorrow that belongs to piety and religion) what greater imposture or deceitfull couenage can there be in any thing besides? How many fained and artificiall counterfeited couenages are there with no small cost and charges, both in those whom it concerneth, the authors of the sport, and those whose offices they make vse of in that businesse? For to giue the better credit to their iugling tricks they hire people to lament, and to send vp their shrieking cries and lamentations, which all men know to bee fained and extorted for mony, teares that are not shed but to bee seene, and so soone as they are out of sight are dried vp; where is it that nature hath taught vs this? Nay what is there that nature doth more abhorre and condemne? It is a tyrannicall, false and vulgar opinion (the worst, as hath beene said, almost of all the passions) that teacheth vs to weepe and lament in such a case. And if a man cannot finde occasion of teares & a heavy countenance in him selfe, he must buy it at a deare price in another; in such sort that to satisfie this opinion, hee must enter into a great charge

2

Not naturall.
Publike mournings.

Particular.

charge whereof nature if we would credit it, would willingly discharge vs. Is not this willingly and publicly to betray reason, to enforce and to corrupt nature, to prostitute his owne manhood, to mocke both the world and himselfe, to satisfie the vulgar sort, which produce nothing but error, and account of nothing that is not counterfeit and disguised? Neither are those more particular sorrowes naturall, as it seemes to many; for if they did proceed from nature, they should bee common to all men, and almost touch all men alike. Now wee see that the selfe same things that are causes of sorrow to some, giue occasion of ioy vnto others, that one Province, one person laugheth at that whereat another weepeth; that they that are conuersant with those that lament, exhort them to resolution, and to quit themselves of their teares. Yea the greatest part of those that thus torment themselves, when you haue talked with them, or that themselves haue had the leasure but to discourse vpon their owne passions, they confesse that it is but a folly thus to afflict themselves, and praise those who in the like aduersities, haue made head against fortune, and with a manly and generous courage haue withstood their afflictions. And it is certaine that men do not accommodate their mourning to their cause of sorrow, but the opinion of those with whom they liue. And if a man marke them well, he shall finde that it is opinion, which the more to annoy vs presenteth the things vnto vs which torment vs either more than they should, or by anticipation, feare, and preuention of that which is to come, sooner than they should.

3
Against nature.

But it is against nature, inasmuch as it polluteth and defaceth whatsoever nature hath made beautifull and amiable in vs, which is drowned by the force of this passion, as the beautie of a pearle is dissolued in vineger. Wee make our selues heerby spectacles of pity, we go with our heads hanging, our eies fastned on the earth, our mouthes tonguelesse, our members immoouable, our eies serue for no other vse than to weepe, that you may say wee are nothing but sweating statues, turned (as the Poets faine) like *Niobe* into a stone by the power of this passion.

4
Iniust and impious.

Now it is not only contrary and an enemy vnto nature, but God himselfe: for what other thing is it, but a rash and outrageous

ragious complaint against the Lord and common law of the whole world, which hath made all things vnder the Moone changeable and corruptible? If we know this law, why do we torment our selues? If we know it not, whereof doe we complaine, but of our owne ignorance, in that we know not that which Nature hath written in all the corners and creatures of the world? We are heere not to giue a law, but to receiue it, and to follow that which we find established: for to torment our selues by contradicting it, doth but double our paine.

Besides all this, it is pernicious and hurtfull vnto man, and by so much the more dangerous, because it killeth when we thinke it comforts, hurteth vnder the colour of doing good; vnder a false pretence of plucking the iron out of the wound, it driues it to the heart: and the blowes thereof are so much the more hardly auoided, and the enterprises broken, because it is a domesticall enemy brought vp with vs, which we haue engendred for our owne punishment.

Outwardly, by a deformed and new countenance wholly altered and counterfeited; it dishonoreth and defameth man. Doe but consider when it entreth into vs, it filleth vs with shame, in such sort, that wee dare not to shew our selues in publike place, no not priuatly to our dearest friends; and after we are once possessed of this passion, we doe nothing but seeke corners to hide our selues from the sight of men. What is this to say, but that it condemneth it selfe, and acknowledgeth how indecent it is? For it is for a woman that is taken in her wantonnesse to hide herselfe, and to feare to be knowen. Againe, do but consider the vestments and habits of sorrow, how strange and effeminate they are; which sheweth, that it taketh away whatsoever is manly and generous in vs, and puts vpon vs the countenances and infirmities of women: and therefore the *Thracians* adorned those men that mourned, like women. And some say, that sorrow makes men eunuches. The first and more manly and generous lawes of the *Romans* forbad these effeminate lamentations, finding it an horrible thing, that men should so degenerate from their owne natures, and do things contrary to manhood; allowing only of those first teares, which proceed from the first encounter of a fresh and new griefe, which may fall euen from the eyes of

Philosophers themselves, who keepe with their humanitie their dignitie : and may fall from the eyes, vertue not falling from the heart.

7
Inwardly.

Now it doth not only alter the visage, change, and dishonestly disguise a man outwardly, but piercing euen to the marrow of the bone, *Tristitia exsiccat ossa*, it weakeneth likewise the soule, troubleth the peace thereof, makes a man vnapt to good and honourable enterprises, taking away the taste, the desire, and the disposition to doe any thing that is profitable either to himselfe or to another, and not only to do good but to receiue it : For euen those good fortunes that light vpon him displease him; euery thing is tart vnto his soule, as victuals to a corrupted stomacke : and lastly, it maketh bitter our whole life, and poisoneth all our actions.

8
The affliction.

It is twofolde, great and extreame, or at leastwise, though not great in it selfe, yet great when by reason of a sudden surprise, and furious vnexpected alarm it seiseth vpon the hart of a man, pierceth it thorow, deprieth him of motion and sense, like a stone, & not vnlike that miserable mother *Niobe*,

Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa relinquit,

Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore satur.

And therefore the Painter diuersly and by degrees presenting vnto vs the sorrow and miserable estate of the parents and friends of *Iphigenia* when she was sacrificed, when he came to her father, he painted him with his face couered, as confessing his art not sufficient to expresse in the visage a griefe of that degree. Yea, sometimes a sorrow may be such, that it killeth outright. The second degree is the indifferent sorrow, which though perhaps it may be greater than the former, yet in time it is lessened and eased, and is expressed by teares, sobs, sighs and lamentations : *Cura lentes loquuntur, ingenies stupent.*

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are

Lib. 3. cap. 29. p. 522.

CHAP. XXXII.

Compassion.

WE sigh with those that are afflicted, and with a fellow-like feeling pitie their miseries, either because by a secret

cret consent we participate one the others euils, or because we feare that in our selues, which hath happened to others. But this is done two wayes, whereby there is likewise a twofolde compassion; the one good, when a man with a good will, not troubling or afflicting himselfe, not effeminating his owne nature, and without impeachment of equitie or honor, doth freely and effectually succour those that are afflicted. This is that vertue so much commended in religion, found in the holiest and wisest in the world: the other is a passion of a feeble minde, a sottish and feminine pitie, which proceedeth from a delicate tendernesse, a troubled spirit, proper to women, infants, and to cruell and malicious mindes (which are consequently base and cowardly, as hath beene prooued in the Chapter of Crueltie) who pitie the punishments of offenders, which produceth vniust effects, not respecting the depth and merit of the cause, but the present fortune, state and condition.

Aduisements and remedies against this euill, you shall find

Lib. 3. cap. 30. p. 523.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Feare.

FEare is the apprehension of an euill to come, which holdeth vs in a continuall care, and runnes before those euils that fortune threatneth vs. 1
The description.

Wee speake not heere of that feare of God so much commended in Scripture, nor of that feare which proceedeth from loue, and is a sweet respect towards the thing beloued, commendable in subiects and all inferiours towards their superiours; but of that vitious feare that troubleth and afflicteth, which is the seed of sinne, the twinne of shame, both of one wombe, sprung from that close and cursed marriage of the spirit of man with a diabolicall perswasion. *Timeo, eò quòd nudus essem, & abscondam me.*

It is a deceitfull and malicious passion, and hath no other power ouer vs, but to mocke and seduce vs: it serues it turne with that which is to come, where though we seeme to foresee much, we see nothing at all; and in that doubtfull darkness 2
The malice and tyranny thereof.

nesse it holdeth vs, as in a darke place, as theeues do by night, to the end they may robbe a man and not be knownen, and giue a great and sudden affright with a small number. And therefore it tormenteth vs with masks and shewes of euils, as men feare children with bug-beares; euils that haue nothing but a simple appearance, and haue nought in themselues whereby to hurt vs, yea, are not euils, but that wee thinke them so. It is the only apprehension which we haue, which makes that euill to vs which is not so, and draweth euill euen from our owne good to afflict vs withall. How many do we see euery day, that with feare to become miserable, become that they feare, and turne their vaine feare into certaine miseries? How many haue lost their friends, by distrusting their friends; haue got diseases, by fearing them? One hath in such sort conceiued an opinion that his wife hath plaid false play with him, that for griefe he languisheth; another hath in such sort apprehended such a conceit of pouertie, that he fallerth sicke: and to be brieft, some haue died for feare to die. And euen so may a man say almost of whatsoever we feare: for feare seemeth not to other end, than to make vs finde that which we flie from. Doubtlesse, feare is of all other euils the greatest and most tedious: for other euils are no longer euils than they continue, and the paine endureth no longer than the cause; but feare is of that which is, and that which is not, and that perhaps which neuer shall be, yea sometimes of that which can not possible be. Beholde then a passion truly malicious and tyrannicall, which draweth from an imaginarie euill true and bitter sorrowes, and is over-greedy by thought and opinion to ouertake, nay out-run them.

3 Feare doth not only fill vs with euils, and many times by false appearances, but it likewise spoileth all the good that we haue, and all the pleasure of our life, as an enemy to our rest. A man can take no delight in the fruition of that good which he feareth to lose; life it selfe can not be pleasant, if a man feare to die. Nothing good (saith an ancient writer) can bring pleasure with it, but that against the losse wherof a man is alwayes prepared.

4 It is also a strange passion, indiscreet and inconsiderate, and proceeds as often from the want of iudgement, as of heart.

It

It ariseth from dangers, and many times casteth vs into dangers; for it ingendreth in vs such an inconsiderate desire to get out, that it astonisheth, troubleth, and hindereth vs from taking that order that is fit to get out. It bringeth a violent kinde of trouble, whereby the soule being affrighted, withdraweth it selfe into it selfe, and debateth with it selfe how to auoid that danger that is presented. Besides that great discouragement that it bringeth, it seizeth on vs with such an astonishment, that we lose our iudgement, & there is no longer reason or discourse in vs: it maketh vs to flie when no man pursueth, yea many times our owne friends and succours: *adeo paor etiam auxilia formidat*. Many haue run mad heere-with, yea the senses themselues haue heereby lost their vse: we haue our eyes open, and see not; one speaks to vs, and we hearken not vnto him; we would flie, and we can not go.

An indifferent feare puts wings to our heeles; a great nailes fast our feet, and intangles them. Feare peruerteth and corrupteth the intire man, both the spirit, *Paor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat*, and the bodie, *Obstupui steteruntq; comae, vox haufibus haesit*. Sometimes it makes vs desperate, and therefore resolute, like that *Romane* Legion vnder the conduct of the Consull *Sempronius* against *Hannibal*, *Audacem fecerat ipse timor*. There are feares and affrightments without any apparent cause, and as it were by some celestiaall impulsion, which they call Panique terrours, *Terrores de caelo*, Luc. 21. *arescentibus hominibus pra timore*, such as once happened in the citie of *Carthage*, and wherewith whole people and armies haue beene confounded.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are
Lib. 3. cap. 28. p. 521.

The second Consideration of Man, by comparing him with all other creatures.

CHAP. XXXIIII

WE haue considered man whollie and simplic in himselfe: now let vs consider him by comparing him with other creatures, which is an excellent meanes to know him. This comparison hath a large extent, and

^I
A profitable
and difficult
comparison,
wherein man
is suspected.

In the chap.
of presum-
ption.

and many parts that bring much knowledge of importance, and very profitable, if it be well done. But who shall doe it? Shall man? He is a partie and to be suspected; and to say the truth, deales partially therein: which may easily be proued, because he keepes neither measure nor mediocritie. Sometimes he placeth himselfe farre aboue all, he tearmes himselfe a Master, and disdaineth the rest; diuides vnto them their morsels, distributeth such a portion of faculties and powers vnto them as shall seeme good vnto him. Sometimes as it were in despight, he debaseth himselfe beneath all; he murmureth, complaineth, wrongeth Nature as a cruell step-mother, makes himselfe the outcast and most miserable of the world. Now both these extreames are equally against reason, veritie, modestie. But how would you haue him to walke vprightly & euenly with all other creatures, when he doth it not with man his companion, nor with God himselfe, as shall be shewed? This comparison is also difficult to do; for how can a man know the inward and secret carriages of creatures, that which moueth within them? But yet let vs do our endeavour to do it without passion.

Ecclesiast.

First, the policie of the world is not so vnequall, so deformed and irregular, neither is there so great a disproportion between the parts thereof, but that they that are neere neighbours and touch one another haue a resemblance, some more, some lesse. So is there a great vicinitie and kindred betwixt man and other creatures: they haue many things alike and common to each other, and they haue differences likewise, but not so farre distant and vnlike, but that they may holde together. Man is neither altogether aboue, nor beneath the rest: All that is vnder heauen, saith the Wisdome of God, runnes the same fortune.

Things com-
mon.

Eccles. 4.

Let vs first speake of those things that are common to all, and almost alike, which are to ingender, nourish, to do, moue, liue, die: *Idem interitus hominis & iumentorum, & aqua viri- usque conditio*. And this is against those that finde themselves agriued, saying, that man is the most contemptible creature of Nature, abandoned, left naked vpon the naked earth, without couert, without armor, bound, swadled, without instruction of what is fit for him: whereas all other creatures

are

are clothed and couered with shels, husks, haire, wooll, feathers, scales : armed with teeth, horns, tallants, both to assault and to defend : taught to swim, to runne, to flie, to sing, to seeke their releefe, and man knowes neither how to go, nor to speake, nor to eat, nor any thing but crie, without an apprenticeship and much labour. All these complaints to him that considereth the first composition and naturall condition, are vniust and false : our skinne is as sufficiently provided against the iniuries of times and seasons as theirs, witnesse many nations (as hath beene said) that neuer knew what garments meant : yea those parts that we thinke good we keepe vncovered, yea the most tender and sensible, as the face, the hands, the stomacke, and the delicatest damosels their breasts. Bands and swadling clothes are not necessarie, witnesse the *Lacedemonians*, and in these daies the *Switzers*, *Almaines*, which dwell in cold countries, the *Bisques* & vagabonds that are called *Egyptians*. Crying is likewise common vnto beasts: all creatures almost complain, and grone for a time after they come into the world. As for armour, we want not that which is naturall, and haue more motion of our members, vse their seruice more naturally and without instruction. If some beasts excell vs in this, wee in the same excell diuers others. The vse of eating is both in them and in vs naturall and without instruction. Who doubteth that an infant, being once able to feede himselfe, knowes how to seeke his sustenance ? And the earth likewise bringeth forth and offereth enough vnto him for his necessitie, without other culture or Art, witnesse so many nations, which without labour, industrie and care liue plenteously. As for speech, a man may well say that if it be not naturall, it is not necessarie : but it is common to man with other creatures. What else but speech is that facultie we see in them of complaining, reioicing, of calling others to their succour, of making loue ? And as wee speake by gestures and motion of the eies, the head, the shoulders, the hands (wherein deafe men are very cunning) so beasts, as we see in those which haue no voice, who neuerthelesse do interchange their mutuall offices ; and as in some kinde of measure beasts vnderstand vs, so we them. They flatter vs, threaten vs, intreat vs and we them, we speake to them, and they to

1. Naked.
nesse. cap. 5.2. Swadling
clothes.

3. Crying.

4. Armes.

5. Eating.

6. Speech.

vs, and if we perfectly vnderstand not one another, where is the fault? in vs or in them? That is to be determined. They may as well account vs beasts by that reason, as we them, yea they reproch vs for that we our selues vnderstand not one another. We vnderstand not the *Bisques*, the Britons, and they all vnderstand the one the other, not onely of the same, but which is more of a diuers kinde. By a certaine barking of the dog, the horse knoweth that he is in choler, and by another voice he knoweth he is not.

7. *Mutual
intelligence.*

Againe they haue their intelligence with vs. In the warres in the middest of the fight, Elephants, Dogs, Horses vnderstand with vs, they frame their motions according to the occasion, they pursue, they make their stand, they retire, nay they haue their pay, and diuide the booty with vs, as it hath been practised in the new conquests of the Indies. And these are those things that are common to all, and alike.

4
*Differences
and aduan-
tages.*

Let vs now come to those differences and aduantages that the one hath ouer the other. Man is singular and excellent in some things aboue other creatures, and in others, beasts haue the superiority, to the end that all things might thereby bee knit and chained together in this generall policy of the world and of nature. The certaine aduantages or excellencies of man, are those great faculties of the soule; the subtiltie, viuacitie, & sufficiency of the spirit to inuent, to iudge, to chuse, speech to demand and to offer aid and succour, the hand to execute that the spirit hath inuented either of it selfe, or learned from another. The forme also of the body, the great diuersity of the motions of the members, whereby his body doth him better seruice.

5
*Of Beasts
generall.*

The certaine aduantages that beasts haue ouer men, and such as are past all doubt, are either general or particular. The generall are health, and strength of body farre more perfect, constant, & strong in them, among whom there are no blind, deafe, lame, mute, diseased, defectiue, and ill born, as amongst men. The *Sereno* hurts them not, they are not subiect to rheumes frō whence proceed almost all other diseases; from which man though he couer his head with a hat and a house too, can hardly defend himselfe. Moderation in diet and other actions, innocency, safety, peace and tranquillity of life,

a plaine and entire liberty without shame, feare, or ceremony in things naturall and lawfull (for it is onely man that hath cause to hide himselfe in his actions, and whose faults and imperfections offend others). Exemption from so many vices and disorders, superstition, ambition, avarice, enuie, yea mightie dreames trouble not them as they doe men, nor so many thoughts and fantasies. The particular aduantages are the pure, high, healthfull, pleasant habitation, and abode of birds in the aire. Their sufficiencie in some arts, as the swallow and other birds in building, the Spider in spinning and weauing, diuers beasts in Physicke, and the Nightingale in Musicke. Maruellous effects and properties, not to be imitated, no not imagined, as the propertie of the fish *Remora* to stay the greatest vessels of the sea, as we reade of the chiefe galley of *Marcus Antonius*, and the selfe same of *Caligula*; of the *Torpedo* or Crampe-fish, to benum and dead the members of another, though farre distant, and not touching him; of the Hedgehog, to foresee the windes; of the Chameleon, to change his colours. Prognostications, as of birds in their passages from countrey to countrey, according to the diuersitie of the seasons; of all beasts that are dammes, in knowing which of their yoong is the best; for some happe falling out of defending them from danger, or conueying them to their nests, they alwayes begin with that they know and foresee to be the best. In all these things man is farre their inferior, and in some of them he hath no skill at all. A man may adde vnto this, if hee will, the length of their liues, which in some beasts doth seuen or eight times exceed the longest terme of the life of man.

Those aduantages that man pretendeth to haue aboue beasts, but are yet disputable, and perhaps as well in beasts as men, are many: First, the reasonable faculties, discourse, reasoning, discipline, iudgement, prudence. There are heere two things to be spoken, the one of the veritie of the thing it selfe. It is a great question, whether beasts be depriued of all these spiritual faculties. The opinion that they are not depriued but haue them, is the more true and the more authentike. It is defended by many great Philosophers, especially by *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, the *Stoicks*, *Galen*, *Porphyry*, *Plutarch*, and

Particular.

1

2

3

6

Disputable
aduantages.

1

Reason.

and mainteined by this reason. The composition of the braine, which is that part which the soule makes vse of, and whereby it reasoneth, is all alike as the same in beasts and men, confirmed by experience. Beasts from particulars conclude generals, by the sight of one only man they know all men, they know how to ioyne, and diuide, and distinguish the good from the ill, for the safegard of their liues, libertie, and little ones. Yea, we reade and see, if we would but marke and consider it, many things done by beasts, that doe farre excell the insufficiencie, subtiltie, and all the wit and cunning of the common sort of men: some of those that are best woorth the noting, I will note vnto you. The Fox being to passe ouer a riuer that is frozen with ice, applieth his eare vnto the ice, to finde whether he can heare any noise, and that the water doe runne vnder it, that thereby he may resolue either to go forward, or to retire backe; of whom the *Thrasians* haue learned the same cunning, being to passe their frozen riuers. A Dogge, to the end hee may know which way of three either his master or that beast he hunteth is gone, hauing assured himselfe by senting them, that he hath not passed by two of them, because he findes not the trace, without the setting of his nose to the ground or farther trauerling, he runneth mainly into the third. The Mule of the Philosopher *Thales* crossing a riuer with a sacke of salt on his backe, and being plunged into the deepe with his burthen, his salt dissolved in the water, and made his burthen the lighter; which the Mule (falling into the deepe by chance) hauing found, being afterwards loaden with wooll, vsed the same remedie, and sunke the more. *Plutarch* reporteth, that he saw a Dog in a ship casting stones into a pipe of oile, to make the oile to mount, that hee might the better come at it. As much is reported of the Crowes of *Barbarie*, who by that meanes raise the water when it is too low, that they may drinke. So likewise Elephants gather stones and sticks, and cast them into that ditch whereinto their companion is fallen, to helpe him to get out. The Oxen of the Kings gardens of *Suse* being taught to go in a wheele a iust hundred turnes, to draw water to water the gardens, they would neuer exceed that iust number, and were neuer deceiued in their account. All these things

things, how can they be done, without discourse and reason, addition and diuision? To say they know not this, were to denie that we see they doe. What should we thinke of that dexteritie that is in the Elephant in plucking those darts and iauelins forth of his bodie with little or no paine at all? of the Dogge that *Plutarch* speaketh of, which in a publike play vpon a scaffold counterfeited death, drawing towards his end, trembling, afterwards growing stiffe, and suffering himselfe to be caried forth, by little and little comming to himselfe, and lifting vp his head counterfeited a new resurrection? of so many apish imitations and strange tricks that the dogs of Players and Iuglers doe? of the policies and inuentions wherewith beasts defend themselves against the assaults we make vpon them? of the husbandrie and great prouidence of the Ant in laying abroad his graine to drie, lest it take moisture and so corrupt, in nipping the ends thereof that it grow not? of the policie of the Bee, where there is such diuersitie of offices and charges so firmly established?

To beat downe all this, some doe maliciously attribute these things to a naturall, seruile and forced inclination; as if beasts did performe their actions by a naturall necessitie, like things inanimate, as the stone falleth downward, the fire mounteth vpward. But besides that, that can not be, nor enter into our imagination; for there must be a numbring of the parts, comparison, discourse by addition and diuision, and consequents; they likewise know not what this naturall inclination and instinct is; they be words which they abuse to small purpose, that they may not be deafe and mute altogether. Againe, this saying is retorted against them: for it is beyond all comparison more noble, honourable, and resembleth more the Diuinitie to worke by nature than by art and apprenticeship; to be led and directed by the hand of God, than by our owne; regularly to act by a naturall and ineuitable condition, than regularly by a rash and casuall libertie.

By this obiection of the naturall instinct, they would likewise deprive them of instruction and discipline both actiue and passiue, but experience giues them the lie; for they doe both receiue it: witnesse the Pie, the Parret, the Black-bird, the Dogge, the Horlle, as hath beene said, and they giue it, witnesse

7
An opposi-
on of the na-
turall in-
stinct.

witnesse the Nightingale, and aboue all other the Elephant, which excelleth all other beasts in docilitie, and all kinde of discipline and sufficiencie.

8

As for this facultie of the spirit whereof man doth so much glorie, which is to spiritualize things corporall and absent, robbing them of all accidents, to the end it might conceiue them after it owne maner, *nam intellectum est in intelligente ad modum intelligentis*; beasts themselves do the like. The Horse accustomed to the warres sleeping in his stable, trembleth and groaneth as if he were in the midst of the fight; conceiue the sound of the drumme, the trumpet, yea an armie it selfe. The Hare in her sleepe panting, listeth vp her scut, shaking her legs, conceiue a spirituall Hare. Dogs that are kept for gard, in their sleepe do snarre, and sometimes barke outright, imagining a stranger to be come. To conclude this first point, we must confesse that beasts doe reason, haue the vse of discourse and iudgement, but more weakly and imperfectly than man; they are inferiour vnto men in this, not because they haue no part therein at all; they are inferiour vnto men, as amongst men some are inferiour vnto others; and euen so amongst beasts there is such a difference: but yet there is a greater difference betweene men; for (as shall be said heereafter) there is a greater distance betweene a man and a man, than a man and a beast. But for all this we must not heereby inferre, a kinde of equalitie or paritie betwixt a beast and a man (though as *Aristotle* sayth, there are some men so weake and blockish, that they differ from a beast only in figure) and that the soule of a beast is immortall as that of a man, or the soule of a man mortall as that of a beast: for these are but malicious illations. For besides that in this reasoning facultie, man hath a verie great aduantage aboue beasts, so hath the other faculties more high and wholly spirituall, whereby he is sayd to be like vnto God himselfe, and is capable of immortalitie, wherein beasts haue no part, and are signified by that vnderstanding, which is more than a simple discourse. *Nolite fieri sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus.*

9

The other point which we are to speake of in this matter is, that this preheminance and aduantage of vnderstanding, and

and other spirituall faculties that man pretendeth, is sold him at a deare rate, and brings with it more hurt than good: for it is the principall source of all those euils that oppresse him; of vices, passions, maladies, irresolution, trouble, despaire, which beasts want, by the want of this great aduantage: witnesse the Hogge of *Pyrrho*, which did eat his meat peaceably in the shippe in the middest of a great tempest, when all the men were almost dead for feare. It seemeth that these great parts of the soule haue beene denied vnto beasts, or at leastwise lessened, and giuen them more feeble, for their great good and quiet, and bestowed vpon man for his torment: for it is long of them that he toileth and trauelleth, tormenteth himselfe with what is past, and that which is to come; yea he imagineth, apprehendeth, and feareth those euils that are not, nor euer shall be. Beasts apprehend nothing that is ill vntill they feele it; and being escaped, they are presently in securitie and at peace. So that we see that man is most miserable euen in that wherein he thought himselfe most happy: whereby it seemeth that it had beene better for man, not to haue beene indued and adorned with all those beautifull and celestiaall armes, since he turneth them against himselfe, euen to his owne destruction. And to say the trueth, we see those that are most stupid and feeble of spirit, liue at best content, and feele not their euill accidents in so high a degree, as those that are more spirituall.

Another aduantage that man pretendeth aboue beasts is a signorie and power of commanding, which he thinketh hee hath ouer beasts; but besides, that it is an aduantage that men themselues haue and exercise the one ouer the other, this is not true. For where is this command of man, this obedience of the beasts? It is a monster that was neuer seen, yea men do more feare beasts, than beasts them. It is true that man hath a great preheminance ouer beasts, *ut praesit piscibus maris, volatilibus caeli, bestiis terra.* And this by reason of his beautifull and vpright forme, of his wisdom and the prerogatiue of his spirit: but not that hee should either command, or they obey.

There is likewise another aduantage, neere neighbour to this, pretended by man, which is a plaine libertie, reproching beasts.

10

2. Signorie
and com-
mand.

Gen. 1.

11

3. Libertie.

beasts with their seruitude, captiuitie, subiection : but this is to small purpose. There is farre greater reason why man should reproch man ; witnesse those slaues, not only made by force, and such as descend from them, but also those that are voluntarie, who either sell for money their libertie or giue it, out of the lightnesse of their hearts, or for some commoditie, as the ancient fensers solde outright women to their mistresses, souldiers to their captaines. Now there is none of all this in beasts, they neuer serue one another, nor yeeld themselves to any seruitude either actiue or passiue, either to serue or to be serued, and are in euery thing more free than men. And as man goeth to the chase, taketh, killeth, eateth the beasts ; so is he taken, killed, eaten by them in his turne, and more honourably too, by maine strength, not by wit and art, as man doth : and not only by them is he killed, but by his companion, by another man, a thing base and dishonorable. Beasts assemble not themselves in troops to go to kill, to destroy, to ransacke, to inthrall another troope of their kinde, as men do.

12
4. Vertue.

The fourth and greatest aduantage pretended by man, is in vertue; but of morall it is disputable (I meane morall materially by the outward action) : for formallie the moralitie good or euill, vertue and vice, can not be in a beast. Kinde acknowledgement, officious amitie, fidelitie, magnanimitie, and many other vertues, which consist in societic and conuersation, are more liuely, more expresse and constant, than can be in the common sort of people. *Hircanus* the dogge of *Lyfimachus* continued vpon the bed of his dead master, refusing all kinde of sustenance, and afterwards cast himselfe into that fire wherein his master was burnt, and there died with him. The selfe same did another belonging to one *Pyrrhus*. That dogge of wise *Hesiodus* discovered the murther of his master. Another in like sort in the presence of King *Pyrrhus*, and his whole armie. Another which neuer ceased, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, going from citie to citie, vntill that sacrilegious Robber of the Temple of *Athens* was apprehended and brought to iudgement. That historie is famous, of the lion that was host and nurse to *Androdus* the slaue and his Physician, which would not touch him being cast out vnto him : which *Appion* affirmeth to haue scene at *Rome*. An Elephant hauing

hauing in choler killed his gouernour, repenting himselfe of it, refused any longer to eat, drinke, or liue. Contrariwise, there is not a creature in the world, more vniust, vnthankfull, traiterous, perfidious, lying and deceitfull, than man. Againe, forasmuch as vertue consisteth in the moderation of our appetites, and the bridling of our pleasures, beasts are much more moderate therein than wee, and doe better containe themselves within the limits of nature. For they are not only not touched with vnnaturall, superfluous and artificiall passions and desires, which are all vitious and infinite, as men who for the most part are plunged in them; but also in the naturall, as eating and drinking, the acquaintance betwixt the male and the female, they are farre more moderate and staied. But that we may see which is the more vertuous or vitious a man or a beast, and in good earnest to shame a man more than a beast, let vs take the vertue most proper and agreeable vnto man, that is, as the word it selfe importeth, humanity: as the most strange and contrary vice is cruelty. Now heerin beasts haue aduantage enough euen to make men blush for shame. They neuer assaile, and seldome offend those of their kind, *maior serpentum ferarumque concordia quam hominum*: They neuer fight but for great and iust causes, as the defence and preservation of their liues, liberty, and their little ones; and that they doe with their naturall and open armes, by their only force and valour, and that one to one, as in single combates, and not in troupes, nor by designements. Their combates are short and soone ended, vntill one of them be either wounded or yeeldeth, and the combate ended, the quarrell, hatred, and choler is likewise at an end. But man hath no quarrell but against man, for not only light, vaine and friuolous causes, but many times vniust, with artificiall and traiterous armes, by deceits and wicked meanes, in troupe and assembly gathered by assignement; and lastly his wars are long and neuer ended but with death, and when he is able no longer to hurt, yet the hatred and choler endureth.

Humanity:
Cruelty:

The conclusion of this comparison is, that vntruely and vainly doth man glorifie himselfe aboue beasts. For if man haue in him something more than they, as especially the viuacity of the spirit and vnderstanding, and those great faculties

I 2
The conclusion
of this
second comparison.

ties

ties of the soule ; so likewise in exchange is hee subiect to a thousand euils from which the beasts are freed, inconstancie, irresolution, superstition, a painfull care of things to come, ambition, auarice, enuie, curiositie, detraction, lying, and a world of disordered appetites, discontentments, emulations. This spirit wherewith man maketh himselfe so mery, brings him a thousand inconueniences, and then most, when it is most stirred and enforced. For it doth not only hurt the body, trouble, breake and weaken the bodily forces and functions, but also it hurts and hindereth it selfe. What casteth man into follie and madnesse, but the sharpenesse, agility, and proper force of the spirit ? The most subtile follies and excellent lunacies proceede from the rarest and quickest agitations of the spirit, as from greatest amities spring greatest enmities, and from soundest healths mortall maladies. Melancholiemen, saith *Plato*, as they are more capeable of knowledge and wisdome, so likewise of folly. And hee that well marketh it, shall finde, that in those eleuations and salies of a free soule, there is some mixture of folly ; for to say the truth, these things are neere neighbours.

13
An exhortation.

Touching a simple life and such as is according to nature, beasts do farre exceede men ; they liue more freely, securely, moderately, contentedly. And that man is wise that considereth heereof, and benefiteth himselfe by making them an instruction vnto himselfe, which doing, he frameth himselfe to innocencie, simplicitie, libertie, and that naturall sweetnesse which shineth in beasts, and is wholly altered and corrupteth in vs by our artificiall inuentions, and vnbridled licentiousnesse, abusing that wherein we say we excell them, which is the spirit and iudgement. And therefore God doth many times send vs to schoole, to birds, beasts themselues, to the kite, the grasshopper, the swallow, the turtle, the ant, the ox, the asse, and diuers others. Lastly, we must remember that there is a kind of commerce betwixt beasts & vs, a certain relation & mutuall obligation, whereof there is no other reason, but that they belong to one & the same master, and are of the same family that we are. It is an vnworthy thing to tyrannise ouer them, we owe iustice vnto men, and pitie and gentlenesse to such other creatures as are capeable thereof.

The

The third Consideration of Man,
which is by his life.

CHAP. XXXV.

The estimation, breuitie, description, of the life of man,
and the parts thereof.

IT is a great and principall point of wisdom, truly to know how to esteeme of life, to holde and preserue it, to lose or to take it away, to keepe and direct it, as much as after such a maner as is fit; there is not perhaps any thing wherein a man faileth more, or is more hindred. The vulgar vnlearned sot accounteth it a souereigne good, and preferreth it aboue all things; yea he will not sticke to redeeme and prolong it by all the delayes that may be, vpon what conditions soeuer, thinking it can neuer be bought too deare: for it is all in all with him, his motte is *Vita nihil carius*. He esteemeth and loueth his life for the loue of it selfe: he liues not but to liue. It is no maruell if hee faile in all the rest, if hee be wholly compounded of errours, since from his very entrance, and in this fundamentall point he mistakes himselfe so grossly. It may be likewise with some lesse esteemed, and more basely accounted of than it should, either by reason of some insufficiencie in iudgement, or a proud misknowledge thereof: for falling into the hands of those that are good and wise, it may be a profitable instrument both to themselues and others. And I can not be of their opinion (as it is simply taken) that say it is best of all, not to be at all; and that the best is the shortest life: *optimum non nasci aut quam citissime aboleri*. And it is neither well nor wisely sayd, What hurt or what matter had it beene if I had neuer beene? A man may answer him with the like question: Where had that good beene which is come, and being not come, had it not beene euill not to haue beene? It is a kinde of euill that wanteth good, whatsoeuer it be, yea though not necessarie. These extremities are too extreame and vitious, though not equally: but that seemes true that a wise man spake, That life is such a good as a man would not take, if he knew well what it were before he tooke it: *Vitam Seneca.*

I
Of the estimation and worth of life.

nemo

nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus. It is well that men are within before they see the entrance, and that they are carried hwdwinckt into it. Now when they are within, some doe so cocker and flatter themselves therein, that vpon what condition soeuer they will not go forth againe; others do nothing but murmur and vex themselves: but the wiser sort seeing it to be a market that is made without themselves (for a man neither liues nor dies when and how he will) and that though the way be rough and hard, yet neuertheless it is not alwaies so, without wining, or struiuing and troubling any thing, they accomodate themselves vnto it as they may, and so passe their life in quietnesse, making of necessitie a vertue; which is a token of wisdom and industrie: and so doing, they liue as long as they should, and not like fooles, as long as they can. For there is a time to liue, and a time to die: and a good death is farre better than an ill life. A wise man liues no longer, than that his life may be woorth more than his death: for the longest life is not alwaies the better.

See heere of
lib. 2. ca. 11.

p. 328

2

Of the length
and breuitie
of life.

All men doe much complaine of the breuitie of the life of man; not only the simple vulgar sort, who wish it would neuer haue end, but also (which is more strange) the greatest and wisest make it the principall ground of their complaints. To say the truth, the greatest part thereof being diuerted and otherwise employed, there remaines little or nothing for it selfe: for the time of our infancie, olde age, sleepe, maladies of minde and bodie, and many other times, both vnprofitable and vnfit for any good, being taken away, that which remaineth is little or nothing at all. Neuertheless, without opposing the contrarie opinion to them that holde a short life to be a great good and gift of Nature, their complaint seemeth to haue little equitie and reason, and rather to proceed from malice. For to what end serueth a long life? Simplic to liue, to breathe, to eat, to drinke, to see this world: for all this what needs so long time? We haue seene, knowen, tasted all in a short space; and knowing it, to desire so long a time to practise it, and still to reiterate the same thing, to what end is it? Who will not be satisfied, nay wearied, to do alwaies one and the same thing? If it be not tedious and irkesome, at the least it is superfluous: it is a turning wheele where the same things

things come and go : it is alwaies to begin where we end, and to respinne the same webbe. But perhaps they will say they desire a long life to learne and to profit the more, and to proceed to a greater perfection of knowledge and vertue. Alas good soules that wee are, what should wee know, or who should teach vs ? We employ but badly that little which is giuen vs, not only in vanities and those things that yeeld vs no profit, but in malice and sinne; and then we crie out and complaine, that we haue not enough giuen vnto vs. And to say the truth, to what end serues so great store of knowledge and experience, since in the end wee must leaue it and dislodge it; and hauing dislodged it altogether, forget and lose it all, or know it better and otherwise ? But you will say, that there are beasts that do triple and quadruple the life of man. To omit those fables that are tolde heereof; Be it so : but yet there are a number that liue not a quarter of that time that man doth, and few neither, that liue out their time. By what right or reason, or priuiledge, can man challenge a longer life than other creatures ? Is it because he doth better employ it in matters more high and more worthie life ? By this reason he should liue lesse time than all other creatures ; for there is none comparable to man in the ill employment of his life, in wickednesse, ingratitude, intemperance, and all manner of disorder and immodestie in maners, as hath been shewed before in the comparison of man with beasts : so that as I asked euen now, to what end a long life serued ; now I aske, what euils there would be in the world, if the life of man were long ? What would he not enterprise, since the shortnesse of life, which cuts off his way, and (as they say) interrupts his cast, and the vncerteinty thereof, which takes away all heart and courage, cannot stay him, liuing as if he should liue euer ? On the one side he feareth perceiuing himselfe to be mortall, but notwithstanding that, hee can not bridle himselfe from not coueting, hoping, enterprising, as if he were immortall. *Tanquam semper victuri vinitis, nunquam vobis fragilitas vestra Seneca: succurrit : omnia tanquam mortales timetis, tanquam immortales concupiscitis.* And to say the trueth, what need hath Nature of all these great and godly enterprises and imploiments, whereby man challengeth a longer life than other creatures ?

Seneca.
 Looke lib. 3.
 cap. 6.
 p. 422.

Man therefore hath no subiect whereof to complaine, but to be angrie with himselfe. We haue life enough, but we are not good husbands, we manage it not well; life is not short, but we make it so; we are not in want, but prodigall; *non inopes vita, sed prodigi*: we lose it, we dissipate it, we vilifie it, as if it were nought worth, as if we had more than enough: we all fall into one of these three faults, either we employ it ill, or about nothing, or in vaine. *Magna vita pars elabitur male agentibus, maxima nihil agentibus, tota aliud agentibus*. One man studieth not to liue, but rather busieth himselfe in any other thing; he shall neuer know how to do a thing well by acquitting himselfe of labour, but by care and attention. Others reserue their liues vntill they can liue no longer, then take comfort in life when there is nothing left but the lees and dregs thereof. Oh what follie, what miserie is this! Yea there are some that haue sooner ended than begunne to liue, and life is past before they thought of it. *Quidam viuere incipiunt, cum desinendum; quidam ante desierunt, quam inciperent. Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia, semper incipit viuere.*

3
 A description
 of the life
 of man.

Our present life is but the entrance and end of a Tragedie, a perpetuall issue of errorrs, a web of vnhappie aduentures, a pursuit of diuers miseries inchained together on all sides; there is nothing but euill that it distilleth, that it prepareth; one euill driues forward another euill, as one waue another; torment is euer present, and the shadow of what is good deceiueth vs; blindnesse and want of sense possesseth the beginning of our life, the middle is euer in paine and trauell the end in sorrow; and beginning, middle, and end in errorr.

4

The life of man hath many discommodities and miseries cominon, ordinarie and perpetuall; it hath likewise some particular and distinct, according to the diuersitie of the parts, ages and seasons; infancie, youth, virilitie, olde age, euery one haue their proper and particular discommodities.

5
 A comparison
 betwixt
 youth and
 olde age.

The greatest part of the world speake more honorablie & fauorably of old age, as the more wise, ripe, moderat, accusing and shaming youth as vitious, foolish, licentious, but very vniustly: for in trueth the infirmities and vices of old age are more in number, more great and troublesome than those of youth,

youth, it filles the minde more with wrinckles, then the visage; and there is not a soule growing olde, growes not sower and rotten. With the body the spirit is vsed, and the worse for the vse; and at the last returns to infancy againe: *bis pueri senes*. Old age is a necessary and puissant malady, which loadeth vs insensibly with many imperfections. It were absurd to tearme wisdom a difficultie of humours, an anxietie and distaste of things present, an impotencie to doe as in former times: wisdom is too noble to be serued with such officers. To wax olde is not to wax wise, nor to take away vices; but to change them into worse. Olde age condemneth pleasure, but it is because it can not taste or relish it aright, like *Esops* dogge, it saith it will none of it, but it is because it can not ioy in it: for olde age leaueth not pleasure properly, but pleasure disdaines olde age; for it is alwayes wanton and sporting: and it is no reason that impotencie should corrupt iudgement, which should in youth know vice in pleasure, and in olde age pleasure in vice. The vices of youth are temeritie, indiscreet forwardnesse, and vnbridled libertie and ouergreddie desire of pleasure; which are naturall things proceeding from the heat of the blood and naturall vigour, and therefore the more excusable; but the vices of olde age are farre otherwise. The lighter are a vaine and fraile proteruitie, an enuious prating, insociable humours, superstition, care to get riches, euen then when the vse of them is lost, a sottish auarice, and feare of death, which proceedeth properly, not from the want of spirit and courage, as they say, but because olde men are long acquainted and as it were cockered in this world, whereby their affections are knit vnto it; which is not in yoong men: but besides these they are enuious, froward, vniust: but that which is most sottish and ridiculous in them, is that they would not only be reuerenced but feared, and therefore they put vpon them an austere looke and disdainfull, thinking thereby to extort feare and obedience: but they are therein much deceiued, for this stately and furious gesture is receiued of youth with mockerie and laughter, being practised only to blinde their eyes, and of purpose to hide and disguise the truth of things. There are in old age so many faults on the one side, and so many impotencies on the other, and

therefore so fit for contempt, that the best way to compass their desires is loue and affection: for command and feare are no longer fit armes for them. It ill befits them to make themselves to be feared: and though they could doe it, yet loue and honour is a fairer purchase.

The fourth Consideration of Man, morall
by his maners, humours, conditions,
very liuely and notable.

THE PREFACE.

ALL the descriptions the wise, and such as haue taken greatest paines in the studie of humane knowledge, haue giuen vnto man, seeme all to note in man foure things, *Vanitie, Weaknesse, Inconstancie, Miserie*; calling him the spoile of times, the play-game of Fortune, the image of inconstancie, the example and spectacle of infirmitie, the ballance of enuie and miserie, a dreame, a fantasie, ashes, a vapour, a morning dew, a flower that presently fadeth and withereth, a winde, grasse, a bladder or bubble, a shadow, leaues of trees caried with the winde, vncleane seed in his beginning, a sponge of ordures, a sacke of miseries in his middle age, a stench and meat for wormes in his end; and to conclude, the most miserable and wretched thing in the world. *Iob*, one of the most sufficient in this matter, as well in the practise as contemplation thereof, hath well and at large described him, and after him, *Salomon*, in their Books. To be short, *Plinie* seemeth very properly to haue desciphered him, in calling him the most miserable, and yet the most arrogant creature of the world, *Solum ut certum sit nihil esse certi, nec miserius quicquam homine aut superbius*. By the first word (miserable) he comprehendeth all those former descriptions, and as much as all the rest haue sayd; but by the other (the most proud) hee toucheth another chiefe point very important: and hee seemeth in these two words to haue vttered whatsoeuer can be sayd. These are those two things that seeme to hurt and hinder one the other, Miserie and Pride, Vanitie and Presumption. See then how strange and monstrous a patch-coat man is.

Forasmuch

Forasmuch as man is composed of two diuers parts, the soule and the body, it is a matter of difficulty well to describe him entire in his perfection and declining state. Some refer vnto the body whatsoeuer ill can be spoken of man; they make him an excellent creature, and in regard of his spirit extoll him aboue all other creatures: but on the other side, whatsoeuer is ill, either in man, or in the whole world, is forged and proceedeth from this spirit of man, and in it there is farre more vanity, inconstancy, misery, presumption, than in the body, wherein there is little matter of reproch in respect of the spirit, and therefore *Democritus* calleth it a world of hidden miseries, and *Plutarch* prooueth it in a booke written of that subiect. Now let vs consider man more according to the life, than heeretofore we haue done, and pinch him where it itcheth not, referring all to these fiue points, *vanity*, *weaknesse*, *inconstancy*, *misery*, and *presumption*, which are his more naturall and vniuersall qualities, but the two latter touch him more neerely. Againc there are some things common to many of these fiue, which a man knowes not to which to attribute it, and especially, imbecillity and misery.

CHAP. XXXVI.

I. *Vanity.*

VANITY is the most essentiall and proper quality of humane nature. There is nothing so much in man, bee it malice, infelicity, inconstancy, irresolution (and of all these there is alwaies abundance) as base feeblenesse, sottishnesse and ridiculous vanity. And therefore *Democritus* met better with it, with a kind of disdaine of humane condition, mocking and laughing at it, than *Heracitus* that wept and tormented himselfe, whereby he gaue some testimony, that he made some account thereof; and *Diogenes* who scorned it, than *Timon* that hater and flier of the company of men. *Pindarus* hath expressed it more to the life than any other, by the two vaineſt things in the world, calling it the dreame of a shadow, *οὐρανὸς ὄνειρος, ἀνθρώπων δὲ σκῆμα*.

This is that, that hath wrought in the wisest so great a contempt of man, that hearing of some great deligment and honourable

nourable enterprife, and iudging it fuch, were wont neuerthe-
 leffe to fay that the world was not worthy a mans labour and
 paines, (fo answered *Strabius* to *Brutus*, talking with him a-
 bout the conspiracie againſt *Cæſar*) and that a wiſe man
 ſhould doe nothing but for himſelfe, for it is not reaſon that
 wiſe men, and wiſedome ſhould put themſelves in danger
 for fooles.

2
 Thoughts.

This vanitie is ſhewed and expreſſed many waies, and af-
 ter a diuers maner, firſt in our thoughts and private imagina-
 tions, which are many times more than vaine, friuolous, and
 ridiculous, wherein neuertheleſſe we ſpend much time, and
 yet perceiue it not. Wee enter into them, we dwell in them,
 and we come forth againe inſenſibly, which is a double va-
 nitie, and a great forgetfulneſſe of our ſelues. One walking
 in a hall conſidereth how he may frame his paces after a cer-
 taine faſhion vpon the boords of the floure: another discour-
 ſeth in his minde, with much time, and great attention, how
 he ſhould carry himſelfe if he were a king, a Pope, or ſome
 other thing that he is aſſured can neuer come to paſſe; and ſo
 hee feedeth himſelfe with winde, yea leſſe than winde, that,
 that neither is, nor euer ſhall be. Another dreameth how he
 ſhall compoſe his body, his countenances, his geſtures, his
 ſpeech after an affected faſhion, and pleaſeth himſelfe there-
 in, as with a thing that wonderfully becomes him, and that
 euery man ſhould take delight in. But what a vanitie and ſot-
 tiſh weakenefſe in our deſires is this, that brings forth beliefs
 and hopes farre more vaine? And all this falleth out not on-
 ly when we haue nothing to doe, when we are ſwallowed vp
 with idlenefſe, but many times in the miſt of our moſt ne-
 ceſſarie affaires: ſo naturall and powerfull is vanitie, that it
 robbeth and plucketh out of our hands, the truth, ſoliditie,
 and ſubſtance of things, and fills vs with winde, yea with no-
 thing.

3
 Care for
 times to
 come.

Another more ſottiſh vanitie is a troubleſome care of what
 ſhall heere fall out when we are dead. We extend our deſires
 and affections beyond our ſelues, and our being; wee would
 prouide that ſome thing ſhould bee done vnto vs, when wee
 know not what is done vnto vs; we deſire to be praiſed after
 our death, what greater vanitie? It is not ambition, as it ſee-
 meth

meth & a man may thinke it, for that is the desire of a sensible and perceptible honor: if this praise of our selues when we are gone, might any way profit either our children, our parents, or our friends that suruiue vs, it were well, there were some benefit, though not to our selues; but to desire that as a good, which shall no way touch vs, nor benefit others, is a meere vanitie, like that of those who feare their wiues will marrie after their departure: and therefore they desire them with great passion to continue vnmarrried, and binde them by their willes so to do, leauing vnto them a great part of their goods vpon that condition. This is vanitie and many times iniustice. It was contrariwise a commendable thing in those great men in times past, which dying exhorted their wiues to marry speedily for the better increase of the Commonwealt. Others ordeine, that for the loue of them and for their sakes a friend keepe such and such a thing, or that he do this or that vnto their dead bodies; which rather sheweth their vanitie, than doth any good to soule or bodie.

See heere another vanitie, we liue not but by relation vnto another; we take not so much care what we are in our selues in effect and truth, as what we are in the publike knowledge of men; in such sort, that we do many times deceiue and depriue our selues of our owne goods and commodities, and torment our selues, to frame our outward appearances to the common opinion. This is true, not onely in outward things and such as belong to the bodie, and the expense and charge of our meanes, but also in the goods of the spirit, which seeme vnto vs to be without fruit, if others enioy them not, and they be not produced to the view and approbation of strangers.

Our vanity is not only in our simple thoughts, desires, and discourses, but it likewise troubleth, shaketh and tormenteth both soule and bodie. Many times men trouble and torment themselves more for light occasions and matters of no moment, than for the greatest and most important affaires that are. Our soule is many times troubled with small fantasies, dreames, shadowes, fooleries, without bodie, without subiect; it is intangled and molested with choler, hatred, sorow, ioy, building castles in *Spaine*. The remembrance of a farewell

4

5

Agitations
of the spirit.

well of some particular grace or action afflicteth vs more than a whole discourse of a matter of greater importance. The sound of names and certaine words pronounced with a pitifull voice, yea with sighs and exclamations pierceth euen to the quicke, as Oratours and Players, and others that sell winde and smoake doe well know and practise. And this winde catcheth and carrieth away many times men that are most constant and settled, if they stand not vpon their gard: so puissant is vanitie ouer men. And not only light and little things doe shake and trouble vs, but also lies and impostures, euen those we know to be such (a strange thing) in such sort, that we take pleasure to deceiue our selues in good earnest, to feed our fantasies with tales, with nothing (*ad fallendum nosmetipsos ingeniosissimi sumus*): witnesse they that weepe and afflict themselves hearing a relation, or seeing a Tragedie, which they know to be an inuention made for delight, euen of those things that neuer were. I could tell you of one that was so besotted, that he died for one whom he knew to be foule, olde, deformed, not because he loued her, but because she was well painted, and plastered or coloured with other impostures, though he alwayes knew them to be such.

6

Visitations
and offices
of courtesies

Let vs come from the particular vanitie of euery particular man in his common life, to see how much this vanitie is tied to the nature of man, not onely as a priuate and personall vice. What vanitie and losse of time is there in those visitations, salutations, congies and mutuall enterteinments, those offices of courtesie, orations, ceremonies, offers, praises, promises! How many hyperbolicall speeches, hypocrisies and impostures are there in the sight and knowledge of all, both of those that giue them, that receiue them, that heare of them! insomuch that it seemeth to be a match and market made together, to mocke, lie, and deceiue one another. And that which is woorth all the rest, he that knowes that a man doth impudently lie vnto him, must yet giue him thanks; and he that knowes that when he lies he is not beleeued, sets a bolde face vpon the matter, attending and obseruing one the other, who shall first begin or end; when they could both be content they were both asunder. What inconueniences doth man endure? He faineth, counterfeiteth, disguiseth himselfe; he

he endureth heat, colde, troubleth his rest, afflicteth his life for those courtly vanities, and leaueth his weightie affaires for the winde. We are vaine at the charge of our owne ease, yea of our health and of our life. The accidents and the lighter things trample vnder foot the substance, and the winde carrieth the bodie, so much is man a slaue to vanitie: and he that will do otherwise shall be held for a foole and a man that vnderstands not the world. It is dexteritie well to play this Comedie, and folly not to be vaine. Being entred into speech and familiar discourse, how many vaine and vnprofitable, false, fabulous tales are there (not to say wicked and perniti-ous, which are not of this count) how many vaunts and vaine boastings! Man desireth and delighteth to speake of himselfe and that which is his, and if he thinke he haue either done or said, or possesse any thing that is worthie estimation, he is not at ease vntill he hath vttered it, and made it knowen to others: when a commoditie first commeth he entreth into an account thereof he valueth it, he raiseth the price, nay he will not seeme to attend his commoditie, though he seeke it with industrie; and then to heare what the speech of the people is abroad, he thrusts himselfe into companie, and it tickleth him at the heart to heare his happie successe spoken of, and that men esteeme of him the more, and of what hee esteemes.

But better to make knowen what credit and command this vanitie hath ouer the nature of man, let vs call to minde that the greatest alterations of the world, the most generall and fearefull agitations of States and Empires, armies, battels, murthers, haue risen from light, ridiculous and vaine causes: witnesse the warres of *Troy* and *Greece*, of *Sylla* and *Marius*, *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, *Augustus* and *Antonie*. The Poets signifie as much, when they set all *Greece* and *Asia* on fire for an apple. The first occasions and motiues arise of nothing, afterwards they grow and increase: a testimonie of the vanitie and follie of man. Many times the accident doth more than the principall, the lesser circumstances touch more to the quicke than the greatest, nay the causes and subiects themselves. The robe of *Cæsar* troubled *Rome* more than his death did, or those 22 stabs with a poignard that were giuen him.

Lastly,

7
Publike and
vniuersall
agitations.

8 Lastly, the crowne and perfection of the vanitie of man is *Felicitie and contentment.* shewed in that which he most affecteth and seeks after; he pleaseth himselfe and placeth his whole felicitie in those vaine and friuolous goods, without which hee may well and commodiously liue, and takes not that care that he should for the true and essentiall: his chance is winde, his whole good nothing but opinion and dreames, wherein he is matchlesse. God hath all good things in essence, all euill in vnderstanding; man quite contrarie possesseth his good things by fantasie, his euill in essence. Beasts content not, nor feed themselves with opinions and fantasies, but with that which is present, palpable and in veritie. Vanitie hath beene giuen vnto man as his proper part or condition; he runnes, he stirs, he hunts vp and downe, hee catcheth a shadow, hee adoreth the winde, he flies, he dies, and a mote at the last is the heire of his dayes worke. *Vanitati creatura subiecta est etiam nolens, vniuersa vanitas omnis homo viuens.*

C H A P. XXXVII.

Debilitie or Infirmitie.

1 B Eholde heere the second head of this Consideration and humane knowledge: for how should vanitie be other than fraile and feeble? This weaknesse is confessed, and pro- ued by all that account many things easie to be vnderstood of all, but is not taken to be such in those things it should, as in such wherein a man seemeth, to be most strong, and least weake; in desiring, possessing, and vsing those things that he hath and holdeth, and in euery good and euill; and to be short, in such wherein he glorieth most, wherein he thinketh to excell others, and to be some thing. These are the true testimonies of his weaknesse: but we shall see this better apart.

2 *In desiring & chusing.* First, touching desire, a man can not settle his contentment in any thing, no not his owne desire and imagination. It is not in our power to chuse that we should: and whatsoever we haue desired or obtained, it satisfies vs not: but we go bleating after things vnknownen and to come, because things present content vs not, and wee more esteeme of things absent. If one should put a man to his owne choise, make him his owne

owne caruer, it is not in his power so to chuse, as that he repent not his choise, or which he will not adde vnto, or take from, or alter some way or other; for he desires that which he knowes not how to expresse: and at the last nothing can content him, but he is angrie and falleth out with himselfe.

The weaknesse of man doth more appeare, and is greater in the possession and vse of things, and that diuers wayes: ³ *In possessing and vsing.* first, in that he can not make vse of any thing in it owne puritie and simple nature; but he must disguise, alter and corrupt them before he can accomodate them to his vse: the elements, mettals, and all things els in their owne nature are not fit for vse. Good things, delights and pleasures cannot be enioyed without some mixture of euill and discommoditie: *Medio de fonte leporum surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat.* The highest pleasure that is hath a sigh and a complaint to accompanie it; and being come to perfection is but debilitie, a deiection of the minde, languishment. An extreame and full contentment hath more moderate seueritie than wanton delight: *Ipsa fœlicitas, se nisi temperat, premit:* and therefore it was well said of him, That God selles vnto vs whatsoeuer good thing he sends vs: that is to say, That he giueth nothing vnto vs purely good, but that we buy it at the scales with an addition of some euill to make vp weight. So likewise, sorrow is neuer pure without the alliance of some pleasure: *Labor voluptasq; dissimillima natura, societate quadam naturali inter se sunt iuncta; est quadam flere voluptas.* So all things in this world are mingled and compounded with their contraries: those motions and wrinckles in the visage that serue to laugh, serue to weepe, as Painters teach vs: and we see that the extremitie of laughter is mingled with teares. There is no good thing in vs that hath not some vitious tincture with it; *omnes iustitie nostre sunt tanquam pannus menstruatae*, as anon shalbe shewed in his due place; nor no euill without some good: *nullam sine auroboramento malum est.* Miserie it selfe alwayes serues to some end: for there is no euill without good, no good in man without euill; all is mingled, and there is nothing pure in our hands. Secondly, whatsoeuer happeneth vnto vs, we take and enioy with an ill hand; our taste is vnresolved and vncertaine, it knowes not how to hold and

and possesse any thing after a good maner: and from thence sprang that vndermined question of the souereigne good. The better things many times in our hands, by our infirmities, vice, insufficiencie, are made woorse, are corrupted, become nothing, are vnprofitable vnto vs, yea sometimes hurtfull and contrary.

4
In good and
euill.

Tertull.

But humane imbecillitie is more richly displaied in good and euill, in vertue and vice: hence it is, that man can not be, when it seemes good vnto himselfe, either wholly good or wholly wicked, but he hath his weakenesse, his impotencies in them both. Touching vertue, three points are to be considered: the first is, That it is not in the power of man to doe all good, to put in practise all vertues; insomuch that many vertues are incompatible, and can not be together, at least in one and the same subiect, as filiall or maidenly continencie and viduall, which are wholly different; the married and vnmarried state; the two second of widowhood and marriage, being more painfull and busie, and hauing more difficultie and vertue than the two first of virginie and the vnmarried estate, which haue more puritie, grace and ease: *Virgo felicior, vidua laboriosior, in illa gratia, in ista virtus coronatur*: that constancie which is in pouertie, want, aduersitie, and that which is in abundance and prosperitie: patience in beggerie and liberalitie. And this is more true in vices, which are opposite one against the other.

5

The second point is, That many times a man can not performe that which belongs to one vertue, without the scandall and offence either of another vertue, or of it selfe; insomuch that they hinder one the other: whereby it comes to passe that a man can not fatisfie the one but at the charge of the other; which wee must not attribute vnto vertue, or thinke that the vertues crosse and contrary one another, for they agree well enough; but vnto the weakenesse of our humane condition, all the sufficiencie and industrie thereof being so short and so feeble, that it can not finde any certaine, vniuersall and constant rule, whereby to make an honest man: and such order can not be taken, but that the meanes to doe well doe many times hinder one the other. Let vs take for example, Charitie and Iustice: if I encounter my father or my friend

friend in the warres, on the enemies part, in iustice I ought to kill him, but in charitie I should spare and saue him. If a man be wounded to the death and past all remedie, and that there remaineth nothing but a grievous languishment, it were a deed of charitie to make an end of him, as he did that killed *Saul* at his earnest intreatie; but this charitie is punished by iustice, as he was by *David*, and that iustly, *David* being the minister of publike iustice, not priuate charitie: yea, to be found neere vnto a man in such a case, in a suspicious place, and where there is doubt of the murderer, although hee be there to performe some office of humanitie, is very dangerous; and the best thing that can happen vnto him, is to be called into question, and put to answer to that accident whereof he is innocent. So that we see that iustice doth not only offend charitie, but it hampereth and hindereth it selfe: and therefore it was very well sayd and truly, *Summum ius, summa iniuria.*

The third point and the most notable is, that a man is constrained many times to vse badde meanes for the better auoidance of some great euill, or the execution of what is good, in such sort that he must sometimes approoue as lawfull, not onely those things that are not good, but that are starke naught; as if to be good, it were necessarie to be somewhat wicked. And this is seene in euery thing, in *Policie, Iustice, Veritie, Religion.*

In *Policy*, how many euils are there permitted and publiquely acted, not only by conniuece or permission, but also by *Policy*. the approbation of the lawes themselves? as shall heereafter be said in his due place; *ex senatusconsultis & plebescitis scelera exercentur.* To disburthen a State or Common-weale either of too great a number of people, or of such as are inflamed with a desire of warres, which the state, like a body repleat with bad or abundant humours, cannot beare, it is the maner to send them elsewhere, and to ease themselves at the charge or disease of another. As the *French, Lombards, Gothes, Vandales, Tartarians, Turks* haue beene accustomed to do. To auoid a ciuill war, it is the maner to entertaine a strange war. To instruct others in the vertue of Temperance, *Lycurgus* caused the *Ilotes* their seruants to be made drunke, that by the
vgly

vgly deformity of their superfluous inundation, others might grow into a horror and detestation of that sinne. The *Romanes* to prepare their people to valour, and a contempt of the dangers of death, ordeined of purpose those furious spectacles of the fencers, which at the first they ordained for offenders, afterwards for slaues or seruants, but innocents, and lastly for freemen that gaue themselves thereunto. Brothell houses in great Cities, *usuries*, *diuorces*, vnder the law of *Moy-ses*, and in diuers other nations, and religions, haue beene permitted for the better auoiding of greater mischiefes, *ad duritiem cordis eorum*.

8
Iustice.

Of tortures.

In Iustice, which cannot subsist, cannot be executed, without the mixture of some wrong, not onely Iustice commutative, for that is not strange: it is after a sort necessarie, and men could not liue and traffique together, without mutuall dammage, without offence, and the lawes allow of the losse which is vnder the moiety of the iust price. But also Iustice distributive, as it selfe confesseth: *Summum ius, summa iniuria: & omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos, utilitate publica rependitur*. Plato alloweth, and it is not against the law, by deceits and false hopes of fauour and pardon, to draw the offender to confesse his fault. This is by iniustice, deceit and impudencie to doe iustice. And what should we say of the inuention of tortures, which is rather a prooofe of patience, than verity? For both hee that can suffer them, and cannot, will conceale the truth. For why should grieve cause a man rather to speake that which is, than that which is not? If a man thinke that an innocent is patient enough to endure torments, why should not he that is guilty, being a meanes to saue his life? *Illa tormenta gubernat dolor, moderatur natura, cuiusque tum animi, tum corporis regit quassator, flectit libido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot rerum angustiis nil veritati loci relinquatur*. In defence heereof it is said, that tortures doe astonish and quell the guiltie, and extort from him a truth; and contrariwise strengthen the innocent: but we doe so often see the contrarie, that this may be doubted; and to say the truth, it is a poore meanes full of vncertaintie, full of doubt. What will not a man say, what will he not doe, to auoid such torment? *etenim innocentes mentiri cogit*

cogit dolor, in such sort that it falleth out that the iudge which giueth the torture, to the end an innocent should not die, causeth him to die an innocent and tortured too. A thousand and a thousand haue falsely accused their owne heads, either to shorten their torments or their liues. But in the foot of this account is it not a great iniustice and crueltie to torment and to racke a man in pieces for that offence which is yet doubted of? To the end they may not kil a man without iust cause, they doe worse than kill him: if he be innocent and beare the punishment, what amends is made him for his vniust torture? He shall be quit, a goodly recompence, and much reason he hath to thanke you. But it is the lesser euill that the weaknesse of man could inuent.

If man bee weake in vertue, much more is hee in veritie, whether it be eternall and diuine, or temporall and humane. 9
 That astonisheth him with the lightning, & beats him downe with the thunder thereof, as the bright beames of the sunne, the weake eie of the owle: if he presume to behold it, being oppressed, he presently fainteth, *qui scrutator est maiestatis, opprimetur a gloria*: in such sort that to giue himselfe some breath, some tast, he must disguise, temper, and couer it with some shadow or other. This, that is, humane veritie, offendeth and woundeth him, and he that speakes it, is many times holden for an enemye, *Veritas odium parit*. It is a strange thing, man desireth naturally to know the truth, and to attaine thereunto he remooueth all lets whatsoever, and yet he can not attaine it: if it be present, he can not apprehend it; if he apprehend it, he is offended with it. The fault is not in the truth, for that is alwayes amiable, beautifull, worthie the knowledge; but it is humane imbecillitie that can not endure the splendour thereof. Man is strong enough to desire, but too weake to receiue and holde what he desireth. The two principall means which he vseth to attaine to the knowledge of truth, are Reason and Experience. Now both of them are so feeble & vncertaine (though Experience the more weake) that nothing certaine can be drawen from them. Reason hath so many formes, is so pliable, so wauering, as hath been said, and Experience much more, the occurrents are alwayes vnlike; there is nothing so vniuersall in Nature as diuersitie, no-
cap. 14.

K thing

thing so rare and difficult, and almost impossible, as the likeness and similitude of things: and if a man can not note this dissimilitude, it is ignorance and weaknesse; I meane this perfect, pure, and entire similitude and dissimilitude: for to say the truth, they are both whole and entire, there is no one thing that is wholly like or dislike to another. This is an ingenious and marvellous mixture of Nature.

IO
Religion.

But after all this, what doth better discover this humane imbecillitie than Religion? yea the very intention thereof is to make man feeble his owne euill, his infirmitie, his nothing, and to make him to receiue from God his good, his strength, his all things. First it preacheth it vnto him, it beats it into our memorie, it reprocheth man, calling him dust, ashes, earth, flesh, blood, grasse. Afterwards it insinuateth it into him, and makes him feeble it after an excellent and goodly fashion; bringing in God himselfe, humbled, weakened, debased for the loue of him, speaking, promising, swearing, chiding, threatning; and to be briebe, conuerling and working with man after a base, feeble humane maner, like a father that counterfeits his speech, and playes the childe with his children. The weakenesse of man being such, so great, so inuincible, that to giue it some accesse and commerce with the Diuinitie, and to vnite it vnto God, it was necessary that God should debase himselfe to the basest: *Deus quia in altitudine sua a nobis paruulis apprehendi non poterat, ideo se stravit hominibus.* Againe, it makes him see his owne weaknesse by ordinarie effects; for all the principall and holiest exercises, the most solemne actions of religion, are they not the true symptoms and arguments of humane imbecillitie and sicknesse?

Sacrifices.

Those sacrifices that in former times haue been vsed thorowout the world, and yet in some countreys continue, not only of beasts, but also of liuing men, yea of innocents, were they not shamefull marks of humane infirmitie and miserie? First, because they were signes and symboles of his condemnation and malediction (for they were as publike protestations, that he had deserued death, and to be sacrificed as those beasts were) without which there had neuer been any bloodie offerings or propitiatorie and expiatorie sacrifices. Secondly, because of the basenesse of the purpose and intent, which

was

was to thinke to appease, flatter and gratifie God by the massacre and blood of beasts and of men : *Sanguine non colendus Deus, quæ enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas est ?* It is true, that God in those first ages, yet the feeble infancie of the world and nature remaining simple, did well accept of them at the hands of religious men, euen for their deuotion, or rather Christ his sake : *Respexit Dominus ad Abel, & ad munera eius*, taking in good part that which was done with an intent to honour and serue him : and also afterwards, the world being as yet in it apprentiship, *sub pedagogo*, was wholly seasoned in this opinion so vniuersall, that it was almost thought naturall. I touch not heere that particular mysterie of the religion of the Iewes, who vsed them for figures (that is a point that belongs to religion) and with whom it was common to conuert that which was humane or naturall and corporall to a holy and sacred vse, and to gather from thence a spirituall fruit. But this was not because God tooke pleasure in them, nor because it was by any reason in it selfe good: witnesse the Prophets, and the cleereſt sighted amongst them, who haue alwayes freely sayd, *Si voluisses sacrificium dedissem, utiq; holocaustis non delectaberis, sacrificium & oblationem noluiſti, holocaustum pro peccato non postulaſti, non accipiam de domo tua vitulos &c.* and haue called backe and inuited the world to another sacrifice more high, spirituall and woorthie the Diuinitie, *Sacrificium Deo spiritus : aures autem perforaſti mihi ut facerem voluntatem tuam, & legem tuam in medio cordis mei : Immola Deo sacrificium laudis : misericordiam volo non sacrificium.* At the last, the sonne of God, the Doctor of Truth, being come to secure and free-denize the world, did abolish them wholly : which he had not done, if it had beene a thing in it selfe and essentially good, and that it had pleased his father : for contrarily, *Pater non tales querit, sed tales qui adorent in spiritu & veritate.* And to say the trueth, it is one of the goodliest effects and fruits of Christianitie after the abolition of Idoles. And therefore *Iulian* the Emperour, his capitall enemy, as in despight of him, offered more sacrifices than euer any other did in the world, attempting to set them vp againe with idolatrie. Wherefore let vs heere leaue them, and let vs see those other principall parts of religion.

Sacraments.

Repentance.

An oath.

The Sacraments in a matter base and common, bread and wine, and an outward action as base, are they not testimonies of our pouertie and basenesse? Repentance, the vniuersall remedie of our maladies, is a thing in it selfe shamefull, feeble, yea euill: for to repent, to be sorry, to afflict the spirit, is euill, though by consequent it be good. An oath, what is it, but a symptome and shamefull marke of distrust, infidelitie, ignorance, humane infirmitie, both in him that requires it, that giues it, that ordaines it? *Quod amplius est a malo est.* See then how religion healeth our euils by meanes not only small and feeble, our weaknesse so requiring, *stulta & infirma mundi eligit Deus*; but such as by no meanes are of any value, nor are good in themselves, but good in that they serue and are employed against euill, as medicines are: they sprang from an ill cause, yet they driue away ill: they are good, as gibbets and wheelles are in a Common-wealth, as vomits and other discharges proceeding from ill causes are to the bodie: to be briebe, they are such good things, as that it had beene farre better we had neuer had them; and neuer had we had them, if man had beene wise, and preserved himselfe in that estate wherein God had placed him; neither shall he haue them any more, so soone as he is deliuered from this captiuitie, and arriued to his perfection.

II
In euill.

All this sheweth how great this humane weaknesse is to any thing that is good, in Policie, Iustice, Veritie, Religion towards God, but that which is more strange is, that this weaknesse is as great in what is euill: for man though hee be willing to be wicked, yet hee can not be wholly such, but when he hath done his woorst there will be more to doe. There is alwayes some remorse and fearefull consideration, that mollifieth the will and maketh it relent, and still reserueth something to be done; which hath beene the cause of the ruine of many, although perhaps they made it a proiect for their safetie. This is imbecillitie and sottishnesse, and from hence did arise that Prouerbe at their cost, That a man must not play the foole by halfes. A speech vttered with iudgement, but that may haue both a good and an ill sense. To say that a man, when hee is once in, must still proceed to woorse and woorse, without any reseruatiō or respect, it is a very pernicious

nitious doctrine: and the Prouerbe saith well against it: The shorter follies are the better. But yet in some certaine cases the middle way is verie dangerous, as when a man hath a strong enemy by the throat, like one that holdeth a wolfe by the eares, he must either win him altogether by courtesie or vtterly vndo him & extinguish him; which was alwayes the practise of the *Romans*, and that very wisely: among others, concerning the *Latines* or *Italians*, at the exhortation of *Camillus*, *Pacem in perpetuum parere vel seruiendo vel ignoscendo*: for in such a case to doe things by halfe, is to lose all, as the *Samnites* did, who for want of putting in practise that counsell giuen them by an olde weather-beaten souldier, concerning the *Romans*, whom they had then enclosed and shut vp, payd dearly for it; *aut conciliandus aut tollendus hostis*. The former course of courtesie is the more noble, honourable, and rather to be chosen; and wee ought not come to the second but in extremities, and then when the enemy is not capable of the first. By this that hath beene said, is shewed the extreame imbecillitie of man in good and euill, and that good or euill which hee either doth or flieth, is not purely and entirely good or euill: so that it is not in his power to be wholly deprived of all good, nor altogether wicked.

Let vs likewise note many other effects and testimonies of humane weaknesse. It is imbecillitie and pusillanimitie not to dare or not to be able to reprehend another, or to be reprehended: hee that is feeble or courageous in the one, is so in the other. Now it is a strange kinde of delicatenesse, to deprive either himselfe or another of so great a fruit, for so light and verball a wound, that doth onely touch and pierce the eare. Neere neighbour vnto this it is, not to be able to giue a deniall with reason, nor to receiue and suffer a repulse with patience.

In false accusations and wicked suspitions, which are done in place of iustice and iudgement, there is double imbecillitie; the one in those that are accused and suspected, and that is in iustifying and excusing themselves too carefully, and as it were ambitiously. *Mendax infamia terret quem nisi mendacem?* This is to betray their owne innocencie, to put their conscience and their right to comprmise and arbitrement;

for by such plea *perspicuitas argumentatione elenatur*. Socrates in iudgement it selfe would not do it, neither by himselfe nor by another, refusing to vse the learned plea of great *Lysias*, and chose rather to die. The other is in a contrarie case, that is, when the accused is so couragious that he takes no care to excuse or iustifie himselfe, because he scorneth the accusation and accuser, as vnwoorthy his answer and iustification; and he will not doe himselfe that wrong to enter the lists. This course hath been practised by generous men, by *Scipio* aboue all others, many times out of the maruellous constancie of his minde. Now others are offended heerewith, thinking it too great a confidence and pride, and it stingeth them, that hee hath too sensible a feeling of his innocency, and will not yeeld himselfe; or imputing this silence and contempt to the want of heart, distrust of the law, and inability to iustifie himselfe. O feeble humanitie! the accused or suspected, whether hee defend or defend not himselfe, it is imbecillitie and cowardnesse. We wish a man courage to defend himselfe, and when he hath done it, wee shew our owne weaknesse by being offended with it.

14
Tendernesse
& delicacie.

Another argument of imbecillitie is, when a man shall subiect and addict himselfe to a certaine particular forme of life; this is a base kinde of tendernesse, and effeminate delicacie, vnworthy an honest man, and makes vs vnprofitable, different in conuersation, and may be hurtfull too in a case where change of maners and carriage is necessarie. It is likewise a shame, either not to dare or not to be able to doe that which hee seeth euery man to doe besides himselfe. It were fittest that such people should liue and hide themselves in the chimney corner in their priuate houses. The fairest forme of liuing is to be pliable to all, euen to excesse it selfe, if need be; to be able, to dare, to know how to doe all things, and yet to doe nothing but what is good. It is good to know all, not to vse all.

15
Search of
bookes.

It is likewise imbecillity, and a great & vulgar sottishnes, to run after strange and scholasticall examples, after allegations, neuer to settle an opinion without testimonies in print, nor to beleue men but such as are in bookes, nor trueth it selfe but such as is ancient. By this reason fooleries and toyes if they
once

once passe the presse, they haue credit and dignity enough. Now there are euery day many things done before our eies, which if we had but the spirit and sufficiency well to collect, to search with dexterity to iudge of, and to applie to their times, we should frame and finde miracles and maruellous examples, which yeeld not in any thing to those of times past, which we so much admire, and therefore we admire because they are ancient and in print.

Againe another testimony of weaknesse is, that man is not capable but of indifferent things, and cannot endure extre-

16
Extremities.

mities; for if they be small and in outward shew base, he contemneth and disdaineth them as vnworthy, and it is offensive vnto him to consider of them: if they be very great and ouersplendent, he feares them, he admires them, and is offended with them. The first doth principally concerne great and high minds: the second as common with those that are weake.

This weaknesse doth likewise appeare in our hearing, sight, and in the sudden stroke of a new vnexpected occurrence, which surpriseth and seaseth vpon vs vnawares. For they doe in such sort astonish vs, that they take from vs both our sense and speech,

17
Sudden occurrences.

*Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa reliquit,
Labitur & longo vix tandem tempore fatur,*

yea, sometimes life it selfe: whether they be good, witnesse that Romane dame, who died for ioy seeing hir sonne returne safe from the warres; *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the tyrant: or whether they be euill, witnesse *Diodorus*, who died in the field for shame, because he was not able to resolute a doubt, nor answer an argument.

Yet there is another imbecillity, and it is twofold, and after two contrary maners. Some yeeld and are overcome by the teares and humble supplications of another, and their courage & gallantry is wounded with their words: others quite contrarie are not mooued by all the submissions and complaints that may be, but are rather more obdurate and confirmed in their constancy and resolution. There is no doubt but the former proceeds of weaknesse, and it is commonly found in effeminate and vulgar mindes; but the second is not without

18
Braueries
and submissions.

difficultie, and is found in all sorts of people. It should seeme that to yeeld vnto vertue, and to manly & generous strength and vigour, is the part of a valorous and generous minde. It is true if it be done in a reuerent esteeme of vertue, as *Scanderbeg* did receiuing into grace a souldiour whom hee had seene to carrie himselfe valorously in fight euen against himselfe; or as *Pompey* did, pardoning the citie of the *Mammertines*, for the vertue of *Zenon* a citizen thereof; or as the Emperour *Conradus* did, forgiuing the Duke of *Baviers*, and others besieged with him, for the magnanimitie of their women, who priuily conuaied them away, and tooke the danger vpon their owne heads. But if it be done with a kinde of astonishment and affright of the power of vertue, as the people of *Thebes*, who lost their hearts hearing *Epaminondas* then accused, recount vnto them his honourable acts, and seuerely reproaching them with their ingratitude, it is debility and cowardize. The fact of *Alexander* containing the braue resolution of *Belus* taken with the citie of *Gaza* where he commanded, was neither weaknes nor courage, but choler, which in him had neither bridle, nor moderation.

C H A P. XXXVIII.

3. *Inconstancie.*

MAN is a subiect wonderfully diuers, and wauering, vpon whom it is very difficult to settle an assured iudgement, I say a iudgement vniuersall and entire; by reason of the great contrarietie and disagreement of the parts of our life. The greatest part of our actions, are nothing else but eruptions and impulsions enforced by occasions, and that haue reference to others. Irresolution on the one part, and afterwards inconstancy and instability, are the most common and apparent vices in the nature of man. Doubtlesse our actions doe many times so contradict one the other in so strange a maner, that it seemes impossible they should all come foorth of one and the same shop; we alter and we feele it not, we escape as it were, from our selues, and we rob our selues, *ipsi nobis furto subducimur*. We goe after the inclinations of our appetite, and as the wind of occasions carieth vs,

not

not according to reason; *at nil potest esse equabile, quod non a certa ratione proficiscatur.* Our spirits also and our humours are changed with the change of time. Life is an vnequall motion, irregular, of many fashions. In the end wee stirre and trouble our selues by the instabilitie of our behauour. *Nemo non quotidie consilium mutat & votum: modò uxorem vult, modò amicam; modò regnare vult, modò non est eo officiosior seruus; nunc pecuniam spargit, nunc rapit; modò fragi videtur & gravis, modò prodigius & vanus; mutamus subinde personam.*

Quod petyt, spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,

Æstuat, & vita disconuenit ordine toto.

Man is a creature of all others the most hard to be sounded and knowen, for he is the most double and artificiall couert and counterfeit, and there are in him so many cabinets and blind corners, from whence he comes forth sometimes a man, sometimes a satyre; so many breathing holes, from whence hee breathes sometimes heat, sometimes colde, and from whence comes foorth so much smoake: all his carriage and motion is a perpetuall race of errours; in the morning to be borne, in the euening to die; sometimes in the racke, sometimes at libertie; sometimes a god, sometimes a flie; hee laughs and weeps for one and the same thing; he is content and discontent; hee will, and hee will not; and in the end he knowes not what he will: now he is filled with ioy and gladnesse, that he can not stay within his owne skinne, and presently he falleth out with himselfe, nay dares not trust himselfe, *modò amore noſtri, modò tadio laboramus.*

CHAP. XXXIX.

4. Miserie.

BEhold heere the maine and principall line and liniament of the picture of man, he is (as hath beene sayd) vaine, feeble, fraile, inconstant in good, in felicitie, in pleasure, but strong, constant and hardned in miserie: he is miserie it selfe quicke and incarnate; and this is in a word to expresse humanitie, for in man is all miserie, and without him there is not any in the world. It is the propertie of man to be miserable, only man and all man is alwayes miserable, *Homo natus de*

^I
Miserie pro-
per vnto
man.

de muliere breui viuens tempore repletur multis miserijs. Hee that will take vpon him to represent vnto vs all the parts of humane miserie, had need to discouer his whole life, his substance, his entrance, his continuance, his end. I do not therefore vndertake this businesse, it were a worke without end; and besides, it is a common subiect handled by all: but I will heere only quote certaine points which are not common nor taken for miseries, either because they are not felt, or sufficientlie considered of, although they be such as presse man most, if he knew how to iudge of them.

2
In his begin-
ning and his
end.

The first point and prooffe of the miserie of man is his birth; his entrance into the world is shamefull, vile, base, contemptible; his departure, his death, ruine, glorious and honorable: whereby it seemeth that he is a monster and against nature, since there is shame in making him, honor in destroying him. *Nostri nosmet poenitet & pudet.* Heere of a word or two.

1 The action of planting and making man is shamefull, and all the parts thereof, the congreidents, the preparations, the instruments, and whatsoeuer serues thereunto is called and accounted shamefull, and there is nothing more vncleane in the whole nature of man. The action of destroying and killing him honourable, and that which serues thereunto glorious: we gild it, we enrich it, we adorne our selues with it, we carrie it by our sides, in our hands, vpon our shoulders. We disdain to go to the birth of man: euery man runnes to see him die, whether it be in his bed, or in some publike place, or in the field.

2 When we goe about to make a man, we hide our selues, we put out the candle, we do it by stealth. It is a glorie and a pompe to vnmade a man, to kill him; wee light the candles to see him die, wee execute him at high noone, wee sound a trumpet, we enter the combat, and we slaughter him when the sunne is at highest.

3 There is but one way to beget, to make a man; a thousand and a thousand meanes, inuentions, arts to destroy him. There is no reward, honour or recompence assigned to those that know how to increase, to preserve humane nature; all honours, greatnesse, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, trophes are appointed for those that know how to afflict, trouble, destroy it. The two principall men of the world, *Alexander* and *Cesar*, haue vnmade,

4 haue

haue slaine, ech of them (as *Plinie* reporteth) more than a million of men, but they made none, left none behinde them. And in ancient times, for pleasure onely and pastime, to delight the eyes of the people, there were publike slaughters and massacres of men made. *Homo sacra res per iocum & ludum occiditur : satis spectaculi in homine mors est : innocentes in ludum veniunt, ut publica voluptatis hostie fiant.* There are some nations that curse their birth, blesse their death. How monstrous a creature is this, that is made a horror vnto himselfe ! None of all this is in any other creature, no not in the whole world besides.

Seneca.
Tertull. de
Spectac.

The second point and testimonie of the miserie of man is the diminishing of his pleasures, euen those small and slight ones that appertaine vnto him, (for of such as are great and sound he is not capable, as hath beene shewed in his weakness) and the impairing of the number and sweetnesse of them. If it be so, that he doe it not for Gods cause, what a monster is this, that is an enemy vnto himselfe, robbes, and betrayes himselfe, to whom his pleasures are a burthen and a crosse ! There be some that flie from health, ioy, comfort, as from an euill thing.

3

O miseri quorum gaudia crimen habent !

We are not ingenious but to our owne hurt, it is the true diet of the force of the spirit.

But there is yet that which is worfe, the spirit of man is not only a diminisher of his ioy, a trouble-feast, an enemy to his small, naturall and iust pleasures, as I meane to proue, but also a forger of those that are euill; it faineth, feareth, flieth, abhorreth as great mischiefs, things that are not any way euill in themselves; and in trueth, which beasts themselves feare not, but that by his owne proper discourse and imagination they are fained to be such, as not to be aduanced in honour, greatnes, riches, as cuckoldship, sterility, death : for to say the truth, there is nothing but griefe it selfe that is euill and which is felt. And though some wise men seem to feare these things, yet it is not for their owne sakes, but because of that griefe which sometimes doth accompany them afterwards : for many times it is a fore-runner of death, and sometimes followeth the losse of goods, of credit, of honour. But take from these

4
Forging of
euils.

these things grief, the rest is nothing but fantasie, which hath no other lodging but in the head of man, which quits it selfe of other businelle to be miserable; and imagineth within it owne bounds, false euils besides the true, employing and extending his miserie in stead of lessening and contracting it. Beasts feele not these euils, but are exempted from them, because nature iudgeth them not to be such.

5
He is borne
to sorrow.

1

2

3

As for sorrow, which is the only true euill, man is wholly borne thereunto, and it is his naturall propertie. The *Mexicanes* thus salute their infants comming forth of the wombe of their mother: *Infant thou art come into the world to suffer: endure, suffer, and hold thy peace.* That sorrow is naturall vnto man, and contrariwise, pleasure but a stranger, it appeareth by these three reasons. All the parts of man are capable of sorrow; very few of delight. The parts capable of pleasure can not receiue more than one or two sorts, but all can receiue the greatest number of griefs, all different, heat, colde, pricking, rubbing, trampling, fleaing, beating, boiling, languishing, extension, oppression, relaxation, and infinite others, which haue no proper name, (to omit those of the soule) in such sort, that man is better able to suffer them, than to expresse them. Man hath no long continuance in pleasure: for that of the bodie is like a fire of straw: and if it should continue, it would bring with it much enuie and displeasure: but sorrowes are more permanent, and haue not their certaine seasons as pleasures haue. Againe, the empire and command of sorrow is farre more great, more vniuerfall, more powerful, more durable, and (in a word) more naturall, than that of pleasure.

1

2

3

To these three a man may adde other three: Sorrow and griefe is more frequent, and falles out often; Pleasure is rare. Euil comes easily of it selfe, without seeking; Pleasure neuer comes willingly, it must be sought after, and many times we pay more for it than it is woorth. Pleasure is neuer pure, but alwayes distempered, and mingled with some bitternelle, and there is alwayes something wanting; but sorrow and griefe is many times entire and pure. After all this, the worst of our market, and that which doth evidently shew the miserie of our condition, is, that the greatest pleasures touch vs

not

not so neere, as the lightest griefs. *Segnius homines bona, quàm mala sentiunt*, we feele not so much our soundest health, as the least maladie that is, *pungit in cute vix summa violatum plagula corpus, quando valere, nū quēquam monet.*

It is not enough that man be indeede and by nature miserable, and besides true and substantiall euills he faine & forge false and fantastically, as hath beene saide; but hee must likewise extend and lengthen them, and cause both the true and false to endure and to liue longer than they can, so amarus is he of miserie; which he doth diuers waies. First by the remembrance of what is past, and the anticipation of what is to come, so that we cannot faile to be miserable, since that those things which are principally good in vs, and whereof wee glorie most, are instruments of miserie: *futuro torquemur & præterito, multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris tormentum memoria reducit, prouidentia anticipat, nemo presentibus tantum miser est.* It is not enough to be miserable, but wee must encrease it by a continual expectation before it come, nay seeke it and prouoke it to come, like those that kill themselves with the feare of death, that is to say, either by curiositie or imbecillitie, and vaine apprehension, to preoccupate euills and inconueniences, and to attend them with so much paine & ado, euen those which peradventure will neuer come neere vs? These kinde of people will be miserable before their time, and double miserable, both by a reall sense or feeling of their miserie, and by a long premeditation therof, which many times is a hundred times worse than the euills themselves, *Minus afficit sensus fugatio quàm cogitatio.* The essence or being of miserie endureth not long, but the minde of man must lengthen and extend it, and entertaine it before hand. *Plus dolet quàm necesse est qui ante dolet quàm necesse est. Quædam magis, quædam antequam debeant, quædam cum omnino non debeant, nos torquent. Aut augemus dolorem, aut fugimus, aut præcipimus.* Beasts do well defend themselves from this follie and miserie, and are much bound to thanke nature that they want that spirit, that memorie, that prouidence that man hath. *Cæsar* said well that the best death was that which was least premeditated. And to say the truth, the preparation before death hath beene to many a greater torment, than the execution it selfe.

My

Lib. 2. ca. 7. *p. 304.* My meaning is not here to speake of that vertuous and philosophicall premeditation, which is that temper, whereby the soule is made invincible, & is fortified to the prooffe against all assaults and accidents, whereof we shall speake heerafter: but of that fearefull and sometimes false, and vaine apprehension of euils that may come, which afflicteth and darkeneth, as it were with smoke, all the beauty and serenity of the soule, troubleth all the rest and ioy thereof, insomuch that it were better to suffer it selfe to be wholly surprised. It is more easie and more naturall not to thinke thereof at all. But let vs leaue this anticipation of euill, for simply euery care and painfull thought bleating after things to come by hope, desire, feare, is a very great misery. For besides that we haue not any power ouer that which is to come, much lesse ouer what is past; (and so it is vanity, as it hath been said) there doth stil remain vnto vs that euill and dammage, *Calamitosus est animus, futuri anxius*, which robbeth our vnderstanding, and taketh from vs the peaceable comfort of our present good, and will not suffer vs to settle and content our selues therein.

7
By vnquiet
search.

But this is not yet enough. For to the end man may neuer want matter of misery, yea that he may alwaies haue his full, he neuer ceaseth searching and seeking with great study, the causes and aliments of misery. He thrusteth himselfe into businesse euen with ioy of heart, euen such as when they are offered vnto him, he should turne his backe towards them; and either out of a miserable disquiet of mind, or to the end he may shew himselfe to be industrious, a man of employment and vnderstanding, that is a foole and miserable too, he enterpriseth, mooueth, and remooueth new businesse, or els he putteth himselfe into that of other mens. To be short, he is so strongly and incessantly molested with care, and thoughts not only vnprofitable and superfluous, but painfull and hurtfull, tormented with what is present, annoied with what is past, vexed with that which is to come, that hee seemeth to feare nothing more, than that he shall not be sufficiently miserable. So that a man may iustly crie out, O poore and wretched creatures that you are, how many euils doe you willingly endure, besides those necessarie euils that nature hath bestowed vpon you? But what? Man contenteth himselfe

himselfe in miserie, he is obstinate to ruminare & continually to recall to minde his passed euils. Complaints are common with him, and his owne euils and sorrowes seeme many times deare vnto him, yea it is a happie thing for small and light occasions to be termed the most miserable of all others: *est quedam dolendi voluptas*. Now this is a farre greater miserie to be ambitiously miserable, than not to know it, not to feele it at all. *Homo animal querulum, cupide suis incumbens miserijs*.

We will not account it a humane miserie, since it is an euill common to all men, and not to beasts, that men can not accommodate themselves, and make profit of one another, without the losse and hurt, the sicknesse, folly, sinne, death of one another. We hinder, wound, oppresse one the other in such maner, that the better sort euen without thought or will thereunto, out of an insensible desire and innocentlie thirst after the death, the euill, the paine and punishment of another.

8

By incomparabilite.

So that we see man miserable both naturally and voluntarily, in truth and by imagination, by obligation and willingness of heart. He is too miserable, and yet he feares he is not miserable enough, and laboureth to make himselfe more miserable. Let vs now see how. When he feeles any euill, and is annoyed with some certaine miserie (for hee is neuer without many miseries that he feeles not) he endeouoreth to quit himselfe thereof; but what are his remedies? Truly such as importune him more than the euill it selfe which hee would cure; in such sort, that being willing to get forth of one miserie, he doth but change it into another, and perhaps into a worse. But what of that, the change it selfe perhaps delighteth him, or at least yeelds him some solace: he thinketh to heale one euill with another euill, which proceedeth from an opinion which the bewitched and miserable world holdeth; that is, That there is nothing profitable, if it be not painfull. That is woorth nought that costs nothing, yea ease it selfe is much suspected. This doth likewise proceed from an higher cause. It is a strange thing, but true, and which conuicteth man to be miserable, That no euill can be taken away, but by another euill, whether it be in bodie or in soule. Spiritual maladies and corporall are not cured and chased away, but
by

9

In the remedies of miserie.

It was erroneous, but corrected.

by torment, sorrow, paine. The spirituall by repentance, watchings, fastings, imprisonments, which are truly afflictions, and such as gaule vs too, notwithstanding the resolution and deuotion willingly to endure them : for if we vse them either for pleasure or profit, they can worke no effect, but are rather exercises of pleasure, of couctousnesse, of household gouernment, than of repentance and contrition of heart. The corporall in like sort be medicines, incisions, cauteries, diets, as they well feele that are bound to medicinall rules, who are troubled on the one side with the disease that afflicts them, on the other with that rule, the thought whereof continually annoyeth them. So likewise other euils, as ignorance is cured by great, long and painfull studie : *Qui addit scientiam, addit & laborem* : want and pouertie, by great care, watchings, trauell, sweatings : *In sudore vultus tui*. So that both for the soule and for the bodie, labour and trauell is as proper vnto man, as it is for a bird to flie.

IO
Spirituell
miseries.

All these miseries aboue mentioned are corporall, or common both to the spirit and to the body, and mount little higher than the imagination and fantasie. Let vs consider of the more subtile and spirituall, which are rather to be called miseries, as being erroneous and malignant, more actiue and more our owne, but lesse felt and confessed, which makes a man more, yea doubly miserable, because hee onely feeleth those euils that are indifferent, and not the greater; yea a man dares not touch them, or speake of them, so much is he confirmed, and so desperate in his miseries. We must therefore by the way as it were, and gently say something, at least with the finger point as farre off, to giue him occasion to consider and thinke thereof, since of himselfe he hides it not. First, in regard of the vnderstanding, is it not a strange and a lamentable miserie of humane nature, that it should wholly be composed of error and blindness? The greater part of common and vulgar opinions, yea the more plausible, and such as are receiued with reuerence, are false and erroneous; and which is woorse, the greater part vnprofitable for humane societie. And although some of the wisest, which are but few in number, vnderstand better than the common sort, and iudge of these opinions as they should, neuerthelesse sometimes they suffer

suffer themselves to be caried, if not in all and alwayes, yet in some and sometimes. A man had need be firme and constant, that he suffer not himselfe to be carried with the streame, yea sound and prepared to keepe himselfe cleere from so vniuersall a contagion. The generall opinions receiued with the applause of all, and without contradiction, are as a swift riuer which carrieth all with it: *Proh superi quantum mortalia pectora ceca noctis habent! O miseras hominum mentes & pectora ceca, qualibus in tenebris vita, quantisque periculis degitur hoc exi quodcumque est!* Now it were too long and too tedious a thing to runne ouer all those foolish opinions by name, wherewith the whole world is made drunken: yet let vs take a view of some few of them, which in their due place shall be handled more at large.

1 To iudge of aduice and counsell by the euents, which are no way in our owne hands, and which depend vpon the heauens. See lib. 3. cap. 1.

2 To condemne and reiect all things, maners, opinions, lawes, customes, obseruations as barbarous and euill, not knowing what they are, or seeing any inconuenience in them, but onely because they are vnusuall, and different from such as are ordinarie and common. Lib. 2. ca. 8. see p. 305

3 To esteeme and commend things, because of their noueltie, or raritie, or strangenesse, or difficultie, foure messengers which haue great credit in vulgar spirits: and many times such things are vaine, and not to be esteemed, if they bring not with them goodnesse and commoditie. And therefore that Prince did iustly contemne him that glorified himselfe because he could from far cast a graine of millet thorow the eye of a needle. Lib. 2. ca. 3. see p. 265

4 Generally all those superstitious opinions wherewith children, women, and weake mindes are infected.

5 To esteeme of men for their riches, dignities, honors, and to contemne those that want them, as if a man should iudge of a horse by the saddle and bridle.

6 To account of things not according to their true, naturall and essentiall worth, which is many times inward and hidden, but according to the outward shew or common report.

7 To thinke to be reuenged of an enemy by killing him: for that is to put him in safetie, and to quit him from all ill, and to bring a vengeance vpon himfelfe: it is to take from his enemy all fenfe of reuenge, which is the principall effect thereof. This doth likewise belong vnto weaknesse.

8 To account it a great iniurie, or to thinke a man miserable because he is a cuckold: for what greater folly in iudgement can there be, than to esteeme of a man the lesse for the vice of another, which hee neuer allowed? As much may be fayd of a bastard.

9 To account lesse of things present, and that are our owne, and which wee peaceably enioy; and to esteeme of them most, when a man hath them not, or because they are another mans, as if the presence and possession of them did lessen their worth, and the want of them increase it.

Virtutem incolumem odimus,

Sublatam ex oculis querimus inuidi.

And this is the cause why a Prophet is not esteemed in his owne countrey. So likewise, mastership and authoritie ingendreth contempt of those that are subiect to that authoritie: husbands haue a carelesse respect of their wiues, and many fathers of their children. Wilt thou (saith the good fellow) loue her no more, then marrie her? Wee esteeme more the horse, the house, the seruant of another, because he is another and not ours. It is a thing very strange to account more of things in imagination, than in substance, as a man doth all things absent and that are not his, whether it be before hee haue them, or after he hath had them. The cause hereof in both cases may be, because before a man possesse them, hee esteemeth not according to that they are worth, but according to that which he imagineth them to be, or they haue by another beene reported to be; and possessing them, hee esteemes them according to that good and benefit he getteth by them; and after they are taken from him, he considereth and desireth them wholly in their perfection and declination, whereas before he enioyed them and vsed them, but by peecemeale successiuelly: for a man thinketh he shall alwayes haue time enough to enioy them, and by that meanes they are gone before he was aware that he had them. And this is the

the reason why the griefe is greater in hauing them not, than the pleasure in possessing them. But heerein there is as much imbecillitie as miserie. We haue not the sufficiencie to enioy, but only to desire. There is another vice cleane contrarie to this, and that is, when a man setleth himselfe in himselfe, and in such sort conceits himselfe and whatsoeuer he hath, that he preferres it before all, and thinks nothing comparable to his owne. Though these kinde of people be no wiser than the other, yet they are at least more happie.

10 To be ouer-zealous in euery question that is proposed, to bite all, to take to the heart, and to shew himselfe importunate and opinatiue in euery thing, so he haue some faire pretext of iustice, religion, the weale publike, the loue of the people.

11 To play the mourner, the afflicted person, to weepe *See cap. 27.* for the death, or vnhappie accident of another, to thinke that not to be moued at all, or very little, is for want of loue and affection. There is also vanitie in this.

12 To esteeme and make account of actions that are done *Lib. 2. ca. 10.* with rumour, clatter, and clamor, and to contemne those that are done otherwise, and to thinke that they that proceed after so sweet and calme a maner, do nothing, are as in a dreame without action; and to be brieft, to esteeme Art more than Nature. That which is puffed vp, swollen, and eleuated by studie, fame, report, and striketh the sense (that is to say, artificiall) is more regarded and esteemed, than that which is sweet, simple, plaine, ordinarie, that is to say, Naturall: that awaketh, this brings vs asleepe.

13 To giue an ill and wrong interpretation of the honorable actions of another man, and to attribute them to base and vaine, or vicious causes or occasions; as they that attributed the death of yoong *Cato* to the feare he had of *Cesar*, wherewith *Plutarch* seemes to be offended, and others more foolishly, to ambition. This is a great maladie of the iudgement, which proceedeth either from malice, and corruption of the will and maners, or enuie against those that are more woorthy than themselues, or from that vice of bringing their owne credit to their owne doore, and measuring another by their owne foot; or rather than all this, from imbecillitie and

weaknesse, as not hauing their sight so strong and so certaine to conceiue the brightnesse of vertue in it owne native purity. There are some that thinke they shew great wit and subtiltie in deprauing and obseuring the glory of beautifull and honorable actions, wherein they shew much more malice than sufficiencie. It is a thing easy enough to doe, but base and villanous.

14 To defame and to chastise ouer-rigorously, and shamefully, certaine vices as crimes in the highest degree villanous and contagious, which are neuertheless but indifferent, and haue their roote and excuse in nature: and not so much to detest, and to chastise with so greedy adoo those vices that are truly great, and against nature, as pretended and plotted murders, treasons, and treachery, cruelty, and so forth.

15 Behold also after all this a true testimonie of spirituall miserie, but which is wily & subtile, and that is, that the spirit of man in it best temper, and peaceable, settled, and soundest estate, is not capable but of common, ordinary, naturall, and indifferent things. To be capable of diuine and supernaturall, as of diuination, prophesie, reuelation, inuention, and as a man may say, to enter into the cabinet of the gods, he must be sicke, displaced from his naturall seate, and as it were corrupted, *corruptus*, either by extrauagancie, extasie, inspiration, or by dreaming; insomuch that the two naturall wayes to attein thereunto are either fury, or dead sleepe. So that the spirit is neuer so wise, as when it is a foole, nor more awaked, than when it sleepeth: it neuer meeteth better, than when it goes on one side, or crosseth the way; it neuer mounts or flies so high, as when it is most deiected. So that it must needs be miserable, because to be happy, it must be, as it were lost, and without it selfe. This toucheth not in any sort the diuine disposition, for God can to whom, and when it pleaseth him, reueale himselfe, man in the meane time continuing settled in his sense and vnderstanding, as the scripture makes mention of *Moyes* and diuers others.

16 To conclude, can there be a greater fault in iudgement, than not to esteeme of iudgement, not to exercise it, and to preferre the memory, and imagination, or fantasie before it? We see those great, goodly and learned orations, discourses,

ses, lectures, sermons, bookes, which are so much esteemed and admired, written by men of greatest learning in this age (I except some few) what are they all, but a heape and collection of allegations, and the labours of other men (a worke of memory and reading, and a thing very easie, being all culled and disposed to their hands, and heereof are so many bookes composed) with some few poynts handled, with a good instruction or two (a worke of imagination) and heere is all? This is many times a vanity, and there appeareth not in it any sparke of iudgement, or excellent vertue: so likewise the authours themselves are many times weake and common in iudgement, and in will corrupted: how much better is it, to heare a countrey swaine, or a merchant talking in his counting-house, discoursing of many goodly propositions and verities, plainly and truely without arte or forme and giuing good and wholesome counsell, out of a sound, strong, and solide iudgement?

In the will there are as many, or rather more miseries, and more miserable; they are without number, among which ^{II} Of the Will. these following are some few of them.

1 To be willing rather to seeme an honest man, than to be, and rather to be such to another, than to himselfe.

2 To be farre more ready and willing to reuenge an offence, than to acknowledge a good turne, in such sort, that it is a course to his heart to acknowledge, pleasure and gaine to reuenge, a prooffe of a malignant nature, *gratia oneri est, ultio in quaestu habetur.*

3 To be more apt to hate, than to loue, to slander, than to commend; to feede more willingly and with greater pleasure vpon the euill, than the good of another, to enlarge it more, to display it more in his discourse, and the exercise of his stile; witnesse Lawyers, Oratours, and Poets, who in reciting the good of any man, are idle, eloquent in euill. The words, inuentions, figures, to speake ill, to scoffe, are farre otherwise, more rich, more emphaticall and significant, than to prayse, or speake well.

4 To flye from euill, to doe what is good, not properly for the good effect by naturall reason, and for the loue of vertue, but for some other strange consideration, sometimes base

and idle, of gaine and profit, vaine-glory, hope, feare, of custome, company; and to be brieft, not simply for himselfe and his duty, but for some other outward occasion and circumstance: all are honest men by occasion and accident. And this is the reason why they are such vnequally, diuersly, not perpetually, constantly, vniformely.

5 To loue him the lesse whom we haue offended, and that because we haue offended him; a strange thing, and which proceedeth not alwayes from feare that he will take occasion to be reuenged, for it may be he wisheth vs neuer the worse; but it is because his presence doth accuse vs, and brings to memory our fault and indiscretion. And if the offendour loue not the offended the worse, it is because the offence he committed was against his will; for commonly he that hath a will to offend, loues him the lesse whom he hath offended, *Chi offende, mai non perdona*, He that offends, neuer forgiues.

6 As much may be sayd of him to whom we are much bound for courtesies receiued, his presence is a burthen vnto vs, he putteth vs in minde of our band and duty, he reprocheth vnto vs our ingratitude and inabilities, and we wish he were not, so we were discharged of that duty. Villaines by nature, *Quidam quo plus debent, magis oderunt: leue as alienum debitorem facit, graue inimicum*.

7 To take pleasure in the euill, hurt, and danger of another, to greeue and repine at his good, aduancement, prosperitie (I meane when it is without cause of hatred, or priuate quarrell, for it is another thing when it proceedeth from the ill desert of a man) I speake heere of that common and naturall condition, whereby without any particular malice, men of indifferent honestie, take pleasure to see others aduenture their fortunes at sea, and are vexed to see them thriue better than themselues, or that fortune should smile more vpon others than them, and make themselues merry with the sorrow of another: this is a token of a malicious seed in vs.

12 To conclude, that I may yet shew you how great our misery is, let me tell you that the world is replenished with three sorts of people, who take vp much roome therein, and carry a great sway both in number and reputation: the superstitious,

The conclusion of these spirituall miseries.

stitious, formalists, *Pedanties*, who notwithstanding they are in diuers subiects, iurisdiccions, and theaters (the three principall, religion, life or conuersation, and doctrine) yet they are all of one stamp, weake spirits, ill borne, or very ill instructed, a very dangerous kind of people in iudgement, and touched with a disease incurable. It is lost labour to speake to these kind of people, or to perswade them to change their minds, for they account themselves the best and wisest in the world, opinatiue obstinacie is there in his proper seate; he that is once stricken and touched to the quick with any of these euils, there is little hope of his recovery: Who is there more sottish, and withall more braine-sick and heady than these kind of people? Two things there are that doe much hinder them (as hath been spoken) naturall imbecillitie, and incapacitie, and afterwards an anticipated opinion to do as well and better than others. I do heere but name them, and point them with the finger, for afterwards in their places heere quoted their faults shall be shewed more at large.

The *Superstitious*, iniurious to God, and enemies to true religion, couer themselves with the cloke of pietie, zeale and loue towards God, euen to the punishing and tormenting of themselves more than is needfull, thinking thereby to merit much, and that God is not only pleased therewith, but indebted vnto them for the rest. What would you do to these kind of people? If you tell them that they do more than they need, and that they receiue things with the left hand, in not vnderstanding them aright, they will not belceue you, but tell you, that their intent is good (whereby they thinke to saue themselves) and that they do it for deuotion. Howsoeuer, they will not quit themselves of their gaine, nor the satisfaction which they receiue, which is to bind God vnto them.

I
Superstitious.
See Lib. 2.
Cap. 5. p. 281.

The *Formalists* doe wholly tie themselves to an outward forme and fashion of life, thinking to be quit of blame in the pursuite of their passions and desires, so they do nothing against the tenour of the lawes, and omit none of their formalities. See heere a miserable churle which hath ouerthrowne and brought to a desperate state many poore families; but this hath fallen out by demaunding that which he thought to be his owne, and that by way of iustice. Who then can affirme

2
Formalists.

that he hath done ill? O how many good works haue beene omitted, how many euils committed, vnder this cloake of formes, which a man sees not! And therefore it is very truly sayd, That the extremitie of law is the extremitie of wrong: and as well sayd, God shield vs from *Formalists*.

3
Pedanties.
Lib. 3. cap.
13.

The *Pedantie* or housholde schoole-master hauing with great study and paines filched from other mens writings their learning, they set it out to the view and to sale, and with a questuous and mercenary ostentation they disgorge it, and let it flie with the winde. Are there any people in the world so sottish in their affaires, more vnapt to euery thing, and yet more presumptuous and obstinate? In euery tongue and nation, *Pedante*, *Clerke*, *Master*, are words of reproch. To doe any thing sottishly, is to doe it like a *Clerke*. These are a kinde of people that haue their memories stuffed with the wisdom of other men, and haue none of their owne: their iudgements, willes, consciences are neuer the better, they are vnapt, simple, vnwise, in such sort, that it seemes that learning serues them for no other vse than to make them more fooles, yea more arrogant pratlers: they diminish or rather swallow vp their owne spirits, and bastardize their vnderstanding, but puffe vp their memorie. Heere is that miserie seated which we now come to speake of, and is the last of those of the vnderstanding.

CHAP. XL.

5. *Presumption.*

BEholde heere the last and leawdest line or liniament of this picture; it is the other part of that description giuen by *Plinie*; the plague of man, and the nurse of false and erroneous opinions, both publike and particular: and yet a vice both naturall and originall in man. Now this presumption must be considered diuersly, and in all senses, high, low, collaterall, inward and outward, in respect of God, things high and celestiaall; in regard of things base, as of beasts, man his companion, of himselfe, and all may be reduced to these two, To esteeme too much of himselfe, and not to esteeme sufficiently of another: *Qui in se confidebant, & aspernabantur alios.* A word or two of either.

Luc. 18.

First

First in respect of God (and it is a horrible thing) all superstition and want in religion, or false seruice of God, proceedeth from this, That we esteeme not enough of God, we vnderstand him not; and our opinions, conceits and beliefs of the Diuinitie are not high and pure enough. I meane not by this enough, proportion answerable to the greatnesse of God, which being infinite receiueth not any proportion; for it is impossible in this respect to conceit or belecue enough: but I meane enough in respect of what we can and ought to doe. We soare not high enough, we doe not eleuate and sharpen sufficiently the point of our spirit, when we enter into an imagination of the Diuinitie: we ouer-basely conceit him, our seruices are vnworthy his maiestie: we deale with him after a baser maner than with other creatures; we speake not only of his works, but of his maiestie, will, iudgements, with more confidence and boldnesse than we dare to doe of an earthly Prince or man of honour. Many men there are that would scorn such kind of seruice and acknowledgement, and would holde themselves to be abused, and their honours in some sort violated, if a man should speake of them, or abuse their names in so base and abiect a maner. We enterprise to leade God, to flatter him, to bend him, to compound or condition with him; that I may not say, to braue, threaten, despight, murmure against him. *Cesar* willed his Pilot not to feare to hoise vp sailes, and cominit himselfe to the furie of the seas euen against destinie and the will of the heauens, with this onely confidence, That it was *Cesar* whom he carried. *Augustus* hauing beene beaten with a tempest at sea, defied god *Nep-tune*, and in the chiefeest pompe of the *Circean* sports caused his image to be taken downe, from where it was placed amongst the rest of the gods, to be reuenged of him. The *Thracians* when it thundereth and lighteneth, shoot against heauen, to bring God himselfe into order. *Xerxes* scourged the sea, and writ a bill of defiance against the hill *Athos*. And one telleth of a Christian King a neere neighbour of ours, who hauing receiued a blow from God, swore he would be reuenged: and gaue commandement, that for ten yeeres no man should pray vnto him, or speake of him.

I
Presumpti-
on in regard
of God.

See lib. 2.
cap. 10.

See lib. 2.
cap. 18.
See lib. 3.
cap. 1.

Andax Lapetigenus

Nal

Nil mortalibus arduum.

Cælum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque

Per nostrum patimur scelus

Iracunda Iouem ponere fulmina.

But to leaue these strange extrauagancies, all the common sort of people do they not plainly verifie that saying of *Pliny*, That there is nothing more miserable, and therewithall more glorious than man? For on the one side he faineth loftie and rich opinions of the loue, care and affection of God towards him, as his minion and only beloued, and in the meane time he returneth him no dutie or seruice worthie so great and louing a God. How can a life so miserable, and a seruice so negligent on the one side, agree with an opinion and beliefe so glorious and so haughtie on the other? This is at one and the same time, to be an angel and a swine: and this is that where-with a great Philosopher reproched the Christians, that there were no people more fierce & glorious in their speech, and in effect more dissolute, effeminate and villanous. It was an enemy that spake it perhaps to wrong and abuse vs, but yet he spake but that which doth iustly touch all hypocrites.

²
In respect of
Nature.

It likewise seemeth vnto vs, that we burthen and importune God, the world, and nature, that they labour and trauell in our affayres, they watch not but for vs, and therefore we wonder and are astonished with those accidents that happen vnto vs, and especially at our deaths. Few there are that resolve and beleue, that it is their last houre, and almost all do euen then suffer themselves to be mocked with vaine hopes. This proceedeth from presumption, we make too much of our selues, and we thinke that the whole world hath great interest in our death, that things faile vs according to that measure that we faile them, or that they faile themselves, according to that measure that they faile vs; that they goe the selfe-same daunce with vs, not vnlike those that rowe vpon the water, thinke the heauens, the earth, yea cities themselves to mooue, when they mooue; we thinke to draw all with vs, and there is no man amongst vs that sufficiently thinks he is but one.

³
Of Heauen.

Besides all this, man beleeueth that the heauen, the starres,

all

all this great celestiall motion of the world, is only made for him, *Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes Deos.* And the poore miserable wretch is in the meane time ridiculous: he is heere beneath lodged in the last and worst stage of the world, most distant from the celestiall vault, in the sincke of the world, amongst the filth and lees thereof; with creatures of baser condition, made to receiue all those excrements and ordures, which raine downe and fall from aboue vpon his head; nay he liues not but by them, and to endure all those accidents that on all sides happen vnto him; and yet he makes himselfe beleeeue that he is the master and commander of all, that all creatures, yea those great luminous incorruptible bodies, whereof he knowes not the least vertue, and which he is constrained with astonishment to admire, moue not but for him, and to do him seruice. And because he beggeth (wretch that he is) his liuing, his maintenance, his commodities, from the beames, light and heate of the Sunne, from the raine and other distillations of heauen, and the aire, he sticks not to say, that he enioyeth the heauens and the elements, as if all had been made, and still mooue only for him. In this sense a gosling may say as much, and perhaps more iustly and peremptorily. For man who many times receiueeth many discommodities from aboue, and of all that he receiueeth hath nothing in his owne power or vnderstanding, nor can diuine of them, is in continuall doubt and feare, lest those superiour bodies should not moue aright, and to that end and purpose which he hath proposed, and that they procure vnto him sterilitie, sicknesse, and whatsoeuer is contrary to his designement, and so he trembleth vnder this burthen; whereas beasts receiue whatsoeuer commeth from aboue, without stirre or apprehension of what shall happen vnto them, and without complaint of that which is hapned, which man cannot doe. *Non Seneca: nos causa mundo sumus hiemem astatemq; referendi: suas ista leges habent, quibus diuina exercentur: minus nos suspicimus si digni nobis videmur, propter quos tanta moueantur. non tanta cælo nobiscum societas est, ut nostro fato sit ille quoque siderum fulgor.*

In respect of things base and earthly, that is to say, all other creatures, he disdaineth and contemneth them, as if they did not appertaine to the same master-workeman, and came not
of:

of the same mother, did not belong to the same family with him, as if they did not any way concerne him, or had any part or relation vnto him. And from hence proceedeth that common abuse and cruelty that is practised against them; a thing that reboundeth against that common and vniuersall master which hath made them, which hath care of them, and hath ordeined lawes for their good and preservation, hath giuen them preheminance in certaine things, and sent man vnto them as to a schoole. But this belongs to the subiect of the chapter following.

5

Now this derogateth not any thing at all from that common doctrine, that the world is made for man, and man for God: for besides the instruction that man draweth in generall from euery high and low thing, whereby to know God, himselfe, his duty, he also draweth in particular from euery thing either profit, pleasure, or seruice. That which is aboue him, which he hath least in vnderstanding, and nothing at all in his power, the azured heauen so richly decked and counterpointed with starres, and rowling torches neuer ceasing ouer our heads, he only enioyeth by contemplatiō, he moun- teth and is caried with admiration, feare, reuerence of the au- thour and soueraigne Lord of all: and therefore in this sence it was truly said by *Anaxagoras*, that man was created to con- template the heauen and the sunne, and as truly by other Phi- losophers was he called *δυσανόσκοπον*, from base and inferior things, he draweth help, seruice, commoditie; but for a man to perswade himselfe that in the framing of all these things no other thing was thought vpon but man, and that he is the only end and butt of all these luminous and incorruptible bodies, it is a great folly and an ouer-bold presumption.

6

Of man him-
selfe.

Three de-
grees of hu-
mane pre-
sumption.

Finally but especially, this presumption is to be considered in man himselfe, that is to say, in regard of himselfe, and of man his companion, both within, in the progresse of his iudg- ment and opinions; and without in his communication and conuersation with another. Concerning which, wee are to consider three things, as three heads which follow one the o- ther, where humanitie bewrayeth in a sottish imbecillitie the foolish presumption thereof. The first in beleeuing or misbe- leeuing (heere is no question of religion, nor of faith and be- liefe

liefeth theologicall, and therefore we must still call to minde the
 aduertisement giuen in the Preface) where we are to note two
 contrary vices, which are common in humane condition; *To beleeue*
 the one and the other more ordinarie, is a kinde of lightnes, *mis-beleeue.*
qui cito credit, lenis est corde, and too great a facilitie to be-
 leeu and to entertaine whatsoeuer is proposed, with any
 kinde of appearance of truth or authority. This belongeth to
 the folly, simplicitie, tendernesse and imbecillitie of the wea-
 ker sort of people, of spirits effeminate, sick, superstitious, a-
 stonished, indiscretely zealous, who like wax do easily receiue
 all impressions, suffer themselves to be taken and lead by the
 eares. And this is rather an error and weakenesse, than malice,
 and doth willingly lodge in minds gentle and debonaire.
Credulitas error est magis quam culpa, & quidem in optimi cu-
iusq; mentem facile irrepit. We see almost the whole world led
 and caried with opinions and beliefs, not out of choice and
 iudgement, yea many times before they haue either yeares
 or discretion to iudge, but out of the custome of the countrey,
 or instruction in youth receiued, or by some suddaine en-
 counter as with a tempest, whereby they are in such sort
 fastned, subiected and enthralled, that it is a matter of great
 difficultie euer to vnlearne them againe. *Veluti tempestate de-*
lati ad quamcunq; disciplinam tanquam ad saxum adherescunt.
 Thus is the world lead, we trust our selues too much, and then
 perswade others to beleeue vs. *Vnusquisq; mouit credere quam*
iudicare; versat nos & precipitat traditus per manus error, ipsa
consuetudo assentiendi periculosa & lubrica. Now this popular
 facilitie, though it be in truth weakenesse and imbecillitie, yet
 it is not without presumption. For so lightly to beleeue and
 hold for truth and certaintie that which we know not, or to
 enquire of the causes, reasons, consequents, and not of the
 truth it selfe, is to enterprise to presume too much. For from
 what other cause proceeds this? If you shall answere, from a
 supposition that it is true; why this is nothing: a man hand-
 leth and stirreth the foundations and effects of a thousand
 things which neuer were, whereby both *pro* and *contra* are
 false. How many fables, false and supposed miracles, visions,
 reuelations, are there receiued in the world that neuer were?
 And why should a man beleeue a miracle, a thing neither hu-
 mane

mane nor naturall, when he is able by naturall and humane meanes to confute, and confound the truth thereof? Truth and lying haue like visages, like cariage, relish, gate, and we behold them with one and the same eye, *ita sunt finitima falsa veris, ut in precipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere.* A man ought not to beleue that of a man which is not humane, except he be warranted by supernaturall and superhumane approbation, which is only God, who is only to be beleued in that he saith, only because he saith it.

7

The other contrary vice is an audacious temeritie to condemne and reiect as false all things that are not easily vnderstood, and that please not the palat. It is the propertie of those that haue a good opinion of themselves, which play the parts of men of dexteritie and vnderstanding, especially heretikes, *Sophists*, *Pedanties*: for they finding in themselves some speciall point of the spirit, and that they see a little more cleerely than the common sort, they assume vnto themselves law and authoritie to decide and determine all things. This vice is farre greater and more base than the former: for it is an enraged folly to thinke to know as much as possible is to be knowne, the iurisdiction and limits of nature, the capacitie of the power and will of God, to frame vnto himselfe and his sufficiencie the truth and falshood of things, which must needs be in so certaine and assured resolution and definition of them: for see their ordinarie language, that is false, impossible, absurd: and how many things are there which at one time we haue reiected with laughter as impossible, which we haue been constrained afterwards to confesse and approue, yea and others too, more strange than they? And on the other side how many things haue wee receiued as articles of our faith, that haue afterwards prooued vanities and lies?

2. To affirme
and con-
demne.

The second degree of presumption, which followeth and commonly proceedeth from the former, is certainly and obstinatelie to affirme or disprooue that which he hath lightly beleued or misbeleued. So that it addeth vnto the first obstinacie in opinion, and so the presumption increaseth. This facilitie to beleue with time is confirmed, and degenerateth into an obstinacie inuincible and vncapable of amendment, yea a man proceeds so farre in this obstinacie, that he defends those

those things that he knowes and vnderstands least : *Maiorem fidem homines adhibent ijs quæ non intelligunt : cupiditate humani ingenij lubentius obscura creduntur* : he speaks of all things with resolution. Now affirmation and opinatiue obstinacie are signes of negligence and ignorance accompanied with follie and arrogancie.

The third degree which followeth these two , and which is the height of presumption, is to perswade others to receiue 8
as canonically whatsoeuer he beleeueth, yea imperiously to ^{3. To per-}swade.
impose a beleefe as it were by obligation, and inhibition to doubt. What tyranny is this? Whosoever beleueth a thing, thinks it a worke of charitie to perswade another to beleue the same; and that he may the better do it, he feareth not to adde of his owne inuention so much as he seeth necessarie for his purpose to supplie that want, and vnwillingnes which he thinks to be in the conceit of another of that he tels. There is nothing vnto which men are commonly more prone, than to giue way to their owne opinions : *Nemo sibi tantum errat, sed alijs erroris causa & author est*. Where the ordinarie meane wanteth, there a man addeth commandement, force, fire, sword. This vice is proper vnto dogmatists, and such as will gouerne, and giue lawes vnto the world. Now to attaine to the end heereof, and to captiuate the beliefs of men vnto themselves they vse two meanes : First they bring in certain generall and fundamentall propositions, which they call principles and presuppositions, wherof they say we must neither doubt nor dispute; vpon which they afterwards build whatsoeuer they please; and leade the world at their pleasure: which is a mockerie whereby the world is replenished with errorrs and lies. And to say the trueth, if a man should examine these principles, he should finde as great or greater vntueths and weakneses in them, than in all that which they would haue to depend vpon them, and as great an appearance of trueth in propositions quite contrarie. There haue ^{Copernicus.}
^{Paracelsus.} beene some in our time that haue changed and quite altered the principles and rules of our Ancients and best Professors in *Astronomie, Phisicke, Geometrie*, in nature, and the motion of the windes. Euery humane proposition hath as much authoritie as another, if reason make not the difference. Trueth dependeth

dependeth not vpon the authoritie and testimonie of man: there are no principles in man if Diuinitie haue not reuealed them; all the rest is but a dreame and smoake. Now these great masters will that whatsoeuer they say should be beleeued and receiued, and that euery man should trust them, without iudging or examining what they teach: which is a tyrannicall iustice. God onely (as hath beene sayd) is to be beleeued in all that he saith, because he saith it: *Qui a semet ipso loquitur mendax est.*

The other meane is by supposition of some miraculous thing done, new and celestially reuelation and apparition, which hath beene cunningly practised by Law-makers, Generals in the field, or priuate Captaines. The perswasion taken from the subiect it selfe possesseth the simpler sort, but at the first it is so tender and fraile, that the least offence, mistaking or imprudencie that shall happen, vndoeth all: for it is a great maruell how from so vaine beginnings and friuolous causes there should arise the most famous impressions. Now this first impression being once gotten, doth woonderfully grow and increase, in such sort that it fasteneth euen vpon the most expert and skilfull, by reason of the multitude of beleeuers, witnesses, yeeres, wherewith a man suffereth himselfe to be carried, if he see not well into it, and be not well prepared against it: for then it is to small purpose to spurne against it, or to enquire farther into it, but simply to beleue it. The greatest and most powerfull meane to perswade, and the best touch-stone of trueth, is multitude of yeeres and beleeuers: now fooles do win the game, *sanitatis patrocinium est insanientium turba.* It is a very difficult thing for a man to resolue and settle his iudgement against the common opinion. All this may easily appeare by those many impostures and fooleries which we haue seene to go for miracles, and rauish the whole world with admiration, but instantly extinguished by some accident, or by the exact inquirie of such as are quicke sighted, who haue cleered and discovered the couzenage; which if they had had but time to ripen, and to haue fortified in nature, they had continued for euer, beene generally receiued and adored. And euen such are diuers others, which by the fauour of Fortune haue passed for currant, and gained publike

like beliefe, whereunto men afterwards accommodate themselves, without any farther desire to know the thing in it first forme and originall, *nusquam ad liquidum fama perducitur*. And this is the reason why there are so many kinds of religions in the world, so many superstitious customes of the *Pagans*, which are yet remaining euen in Christendome, and concerning which we can not wholly assure the people. By this whole discourse we see what we are, and to what we tend, since we are lead by such guides.

The fift and last Consideration of Man, by
those varieties and great differences that are
 in him, and their comparisons.

CHAP. XLI.

*Of the difference and inequality of men
 in generall.*

THere is nothing in this lower world wherein there is found so great difference as amongst men, and where the differences are so distant and diuers in one and the same subiect and kinde. If a man should beleue *Plinie*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, there are shapes of men in some countreys, that haue very little resemblance with ours, and some that are of a mixt and doubtfull kind betwixt men and beasts. There are some countreys where men are without heads, carrying their eyes and mouthes in their breasts, where they are *Hermaphrodites*, where they go with foure feet, where they haue one eye in the forehead, and a head liker to a dogs head than a mans, where they are fish from the nauell downwards, and liue in the water; where their women beare children at five yeeres of age, and liue but eight; where they haue their head and forehead so hard, that iron can not pierce them; where they doe naturally change into wolues and other beasts, and afterwards into men again; where they are without a mouth, nourishing themselves with the smell of certaine odours; where they yeeld a seed that is blacke; where they are verie little and dwarfs; where they are very great and giants; where they goe alwayes naked; where they are all hairie;

M

where

where they speake not; but liue in woods like beasts, hidden in caues and hollow trees. And in our times we haue discovered, seene with the eye, and touched with our fingers, where the men are without beards, without vse of fire, corne, wine; where that is held to be the greatest beautie, which we account the greatest deformitie, as hath beene sayd before. Touching the diuersitie of maners we shall speake elsewhere. And to omit many of these strange wonderments, we know that as touching the visage, it is impossible to find two in all things alike; it may fall out that we may mistake, and take the one for the other, because of the great resemblance that may be betweene two; but this must be in the absence of the one, for in the presence of them both it is easie to note a difference, though a man know not how to expresse it. In the soules of men there is a farre greater difference, for it is not only greater without comparison betwixt a man and a man, than betwixt a beast and a beast: but there is greater difference betwixt a man and a man, than a man and a beast; for an excellent beast comes neerer to a man of the basest sort and degree, than that man to another great and excellent personage. This great difference of men proceedeth from the inward qualities, and from the spirit, where there are so many parts, so many iurisdiccions, so many degrees beyond number, that it is an infinit thing to consider. We must now at the last learne to know man by those distinctions and differences that are in him, which are diuers, according to the many parts in man, many reasons, and meanes to compare and consider of him. We will heere set downe five principall, vnto which all the rest may be referred, and generally all that is in man, *Spirit, bodie naturall*, acquired, publike, priuate, apparent, secret; and so this fift and last consideration of man shall haue five parts, which are five great and capitall distinctions of men, that is to say:

The first naturall, essentiall, and vniuersall of all men, soule and bodie.

The second naturall and essentiall principally, and in some sort acquired, of the force and sufficiencie of the spirit.

The third accidentall of the estate, condition and dutie of man, drawen from superioritie and inferioritie.

The

The fourth accidentall of the condition and profession of life.

The fift and last of the fauours and disfauours of Nature and of Fortune.

CHAP. XLII.

The first distinction and difference of men naturall and essentiall, drawen from the diuers situation of the world.

THe first most notable and vniuersall distinction of men, which concerneth the soule and body, and whole essence of man, is taken and drawne from the diuers site of the world, according to which the aspect and influence of heauen, and the sunne, the aire, the climate, the countrie, are diuers. So likewise not only the colour, the feature, the complexion, the countenance, the manners, are diuers, but also the faculties of the soule, *plaga cœli non solum ad robur corporum, sed & animorum facit. Athenis tenue calum, ex quo etiam acutiores Attici; crassum Thebis, ideo pingues Thebani & valentes.* And therefore Plato thanked God that he was an *Athenian*, and not a *Theban*. As fruites and beasts are diuers, according to the diuers countries wherein they are: so men are borne more and lesse warlike, iust, temperate, docible, religious, chaste, ingenious, good, obedient, beautifull, sound, strong. And this is the reason why *Cyrus* would not agree to the Persians to abandon their sharp and hillie countrie, to goe to another more plaine and pleasant, saying, that fat countries and delicate, made men soft and effeminate, and fertile grounds barren and infertile spirits.

Following this foundation, we may in grosse diuide the world into three parts, and all men into three kinds of nature: we will make three generall situations of the world, which are, the two extremities South, and North, and the middle betwixt them both; euery part and situation shall haue sixtie degrees. The Southerne part which is vnder the *Æquator*, hath thirtie degrees on this side the line, thirtie on that, that is to say, all that part which is betwixt the two tropicks or somewhat more, where are the hot and Southerne countries, *Africke* and *Æthiope*, in the middle betwixt the East and the West; *Arabia*, *Calicut*, the *Molnques*, *Ianes*, *Taprobana* towards the Orient; *Peru* and the great Seas towards the Occident.

dent. The other middle part hath thirtie degrees beyond the Tropicks both on this side the line and on that, towards the Poles, where are the middle and temperate regions, all *Europe* with the *Mediterrane* Sea in the middle betwixt the East and West; all *Asia* both the lesse and the greater which is towards the East, with *China*, *Iapan*, and *America*, towards the West. The third which is the thirtie degrees which are next to the two Poles on both sides, which are the cold and Icie countries, the *Septentrionall* people, *Tartary*, *Muscovy*, *Estotilan*, *Magellan*, which is not yet throughly discovered.

3
Their na-
tures.

Following this generall partition of the world, the natures of men are likewise different in every thing, body, soule, religion, maners, as wee may see in this little Table: For the

	Northerne people are	Middle are	Southerne are
I In their Bodies.	{ High and great, phlegmaticke, sanguin, white, and yellow, sociable, the voyce strong, the skin soft and hairie, great eaters and drinkers, puissant.	{ Indifferent and temperate in all those things as newters, or partakers a little	{ Little, melancholicke, cold, and dry, blacke. Solitary, the voyce shrill, the skin hard, with little haire, and curled, abstinent, feeble.
2 Spirit.	{ Heavy, obtuse, stupid, sottish, facill, light, inconstant.	{ of those two extremities, & participating	{ Ingenious, wise, subtle, opinative.
3 Religion.	{ Little religious and devout.	{ most of that region to	{ Superstitious, contemplative.
4 Manners.	{ Warriors, valiant, painful, chaste, free from jealousy, cruell and inhumane.	{ which they are nearest neighbours.	{ No warriors, idle, unchaste, jealous, cruell, and inhumane.

4
The proofes
of these differences of
the Body.

All these differences are easily prooued. As for those of the bodie, they are knowne by the eye, and if there be any exceptions, they are rare, and proceed from the mixture of the people, or from the winds, the waters, and particular situation of the place, whereby a mountaine is a notable difference in the selfe-same degree, yea the selfe-same countrie and citie. They of the higher part of the citie of *Athens*, were of a quite contrary

trary humor, as *Plutarke* affirmeth, to those that dwell about the gate of *Pyreus*: and they that dwell in the North side of a mountaine differ as much from those that dwell on the South side, as they do both differ from those in the valley.

As for the differences of the spirit, we know that mechanicall and manuell artes belong to the North, where men are made for labour; Speculative sciences came from the South. *Cesar* and other ancients of those times called the *Aegyptians* ingenious, and subtile: *Moyse* is said to be instructed in their wisdom: and Philosophie came from thence into *Greece*. Greatnesse began rather with them, because of their spirit and subtiltie. The gards of Princes (yea in the Southerne partes) are Northerne men, as hauing more strength, and lesse subtiltie and malice. So likewise the Southerne people are indued with great vertues, and subiect to great vices, as it is said of *Hannibal*: The Northerne haue goodnes and simplicitie. The lesser and middle sciences, as policies, lawes, and eloquence, are in the middle nations, wherein the greatest Empires and policies haue flourished.

As touching the third point, religions haue come from the South, *Egypt*, *Arabia*, *Chaldea*; more superstition in *Africke* than the whole world besides, witnesse their vowes so frequent, their temples so magnificent. The Northerne people, saith *Cesar*, haue little care of religion, being whollie giuen to the warres and to hunting.

As for manners, and first touching warres, it is certaine that the greatest armies, artes, military instruments and inuentions haue come from the North. The *Scythians*, *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Tartarians*, *Turks*, *Germanes*, haue beaten and conquered all other nations, and ranfaked the whole world; and therefore it is a common saying, that all euill comes from the North. Single combats came from them. The Northerne people adore a sword fastned in the earth, saith *Solinus*. To other nations they are inuincible, yea to the *Romans*, who hauing conquered the rest of the world, were vtterly destroyed by them. They grow weake and languish with the Southerne winds, and going towards the South; as the Southerne men comming into the North redouble their forces. By reason of their warlike fiercenes, they will not endure to be com-

ded by authority, they loue their libertie, at leastwise electiue commanders. Touching chastitie and ieaousie in the North, saith *Tacitus*, one woman to one man; yea, one woman sufficeth many men, saith *Cesar*. There is no ieaousie, saith *Munster*, where men and women bathe themselues together with strangers. In the South *Polygamie* is altogether receiued. All *Africke* adoreth *Venus*, saith *Solinus*. The Southernns die with ieaousie, and therefore they keepe Eunuches as gardians to their wiues, which their great Lords haue in great number, as they haue stables of horses. Touching crueltie, the two extreames are alike cruell, but the causes are diuers, as we shall see anon, when we come to speake of the causes. Those tortures of the wheele, and staking of men aliue, came from the North: The inhumanities of the *Moscouites* and *Tartars*, are too well knowne. The *Almanes*, saith *Tacitus*, punish not their offenders by lawe, but cruelly murder them as enemies. The Southernns flea their offenders aliue, and their desire of reuenge is so great, that they become furious if they be not gluttred therewith. In the middle regions they are mercifull and humane: The *Romans* punished their greatest offenders with banishment. The *Greeks* vsed to put their offenders to death with a sweet drugg made of a kinde of Hemlocke which they gaue them to drinke: And *Cicero* saith, that humanitie and courtesie were the conditions of *Asia minor*, and from thence deriued to the rest of the world.

⁵
The cause of
the aforesaid
differences. The cause of all these corporall and spirituall differences, is the inequality and difference of the inward naturall heate, which is in those countries and peoples, that is to say, strong and vehement in the Northernns, by reason of the great outward cold which incloseth and driueth the heate into the inward parts, as caues and deepe places are hot in winter, so mens stomacks, *ventres hieme calidiores*. Weake and feeble is the Southernns, the inward heate being disperfed and drawne into the outward parts, by the vehemencie of the outward heate, as in Sommer vaults and places vnder the earth are cold. Meane and temperate in the middle regions. From this diuersitie, I say, and inequality of naturall heat, proceed these differences not only corporall, which are easie to note, but also spirituall; for the Southernns by reason of their cold temperature,

perature, are melancholike, and therefore staied, constant, contemplatiue, ingenious, religious, wise; for wisdom is in cold creatures, as Elephants, who as they are of all other beasts the most melancholicke, so are they more wise, docile, religious, by reason of their cold blood. From this melancholic temperature it likewise commeth, that the Southerns are vnchaste, by reason of that frothie, freating, tickling melancholie, as we commonly see in Hares; and cruell, because this freating sharp melancholie doth violently presse the passions and reuenge. The Northernes are of a phlegmatick and sanguine temperature, quite contrarie to the Southerne; and therefore haue contrary qualities, saue that they agree in this one, that they are likewise cruell and inhumane, but by another reason, that is, for want of iudgement, whereby like beasts, they know not how to containe and gouerne themselves. They of the middle regions are sanguin and cholericke, tempered with a sweete, pleasant, kindly disposed humor; they are actiue. We could likewise more exquisitely represent the diuers natures of these three sorts of people, by the application and comparison of all things, as you may see in this little Table, where it appeareth that there doth properly belong, and may be referred to the

<i>Northerne,</i>	<i>Midlers,</i>	<i>Southerne.</i>	<i>Qualities of the soule.</i>
<i>The commonsense,</i>	<i>Discourse & reasoning,</i>	<i>Vnderstanding</i>	
<i>Force as of Beares and other beasts.</i>	<i>Reason and iustice of men.</i>	<i>Subtilty of foxes, & religion of diuines.</i>	
<i>Mars } warre The moon } hunting</i>	<i>Iupiter } Semperours. Mercurie } oratours.</i>	<i>Saturn } cotemplati- Planets. Venus } loue. (on.</i>	<i>Actions and parts of the Common- weale.</i>
<i>Arte and handi- crafts.</i>	<i>Prudence, knowledge of good and euill.</i>	<i>Knowledge of truth and falshood.</i>	
<i>Labourers, artifi- cers, souldiers, to execute & obey.</i>	<i>Magistrates, prouident, to iudge, command.</i>	<i>Prelates, Philoso- phers, to contem- plate.</i>	
<i>Yoong men vnapt.</i>	<i>Perfect men, managers of affaires.</i>	<i>Graue old men, wise, pensive.</i>	

The other distinction more particular may be referred to this generall of North and South: for wee may referre to

the conditions of the Northerne those of the West, and that liue in mountaines, warriours, fierce people, desirous of libertie, by reason of the colde which is in mountaines. So likewise, they that are farre distant from the sea are more simple and innocent. And contrarily to the conditions of the Southernes, we may referre the Easterlings, such as liue in valleys, effeminate and delicate persons, by reason of the fertillitie of the place, which naturally yeeldeth pleasure. So likewise they that liue vpon the sea coasts are subtile, deceiuers by reason of their commerce and traffike with diuers sorts of people and nations. By all this discourse we may see that generally those of the North doe excell in bodie, haue strength for their part; and they of the South in spirit, and haue for their part subtiltie; they of the middle Regions partake of both, and are temperate in all. So likewise we may see that their maners, to say the trueth, are neither vices nor vertues, but works of nature, which to amend or renounce altogether is more than difficult; but to sweeten, temper and reduce the extremities to a mediocritie, is a worke of vertue.

CHAP. XLIII.

The second distinction, and more subtile difference of the spirits and sufficiences of men.

Three sorts
and degrees
of people in
the world.

1

2

THis second distinction which respecteth the spirit and sufficiencie, is not so plaine, and perceptible as the other, and comes as well from nature as atchieuement; according vnto which there are three sorts of people in the world, as three conditions and degrees of spirits. In the one and the lowest are the weake and plaine spirits, of base and slender capacitie, borne to obey, serue, and to be led, who in effect are simply men. In the second and middle stage are they that are of an indifferent iudgement, make profession of sufficiencie, knowledge, dexterity; but do not sufficiently vnderstand and iudge themselves, resting themselves vpon that which is commonly held, and giuen them at the first hand, without further enquire of the truth and source of things, yea with a perswasion that it is not lawfull; and neuer looking farther than where they be, but thinking that it is euery where so, or ought to be so, and that if it be otherwise, they are deceiued;
yea

yea, they are barbarous. They subiect themselves to opinions, and the municipall lawes of the place where they liue, euen from the time they were first hatched, not only by obseruance and custome, which all ought to do, but euen from the very heart and soule, with a perswasion that that which is beleeued in their village is the true touchstone of truth (heere is nothing spoken of diuine reuealed truth, or religion) the only, or at least the best rule to liue well. These sorts of people are of the schoole and iurisdiction of *Aristotle*, affirmers, positive men, dogmatists, who respect more vtilitie than veritie, according to the vse and custome of the world, than that which is good and true in it selfe. Of this condition there are a very great number, and diuers degrees, the principall and most actiue amongst them gouerne the world, and haue the commaund in their hand. In the third and highest stage are men indued with a quick and cleare spirit, a strong, firme, and solid iudgement, who are not content with a bare affirmation, nor settle themselves in common receiued opinions, nor suffer themselves to be wonne and preoccupied by a publicke and common beleeve, whereof they wonder not at all, knowing that there are many couenages, deceits & impostures receiued in the world with approbation and applause, yea publick adoration and reuerence: but they examin all things that are proposed, sound maturely, and seeke without passion the causes, motiues, and iuridictions euen to the roote, louing better to doubt, and to hold in suspence their beleeve, than by a loose and idle facilitie or lightnesse, or precipitation of iudgement to feede themselves with lies, and affirme or secure themselves of that thing whereof they can haue no certaine reason. These are but few in number, of the Schoole of *Socrates* and *Plato*, modest, sober, staied, considering more the veritie and realitie of things than the vtilitie; who if they be well borne, hauing with that aboue mentioned probitie and gouernment in manners, they are truly wise, and such as heere we seeke after. But because they agree not with the common sort, as touching opinions, see more clearely, pierce more deeply, are not so facill and easily drawne to beleeue, they are suspected and little esteemed of others, who are farre more in number, and held for fantasticks and philosophers; a word which they

vse.

vse in a wrong sence, to wrong others. In the first of these three degrees or orders there is a farre greater number than in the second, and in the second, than in the third. They of the first and last, the lowest and highest trouble not the world, make no stirre, the one for insufficiencie and weakenes, the other by reason of too great sufficiencie, stabilitie, and wisdom. They of the middle make all the stirre, the disputations that are in the world, a presumptuous kind of people, alwayes stirred, and alwayes stirring. They of the lower range, as the bottome, the leese, the sinke, resemble the earth, which doth nothing but receiue and suffer that which comes from aboue. They of the middle resemble the region of the aire, wherein are formed all the meteors, thunderings, and alterations are made, which afterwards fall vpon the earth. They of the higher stage resemble the firmament it selfe, or at least the highest region next vnto heauen, pure, cleare, neate, and peaceable. This difference of men proceedeth partly from the nature of the first composition and temperature of the braine, which is different, moist, hot, drie, and that in many degrees, whereby the spirits and iudgements are either very solid, couragious, or feeble, fearefull, plaine: and partly from instruction and discipline; as also from the experience and practise of the world, which serueth to put off simplicitie, and to become more aduised. Lastly, all these three sorts of people are found vnder euery robe, forme and condition both of good and euill men, but diuersly.

2
Another distinction.

There is another distinction of spirits and sufficiencies, for some there are that make way themselves, and are their owne guides and gouernours. These are happie, of the higher sort, and very rare; others haue neede of help, and these are of two sorts. For some neede only a little light, it is enough if they haue a guide and a torch to goe before them, they will willinglie and easily follow. Others there are that must be drawen, they neede a spurre, and must be led by the hand. I speake not of those that either by reason of their great weakness cannot, as they of the lower range, or the malignitie of their nature will not, as they of the middle, who are neither good to follow, nor will suffer themselves to be drawen and directed, for these are a people past all hope.

CHAP. XLIIII.

The third distinction and difference of men accidentall, of their degrees, estates and charges.

THis accidentall distinction, which respecteth the estates and charges, is grounded vpon two principles and foundations of humane societie, which are, to command and obey, power and subiection, superioritie and inferioritie; *impero & obsequio omnia constant*. This distinction we shall better see, first in grosse in this Table.

		<p><i>Marriage, of the husband and the wife. This is the source of humane societie.</i></p>		<p><i>The first general division.</i></p>
		<p><i>Paternall, of parents ouer their children. This is truly naturall.</i></p>		
<p><i>All power and subiection is either</i></p>	<p><i>Private, which is either in</i></p>	<p><i>Families and householdes gouernment, and it is fourfold:</i></p>	<p><i>Herule, which is twofold, of</i></p>	<p><i>Lordes, ouer their slaues.</i></p>
				<p><i>Masters, ouer their seruants.</i></p>
			<p><i>Patronall, of patrons ouer their pupils: the vse whereof is lesse frequent.</i></p>	
			<p><i>Corporations and Colleges, Ciuill communities ouer the particular members of that communitie.</i></p>	
	<p><i>Publike, which is either</i></p>	<p><i>Souereign, which is threefold, and they are three sorts of estates, cunctas nationes & vrbes, populus aut primores, aut singuli regunt. i.</i></p>	<p><i>Monarchie, of one.</i></p>	
			<p><i>Aristocratie, of a few.</i></p>	
			<p><i>Democritie, of all.</i></p>	
			<p><i>Subaltern, which is in those who are superiors and inferiors, for diuers reasons, places, persons, as</i></p>	
			<p><i>Particular lords in manie degrees. Officers of the souerignty, whereof there are diuers sorts.</i></p>	

This

The subdivi-
sion of the
sovereigne
power.

This publicke power whether it be soueraigne, or subalterne, hath other subdivisions necessarie to be knowne. The soueraigne, which, as hath been said, is threefold, in regard of the maner of gouernment is likewise threefold; that is to say, euery one of these three is gouerned after a threefold manner, and is therefore called Royall, or Signorall, or Tyrannicall. Royall, wherein the soueraigne (be it one, or many, or all) obeying the lawes of nature, preserueth the naturall libertie and proprietie of the goods of his subiects. *Ad reges potestas omnis pertinet, ad singulos proprietas: omnia Rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio.* Seignoriall or lordly, where the soueraigne is lord both of men and goods, by the right of armes, gouerning his subiects as slaues. Tyrannicall where the soueraigne contemning all lawes of Nature, doth abuse both the persons and goods of his subiects, differing from a lord, as a theefe from an enemy in warre. Of the three souereigne states, the *Monarchie*, & of the three gouernments, the Lordly, are the more ancient, great, durable and maiestically, as in former times *Assyria*, *Persia*, *Egypt*, and now *Ethiopia* the most ancient that is, *Moscouie*, *Tartarie*, *Turkie*, *Peru*. But the better and more naturall state and gouernment is the *Monarchie Royall*. The most famous *Aristocracies* hath sometimes beene that of the *Lacedemonians*, and now the *Venetians*. The *Democrities*, *Rome*, *Athens*, *Carthage*, Royall in their gouernment.

3
Of particu-
lar lords.

The publicke subaltern power, which is in particular lords, is of many kindes and degrees, principally fiue, that is to say, Lords *Tributaries*, who pay only tribute.

Feudataries, simple *Vassals*, who owe faith and homage for the tenure of their land. These three may be souereignes.

Vassals bound to do seruice, who besides faith and homage owe likewise personall seruice, whereby they cannot trulie be souereignes.

Naturall subiects, whether they be *Vassals* or *Censors*, or otherwise, who owe subiection and obedience, and can not be exempted from the power of their souereigne: and these are Lords.

4
Of offices.

The publicke subaltern power which is in the officers of the souereignty, is of diuers kindes, and both in regard of the honour and the power may be reduced to fiue degrees.

The

THE FIRST BOOKE. 173

The first and basest are those ignominious persons, which should remaine without the citie, the last executioners of iustice.

The second, they that haue neither honour nor infamie, Sergeants, Trumpeters.

The third, such as haue honour without knowledge and power, Notaries, Receiuers, Secretaries.

The fourth, they that haue with honour, power and knowledge, but without iurisdiction, the Kings seruants.

The fift, they that haue with the rest iurisdiction; and these are properly called Magistrates: of whom there are many distinctions, and especially these fiue, which are all double:

1 { Maiors, Senators. } 2 { Politiques.
 { Minors, Iudges. } { Militaries.

3 { Ciuill. } 4 { Titularies in offices of form, who haue
 { Criminall. } { Commissaries. (it by inheritance.

5 { Perpetuall, as the lesser both in number and otherwise
 { should be.

 { Temporall and moucable, as the greater should be.

OF THE ESTATES AND DEGREES OF MEN
 in particular following this precedent Table.

An Aduertisement.

HEere we are to speake in particular of the parts of this Table, and the distinctions of powers and subiections (beginning with the priuate and domesticall) that is to say, of euery estate and profession of men, to the end we may know them; and therefore this may be called The Booke of the Knowledge of man: for the duties of euery one shall be set downe in the Third Booke, in the vertue of iustice; where in like maner and order, all these estates and chapters shall be resumed and examined. Now before we begin, it shall be necessarie summarily to speake of commanding and obeying, two foundations and principall causes of these diuersities of estates and charges.

CHAP.

Of commanding and obeying.

THESE, as hath beene sayd, are the two foundations of all humane societie, and the diuersitie of estates and professions. They are Relatiues, they do mutually respect, ingender and conserue one the other, and are alike required in all assemblies and communities; but are yet subiect to a naturall kinde of enuie, and an euerlasting contestation, complaint and obtrection. The popular estate make the Soueraigne of woorse condition than a Carter. The Monarchie placeth him aboue God himselfe. In commanding is the honour, the difficultie (these two commonly go together) the goodnesse, the sufficiencie, all qualities of greatnesse. Command, that is to say, sufficiencie, courage, authority, is from heauen and of God, *imperium non nisi diuino fato datur: omnis potestas a Deo est*: And therefore Plato was wont to say, That God did not appoint and establishe men, that is to say, men of a common sort and sufficiencie, and purely humane, to rule others, but such as by some diuine touch, singular vertue, and gift of heauen, do excell others: and therefore they are called *Heroes*. In obeying is vtilitie, procliuitie, necessitie, in such sort, that for the preservation of the weale publike it is more necessarie than well to command; and the deniall of obedience, or not to obey as men should, is farre more dangerous than for a Prince not to command as he should. Euen as in marriage, though the husband and the wife be equally obliged to loialtie and fidelitie, and haue both bound themselves by promise in the same words, the same ceremonies and solemnities, yet notwithstanding the inconueniences are incomparably farre greater, in the fact of adulterie, ~~in~~ the wife than the husband: euen so, though command and obedience are equally required in euery state and companie, yet the inconueniences of disobedience in subiects are farre more dangerous than of ill gouernment in a Commander. Many States haue a long time continued and prospered too vnder the command of wicked Princes and Magistrates, the subiects obeying and accommodating themselves to their gouernment: and therefore a wise man being once asked why the Common-wealth of

of *Sparta* was so flourishing, and whether it were because their Kings commanded well? Nay rather, saith he, because the Citizens obey well. For if the subjects once refuse to obey, and shake off their yoke, the state must necessarily fall to the ground.

CHAP. XLVI.

Of Mariage.

NOtwithstanding the state of marriage be the first, more ancient and most important, and as it were the foundation and fountaine of humane societie, whence arise families, and from them Common-weales, *Prima societas in coniugio est, quod principium urbis, seminarium Reipublicæ*; yet it hath been contemned and defamed by many great personages, who haue iudged it vnwoorhy men of heart and spirit, and haue framed many obiections against it.

First, they account the band and obligation thereof vniust, a hard and ouerstreight captiuitie, insomuch, that by marriage a man is bound and enthralled to the cares and humours of another. And if it fall out, that hee haue mistaken in his choice, and haue met with a hard bargaine, more bone than flesh, his life is euer afterwards most miserable. What iniquitie and iniustice can there be greater than for one houres follie, a fault committed without malice, and by meere oversight, yea many times to obey the aduice of another, a man should be bound to an euerlasting torment? It were better for him to put the halter about his necke, and to cast himselfe into the sea, his head downward, to end his miserable life, than to liue alwayes in the paines of hell, and to suffer without intermission on his side, the tempest of iealousie, of malice, of rage, of madnesse, of brutish obstinacie, and other miserable conditions: and therefore one sticks not to say, That he that inuented this knot and tie of marriage, had found a goodly and beautifull meanes to be reuenged of man, a trap or gin to intangle beasts, and afterwards to make them languish at a little fire. Another saith, That to marrie a wise man to a foole, or a foole to a wise man, is to binde the liuing to the dead, which was the cruellest death inuented by Tyrants, to make the liuing to languish and die by the companie of the dead.

Secondly,

2
Objections
against marriage.

Secondly, they say that mariage is a corruption and adulterating of good and rare spirits; insomuch that the flatteries and smooth speeches of the partie beloued, the affection towards children, the care of household affaires, and aduancement of their famelies, do lessen, dissolue, and mollifie the vigour and strength of the most liuely and generous spirit that is, witnesse *Samson, Salomon, Marc. Antony*. And therefore howsoeuer the matter goe, we had not neede to marry. But those that haue more flesh than spirit, strong in bodie, and weake in minde, tie them to the flesh, and giue them the charge of small and base matters, such as they are capable of. But such as are weake of body, haue their spirits great, strong, and puissant, is it not then a pitie to binde them to the flesh, and to mariage, as men doe beasts in a stable? We see that beasts the more noble they are, the stronger and fitter for seruice, as horses and dogs, the more are they kept asunder from the companie and acquaintance of the other sex, and it is the maner to put beasts of least esteeme at randon together. So likewise such men and women as are ordeined to the most venerable and holiest vocation, and which ought to be as the creame and marrow of Christianitie, Church-men and religious, are (though not by any warrant from the word of God) excluded from mariage. And the reason is, because mariage hindreth and auerteth those beautifull and great elevations of the soule, the contemplation of things, high, celestially, and diuine, which is incompatible with the troubles and molestations of domesticall affaires; for which cause the Apostle preferreth the solitarie continent life before mariage. Vilitie may well hold with mariage, but honestie is on the other side.

Againe, it troubleth beautifull and holy enterprises: as Saint *Austin* reporteth, that hauing determined with some other his friends; among whom there were some married, to retire themselves from the citie, and the company of men, the better to attend to the studie of wisdom and vertue, their purpose was quickly broken and altered by the wiues of those that were married. And another wiseman did not doubt to say, that if men could liue without women, they should be visited and accompanied by Angels. Moreouer, mariage is a hindrance

drance to such as delight in trauell and to see strange countries, whether to learne to make themselves wise, or to teach others to be wise, and to publish that to others which they know. To conclude, mariage doth not only corrupt and deiect good and great spirits, but it robberth the weale-publicke of many beautifull and great things, which cannot manifest themselves remaining in the bosome and lap of a woman, or being spent about young children. But is it not a goodly sight, nay a great losse, that he that is able for his wisdom and policie to gouerne the whole world, should spend his time in the gouernment of a woman and a few children? And therefore it was well answered by a great personage being sollicitated to marry, That he was borne to command men, not a woman, to counsell Kings and Princes, not little children.

To all this a man may answere, that the nature of man is not capable of perfection, or of any thing against which nothing may be objected, as hath elsewhere beene spoken. The best and most expedient remedies that it hath, are in some degree or other but sickly, mingled with discommodities: They are all but necessarie euils. And this is the best that man could deuise for his preservation and multiplication. Some (as *Plato*, and others) would more subtiltie haue inuented meanes to haue auoided these thornie inconueniences; but besides that they built castels in the aire, that could not long continue in vse, their inuentions likewise if they could haue been put in practise, would not haue been without many discommodities and difficulties. Man hath been the cause of them, and hath himselfe brought them forth by his vice, intemperancie, and contrarie passions; and we are not to accuse the state, nor any other but man, who knowes not well how to vse any thing. Moreouer a man may say, that by reason of these thornes and difficulties, it is a schoole of vertue, an apprenticeship, and a familiar and domestiell exercise: and *Socrates* a doctor of wisdom did once say to such as hit him in the teeth with his wiues pettish frowardnes, That he did thereby learne euen within his owne dores, to be constant and patient euery where else, and to thinke the crosses of fortune to be sweet and pleasant vnto him. It is not to be denied but that he that can liue vnmarried, doth best: but yet for the honour of mariage, a

3
The answere
to the afore-
said objecti-
ons, Cap. 4.

man may say, that it was first instituted by God himselfe in Paradise before any other thing, and that in the state of innocencie and perfection. See heere foure commendations of mariage, but the fourth passeth all the rest, and is without replie. Afterwards the Sonne of God approued it, and honored it with his presence at the first miracle that he wrought, and that miracle done in the fauour of that state of mariage and married men; yea he hath honored it with this priuiledge, that it serueth for a figure of that great vnion of his with the Church, and for that cause it is called a mysterie and great.

⁴
 wholly good,
 or wholly
 ill.
 Without all doubt, mariage is not a thing indifferent: It is either wholly a great good, or a great euill, a great content, or a great trouble, a paradise or a hell: It is either a sweet and pleasant way, if the choice be good, or a rough and dangerous march, and a gauling burthen some tye, if it be ill: It is a bargain where truly that is verified which is said, *Homo homini deus, aut lupus.*

⁵
 A good ma-
 riage, a rare
 good.
 Mariage is a worke that consisteth of many parts; there must be a meeting of many qualities, many considerations besides the parties married. For whatsoeuer a man say, he marieth not only for himselfe; his posteritie, familie, alliance, and other meanes, are of great importance, and a greuous burthen. See heere the cause why so few good are found; and because there are so few good found, it is a token of the price and value thereof: it is the condition of all great charges: Royaltie is full of difficultie, and few there are that exercise it well and happily. And whereas we see many times that it falleth not out so luckely, the reason thereof is the licentious libertie, and vnbridled desire of the persons themselves, and not in the state and institution of mariage: and therefore it is commonly more commodious, and better fitted in good, simple, and vulgar spirits, where delicacie, curiositie, and idleness are lesse troublesome: vnbridled humours and turbulent wauering minds are not fit for this state or degree.

⁶
 A simple de-
 scription and
 summary of
 mariage.
 Mariage is a step to wisdom, a holie and inuiolable band, an honorable match. If the choyce be good and well ordered there is nothing in the world more beautifull: It is a sweet societie of life, full of constancie, trust, and an infinite number of profitable offices and mutuall obligations: It is a fellowship

fellowship not of loue, but amitie. For loue and amitie are as different, as the burning sick heate of a feuer, from the naturall heate of a sound bodie. Mariage hath in it selfe amitie, vtilitie, iustice, honor, constancie, a plaine pleasure, but sound, firme, and more vniuersall. Loue is grounded vpon pleasure only, and it is more quicke, piercing, ardent. Few mariages succcede well that haue their beginnings and progresse from beautie and amorous desires. Mariage hath neede of foundations more solid and constant; and we must walke more warily; this boyling affection is worth nothing: yea mariage hath a better conduct by a third hand.

Thus much is said summarily and simplie; but more exactly to describe it, we know that in Mariage there are two things essentiall vnto it, and seeme contraries, though indeed they be not; that is to say, an equalitie sociable, and such as is betweene Peeres: and an inequality, that is to say, superiority and inferioritie. The equalitie consisteth in an entire and perfect communication and communitie of all things, soules, wills, bodies, goods, the fundamentall law of Mariage, which in some places is extended euen to life and death, in such sort, that the husband being dead, the wife must incontinently follow. This is practised in some places by the publick lawes of the countries, and many times with so ardent affection, that many wiues belonging to one husband, they contend, and publickly pleade for the honor to goe first to sleepe with their spouse (that is their word) alleaging for themselves the better to obtaine their suite, and preferment heerein, their good seruice, that they were best beloued, had the last kisse of their deceased husband, and haue had children by him.

*Et certamen habent lethi, quæ viua sequatur
coniugium; pudor est non licuisse mori.*

*Ardent victrices, & flamma pectora præbent,
Imponuntq; suis ora perusta viris.*

In other places it was obserued, not by publicke lawes, but priuate compacts and agreements of mariage, as betwixt *Marc. Antony*, and *Cleopatra*. This equalitie doth likewise consist in that power which they haue in commune ouer their family, whereby the wife is called the companion of her husband, the mistress of the house and family, as the husband

band the master and lord : And their ioint authoritie ouer their family is compared to an *Aristocracie*.

8
Inequality.

The distinction of superioritie and inferioritie consisteth in this, that the husband hath power ouer the wife, and the wife is subiect to the husband. This agreeth with all lawes and policies ; but yet more or lesse according to the diuersitie of them. In all things the wife, though she be far more noble, and more rich, yet is subiect to the husband. This superioritie and inferioritie is naturall, founded vpon the strength and sufficiencie of the one, the weaknes and insufficiencie of the other. The Diuines ground it vpon other reasons drawn from the Bible : Man was first made by God alone and immediatly, expressly for God his head, and according to his image, and perfect, for nature doth always begin with things perfect. The woman was made in the second place, after man, of the substance of man, by occasion and for another thing, *mulier est vir occasionatus*, to serue as an aide and as a second to man, who is her head, and therefore imperfect. And this is the difference by order of generation. That of corruption and sinne proueth the same, for the woman was the first in preuarication, and by hir own weakenes and will did sinne, man the second, and by occasion of the woman ; the woman then the last in good and in generation, and by occasion, the first in euill and the occasion thereof, is iustly subiect vnto man, the first in good, and last in euill.

9
The power
of the hus-
band.
Dion. Halic.
car. l. 2.
Lib. 2.
Lib. 6. bel.
Gal.

This superioritie and power of the husband hath beene in some places such as that of the father, ouer life and death, as with the *Romans* by the law of *Romulus*: and the husband had power to kill his wife in foure cases, *Adulterie, Suborning of children, counterfeiting of false keyes, and drinking of wine.* So likewise with the *Greeks*, as *Polybius*, and the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* affirmeth, the power of the husband was ouer the life and death of his wife. Elsewhere, and there too, afterwards this power was moderated ; but almost in all places the power of the husband and the subiection of the wife doth inferre thus much, That the husband is master of the actions and vowes of his wife, and may with words correct her and hold her to the stocks (as for blowes, they are vnworthy a woman of honour or honestie, saith the Law) and the wife is bound

to

to holde the condition, follow the qualitie, countrey, familie, habitation and rancke of her husband, she must accompanie and follow him in all things, in his iourneys if need be, his banishment, his imprisonment, yea a wandring person, a vagabond, a fugitiue. The examples heereof are many and excellent, of *Sulpitia*, who followed her husband *Lentulus* being banished into *Cicilie*; *Erithrea* her husband *Phalaris*; *Ipsicrates* the wife of King *Mithridate* vanquished by *Pompey*, who wandred thorow the world. Some adde vnto this, That wiues are to follow their husbands euen in the warres, and into those prouinces whither the husband is sent with publike charge. Neither can the wife bring any thing into question of law, whether she be plaintiffe or defendant, without the authority of her husband, or of the Iudge, if he refuse; neither can she call her husband into iudgement, without the permission of the Magistrate.

Marriage is not carried after one and the same fashon, neither hath it in euery place the same lawes and rules, but according to the diuersitie of religions and countreys, it hath rules either more easie or more streight: according to the rules of Christianitie of all others the streightest, marriage is more subiect, and held more short. There is nothing but the entrance left free, the continuance is by constraint, depending of some thing els than our owne willes. Other nations and religions, to make marriage more easie, free, and fertile, haue receiued and practised *Polygamie* and repudiation, libertie to take and leaue wiues: they accuse Christianitie for taking away these two, by which meanes amity and multiplication, the principall ends of marriage, are much preiudiced, inasmuch as amitie is an enemy to all constraint, and they doe better maintaine themselves in an honest libertie; and multiplication is made by the woman, as Nature doth richly make knowen vnto vs in wolues, of whom the race is so fertile in the production of their yoong, euen to the number of twelue or thirteene, that they farre excell all other profitable creatures: of these there are great numbers killed euery day, by which meanes there are but few, and they though of all others the most fertile, yet by accident the most barren: the reason is because of so great a number as they bring, there is

Corn. Tacit.

10
The diuers
rules of marriage.

one only female, which for the most part beareth not by reason of the multitude of males that concur in the generation, of which the greatest part die without fruit, by the want of females. So likewise we may see how much *Polygamy* helpeth to multiplication in those nations that receiue it, Iewes, Turks and other Barbarians, who are able to raise forces of three or foue thousand fighting men fit for warres. Contrariwise, in Christendome there are many linked together in matrimony, the one of which, if not both, are barren, which being placed with others, both the one and the other may happily leaue great posteritie behinde them. But to speake more truly, all his fertilitie consisteth in the fertilitie of one only woman. Finally, they object, That this Christianlike restraint is the cause of many lasciuious pranks and adulteries. To all which we may answer, That Christianitie considereth not of marriage by reasons purely humane, naturall, temporall; but it beholds it with another visage, and weigheth it with reasons more high and noble, as hath beene said. Adde vnto this, That experience sheweth in the greatest part of marriages, that constraint increaseth amitie, especially in simple and debonaire mindes, who doe easily accommodate themselves where they finde themselves in such sort linked. And as for lasciuious and wicked persons, it is the immodestie of their maners that makes them such, which no libertie can amend. And to say the truth, Adulteries are as common where Polygamie and repudiation are in force; witnesse the Iewes and *Dauid*, who for all the wiues that hee had could not defend himselfe from it: and contrariwise, they haue beene a long time vnknownen in policies well gouerned, where there was neither Polygamie nor repudiation; witnesse *Sparta* and *Rome* a long time after the foundation. And therefore it is absurd to attribute it vnto religion, which teacheth nothing but puritie and continencie.

11
Polygamie
diuers.

The libertie of Polygamie which seemeth in some sort naturall, is caried diuersly according to the diuersitie of nations and policies. In some, all the wiues that belong to one husband liue in common, and are equall in degree; and so are their children. In others, there is one who is the principall and as the mistresse, whose children inherit the goods, honours,

nours, and titles of the husband : the rest of the wiues are kept apart, and carrie in some places the titles of lawfull wiues, in others of concubines, and their children are onely pensioners.

The vse of repudiation in like sort is different : for with some, as the *Hebrewes*, *Greeks*, *Armenians*, the cause of the separation is not expressed, and it is not permitted to retake the wife once repudiated, but yet lawfull to marry another. But by the law of *Mahomet*, the separation is made by the Iudge, with knowledge taken of the cause (except it be by mutuall consent) which must be adulterie, sterilitie, incompatibilitie of humours, an enterprise on his, or hir part against the life of each other, things directly and especiallie contrarie to the state and institution of mariage : and it is lawfull to retake one another as often as they shall thinke good. The former seemeth to be the better, because it bridleth proud women, and ouer-sharp and bitter husbands: The second, which is to expresse the cause, dishonoureth the parties, & discouereth many things which should be hid. And if it fall out that the cause be not sufficientlie verified, and that they must continue together, poysonings and murders doe commonly ensue, many times vnknowne vnto men : as it was discouered at *Rome* before the vse of repudiation, where a woman being apprehended for poysoning of her husband, accused others, and they others too to the number of threescore and ten, which were all executed for the same offence. But the worst law of all others hath beene, that the adulterer escapeth almost euery where without punishment of death, and all that is laid vpon him is diuorce & separation of companie, brought in by *Iustinian*, a man whollie possessed by his wife, who caused whatsoeuer lawes to passe that might make for the advantage of women. From hence doth arise a danger of perpetuall adulterie, desire of the death of the one partie, the offender is not punished, the innocent iniured remaineth without amends.

12
Repudiation
diuers.

The dutie of married folke, See *Lib.3. Cap.12. p. 454.*

CHAP. XLVII.

Of Parents and Children.

I
Fatherly
power.

Dion. Ha-
lic. li 2. an-
tiq. Rom l.
in ius ff. de
lib. & post.
Aul. Gell.
lib. 20.
Lib. 8. Eth.
cap. 20.
Lib 6. Bel.
Gal.
Prosper.
Aquitain.
in Epist.
Sigism.

Deut. 21.

Here are many sorts and degrees of authoritie and humane power, Publicke, and Priuate; but there is none more naturall, nor greater, than that of the father ouer his children, (I say father, because the mother who is subiect vnto hir husband, cannot properly haue hir children in hir power and subiection) but it hath not been alwayes, and in all places alike. In former times almost euery where it was absolute and vniuersall ouer the life and death, the libertie, the goods, the honor, the actions and cariages of their children, as to plead, to marie, to get goods: as namely with the *Romans* by the expresse law of *Romulus*, *parentum in liberos omne ius esto, relegendi, vendendi, occidendi*; except only children vnder the age of three yeares, who as yet could not offend either in word or deede; which law was afterwards renued by the law of the twelue tables, by which the father was allowed to sell his children to the third time: with the *Persians* according to *Aristotle*; the ancient *French* as *Cesar* and *Prosper* affirme; with the *Muscovits* and *Tartars*, who might sell their children to the fourth time. And it should seeme by that fact of *Abraham* going about to kill his sonne, that this power was likewise vnder the law of nature: for if it had been against his dutie, and without the power of the father, he had neuer consented thereunto, neither had hee euer thought that it was God that commanded him to do it, if it had beene against nature. And therefore we see that *Isaac* made no resistance, nor alledged his innocencie, knowing that it was in the power of his father: which derogateth not in any sort from the greatnesse of the faith of *Abraham*, because he would not sacrifice his sonne by vertue of his right or power, nor for any demerit of *Isaac*, but only to obey the commandement of God. So likewise it was in force by the law of *Moyse*, though somewhat moderated. So that we see what this power hath been in ancient times in the greatest part of the world, and which endured vnto the time of the *Romane Emperours*. With the *Greeks* it was not so great and absolute, nor with the *Egyptians*: neuerthelesse, if it fell out, that the father had killed his

his sonnes wrongfully and without cause, he had no other punishment, but to be shut vp three daies together with the dead bodie.

Now the reasons and fruits of so great and absolute a power of fathers ouer their children, necessarie for the culture of good maners, the chasing away of vice, and the publike good, were first to holde the children in awe and dutie: and secondly, because there are many great faults in children, that would escape vnpunished, to the great preiudice of the weale publike, if the knowledge and punishment of them were but in the hand of publike authoritie, whether it be because they are domesticall and secret, or because there is no man that will prosecute against them: for the parents who know them and are interessed in them will not discredit them; besides that, there are many vices and insolencies that are neuer punished by iustice. Adde heereunto, that there are many things to be tried, and many differences betwixt parents and children, brothers and sisters, touching their goods or other matters, which are not fit to be published, which are extinct and buried by this fatherly authoritie. And the law did alwayes suppose, that the father would neuer abuse this authoritie, because of that great loue which he naturally carrieth to his children, incompatible with crueltie; which is the cause that in stead of punishing them with rigour, they rather become intercessours for them, when they are in danger of the law: and there can be no greater torment to them, than to see their children in paine. And it falleth out very seldome or neuer, that this power is put in practise without very great occasion; so that it was rather a scarcrow to children and very profitable, than a rigour in good earnest.

Now this fatherly power (as ouer-sharpe and dangerous) is almost of it selfe lost and abolished (for it hath rather happened by a kinde of discontinuance than any expresse law) and it beganne to decline at the comming of the Romane Emperours: for from the time of *Augustus*, or shortly after, it was no more in force, whereby children became so desperate and insolent against their parents, that *Seneca*, speaking to *Nero*, sayd, That hee had seene more paricides punished in five yeeres past, than had beene in seven hundred yeeres before; that

2
The reasons
and fruits
thereof.

3
The decli-
nation.

Lib. i. de
Clem.

Salust. in
bel. Catil.
Valer.
Maxim.

Matt. 5.

that is to say, since the foundation of *Rome*. In former times, if it fell out that the father killed his children, he was not punished, as we may see by the example of *Fulvius* the Senator, who killed his sonne because he was a partner in the conspiracie of *Catiline*: and of diuers other Senatours, who haue made criminall processe against their children in their owne houses, and haue condemned them to death, as *Cassius Traianus*; or to perpetuall exile, as *Manlius Torquatus* his sonne *Sillanus*. There were afterwards lawes ordeined, that inioyned the father to present vnto the Iudge his children offending, that they might be punished, and that the Iudge should pronounce such a sentence as the father thought fit; which is still a kinde of footstep of antiquitie: and going about to take away the power of the father, they durst not doe it but by halfes, and not altogether and openly. These latter lawes come somewhat neere the law of *Moyse*, which would, That at the only complaint of the father made before the Iudge, without any other knowledge taken of the cause, the rebellious and contumacious childe should be stoned to death; requiring the presence of the Iudge, to the end the punishment should not be done in secret or in choler, but exemplarilie. So that according to *Moyse* this fatherly power was more free and greater, than it hath beene after the time of the Emperours; but afterwards vnder *Constantine* the Great, and *Theodosius*, and finally vnder *Iustinian*, it was almost altogether extinct. From whence it is, that children haue learned to denie their obedience to their parents, their goods, their aide, yea to wage law against them; a shamefull thing to see our Courts full of these cases. Yea, they haue beene dispensed heerewith vnder pretext of deuotion and offerings, as with the Iewes before Christ, wherewith he reprocheth them: and afterwards in Christianitie; according to the opinion of some: yea, it hath beene lawfull to kill them either in their owne defence, or if they were enemies to the Commonweale: although, to say the truth, there should neuer be cause iust enough for a sonne to kill his father. *Nullum tantum scelus admitti potest a patre, quod sit parricidio vindicandum, & nullum scelus rationem habet.*

Now we feele not what mischiefe and preiudice hath happened

ned to the world, by the abolishing and extinction of this fatherly power. The Common-weales wherein it hath beene in force haue alwayes flourished. If there were any danger or euill in it, it might in some sort be ruled and moderated; but vtterly to abolish it, as now it is, is neither honest nor expedient, but hurtfull and inconuenient, as hath beene sayd.

Of the reciprocall duty of parents and children, See *Lib. 3.*

Cap. 14. p. 457.

CHAP. XLVIII.

Lords and slaues, Masters and seruants.

THe vse of slaues, and the full and absolute power of Lords and Masters ouer them, although it be a thing common thorowout the world and at all times (except within these foure hundred yeeres, in which time it hath somewhat decayed, though of late it reuiue againe) yet it is a thing both monstrous and ignominious in the nature of man, and such as is not found in beasts themselves, who consent not to the captiuitie of their like neither actiuelly nor passiuelly. The law of *Moyse* hath permitted this as other things, *ad duritiam cordis eorum*, but not such as hath beene elsewhere: for it was neither so great, nor so absolute, nor perpetuall, but moderated within the compasse of seuen yeeres at the most. Christianitie hath left it, finding it vniuersall in all places, as likewise to obey idolatrous Princes and Masters, and such like matters as could not at the first attempt and altogether be extinguished, they haue abolished.

¹
*The vse of
slaues vni-
uersall and
against na-
ture.*

There are foure sorts, Naturall, that is, slaues borne; Enforced, and made by right of warre; Iust termed slaues by punishment by reason of some offence, or debt, wherby they are slaues to their Creditors, at the most for seuen yeeres, according to the law of the Iewes, but alwayes vntill paiment and restitution be made, in other places; Voluntaries, whereof there are many sorts, as they that cast the dice for it, or sell their libertie for money, as long sithence it was the custome in *Almaigne*, and now likewise in some parts of Christendom, where they do giue and vow themselves to another for euer, as the Iewes were woont to practise, who at the gate bored a hole

²
Distinction.

*Tacit. de
mori Ger-
man.*

hole in their eare in token of perpetuall seruitude. And this kind of voluntarie captiuitie, is the strangest of all the rest, and almost against nature.

3
The cause
of Slaves.

It is couetousnesse that is the cause of slaves enforced; and lewdnesse the cause of voluntaries. They that are Lords and Masters haue hoped for more gaine and profit by keeping, than by killing them: and indeed the fairest possessions and the richest commodities, were in former times slaves. By this meanes *Crassus* became the richest among the *Romanes*, who had besides those that serued him five hundred slaves, who euery day brought gaine and commoditie by their gainefull artes and mysteries, and afterwards when he had made what profit by them he could, he got much by the sale of them.

4
The cruel-
ties of Lords
against their
slaves.

It is a strange thing to reade of those cruelties practised by Lords vpon their slaves, even by the approbation and permission of the lawes themselves: They haue made them to till the earth being chained together, as the manner is in *Barbary* at this day; they lodge them in holes and ditches; and being old, or impotent, and so vnprofitable, they sell them, or drowne them, and cast them into lakes to feed their fish withall: They kill them not only for the least fault that is, as the breaking of a glasse, but for the least suspition, yea, for their owne pleasure and pastime, as *Flaminius* did, one of the honestest men of his time: And to giue delight vnto the people, they were constrained in their publicke Theaters to kill one another. If a Master hapned to be killed in his house by whomsoever, the innocent slaves were all put to death, inso-much that *Pedonius* the *Romane* being slaine, although the murtherer were knowne, yet by the order of the Senat, foure hundred of his slaves were put to death.

5
The cruelties
of Slaves
against their
Lords.

On the other side, it is a thing as strange, to heare of the rebellions, insurrections, and cruelties of slaves against their Lords, when they haue beene able to worke their reuenge, not only in particular by surprise and treason, as it fell out one night in the Citie of *Tyre*, but in set battaile both by sea and land; from whence the prouerb is, So many slaves, so many enemies.

6
Diminution
of Slaves.

Now as Christian religion, and afterwards *Mahumetisme* did increase, the number of slaves did decrease, and seruitude did

did cease, insomuch that the Christians, and afterwards the Turks, like apes imitating them, gaue freedome and libertie to all those that were of their religion; in such sort, that about the twelue hundred yeare, there were almost no slaues in the world, but where these two religions had no authoritie.

But as the number of slaues diminished, the number of ⁷ *The increase of poore people and vagabonds.* beggers and vagabonds increased: for so many slaues being set at libertie, come from the houses and subiection of their Lords, not hauing wherewithall to liue, and perhaps hauing children too, filled the world with poore people.

This pouertie made them returne to seruitude, and to become voluntarie slaues, paying, changing, selling their libertie, to the end they might haue their maintenance and life assured, and be quit of the burthen of their children. Besides this cause and this voluntarie seruitude, the world is returned to the vse of slaues, because the Christians and Turks alwaies mainteining warres one against the other, as likewise against the Gentiles both orientall and occidentall, although by the example of the Iewes they haue no slaues of their owne nation, yet they haue of others, whom, though they turne to their religion, they hold slaues by force. ⁸ *Returne to seruitude.*

The power and authoritie of masters ouer their seruants, is not very great, nor imperious, and in no sort can be preiudiciall to the libertie of seruants; only they may chastise and correct them with discretion and moderation. This power is much lesse ouer those that are mercenarie, ouer whom they haue neither power nor correction. ⁹

The dutie of Masters and Seruants,
See lib. 3. cap. 15. p. 486.

CHAP. XLIX.

Of the State, Soueraigntie, Soueraignes.

HAuing spoken of priuate power, we come to the publicke, that of the state. The state, that is to say, Rule, dominion, or a certaine order in commanding and obeying, is the prop, the cement, and the soule of humane things: It is the bond of societie, which cannot otherwise subsist; It is the vitall ^T *The description and necessity of the state.*

tall spirit, whereby so many millions of men doe breath, and the whole nature of things.

2
The nature
of the state.
Tacit.

Now notwithstanding it be the pillar and prop of all, yet it is a thing not so sure, very difficult, subiect to changes, *arduum & subiectum fortune cuncta regendi onus*, which declineth and sometimes falleth by hidden and vnknowne causes, and that altogether at an instant, from the highest step to the lowest, and not by degrees, as it useth to be long arising. It is likewise exposed to the hatred both of great and small, whereby it is gauled, subiect to ambushments, vnderminings, and dangers, which hapneth likewise many times by the corrupt and wicked manners of the soueraignes, and the nature of the soueraigntie, which we are about to describe.

3
The descrip-
tion of so-
ueraigntie.

Soueraigntie is a perpetuall and absolute power, without constraint either of time or condition. It consisteth in a power to giue lawes to all in generall, and to euery one in particular, without the consent of any other, or the gift of any person. And as another saith (to derogate from the common law) Soueraigntie is so called, and absolute, because it is not subiect to any humane lawes, no not his owne. For it is against nature to giue lawes vnto all, and to command himselfe in a thing that dependeth vpon his will, *Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quæ a voluntate promittentis statum capit*; nor of another, whether liuing, or of his predecessors, or the countrie. Soueraigne power is compared to fire, to the sea, to a wilde beast; it is a hard matter to tame it, to handle it, it will not be crost, nor offended, but being is very dangerous, *potes tas res est quæ moneri, doceriq, non vult, & castigationem agrè ferat*.

4
The proper-
ties.

The marks and properties thereof, are, to iudge the last appeales, to ordaine lawes in time of peace and warre, to create and appoint magistrates and officers, to giue graces and dispensations against the law, to impose tributes, to appoint money, to receiue homages, ambassages, oathes. But all this is comprehended vnder the absolute power to giue and make lawes according to their pleasure. Other marks there are of lesse weight, as the law of the sea and shipwracke, confiscation for treason, power to change the tongue, title of Maiestie.

5
Greatnes and Soueraigntie is so much desired of all, because
all

all the good that is in it appeareth outwardly, and all the ill is altogether inward: As also because to commaund others, is a thing as beautifull and diuine, as great and difficult; and for this cause they are esteemed and reuerenced for more than men. Which beliefe in the people, and credit of theirs is very necessarie and commodious to extort from the people due respect and obedience, the nource of peace and quietnes. But in the end they prooue to be men cast in the same mould that other men are, and many times worse borne, and worse qualified in nature than many of the common sort of people. It seemeth that their actions because they are weightie and important, doe proceed from weightie and important causes: but they are nothing, and of the same condition that other mens are. The same occasion that breeds a brawle betwixt vs and our neighbour, is ground enough of a warre betwixt Princes: and that offence for which a Lackey deserues a whipping, lighting vpon a King, is the ruine of a whole prouince. They will as lightly as we, and we as they, but they can do more than we: the selfe-same appetites moue a flie and an elephant. Finally, besides these passions, defects, and naturall conditions which they haue common with the meanest of those that doe adore them, they haue likewise vices and discomforts which their greatnes and soueraigntie beares them out in, peculiar vnto themselves.

The ordinarie maners of great personages are, vntamed pride, *durus est veri insolens, ad recta flecti regius non vult tu-* 6
mor; violence too licentious, *id esse regni maximum pignus pu-* The maners
tant, si quicquid alijs non licet, solis licet: quod non potest, vult pos- of Soue-
se, qui nimium potest: Their mott that best pleaseth them is, *Senec.*
quod libet, licet: suspicion, icalousie, *Tacit.* *suapte natura, potentia anxij,*
yea euen of their owne infants, *suspectus semper, inuisusq;* do-
minantibus quisquis proximus destinatur, adeo vt displiceant
etiam ciuilia filiorum ingenia: whereby it falleth out that they
are many times in alarum and feare, *ingenia regum prona ad*
formidinem.

The aduantages of Kings and soueraigne Princes aboue 7
their people, which seeme so great and glittering, are indeed The miseries
but light, and almost imaginarie; but they are repayed with and discom-
great, true, and solid disaduantages and inconueniences. The modities.
name

name and title of a soueraigne, the shew and outside is beautiful, pleasant, and ambitious; but the burthen and the inside is hard, difficult, and yrksome. There is honor enough, but little rest and ioy, or rather none at all: It is a publicke and honorable seruitude, a noble miserie, a rich captiuitie, *Aurea & fulgida compides, clara miseria*; witnesse that which *Augustus, Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax, Diocletian*, haue said and done, and the end that almost all the first twelue *Cesars* made, and many others after them. But because few there are that beleeue this, but suffer themselves to be deceiued by the beautiful shew, I will more particularly quote the inconueniences and miseries that accompanie great Princes.

8
1 In their
charge.

First, the great difficultie to play their part, and to quit themselves of their charge: for can it be but a great burthen to gouerne so many people, since in the ruling of himselfe there are so many difficulties? It is an easier matter and more pleasant to follow, than to guide; to trauell in a way that is already traced, than to finde the way; to obey, than to command; to answer for himselfe only, than for others too; *ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum, quam regere imperio res velle*. Adde heereunto that it is required that he that commandeth must be a better man, than he that is commanded: so said *Cyrus* a great Commander. How difficult a thing this is, we may see by the paucitie of those that are such as they ought to be. *Vespasian*, saith *Tacitus*, was the only Prince that in goodnes excelled his predecessors: and another sticks not to say, that all the good Princes may be grauen in a ring.

9
2 In the
pleasures
and actions
of their life.

Secondly in their delights and pleasures, wherein it is thought they haue a greater part than other men. But they are doubtlesse of a worse condition than the pleasures of priuate men: for besides that the lustre of their greatnes makes them vnfit to take ioy in their pleasures, by reason that they are too cleare and apparent, and made as a butt and subiect to censure, they are likewise crost and peered into euen to their very thoughts, which men take vpon them to diuine and iudge of. Againe, the great ease and facilitie that they haue to do what pleaseth them, because all men applie themselves vnto them, takes away the taste, & sowreth that sweet which should be in their pleasures; which delight no man but those
that

that taste them, with some scarcitie and difficultie. He that giues no time to be thirstie, knowes not what a pleasure it is to haue drinke: Sactietie is noysome, and goes against the stomacke.

Pinguis amor nimiumq; potens in tadia nobis

Veritur: & stomacho dulcis ut esca nocet.

There is nothing more tedious and loathsome than abundance, yea they are deprived of all true and liuely action, which cannot be without some difficultie and resistance. It is not going, living, acting in them, but sleeping and an insensible sliding away.

The third inconuenience that followeth Princes, is in their marriages. The marriages of the vulgar sort are more free and voluntarie, made with more affection, libertie and contentment. One reason heereof may be, that the common sort of men finde more of their degree to chuse, whereas Kings and Princes, who are not of the rout, as we know, haue no plentifull choice. But the other reason is better, which is, that the common sort in their marriages looke but into their owne affaires, and how they may accommodate it best vnto themselves; but the marriages of Princes are many times enforced for publike necessity: they are great parts of the State, and instruments seruing for the generall good and quiet of the world. Great personages and Souereignes marrie not for themselves, but for the good of the State, whereof they must be more amorous and iealous, than of their wiues and children: for which cause they many times hearken vnto marriages where there is neither loue nor delight; and matches are made betweene persons, who neither know nor haue seene one another, much lesse affect: yea, such a great man takes such a great ladie, whom if he were not so great, he would not take: but this is to serue the weale-publike, to assure the States, and to settle peace amongst their people.

10

3 In their marriages.

The fourth is, That they haue no true part in the attempts that men make one against the other in emulation of honour and valour, in the exercises of the minde and of the bodie, which is one of the most delightfull things in the commerce and conuersation of men. The reason heereof is, because all the world giues place vnto them, all men spare them, and

11

4 Attempts of honour.

loue rather to hide their owne valour, to betray their owne glorie, than to hurt or hinder that of their Souereigne, especially where they know he affects the victorie. This, to say the trueth, is by force of respect to handle men disdainfully and iniuriously, and therefore one said, that the children of Princes learned nothing by order and rule, but to manage a horse, because in all other exercises euery one bowes vnto them, and giues them the prise: but the horse who is neither flatterer nor Courtier, casts as well the Prince to the ground as the Esquire. Many great personages haue refused the praises and approbations offered them, saying, I would accept and esteeme of them, and reioyce in them, if they came from free men, that durst say the contrarie, and tax me if there were cause.

12
5 Libertie
of trauell.

The fift is, that they are depriued of the libertie to trauell in the world, being as it were emprisoned within their owne countries, yea within their owne palaces, being alwaies enclosed with people, suters, gazers, and lookers on, and that wheresocuer they be, and in all actions whatsoeuer, prying euen through the holes of their chaire: whereupon *Alphonsus* the King said, that in this respect the estate of an asse was better than the condition of a King.

13
6 Mutuall
and hartie
amitie.

The sixt miserie is, that they are depriued of all amitie and mutuall societie, which is the sweetest and perfectest fruit of humane life, and cannot be but betwixt equals, or those betwixt whom the difference is but small. This great disparitie puts them without the commerce and societie of men; all humble seruices, and base offices, are done vnto them by those that cannot refuse them, and proceed not from loue, but from subiection, or to increase their owne greatnes, or of custome and countenance; which is plaine, because wicked Kings are as well serued and reuerenced as the good; they that are hated, as they that are beloued, there is no difference, the selfe-same apparell, the selfe-same ceremonie: Wherevpon *Iulian* the Emperour answered his Courtiers, that commended him for his iustice, Perhaps I should be proud of these praises, if they were spoken by such as durst to accuse me, and to dispraise my actions when they shall deserue it.

14
7 Ignorance
of things.

The seuenth misery, worse perhaps than all the rest, and more

more dangerous to the weale-publicke, is, that they are not free in the choice of men, nor in the true knowledge of things. They are not suffered truly to know the state of their affaires, and consequently not to call and employ such as they would, and as were most fit and necessarie. They are shut vp, and beset with a certaine kind of people, that are either of their own bloud, or by the greatnes of their houses and offices, or by prescription, are so farre in authoritie, power, and managing of affaires before others, that it is not lawfull, without putting all to hazard, to discontent, or in any sort to suspect them. Now these kind of people that couer, and hold as it were hidden the Prince, do provide that all the truth of things shall not appeare vnto him, and that better men, and more profitable to the state come not neere him, lest they be knowne what they are. It is a pitifull thing not to see but by the eyes, not to vnderstand, but by the cares of another, as Princes doe. And that which perfecteth in all points this miserie, is, that commonly, and as it were by destinie, Princes and great personages are possessed by three sorts of people, the plagues of humane kinde, Flatterers, Inuenters of imposts or tributes, Informers, who vnder a faire and false pretext of zeale and amitie towards the Prince, as the two first, or of loyaltie and reformation as the latter, spoile and ruinate both Prince and State.

The eight miserie is, that they are lesse free, and masters of their owne wills than all other, for they are enforced in their proceedings by a thousand considerations and respects, whereby many times they must captiuate their designments, desires, and wills; *in maxima fortuna, minima licentia*. And in the meane time in stead of being plaintiffes, they are more rudely handled and iudged than any other: For men will not stick to diuine of their designes, penetrate into their hearts and inuentions, which they cannot doe, *Abditos principis sensus, & si quid occultius parat exquirere: illicitum anceps nec ideo assequare*: and looking into things with another visage, where they vnderstand not sufficientlie the affaires of the state, they require of their Princes what they thinke should be done, blame their actions, & refusing to submit themselves to what

15

Not masters of their wills.

is necessarie, they commonly proceed in their businesse rudely enough.

16
A miserable end.

Finally, it falleth out many times, that they make a miserable end, not only tyrants and vlturpers, for it belongs to them, but such as haue a true title to their Crowne; witnes so many Romane Emperours after *Pompey* the Great, and *Cesar*, and in our time *Mary* Queene of *Scotland*, who lost her life by the hand of an executioner; and *Henry* the third, wilfullie murdered in the middle of fortie thousand armed men, by a little Monke, and a thousand the like examples. It seemeth that as lightning and tempests oppose themselues against the pride and height of our buildings, so there are likewise spirits that enuie and emulate greatnes below vpon earth.

*Vsq; adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam
Obterit, & pulchros fasces, fauasq; secures
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.*

17
The conclusion of their miseries.

To conclude, the condition of Soueraignes is hard and dangerous: Their life if it be innocent, is infinitely painefull; if it be wicked, it is subiect to the hate and flaunder of the world, and in both cases exposed to a thousand dangers: for the greater a Prince is, the lesse may he trust others, and the more must he trust himselfe. So that we see, that it is a thing as it were annexed to soueraigntie, to be betrayed.

Of their duty, See the third booke, Chap. 16.

CHAP. L.

Magistrates.

1
The distinction.

There are diuers degrees of Magistrates as well in honor as power, which are the two things to be considered in the distinction of them, and which haue nothing common the one with the other: and many times they that are more honorable haue lesse power, as Counsellors of the priue Counsell, the Secretaries of the state. Some haue but one of the two; others haue both, and that of diuers degrees, but they are properly called Magistrates that haue both.

The

The Magistrates that are in the middle betwixt the Soueraigne & the particulars, in the presence of their Soueraignes haue no power to command. As riuers lose both their name and power at the mouth or entrance into the sea, and the starres their light in the presence of the sunne; so all power of Magistrates is but vpon sufferance in the presence of their Soueraigne: as also the power of inferiours and subalternate Magistrates in the presence of their superiours. Amongst equals there is neither power nor superioritie, but the one may hinder the other by opposition and preuention.

All Magistrates iudge, condemne and command either according to the law, and then their sentence is but the execution of the law; or according to equitie, and such iudgement is called the office or dutie of the Magistrate.

Magistrates cannot change nor correct their iudgements, except the Soueraigne permit it, vnder paine of iniustice: they may reuoke their commands or make stay of them, but not that which they haue iudged and pronounced with knowledge of the cause.

Of the dutie of Magistrates, See lib. 3. p. 493.

CHAP. LI.

Lawyers, Doctours, Teachers.

IT is one of the vanities & follies of man, to prescribe lawes and rules that exceed the vse and capacitie of men, as some Philosophers and Doctours haue done. They propose strange and eleuated formes or images of life, or at leastwise so difficult and austere, that the practise of them is impossible at least for a long time, yea the attempt is dangerous to manie. These are castles in the aire, as the Common-wealth of *Plato*, and *More*, the Oratour of *Cicero*, the Poet of *Horace*, beautiful and excellent imaginations; but he was yet neuer found that put them in vse. The soueraigne and perfect Lawgiuer and Doctortooke heed of this, who both in himselfe, his life and his doctrine, hath not sought these extrauagancies and formes diuided from the common capacitie of men; and therefore he calleth his yoke easie, and his burden light. In-

gum meum suauē, & onus meum leue. And they that haue instituted and ordered their companie vnder his name, haue very wisely considered of the matter, that though they make speciall profession of vertue, deuotion, and to serue the weale-publike aboue all others, neuerthelesse they differ very little from the common and ciuill life. Wherein there is first great iniustice: for there must alwaies be kept a proportion betwixt the commandement and the obedience, the duetie and the power, the rule and the workmaster: and these binde themselves and others to be necessarilie in want, cutting out more worke than they know how to finish: and many times these goodly Law-makers are the first Law-breakers: for they do nothing, and many times do quite contrarie to that they enioyne others, like the Pharises, *Imponunt onera graua, & nolunt ea digito mouere.* So do some Phyisitians and Diuines: so liues the world; rules and precepts are enioined, and men not only by an irregularitie of life and maners, but also by contrarie opinion and iudgement follow others.

There is likewise another fault full of iniustice, they are farre more scrupulous, exact, and rigorous in things free and accidentall than in necessarie and substantiall, in positiue and humane than in naturall and diuine; like them that are content to lend, but not to pay their debts: and all like the Pharises, as the great and heavenly Doctour telleth them to their reproch. All this is but hypocrisie and deceit.

CHAP. LII.

People or vulgar sort.

THe people (we vnderstand heere the vulgar sort, the popular rout, a kinde of people vnder what couert soeuer, of base, seruile, and mechanicall condition) are a strange beast with many heads, and which in few words can not be described, inconstant and variable, without stay, like the waues of the sea: they are moued and appeased, they allow and disallow one and the same thing at one and the same instant: there is nothing more easie than to driue them into what passion he will: they loue not warres for the true end thereof, nor peace for rest and quietnesse, but for varieties sake, and the change that

that there is from the one to the other: confusion makes them desire order, and when they haue it, they like it not: they run alwaies one contrary to another, and there is no time pleaseth but what is to come: *hi vulgi mores, odisse praesentia, ventura cupere, praeterita celebrare.*

They are light to beleue, to gather together newes, especially such as are most hurtfull; holding all reports for assured truths. With a whistle, or some sonnet of newes, a man may assemble them together like bees at the sound of a bason.

Without iudgement, reason, discretion. Their iudgement and wisdom is but by chance, like a cast at dice, vnadvised and headlong of all things, and alwayes ruled by opinion or custome, or the greater number, going all in a line, like sheepe that run after those that goe before them, and not by reason and truth. *Plebi non iudicium, non veritas: ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca indicat.* Tacit. Cic.

Enuious and malicious, enemies to good men, contemners of vertue, beholding the good hap of another with an ill eye, fauouring the more weake and the more wicked, and wishing all ill they can to men of honor they know not wherefore, except it be because they are honourable and well spoken of by others.

Treacherous and vnttrue, amplifying reports, smothering of trutthes, and alwayes making things greater than they are, without faith, without holde. The faith or promise of a people, and the thought of a childe, are of like durance, which change not onely as occasions change, but according to the difference of those reports that euery houre of the day may bring forth.

Mutinous, desiring nothing but nouelties and changes, seditious, enemies to peace and quietnesse: *ingenio mobili, seditiosum, discordiosum, cupidum rerum nouarum, quieti & otio aduersum*, especially when they meet with a leader: for then euen as the calme sea, of nature tumbleth, and foameth, and rageth, being stirred with the furie of the windes; so doe the people swell, and grow proud, wilde, and outrageous: but take from them their leader, they become deiect, grow wild, are confounded with astonishment, *sine rectore praeps, pauidus, socors: nil ausura plebs principibus amotis.* Salust.

7 Procurers and fauorers of broiles and alterations in house-
holde affaires, they account modestie simplicitie, wisdome
rusticitie: and contrariwise, they giue to fierie and heady vi-
olence the name of valour and fortitude. They prefer those
that haue hot heads and actiue hands, before those that haue
a settled and temperate iudgement, and vpon whom the
weight of the affaires must lie; boasters and pratlers before
 those that are simple and stayed.

8 They care neither for the publike good nor common ho-
 nestie, but their priuate good only; and they refuse no base
 offices for their gaine and commodity. *Prinata cuiq; stimula-*
tio, vile decus publicum.

9 Alwayes muttering and murmuring against the State, al-
 wayes belching out landers and insolent speeches against
 those that gouerne and command. The meaner and poorer
 sort haue no better pastime, than to speake ill of the great and
rich, not vpon cause and reason, but of enuie, being neuer
 content with their gouernours, nor the present State.

10 They haue nothing but a mouth, they haue tongues that
 cease not, spirits that bowge not: they are a monster whose
parts are all tongues, they speake all things, but know no-
 thing; they look vpon all, but see nothing; they laugh at all,
 and weepe at all; fit to mutine and rebell, not to fight. Their
 propertie is rather to assaye to shake off their yoke, than to
 defend their libertie: *procacia plebis ingenia, impigra lingua,*
ignaua animi.

Tacit.
 Salust.

• 11

They neuer know how to holde a measure, nor to keepe
 an honest mediocritie. Either like slaues they serue ouer-
 basely, or like lords they are beyond all measure insolent and
 tyrannicall. They cannot endure a soft and temperate bit,
 nor are pleased with a lawfull libertie; they run alwaies to ex-
 tremities, either out of hope too much trusting, or too much
distrusting out of feare. They will make you afeard, if you
 feare not them: when they are frighted, you chocke them
 vnder the chin, and you leape with both feet vpon their bel-
 lies. They are audacious and proud, if a man shew not the
 cudgell; and therefore the prouerbe is, Tickle them, and they
 will pricke thee; pricke them, and they will tickle thee. *Nil*
in vulgo modicum. terrere ni paueant, ubi pertimuerint impune
contemni:

contemni: audacia turbidum nisi ubi metuat aut seruit humiliter, aut superbe dominatur: libertatem, quæ media, nec spernere nec habere.

Very vnthankfull towards their benefactors. The recompense of all those that haue deserued well of the Commonwealth, haue alwayes beene banishment, reproch, conspiracie, death. Histories are famous, of *Moyse* and all the Prophets, *Socrates*, *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Lycurgus*, *Demosthenes*, *Themistocles*. And the Truth it selfe hath said, That he being one that procured the good and health of the people escaped not: and contrariwise, they that oppresse them, are dearest vnto them. They feare all, they admire all.

12

To conclude, the people are a sauage beast, all that they thinke, is vanitie; all they say, is false and erroneous; that they reprocue, is good; that they approoue, is naught; that which they praise is infamous; that which they doe and vndertake, is follie: *Non tam bene cum rebus humanis geritur ut Seneca. meliora pluribus placeant: argumentum pessimi turba est.* The vulgar multitude is the mother of ignorance, iniustice, inconstancie, idolatrie, vanitie, which neuer yet could be pleased: their mot is, *Vox populi, vox Dei*; but we may say, *Vox populi, vox stultorum*. Now the beginning of wisdom, is for a man to keepe himselfe cleere and free, and not to suffer himselfe to be caried with popular opinions. This belongs to the second Lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 224. booke, which is now neere at hand.

13

The fourth distinction and difference of men, drawen from their diuers professions and conditions of life.

THE PREFACE.

BEholde heere another difference of men, drawen from the diuersitie of their professions, conditions and kindes of life. Some follow the ciuill and sociable life, others flie it, thinking to saue themselves in the solitarie wilderness; some loue armes, others hate them; some live in common, others in private; it pleaseth some best to haue charge, and to leade a publike life, others to hide and keepe themselves priuate; some are Courtiers, attending wholly vpon others, others court

court none but themselves; some delight to live in the citie, others in the fields affecting a countrey life; whose choice is the better, and which life is to be preferred, It is a difficult thing simply to determine, and it may be impertinent. They haue all their aduantages and disadvantages, their good and their ill. That which is most to be looked into and considered heerein, as shall be said, is, That euery man know how to chuse that which best befits his owne nature, that he might live the more easily and the more happily. But yet a word or two of them all, by comparing them together: but this shall be after we haue spoken of that life that is common to all, which hath three degrees.

CHAP. LIII.

The distinction and comparison of the three sorts of degrees of life.

There are three sorts of life, and as it were three degrees, one priuate of euery particular man within himselfe, and in the closet of his owne heart, where all is hid, all is lawfull: the second, in his house and family, in his priuate and ordinarie actions, where there is neither studie nor arte, and whereof he is not bound to giue any reason: the third is publike in the eyes of the world. Now to keepe order and rule in this first low and obscure stage, it is very difficult, and more rare than in the other two; and in the second, than in the third: the reason is, because where there is neither Iudge nor Controller, nor Regarder, and where we haue no imagination either of punishment or recompense, we carrie our selues more loosely and carelessly, as in priuate liues, where conscience and reason only is our guide, than in publike; where we are still in checke and as a marke to the eyes and iudgement of all; where glory, feare of reproch, base reputation, or some other passion doth leade vs (for passion commands with greater power than reason) whereby we keepe our selues readie, standing vpon our guard: for which cause it falleth out, that many are accounted holy, great, and admirable in publike, who in their owne priuate haue nothing commendable. That which is done in publike is but a fable, a fiction, the truth

truth is secret and in priuat; and he that will well iudge of a man, must conuerse euery day with him, and pry into his ordinarie and naturall cariage; the rest is all counterfet; *Vniuersus mundus exercet histrioniam*: and therefore said a wise man, That he is an excellent man, who is such within and in himselfe which he is outwardly for feare of the lawes, and speech of the world. Publick actions thunder in the eares of men, to which a man is attentue, when he doth them; as exploits in warre, sound iudgement in counsell, to rule a people, to performe an Ambassage. Priuate and domesticall actions are quick and sure, to chide, to laugh, to sell, to pay, to conuerse with his owne, a man considers not of them, he doth them not thinking of them: secret and inward actions much more, to loue, to hate, to desire.

Againe, there is heere another consideration, and that is, that that is done by the naturall hypocrisie of men, which we make most account of, and a man is more scrupulous in outward actions, that are in shew, but yet are free, of small importance, and almost all in countenances and ceremonies, and therefore are of little cost, and as little effect; than in inward and secret actions that make no shew, but are yet requisite and necessarie, and therefore they are the more difficult. Of those depend the reformation of the soule, the moderation of the passions, the rule of the life; yea, by the attainment of these outward, a man becomes carelesse of the inward.

Now of these three liues, inward, domesticall, publicke, he that is to leade but one of them, as Hermits, doth guide and order his life at a better rate, than he that hath two, and he that hath but two, his condition is more easie, than he that hath all three.

CHAP. LIIII.

A comparison of the euill and sociable life with the solitarie.

THEY that esteeme and commend so much the solitarie and retired life, as a great stay and sure retraite from the molestations and troubles of the world, and a fit meanes to preferue and maintaine themselves pure and free from many vices, in as much as the worse part is the greater, of a thousand

sand there is not one good, the number of fooles is infinite, contagion in a prease is dangerous, they seeme to haue reason on their side: for the companie of the wicked is a dangerous thing, and therefore they that aduenture themselves vpon the sea, are to take heed that no blasphemers, or dissolute and wicked person enter their ship; one only *Ionas* with whom God was angrie had almost lost all; *Bias* to those that were in the ship with him crying out in a great danger for help vnto their gods, pleasantlie said, Hold you your peace, for the gods perceiue not that you are heere with me. *Albuquerque* the Vice-roy of the *Indies* for *Emmanuel* king of *Portingall*, in a great danger at sea, tooke vpon his shoulders a little child, to the end that his innocencie might serue as a suretie to God for his sinnes. But to thinke that a solitarie life is better, more excellent and perfect, more fit for the exercise of vertue, more difficult, sharp, laborious and painfull, as some would make vs beleue, they grossely deceiue themselves: for contrarily it is a great discharge and ease of life, and it is but an indifferent profession, yea a simple apprenticeship and disposition to vertue. This is not to enter into busines, troubles, and difficulties, but it is to flie them, and to hide themselves from them, to practise the counsell of the Epicures (Hide thy selfe) it is to runne to death, to flie a good life. It is out of all doubt, that a King, a Prelat, a Pastor, is a farre more noble calling, more perfect, more difficult, than that of a Monke, or a Hermit. And to say the truth, in times past the companies of Monks were but seminaries and apprenticeships, from whence they drew those that were fit for Ecclesiasticall charge, and their preparatiues to a greater perfection. And he that liues ciuillie hauing a wife, children, seruants, neighbours, friends, goods, busines, and so many diuers parts which he must satisfie, and truly and loyally answere for, hath without comparison farre more busines, than he that hath none of all these, hath to doe with none but himselfe: Multitude and abundance is farre more troublesome, than solitarinesse and want. In abstinencie there is but one thing, in the conduct and vse of many, diuers things, there are many considerations, diuers duties. It is an easier thing to part from goods, honours, dignities, charges, than to gouerne them well, and well to discharge

charge them. It is easier for a man to liue altogether without a wife, than in all points duly to liue, and to maintaine himselfe with his wife, children, and all the rest that depend vpon him: so is the single life more easie than the married state.

So likewise to thinke that solitarinesse is a sanctuarie and an assured haue against all vices, temptations, and impediments, is to deceiue themselves; for it is not true in euery respect. Against the vices of the world, the stirre of the people, the occasions that proceed from without, it is good; but solitarinesse hath it inward and spirituall affaires and difficulties: *Init in desertum vt tentaretur à diabolo.* To imprudent and vnadvised young men, solitarinesse is a dangerous staffe, and it is to be feared, that whilest he walks alone he entertaines worse companie than himselfe, as *Crates* said to a young man who walked all alone farre from companie. It is there where fooles contriue their wicked designements, begin their owne overthrowes, sharpen their passions and wicked desires. Many times to auoid the gulf of *Charybdis*, they fall into *Scylla*; to flie is not to escape, it is many times to increase the danger, and to lose himselfe, *non vitat, sed fugit: magis autem periculis patemur auersi.* A man had neede be wise and strong, and well assured of himselfe when he falles into his owne hands, for it falls out many times that there are none more dangerous than his owne, *Guarda me, dios de mi,* saith the Spanish proverb very excellently; *nemo est ex imprudentibus qui sibi relinqui debeat; solitudo omnia mala persuadet.* But for some priuat and particular consideration, though good in it selfe (for many times it is for idlenesse, weakenesse of spirit, hatred, or some other passion) to flie and to hide himselfe, hauing means to profit another, or to do good to the weale-publick, is to be a fugitiue, to bury his talent, to hide his light, a fault subiect to the rigour of iudgement.

CHAP. LV.

*A comparison betwixt the life led in common,
and in priuat.*

Some haue thought that the life led in common, wherein nothing is proper to any man, whereby he may say, this is

Luc.
Acts 6.

is mine, or that is thine, but where all things are common, tendeth most to perfection, and hath most charitie and concord. This may take place in the companie of a certaine number of people, lead and directed by some certaine rule, but not in a state and common-weale; and therefore *Plato* hauing once allowed it, thinking thereby to take away all auarice and dissension, did quickly alter his opinion, and was otherwise aduised: for as the practise sheweth, there is not only not any hartie affection towards that that is common to all, and as the prouerb is, *The common asse is alwaies ill saddled*, but also the communitie draweth vnto it selfe contentions, murmurings, hatreds, as it is alwaies seene, yea euen in the primitiue Church: *Crescente numero discipulorum, factum est murmur Græcorum aduersus Hebræos*. The nature of loue is such as that of great riuers, which being ouer-charged with abundance of waters, being diuided, are quit of that charge; so loue being diuided to all men, and all things, loseth it force and vigor. But there are degrees of communitie; to liue, that is to say, to eate and drinke together is very good, as the maner was in the better and most ancient common-weales of *Lacedemon* and *Creete*; for besides that modestie and discipline is better retained amongst them, there is also a very profitable communication; but to thinke to haue all things common, as *Plato* for a while would, though he were afterwards otherwise aduised, is to peruert all.

CHAP. LVI.

*The comparison of the countrie-life with
the Citizens.*

THIS comparison to him that loueth wisdom is not hard to make, for almost all the commodities and aduantages are on one side, both spirituall and corporall, libertie, wisdom, innocencie, health, pleasure. In the fields the spirit is more free and to it selfe: in Cities, the persons, the affaires, both their owne and other mens, the contentions, visitations, discourses, entertainements, how much time doe they steale from vs? *amici fures temporis*. How many troubles bring they with them, auocations, allurements to wickednesses? Cities
are

are prisons to the spirits of men, no otherwise than cages to birds and beasts. This celestiall fire that is in vs, will not be shut vp, it loueth the aire, the fields; and therefore *Columella* sayth, that the countrey life is the couden of wisdom, *con sanguinea*, which can not be without beautifull & free thoughts and meditations; which are hardly had and nourished among the troubles and molestations of the citie. Againe, the countrey life is more neat, innocent and simple. In cities vices are hid in the rout, and are not perceiued, they passe and insinuate themselves pell-mell, the vse, the aspect, the encounter so frequent and contagious is the cause. As for pleasure and health, the whole heauens lie open to the view, the sun, the aire, the waters, and all the elements are free, exposed and open in all parts, alwayes sustaining vs, the earth disco- uereth it selfe, the fruits thereof are before our eyes; and none of all this is in cities in the throng of houses: so that to liue in cities is to be banished in the world and shut from the world. Againe, the countrey life is wholly in exercise, in action, which sharpeneth the appetite, mainteineth health, hardeneth and fortifieth the bodie. That which is to be com- mended in cities, is commoditie either priuate, as of mer- chants and artificers; or publike, to the managing whereof few are called, and in ancient times heeretofore they were chosen from the countrey life, who returned hauing perfor- med their charge.

CHAP. LVII.

Of the militarie profession.

THE militarie profession is noble in the cause thereof, for there is no commoditie more iust, nor more vniuersall ^{The praise thereof.} than the protection of the peace and greatnesse of his coun- trey; noble in the execution, for valour is the greatest, the most generous and heroicall vertue of all others; honorable, for of all humane actions, the greatest & most glorious is the warriors, and by which all other honours are iudged and discerned; pleasant, the company of so many noble men, yong, actiue, the ordinarie view of so many accidents and specta- cles, libertie and conuersation without arte, a manly fashion of

of life without ceremonie, the varietie of diuers actions, a couragious harmonie of warlike musike, which entertaines vs and stirres our blood, our eares, our soule; those warlike commotions which rauish vs with their horror and feare, that confused tempest of sounds and cries, that fearefull ordering of so many thousands of men, with so much furie, ardour and courage.

2
The dis-
praise.

But on the other side, a man may say, that the arte and experience of vndoing one another, of killing, ruinating, destroying our owne proper kinde, seemes to be vnnaturall and to proceed from an alienation of our sense and vnderstanding; it is a great testimonie of our weaknesse and imperfection, and it is not found in beasts themselues, in whom the image of nature continueth farre more entire. What follie, what rage is it, to make such commotions, to torment so many people, to runne thorow so many dangers and hazzards both by sea and land, for a thing so vncertaine and doubtfull as the issue of warre, to runne with such greedinesse and fiercenesse after death, which is easily found euery where, and without hope of sepulture, to kill those he hates not, nor euer saw? But whence proceedeth this great furie and ardor, for it is not for any offence committed? What frensie and madnesse is this for a man to abandon his owne bodie, his time, his rest, his life, his libertie, and to leaue it to the mercie of another? to expose himselfe to the losse of his owne members, and to that which is a thousand times worse than death, fire and sword, to be troden, to be pinched with hot iron, to be cut, to be torne in pieces, broken, and put to the gallies for euer? And all this, to serue the passion of another, for a cause which a man knowes not to be iust, and which is commonly vniust: for warres are commonly vniust, and for him whom a man knowes not, who takes so little care for him that fights for him, that he will be content to mount vpon his dead bodie to helpe his owne stature, that he may see the farther. I speake not heere of the dutie of subiects towards their Prince and countrey; but of voluntaries and mercenarie soldiers.

*The first and last distinction and difference of men, drawen from
the fauors and disfauors of Nature and
Fortune.*

THE PREFACE.

THis last distinction and difference is apparent enough and sufficiently knowen, and hath many members and considerations, but may all be reduced to two heads, which a man may call with the vulgar sort, Felicitie or good fortune, and Infelicitie or ill fortune, Greatnesse or littlenesse. To Felicitie and greatnesse belong health, beautie, and the other goods of the bodie, libertie, nobilitie, honor, dignitie, science, riches, credit, friends. To Infelicitie or littlenesse belong all the contraries, which are priuations of the other good things. From these things doth arise a very great difference, because a man is happie in one of these, or in two, or in three, and not in the rest, and that more or lesse by infinite degrees: few or none at all are happie or vnhappie in them all. He that hath the greatest part of these goods, and especially three, Nobilitie, Dignitie, or Authoritie and riches, is accounted great; he that hath not any of these three, little. But many haue but one or two, and are accounted midlings betwixt the great and the little. We must speake a little of them all.

Of Health, beautie, and other naturall goods of the bodie *chap. II.*
hath been spoken before; as likewise of their contraries, *chap. 6.*
Sicknesse, Griefe.

CHAP. LVIII.

Of Libertie and Seruitude.

Libertie is accounted by some a souereigne good, and Seruitude an extreame euill, insomuch that many haue chosen rather to die a cruell death, than to be made slaues, or to see either the publike good or their owne priuate indangered. But of this there may be too much, and of these too manie, as of all other things. There is a twofolde libertie: the true, which is of the minde or spirit, and is in the power of

P

eucry

euery one, and can not be taken away, nor indamaged by another, nor by Fortune it selfe : contrariwise, the seruitude of the spirit is the most miserable of all others, to serue our owne affections, to suffer our selues to be deuoured by our owne passions, to be led by opinions. ô pitifull captiuitie ! The corporall libertie is a good greatly to be esteemed, but subiect to Fortune : and it is neither iust nor reasonable (if it be not by reason of some other circumstance) that it should be preferred before life it selfe, as some of the ancients haue done, who haue rather made choice of death, than to lose it; and it was accounted a great vertue in them : so great an euill was seruitude thought to be : *Seruitus obedientia est fracti animi & abiecti arbitrio carentis suo.* Many great and wise men haue serued, *Regulus, Valerianus, Plato, Diogenes*, euen those that were wicked, and yet dishonoured not their owne condition, but continued in effect and truth more free than their masters.

CHAP. LIX.

Nobilitie.

Nobilitie is a qualitie euery where not common, but honourable, brought in and established with great reason and for publike vtilitie. ✕

The descrip-
tion of nobi-
litie.

It is diuers, diuersly taken and vnderstood, and according to diuers nations and iudgements it hath diuers kindes. According to the generall and common opinion and custome it is a qualitie of a race or stocke. *Aristotle* saith, that it is the antiquitie of a race and of riches. *Plutarch* calleth it the vertue of a race, ἀρετή γένους, meaning thereby a certaine habit and qualitie continued in the linage. What this qualitie or vertue is, all are not wholly of one accord, sauing in this, that it is profitable to the weale-publike. For to some and the greater part this qualitie is militarie, to others it is politike, literarie of those that are wise, palatine of the officers of the Prince. But the militarie hath the aduantage aboue the rest: for besides the seruice which it yeeldeth to the weale-publike as the rest do, it is painfull, laborious, dangerous; whereby it is accounted more worthy and commendable. So hath it carried with vs by excellencie the honourable title of Valour.

There

There must then according to this opinion be two things in true and perfect nobilitie, profession of this vertue, and qualitie profitable to the common-weale, which is as the forme; and the race as the subiect and matter, that is to say, a long continuance of this qualitie by many degrees and races, and time out of mind, whereby they are called in our language Gentlemen, that is to say, of a race, house, familie, carying of long time the same name, and the same profession. For he is truly and entirely noble, who maketh a singular profession of publick vertue, seruing his Prince and Countrie, and being descended of parents and ancestors that haue done the same.

There are some that separate these two, and thinke that one of them sufficeth to true nobilitie, that is, either only vertue ³ *The distinction.* and qualitie, without any consideration of race or ancestors.

This is a personall and acquired nobilitie, & considered with rigour it is rude, that one come from the house of a Butcher or Vintner should be held for noble, whatsoever seruice he hath done for the Common-weale. Neuerthelesse, this opinion hath place in many nations, namely with the *Turks*, contemners of ancient nobilitie, and esteeming of no other but personall, and actuall militarie valour; or only antiquitie of race without profession of the qualitie; this is in the bloud and purely naturall.

If a man should compare these two simple and imperfect nobilities together, that which is purely naturall (to iudge aright) it is the lesse, though many, out of their vanitie haue ⁴ *Naturall nobilitie.* thought otherwise. The naturall is another mans qualitie, and not his owne, *genus & proanos & quæ non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra puto: nemo vixit in gloriam nostram; nec quod ante nos fuit nostrum est.* And what greater follie can there be, than to glorie in that which is not his owne? This honor may light vpon a vitious man, a knaue, and one in himself a true villaine. It is also vnprofitable to another, for it communicateth not with any man, neither is any man bettered by it, as science, iustice, goodnes, beautie, riches do. They that haue nothing else commendable in them but this nobilitie of flesh and bloud, make much of it, they haue it alwaies in their mouthes, it makes their cheekes swell and their hearts too (they will be sure to manage that little good that they haue) it is the marke

by which they are knowne, and a token that they haue nothing else in them, because they rest themselues whollie vpon that. But this is vanitie, for all their glorie springeth from fraile instruments, *ab vtero, conceptu, partu*, and is buried vnder the toombe of their ancestors. As offenders being pursued haue recourse to altars and the sepulchers of the dead, and in former times to the statues of Emperours; so these men being destitute of all merit and subiect of true honor, haue recourse to the memorie and armories of their ancestors. What good is it to a blind man, that his parents haue beene well sighted, or to him that stammereth, that his Grandfather was eloquent? and yet these kind of people are commonly glorious, high minded, contemptners of others; *Contemptor animus & superbia commune nobilitatis malum.*

Salust.

5
Acquired
and personall
honor.

The personall and acquired honor hath conditions altogether contrarie and very good. It is proper to the possessor thereof, it is alwaies a worthie subiect, and profitable to others. Againe, a man may say that it is more ancient and more rare, than the naturall, for by it the naturall began; and in a word, that is true honor which consisteth in good and profitable effects, not in dreames and imagination, vaine and vnprofitable, and proceedeth from the spirit, not the bloud, which is the same in noble men that is in others. *Quis generosus? ad virtutem à natura bene compositus animus facit nobilem, cui ex quacumq; conditione supra fortunam licet surgere.*

Senec.

6
Naturall
and acquired.

But they are both oftentimes, and verie willinglie together, and so they make a perfect honor: The naturall is a way and occasion to the personall; for things do easily returne to their first nature and beginning. As the naturall hath taken his beginning and essence from the personall, so it leadeth and conducteth his to it, *fortes creantur fortibus: hoc unum in nobilitate bonum, ut nobilibus imposita necessitudo videatur, ne à maiorum virtute degenerent*; To know that a man is sprung from honorable ancestors, and such as haue deserued well of the Common-weale, is a strong obligation and spurre to the honorable exploits of vertue. It is a foule thing to degenerate, and to belie a mans owne race. The nobilitie that is giuen by the bountie and letters patent of the Prince, if it haue no other reason, it is shamefull, and rather dishonorable than honorable.

able. It is an nobilitie in parchment, bought with siluer or fauor, and not by bloud as it ought: If it be giuen for merit, and notable seruices, it is personall and acquired as hath beene said.

CHAP. LX.

Of Honor.

SOME say (but not so well) that honor is the prize and recompence of vertue, or not so ill, an acknowledgement of ^I *The descrip-* vertue, or a prerogative of a good opinion, and afterwards of *tion of honor.* an outward dutie towards vertue; It is a priuiledge that draweth his principall essence from vertue. Others haue called it the shadow of vertue, which sometimes followeth, sometimes goeth before it, as the shadow the bodie. But to speake truly, it is the rumor of a beautifull and vertuous action, which reboundeth from our soules to the view of the world, and by reflexion into our selues, bringeth vnto vs a testimonie of that which others beleue of vs, which turneth to a great contentment of mind.

Honor is so much esteemed and sought for by all, that to attaine thereunto a man enterpriseth, endureth, contemneth whatsoeuer besides, yea life it selfe; neuerthelesse, it is a matter of small and slender moment, vncertaine, a stranger, and as it were separated in the aire, from him that is honored; for it doth not only not enter into him, nor is inward and essentiall vnto him, but it doth not so much as touch him (being for the most part either dead or absent, and who feeleth nothing) but setleth it selfe and stayeth without at the gate, sticks in the name, which receiueth and carieth all the honors and dishonours, praises and dispraises, whereby a man is said to haue either a good name or a bad. All the good or euill that a man can say of *Cesar* is caried by his name. Now the name is nothing of the nature and substance of the thing, it is only the image which presenteth it, the marke which distinguisheth it from others, a summarie which containeth it in a small volume, mounteth it, and carieth it whole and entire, the meane to enioy it and to vse it (for without the names there would be nothing but confusion, the vse of things would be lost, the world would decay, as the historie of the

tower of *Babell* doth richly teach vs) to be breefe, the stickler and middle of the essence of the thing, and the honor or dishonor thereof, for it is that that toucheth the thing it selfe, and receiueth all the good or ill that is spoken/ Now honor before it ariue to the name of the thing, it goes a course almost circular, like the Sunne, performed and perfected in three principall sites or places, the action or worke, the heart, the tongue: for it begins and is conceived, as in the matrix and roote, in that beautie, goodnes, profit of the thing honored which comes to light and is produced, this is (as hath beene said) the rumor of a beautifull or honorable action. *Cæli enarrant gloriam dei: pleni sunt cæli & terra gloria tua* (for whatsoever valour worth and perfection the thing haue in it selfe and inwardly, if it produce nothing that is excellent, it is altogether vncapable of honor, and is as if it were not at all) from thence it entreth into the spirit and vnderstanding, where it takes life, and is formed into a good, hautie, and great opinion: finally fallying foorth from thence, and being caried by the word verball or written, it returnes by reflexion, and as it were, dissolueth and endeth in the name of the authour of this beautifull worke, where it had the beginning, as the Sunne in the place from whence it departed, and then it beares the name of honor, praise, glorie, and renowne.

- 3 But the question is, what those actions are to which honor is due. Some thinke that it is generally due to those that performe their dutie in that which belongs to their profession, although it be neither famous nor profitable, as he that vpon a Stage playes the part of a seruant, well, is no lesse commended than he that presenteth the person of a King, and he that cannot worke in statues of gold, cannot want those of leather or earth wherein he may as well shew the perfection of his arte. All cannot employ themselves, neither are they called to the managing of great affaires, but the commendation is to do that well, that he hath to do. This is too much to lessen and vilifie honor, which is not a common and ordinarie ghest for all persons, and all iust and lawfull actions. Euery chaste woman, euery honest man is not honorable. The wisest men require also thereunto two or three things, the one is difficultie, labor or danger, the other is publick vtilitie, and this is the reason

reason why it is properly due to those that administer, and well acquit themselves of great charges; that be the actions as priuately and generally good and profitable as they will, they shall haue approbation and sufficient renowne which those that know them, and the safetie and protection of the lawes; but not honour, which is publike, and hath more dignitie, fame, and splendor. Some adde vnto these a third, and that is, that it be not an action of obligation, but of supererogation.

The desire of honour and glorie, and the approbation of another, is a vitious, violent, powerfull passion, whereof we haue spoken in the passion of ambition; but very profitable to the weale-publike, to conteine men in their dutie, to awaken and inflame them to honourable actions, a testimonie of weaknesse and humane insufficiencie, which for want of good money vseth light and false coine. Now in what, and how far-foorth is it excusable, and when not commendable, and that honour is not the recompense of vertue, shall be sayd heerafter.

4
Desire of honour, chap. 20. p. 76

Lib. 3. in the vertue of Temperancie. p. 545.

The marks of honour are very diuers, but the better and more beautifull are they that are without profit and gaine, and are such as a man may not straine, and applie to the vitious, and such as by some base office haue serued the weale-publike. These are the better and more esteemed: they are in themselves more vaine, that haue nothing of woorth in them but the simple marke of men of honour and vertue, as almost in all policies, crownes, lawrell garlands, oake, a certaine forme of accoutrements, the prerogatiue of some surname, precedencie in assemblies, orders of Knighthood. And it falleth out sometimes, that it is a greater honour not to haue these marks of honour, hauing deserued them, than to haue them. It is more honourable vnto me, said *Cato*, that euery man should aske me, why I haue not a statue erected in the Market-place, than they should aske why I haue it.

5
Marks of honour.

CHAP. LXI.

Science.

Science, to say the trueth, is a beautifull ornament, a very profitable instrument to him that knowes well how to vse

See lib. 3.

cap. 14.

p. 467.

it; but in what rank to place it, or how to prize it, all are not of one opinion: and therein they commit two contrary faults, some by esteeming it too much, some too little. Some make that account of it, that they preferre it before all other things, and thinke that it is a souereigne good, some kinde and ray of Diuinitie, seeking it with greedinesse, charge and great labour; others contemne it, and despise those that professe it: the mediocritie betwixt both is the more iust and most assured. For my part I place it farre beneath honestie, sanctitie, wisdom, vertue, yea beneath dexteritie in affaires: and yet I dare to range it with dignitie, naturall nobilitie, militarie valour, and I thinke they may very well dispute of the precedencie: and if I were called to speake my opinion, I should make it to march either side by side with them, or incontinently after. As sciences are different in their subiects and matters, in the apprenticeship and acquisition, so are they in their vtilitie, honestie, necessitie, as also in their gaine and glorie: some are Theoricks and in speculation only, others are practike and in action: againe, some are Reals, occupied in the knowledge of things that are without vs, whether they be naturall or supernaturall; other are particular, which teach the tongues to speake, and to reason. Now without all doubt, those sciences that haue most honestie, vtilitie, necessitie, and least glorie, vanitie, mercenarie gaine, are farre to be preferred before others. And therefore the practike are absolutely the better, which respect the good of man, teaching him to liue well, to die well, to command well, to obey well; and therefore they are diligently to be studied by him that endeoureth to be wise: whereof this worke is a brieve and summarie, that is to say, Morall Science, Oeconomical, Politicall. After these is Naturall, which serueth to the knowledge of whatsoeuer is in the world fit for our vse, as likewise to admire the greatnesse, goodnesse, wisdom, power of the chiefe workmaster. All other knowledges are vaine, and are to be studied cursorily, as appendents vnto these, because they are no wayes beneficiall to the life of man, and helpe not to make vs honest men. And therefore it is a losse and a follie to employ therein so much time, so much cost, so much labour as we doe. It is true that they serue to heape vp crownes, and
to

to win reputation with the people, but it is in policies that are not wholly found goods.

CHAP. LXII.

Of riches and pouertie.

THESE are the two sources and elements of all discords, troubles, and commotions that are in the world: for the excessiue riches of some do stirre them vp to pride, to delicacies, pleasures, disdaine of the poore; to enterprise and attempt: the extreame pouertie of others, prouokes them to enuie, extreame icalousie, furie, despaire, and to attempt fortunes. *Plato* calleth them the plagues of a Common-wealth. But which of the two is the more dangerous, is not thorowly resolued amongst all. According to *Aristotle* it is abundance, for a State needs not doubt of those that desire but to liue, but of such as are ambitious and rich. According to *Plato* it is pouertie, for desperate poore men are terrible and furious creatures; for wanting either bread or worke to exercise their arts and occupations, or too excessiue charged with imposts, they learne that of the mistresse of the schoole Necessitie, which of themselues they neuer durst to haue learned, and they dare because their number is great. But yet there is a better remedie for these than for the rich, and it is an easie matter to hinder this euill; for so long as they haue bread and employment to exercise their mysteries, and liue, they will neuer stir. And therefore the rich are to be feared for their owne sakes, their vice and condition: the poore by reason of the imprudencie of gouernours.

Now many Law-makers and great States-men haue gone about to take away these two extremities, and this great inequality of goods and fortunes, and to bring in a mediocritie and equalitie, which they called the nourishing-mother of peace and amitie; and others likewise haue attempted to make all things common, which could neuer be but by imagination. But besides that, it is impossible to establish an equalitie, by reason of the number of children which increase in one familie, and not in another; and that it can hardly be put in practise, although a man be enforced, and it cost much

¹
The causes
of troubles.

See before p. 80.

²
Against the
equalitye &
inequalitye
of riches.

to

to attaine thereunto; it were also inexpedient, and to small purpose, and by another way to fall into the same mischief: for there is no hatred more capitall than betwixt equals; the enuie and iealousie of equals is the seminarie of troubles, seditions, and cruell warres. Inequalitie is good, so it be moderate. Harmonie consisteth not of like sounds, but different and well according.

Nihil est equalitate inaequalius.

This great and deformed inequality of goods proceedeth from many causes, especially two: the one is from vniust lones, as vsuries and interests, whereby the one eat the other, and grow fat with the substance of another: *qui deuorant plebem sicut escam panis.* The other from dispositions, whether amongst the liuing, as alienations, donations, endowments in mariages; or testamentaries by reason of death. By both which meanes some doe excessiue increase aboue others, who continue poore. The heires of rich men marrie with those that are rich, whereby some houses are dismembred and brought to nothing; and others made rich and exalted.

All which inconueniences must be ruled and moderated by auoiding excessiue extremities, and in some sort approaching to some mediocritie and reasonable equality: for to haue either entire, is neither possible, nor good nor expedient, as hath beene sayd. And this shall be handled in the vertue of Iustice.

F I N I S.



OF
WISDOME,
THE
SECOND BOOKE,
*Containing the generall instructions and
rules of Wisdome.*

THE PREFACE.

*Wherein is contained a generall portrait of Wisdome,
and the summe of this Booke.*



Having in the First Booke layd open vnto man many and diuers meanes to know himselfe and our humane condition, which is the first part, and a great introduction to Wisdome, we are now to enter into the doctrine, and to vnderstand in this Second Booke the generall rules and opinions thereof, reseruing the more particular to the Third and last Booke. It is worthiest consideration, and as a Preamble to the rest, to call man vnto himselfe, to taste, sound, studie himselfe, to the end he may know and vnderstand his defects and miserable condition, and so make himselfe capable of holtsome and necessarie remedies, which are the aduiselements and instructions of wisdome.

But it is a strange thing, that the world should take so little care of it owne good and amendment. What wit is it for a man to be vtterly carelesse that his businesse be well done?

Man

Man would only liue, but he cares not to know how to liue well. That which a man should especiallie, and only know, is that which he knowes least, and cares least to know.

Our inclinations, designments, studies, are (as we see) from our youth diuers, according to the diuersitie of natures, companies, instructions, occasions, but there is not any that casteth his eies to the other side, that indeuoreth to make himselfe wise, not any that ruminateth hereupon, or that doth so much as thinke thereon. And if perhaps sometimes he do, it is but by chance, and as it were passing by, and he attendeth it, as newes that is told, which concerneth him not at all. The word pleaseth some well, but that is all, the thing it selfe is neither accounted of, nor sought for in this world of so vniuersall corruption and contagion. To vnderstand the merit and worth of wisdom, some kind of aire or tincture of nature is necessarie; for men are willing to vse studie and indeuor, rather for those things that haue their effects and fruits glorious, outward, and sensible, such as ambition, auarice, passion haue, than for wisdom whose effects are sweet, darke, inward, and lesse visible.

O how much doth the world erre in this account, it loueth better the wind with noise, than the bodie it selfe, the essence without it, opinion and reputation than veritie! Man (as hath been said in the first booke) is nothing but vanitie and miserie, vncapable of wisdom. Euery man hath a taste of that aire which he breatheth, and where he liueth, followeth the traine and custome of liuing followed by all, how then should he aduise himselfe of any other? We follow the steps of another, yea we presse and inflame one another, we inuest our vices and passions one into another; no man stayes vs, or cries *hola* vnto it, so much do we faile and mistake our selues. We haue neede of some speciall fauour from heauen, and withall a great and generous force and constancie of nature to note that common error which no man findeth, in aduising and consulting of that which no man considereth, and resolving our selues quite contrarie to the course of other men.

3 There are some though rare, I see them, I vnderstand them, I smell them with pleasure and admiration; but what, they are all *Democrites* or *Heraclites*; the one sort do nothing but
mock

mock and gibe, thinking they shew truth & wisdom enough in laughing at error and follie. They laugh at the world, for it is ridiculous, they are pleasant, but not good and charitable. The other are weake and poore, they speake with a low voice, their mouths halfe open, they disguise their language, they mingle and stuffe their propositions, to make them palfe more currantlie, with so many other things, and with such arte, that they are hardly discerned. They speake not distinctly, clearely, assuredly, but doubtfully like oracles. I come after them and vnder them, but I speake in good sooth that which I thinke and beleue clearely and perspicuously.

I giue heere a picture, with certaine lessons of wisdom, which perhaps may seeme to some new and strange, and such as no man in former time hath giuen in such a fashion; and I doubt not but malicious people, who haue neither patience, nor power to iudge truly and wisely of things, maliciously condemne whatsoeuer agrees not with their palat, and with that which they haue already receiued. But that is all one, for who is he that can assure himselfe of the good opinion of all? But my hope is that the simple and debonaire, the Ætherian and subline spirits will iudge indifferentlie. These are the two extremities and stages of peace and serenitie; In the middle are the troubles, tempests, and meteors, as hath bene Lib. I. said.

To the end we may haue some rude and generall knowledge of that which is handled in this booke, and the whole doctrine of wisdom, we may diuide this matter into foure points or considerations. The first are preparatiues to wisdom, which are two, the one an exemption and freedome from all that may hinder the attainment thereof, which are either the externall errors and vices of the world, or inward, as passions: the other is a plaine, entire, and vniuersall libertie of the mind. These two first, and the more difficult make a man capable and apt for wisdom, because they emptie and cleanse the place, to the end it may be more ample & capable to receiue a thing of so great importance as wisdom is, magna & spatiosa res est sapiētia, vacuo illi loco opus est, supernacua ex animo tollenda sunt. And this is the first. Afterwards they make him open, free, & always ready to receiue it. This is the second.

The

2
Foundations. The second are foundations of wisdom, which are like-
 wise two, true and essentiall probitie, and to haue a certaine
 end and course of life. These two respect nature, they rule and
 accommodate vs thereunto; the first to the vniuersall nature,
 which is reason; for probitie or honestie, as shall be said, is no
 other thing: the second to the particular of euery one of vs;
 for it is the choice of the kind of life proper and fit for the
 nature of euery one.

3
Offices. The third belongs to the raising of this building, that is to
 say, offices and functions of wisdom, which are six, where-
 of the three first are principallie for euery one in himselfe,
 which are pietie, inward gouernment of our desires and
 thoughts, and a sweet cariage in all accidents of prosperitie
 and aduersitie: the other three respect another, which are
 such an obseruation as is necessarie of lawes, customes, and
 ceremonies, a sweet conuersation with another, and prudence
 in all affaires. These six do correspond and comprehend the
 foure morall vertues, the first, fourth, and fift do properly ap-
 pertaine to Iustice, and to that which we owe to God and our
 neighbour; the second and third to *Fortitude* and *Tempe-*
rance, the sixt to *Prudence*. And therefore these six, are the
 matter and subiect of the third booke, which handleth at
 large the foure morall vertues, and in particular the offices and
 duties of a wise man, but in this booke they are handled
 in generall.

4
Fruits. The fourth are the effects and fruits of wisdom, which
 are two, to be alwaies readie for death, and to maintaine a
 mans selfe in true tranquillitie of spirit, the crowne of wis-
 dome, and the soueraigne good.

These are in all twelue rules and lessons of wisdom, diui-
 ded into so many Chapters, which are the proper and pecu-
 liar foot-steps and offices of a wise man, which are not found
 elsewhere. I meane in that sense wherein we take them, and
 now describe them: For although some of them, as honestie,
 the obseruation of the lawes, seeme to be found in others of
 the common and prophane sort, yet not such as we heere re-
 quire and decipher them to be. He then is wise, who maintei-
 ning himselfe truly free and noble; is directed in all things ac-
 cording to nature, accommodating his owne proper and par-
 ticular

ticular to the vniuersall, which is God; liuing and carying himselfe before God, with all, and in all affaires, vpright, constant, cheerefull, content, and assured, attending with one and the same foote, all things that may happen, and lastly, death it selfe.

CHAP. I.

Exemption and freedom from errors and the vices of the world, and from passions. The first disposition to Wisdome.

IT is heere necessarie for the first lesson and instruction vnto wisdome to ~~get~~ the knowledge of our selues and our humane condition; for the first in euery thing is well to know the subiect, wherewith a man hath to do, and which he handleth and manageth to bring to perfection. But we hold that to be alreadie done, for it is the subiect of our first booke: We can only say heere, as a summary repetition of all that hath beene spoken, that a man aspiring vnto wisdome, should aboue all things, and before all other works, sufficientlie know himselfe, and all men besides. This is the true science of man, very profitable, a matter of great studie, fruit, and efficacie, for man is all in all: It is proper to a wise man, for only he that is wise knowes himselfe, and he that knowes himselfe well is wise: It is very difficult, for man is extreamely counterfeited and disguised, not only man with man, but euery man with himselfe. Euery one takes a delight to deceiue himselfe; to hide, to rob, to betray himselfe, *Ipsi nobis furto subducimur*; flattering and tickling himselfe to make himselfe laugh, extenuating his defects, setting a high price of whatsoeuer is good in himselfe, winking of purpose lest he should too clearely see himselfe: It is very rare and sought for by a few, and therefore no maruell if wisdome be so rare, for they are very few that do well know this first lesson, or that do studie it; there is not a man that is master to himselfe, much lesse to another. In things not necessarie and strange, there are many masters, many disciples. In this point we are neuer with, nor within our selues, we alwaies muse of outward things, and man better knoweth all things than himselfe. O miserie, O madnesse! To be wise in this point, it is necessarie that we know all sorts of

see page 1.

of

of men, of all aires, climats, natures, ages, estates, professions, (to this end serues the trauellet and the historie) their motions, inclinations, actions; not only publicke, (they are least to be regarded, being all fained and artificiall) but priuate, and especially the more simple and peculiar, such as arise from their proper and naturall iurisdiction; as likewise all those that concerne them particularly, for in these two their nature is discovered: afterwards that we conferre them all together to make an entire bodie and vniuersall iudgement; but especially that we enter into our selues, taste and attentiuely sound our selues, examin euery thought, word, action. Doubtlesse we shall in the end learne that man is in truth on the one side a poore, weake, pitifull, and miserable thing, and we cannot but pitie him; and on the other, we shall find him swollen and puffed vp with wind, presumption, pride, desires, and we cannot but disdain and detest him. Now he hath beene sufficientlie deciphered and presented vnto vs euen to the life, in the first booke, by diuers meanes, in all senses, and according to all his visages: and this is the reason why we speake no more of this knowledge of man, and of our selues in this place, but we set downe heere for the first rule of wisdom the fruit of this knowledge, to the end, that the end and fruit of the first booke might be the beginning and entrance of the second. This fruit is to defend and preferue men from the contagion of the world and of themselves; these are the two evils and formiall hindrances of wisdom, the one outward, as popular opinions & vices, the generall corruption of the world; the other inward, that is, our passions. Now we are to see how difficult this is, and how a man may defend himselfe against these two. Wisdom is difficult and rare, and the greatest, yea almost the only endeour that we haue to attaine vnto it, is to set at libertie, & to free our selues from that miserable double captiuitie, publick and domesticall, of another and of our selues: this being attained, the rest will be easie. Let vs speake of these two evils distinctlie and apart.

As concerning the outward, we haue before sufficientlie displayed the vulgar nature, the strange humors of the world, and the common sort of people, whereby it is easie enough to know what can proceed from them; for since they are worshippers

See p. 194.

2
Exemption
of vulgar
errors.

shippers of vanitie; enuious, malicious, vniust; without iudgement, discretion, mediocritie; what can they deliberat, thinke, iudge, resolue, speake, do well and iustlie? We haue likewise as it were by example reported and quoted (in presenting the miserie of mankind) many great faults, which the world doth generally commit in iudgement and will, whereby it is easie to know, that it is whollie composed of error and vice; wherevnto all the sayings of the wisest of the world do accord, affirming, that the worser part is the greater: of a thousand there is not one good; the number of fooles are infinit, and contagion is most dangerous in a prease.

see pag. 118, 145

And therefore they counsell vs not only to preserve our selues neate and cleare from popular opinions, designments, and affections, as being all, base, feeble, indigested, impertinent, and very often false, at the least imperfect: but also to flie aboue all things the multitude, the companie and conuersation of the vulgar sort, because a man cannot approach neere vnto it without some losse and empeachment. The frequentation of the people is contagious and very dangerous euen to the wisest and best settled men that are: for who is able to withstand the force and charge of vices comming with so great a troope? One example of couetousnesse or incontinencie doth much harme. The companie of one delicate effeminate person, doth soften and make nice by little and little those that liue with him. One rich neighbour giues light and life to our couetousnesse. One dissolute person worketh (if I may so say) and applieth his vice, like rust into the neatest and purest minds. What then can we looke for from such maners, after which the world runneth, as it were with a loose bridle?

But what? it is very rare and difficult so to do. It is a plausible thing, and that hath great appearance of goodnes and iustice, to follow the way approued by all; the great beaten way doth easily deceiue, *lata est via ad mortem, & multi per eam; mundus in maligno positus*: we goe one after another like beasts for companie; we neuer diue into the reason, the merit, the equitie of the cause; we follow examples and customes, and as it were of enuie and emulation, we stumble, and fall one vpon another; we throng one another, and draw euery

Q

one

one to a head-long downe-fall. We borrow our owne overthrow, and perish vpon credit, *alienis perimus exemplis*. Now he that would be wise, must alwaies suspect whatsoeuer pleaseth, and is approued by the people by the greater number, and must looke into that that is true and good in it selfe, and not into that which seemeth to them, and that is most vsed and frequented, and not suffer himselfe to be cunny-catcht and caried by the multitude, which should not be accounted but for one, *vnus mihi pro populo, & populus pro vno*. And when to stop his mouth, and to beate him downe at a blow it shall be said, that the whole world faith it, beleeueth it, doth it, he must say in his heart, it is so much the worse, it is but a simple and a wicked caution; I esteeme it the lesse, because the world esteemes it so much; like wise *Phocion*, who seeing the people highlie to applaud something which he had spoken, turned to his friends that stood by him, and said vnto them, Hath any follie vnwitting to my selfe escaped my mouth, or any loose or wicked word, that all this people do so approue me? *Quis placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? malis artibus quaritur popularis fauor*. We must then as much as is possible flie the haunt and companie of the sottish, illiterate, ill-composed people; but aboue all preferue our selues from their iudgements, opinions, vitious behauiour; and without any stirre keepe alwayes our owne thoughts apart by themselves: *Quod scio non probat populus, quod probat populus ego nescio: Sapiens non respicit quid homines iudicent; non ita quia populus, sed ut sidera mundi contrarium iter intendunt, ita hic aduersus opiniones omnium vadit*: remaining in the world, without being of the world, like the kidneies couered with fat, but haue none themselves: *non estis de mundo, ideo odit vos mundus: odi prophanum vulgus & arceo*. This is that solitarinesse so much commended by the wise, which is to disburthen the soule of all vices and popular opinions, and to free it from this confusion and captiuitie, to draw it to it selfe, and to set it at libertie.

The second
part, exemp-
tion of pas-
sions.

The other euill and hinderance to wisdom, which a man must carefullie auoid, and which is inward, and therefore the more dangerous, is the confusion and captiuitie of his passions, and turbulent affections; whereof he must disfurnish and free himselfe, to the end he may be emptie and neate, like a
white

white paper, and be made a subject more fit to receiue the tincture and impressions of wisdom, against which the passions do formally oppose themselves: and therefore the wisest were wont to say, that it was impossible euen for *Jupiter* himselfe to loue, to be in choler, to be touched with any passion, and to be wise at one time. Wisdom is a regular managing of our soule with measure and proportion: It is an equabilitie, and sweet harmonie of our iudgements, wills, manners, a constant health of our mind; whereas the passions are contrariwise but the furious reboundings, accessions and recessions of follie, violent and rash sallies and motions.

We haue sufficientlie deciphered the passions in the first booke, and said enough to bring vs into horror and detestation of them: the generall meanes and remedies to ouercome them (for the particular in euery one are in the third booke, in the vertue of fortitude and temperancie) are many and different, good and euill. And not to speake of that goodnes and felicitie of nature, so well tempered and seasoned, that it maketh vs calme and cleare, exempt and quit from strong passions and violent motions, and keepeth vs in good case, equall, vnited, firme, and as strong as Steele against the assault of our passions, a thing very rare; for this is not a remedie against this euill, but an exemption of euill, and health it selfe: but of the remedies against them we may note foure.

The first improper and by no meanes commendable, is a kind of stupiditie and insensiblenes in not perceiuing and apprehending of things; a brutish pampering foode of base minds, or such as haue their apprehension whollie dulled; a spirituall leprosie, which seemeth to haue some shew of health, but hath it not; for it is not possible there should be wisdom and constancie, where there is not knowledge and vnderstanding, and employment in affaires; so that it is only a complexion, and not a vertue. This is not to feele the disease, and therefore not to cure it: neuerthelesse this estate is nothing so bad, as to know, and feele, and vnderstand, and yet to suffer himselfe to be gulled and overcome:

— *Prætulorim delirus inersq, videri,
Dum mea delectent mala me, vel deniq, fallant,
Quam sapere & ringi.*—

6
Generall re-
medies a-
gainst the
passions. 522/2. 71.

7
Stupiditie.

8
Counterpas-
sion.

The second remedie is little better than the euill it selfe, but yet more in vse, that is, when a man conquereth and extinguisheth one passion by a stronger than it: for passions are neuer of equall force, but there is alwayes one or other (as in the humors of the bodie) which is the predominant, which ruleth and deuoureth the rest; and we attribute many times very vnruly that vnto vertue and wisdom which ariseth from passion: but yet it is enough in these men, when those passions that beare sway in them are not of the worst.

9
Precaution.

The third remedie and good (though it be not the best) is wise and artificiall, whereby a man auoideth, flieth, and hideth himselfe from all such accidents whatsoeuer, as may stirre, awaken, or kindle his passions. This is a kind of studie and arte, whereby a man prepareth himselfe before the occasions, in diuerting of euils, and prouiding that he feele them not; like that King who brake a beautifull and rich cup that one gaue him, to take away in a good houre all matter of brawle and anger that might happen about it. The prayer of these kind of people is, *ne nos inducas in tentationem*. By this remedie, he that sets himselfe forward to the sport, sports not himselfe; men of honor, prompt and cholerick, flie contentions, altercations, and stay themselves at the first onset and occasion of passion. For when a man is once entred, it is no easie matter to carrie himselfe wisely and discretly: We guide our affaires in the beginning, and hold them at our mercie, but after they are once afoote and throughlie heated, they guide and carry vs. Passions are farre more easily auoided than moderated, *excinduntur animo facilius quam temperantur*, because all things are in their first birth feeble and tender. In their weakenes we discouer not the danger, and in their full growth and strength we know not how to withstand them; as we may see in diuers, who easily and lightlie enter into quarels, and law, and contentions, but are afterwards enforced to get out as they can with shame enough, and to come to any agreement, be it neuer so base and dishonorable; yea, to seeke false interpretations, to belie themselves, to betray their own hearts, to plaster and couer the fact, which are all remedies a hundred times worfe than the euill they go about to heale; *melius non incipient, quam desinent*, from the want of wisdom, they

they fall into want of heart: This is contrarie to that saying of *Bias*, Enterprife coldly, pursue ardentlie. It is like fooles, who out of a vitious shame are easily perswaded to agree to whatsoeuer a man demands, and as easily flie from their words and reuoke that they haue spoken. We must therefore in all our affaires and commerce with men, from the beginning be prudent and aduised.

The fourth and best remedie of all, is a liuely vertue, resolution, and constancie of the mind, whereby a man seeth and confronteth all accidents without trouble, he wrestleth and entreth into combat with them. It is a valiant, noble, and glorious impassibilitie, quite contrarie to the first which we haue spoken of, base stupiditie. Now to forme it, and to attaine vnto it, there is nothing more necessarie than a precedent discourse. Discourse is the master of our passions, premeditation is that which giueth the temper to the soule, and makes it hard and steellie and impenetrable against whatsoeuer would wound, or hurt it. The proper meanes to appease and sweeten these passions, is to know them well, to examin, to iudge what power they haue ouer vs, and we ouer them. But aboue all, the soueraigne remedie is to beleue, and not to suffer himselfe to be caried with opinion, which is that which cheriseth and kindleth our passions, and is (as hath bin said) false, foolish, inconstant, and vncertaine, the guide of fooles and the vulgar sort; but to suffer himselfe to be sweetly led by reason and nature, which is the guide of the wiser sort, ripe, solid, and settled. But heereof, heereafter more at large.

But aboue all other passions, it is necessarie that we do carefully guard and defend our selues from that selfeloue presumption, and foolish dotage of our selues, the plague of mankind, the capitall enemy of wisdom, the true gangrene and corruption of the soule, whereby we adore our selues, and rest contented with our selues, we harken to none other, and beleue none other but our selues. Now we should know that we are not in greater danger in the hands of any, than of our selues. It is an excellent mott originallie come from the Spanish tongue, *O God keepe my selfe, from my selfe*. This presumption and foolish loue of our selues procedes from the ignorance we haue of our selues, of our weaknesse, and that little

10

Vertue.

11

Presump-
tion.

see p. 152

that is in vs, not only in generall of the infirmitie and miserie of mankind, but also of our owne proper and personall imperfections: but whosoever he be that hath the least graine or touch of this follie, shall neuer attaine vnto wisdome. Faith, modestie, a hartie and serious acknowledgment of that little that we haue, is a great testimonie of a good and sound iudgement, of a right will, and is an excellent disposition vnto wisdome.

C H A P. II.

A vniuersall and plaine libertie of spirit both in iudgement and will, the second disposition to Wisdome.

THe other disposition vnto Wisdome, which followeth the first (which doth quit vs from this outward and inward captiuitie and confusion, popular and passionate) is a plaine, entire, generous, and lord-like libertie of the mind, which is two-fold, that is to say, of iudgement, and will.

I The first part, libertie of iudgement.

The first, of iudgement, consisteth in the consideration, iudgement, examination of all things, and in not tying himselfe to any one, but remaining free in himselfe, vniuersall, readie, and open for all. And this is the highest point, the proper law and true priuiledge of a wise and actiue man. But few they are that will vnderstand it, and acknowledge it, fewer that practise it as they should: and this is the reason why we must heere establish it, against such as are incapable of wisdome. And first, to auoid all miscountings, we explaine the words, & giue the sense. There are heere three things which maintaine, cause, and conserue one the other, that is, to iudge of all things, not to be married or bound to any; to continue open and readie for all. When I say to iudge, my meaning is not to resolute, affirme, determine: this were contrarie to the second, which is, not to bind our selues to any thing: but it is to examine, and weigh the reasons and counter-reasons on all parts, the weight and merit of them, and thereby worke out the truth. So likewise not to bind our selues to any thing, is not to settle our selues, and to remaine short of that we should, bleating in the aire, and to cease our indeuors, and to proceed in our necessarie actions and deliberations: For I will that in
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all outward and common actions of our life, and in whatsoeuer is ordinarily vsed, a man should agree and accommodate himselfe to the common sort; for our rule extendeth not it selfe to that which is outward, and to the action, but to that which is within, the thought, and secret, and inward iudgement: yea and therein likewise I consent, that a man settle and applie himselfe to that which seemeth most agreeable to the truth, most honest and profitable; but yet that it be without determination, resolution, affirmation, or condemnation of contrarie or diuers iudgements, old, or new; but alwaies to hold himselfe readie to entertaine better if it appeare; yea not to be offended if another shall contest with him against that which he thinketh better, but rather desire to heare what may be said; for this is the meane, to exercise the first, which is to iudge, and alwaies to enter into the search of the truth. These three I say, doe maintaine and conserue one the other; for he that iudgeth well, and without passion of all things, findeth in euery thing appearances of reason, which hinder his resolution, whereby he feareth to settle his iudgement, and so remaineth vndetermined, indifferent, and vniuersall: whereas contrariwise, he that resolueth, iudgeth no more, but settleth and resteth himselfe vpon that which he holdeth, and so makes himselfe a partaker and a particular. To the former, fooles, simple and weake people are contrarie: to the second, obstinate opinatiue affirmers: to the third, both of them, which are particulars: but all three are practised by the wise, modest, discreet, and temperate searcher of the truth and true Philosophie. It remaineth for the explication of this our proposition, that I let you know, that by all things, and some thing (for it is said, to iudge of all things, not to be assured of any) we vnderstand not those diuine verities which haue bin reuealed vnto vs, which we are to receiue simplie with all humilitie and submission, and without all controuersie and discussion, submit our selues, and captiuate our minds thereunto, *captiuantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei*, but we vnderstand heereby all other things without exception. This simple explication would be sufficient perhaps to perswade an indifferent spirit to receiue this rule of wisdom; but I see and perceiue a sort of people, glorious, resolute, affirmatiue, which

would rule the world, and command it as it were with a rod, and as others in former times haue sworne to certaine principles, and married themselves to certaine opinions, so they would that all others should do the like, whereby they oppose themselves to this noble libertie of the spirit. It shall be necessarie therefore to establish it more amplie, and by order to confirme and handle these three points and members thereof.

2
The first, to
iudge of all.

The first is to iudge of all. It is the propertie of a wise and spirituall man; saith one of the first and wisest of the world, *Spiritualis omnia dyndicat, & à nemine iudicatur*: The true office of man, his most proper and naturall exercise, his worthiest profession is to iudge. Why is he a man discoursing, reasoning, vnderstanding? Why hath he a spirit, to build (as they say) castles in the aire, and to feede himselfe with fooleries and vanities, as the greatest part of the world doth? *Quis unquam oculos tenebrarum causâ habuit?* No doubtlesse, but to vnderstand, to iudge of all things, and therefore he is called the gouernour, the superintendent, the keeper of nature, of the world, of the works of God. To go about to depriue him of this right, is to make him no more a man, but a beast; to do it singularly, excellently, is the part of a wise man: If not to iudge, hurts the simple and proper nature of man, what shall it doe in a wise man, who is as farre aboue the common sort of men, as a common man is aboue beasts? It is then strange that so many men (I speake not of idiots, and the weaker sort, who haue not the facultie and meane to exercise it) who either are, or make shew of vnderstanding and sufficiencie, deprive themselves willinglie of this right and authoritie so naturall, so iust, and excellent, who without the examining or iudging of any thing, receiue and approue whatsoeuer is presented, either because it hath a faire semblance & appearance, or because it is in authoritie, credit, and practise; yea, they thinke that it is not lawfull to examin or doubt of any thing, in such sort do they debase and degrade themselves: they are forward and glorious in other things, but in this, they are fearefull and submisse, though it do iustly appertaine vnto them, and with so much reason. Since there are a thousand lies for one truth, a thousand opinions of one and the same thing, and
but

but one that is true, why should not I examin with the instrument of reason which is the better, the truer, the more reasonable, honest, and profitable? Is it possible that amongst so many lawes, customes, opinions, different maners, and contrary to ours, as there are in the world, there are none good but ours? Hath all the world besides beene mistaken? Who dares to say so, and who doubteth but others say as much of ours, and that he that thus condemneth others, if he had been there borne and brought vp, would thinke them better, and prefer them before those he now accounteth the only good, and all because he hath been accustomed vnto them? To conclude, to him that shall be so foole-hardy to say it, I doe answer, that this rule shall at the least be good for all others, to the end that they iudging and examining all, may finde ours to be the better. Go to then, the wise man shall iudge of all, nothing shall escape him which he bringeth not to the barre, and to the ballance. It is to play the part of prophane men and beasts, to suffer themselves to be lead like oxen. I will that men liue, and speake, and do, as others, and the common fort do; but not that they iudge like the common fort, but iudge them. What can a wise man, or a holie man haue aboue a prophane, if he must haue his spirit, his mind, his principall and heroicall part a slaue to the vulgar fort? The publicke and common should content it selfe, if a man conforme himselfe thereunto in all apparent things; what hath it to do with our inside, our thoughts, and iudgements? They shall gouerne as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not my spirit, for that, by their leaue, hath another master. It is a hard thing to bridle the libertie of the spirit, and if a man would do it, it is the greatest tyrannie that may be: a wise man will take heed thereof actiuelly and passiuelly, will maintaine himselfe in his libertie, and not trouble that of other men.

Now a wise man enioying this his right to iudge and examin all things, it many times comes to passe, that the iudge-
ment and the hand, the mind and the bodie, contradict one
another, and that he will carie himselfe outwardlie after one
maner, and iudge inwardlie after another, will play one part
before the world, and another in his mind, which he must do
to preserve equitie and iustice in all. That generall saying,

universus

3
The effect
of this first
treatise.
A wise man
one within,
another
without.
522 h. 312.

uniuersus mundus exercet histrioniam, should properly and truly be vnderstood of a wise man, who is another man within than he outwardly shewes. If he were without such as he is within, he should not be accounted of, but in all things offend the world: If he were within such as without, he should be no more a wise man, he should iudge amisse, be corrupted in his mind. He must do, and carie himselfe outwardly, for publike reuerence, and so as he offend no man, according to the law, custome, and ceremonie of the countrey; and inwardly iudge of the truth as it is, according to the vniuersall reason, whereby it many times comes to passe that he condemneth that which outwardly he doth. *Sapiens faciet quæ non probabit, ut ad maiora transitum inueniat, nec relinquet bonos mores, sed temporis aptabit omnia quæ imperiti faciunt, & luxuriosi, faciet: sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito, multa sapientes faciunt quâ homines sunt, non quâ sapientes.* He will carie himselfe in things and actions, as *Cicero* in words, who said, I leaue the vse or custome of speech to the people, and obserue the true science and knowledge of words, *Loquendum & extrâ viuendum ut multi, sapiendum ut pauci.* Some few examples heereof, and first of things of lesse moment. In all humilitie I take off my hat, and keepe my head vncouered before my superior, for so doth the custome of my countrey require; but yet I will not leaue to iudge, that the custome of the East is farre better, to salute and do reuerence, by laying the hand vpon the brest, without vncouering the head, to the preiudice of our health, and other inconueniences. Contrariwise, if I were in the East, I would take my repast, sitting vpon the earth, or leaning on the elbow, or halfe lying looking vpon the table side-ways as they do there, and as our Sauour with his Apostles did vse to do, *recumbentibus, discumbentibus*: and yet I would not cease to iudge, that the maner of sitting vpright at table, our faces towards it, as the custome is heere, is more honest, more fit, and commodious. These examples are of small weight, and there are a thousand the like: let vs take another of better importance. I will and I yeeld my consent that the dead be interred and left to the mercie of the wormes, of rotnenness and stench, because it is now the common custome almost euery-where; but yet I will
not

not cease to iudge, that the ancient manner of burning them, and gathering their ashes together, is more noble and more neate, to commit and commend them to the fire, the excellentest element, enemy to putrefaction and stench, neighbour to heaven it selfe, a signe of immortalitie, a shadow of the diuinitie, and whereof the vse is proper and peculiar vnto man, rather than to the earth, which is the ordure, lees, dregs of the elements, the sinke of the world, the mother of corruption, and to the wormes which is the extreamest ignominie and horror, and so to couple and handle alike a man and a beast. Religion it selfe teacheth and commandeth to dispose after this maner of all things, as of the Paschall lamb which might not be eaten, and (where popery beareth sway) the consecrated host, and diuers the like; why then should not the like respect be had of our bodies? What can a man do that is more dishonorable to the bodie, than to cast it into the earth there to corrupt? It seemeth to me to be the vttermost punishment that can be inflicted vpon infamous persons and heinous offenders, and that the carcasses of honest and honorable men should be handled with better respect. Doubtlesse of all the maners in disposing of dead bodies, which may be reduced to foure, that is, to commit them to the foure elements, and the bowels of wild beasts, the vilest, and basest, and most shamefull is to interre them, the most noble and honorable to burne them. Again, I will and consent, that this my Wise man in things naturall be modest, that he hide and couer those parts and actions that are called shamefull, dishonorable; and he that should do otherwise, I would detest, and thinke hardlie of him, because it is almost the custome of the whole world; but yet I will neuerthelesse that he iudge that simplie in themselves, and according to nature, they are no more shamefull than the nose or the mouth, to drinke and to eate: Nature, that is, God, hauing made nothing shamefull, but it is for another cause, not from nature, that is to say, from the enemy of nature, which is sinne. Diuinitie also more chaste than Philosophie telleth vs, that in entire nature, not yet altered by the sinne of man, these parts and actions were not shamefull, for then shame was not, it is the enemy of nature, the fruit of sinne. I consent to apparell my selfe like those of
my

my countrey and profession, and if I had beene borne in those countries where they go naked, I would haue gone so too: but yet I cease not to iudge, that neither of the two fashions is very good; and if I were to chuse, and ordaine, I would chuse a fashion indifferent betwixt both, out of those countries where they couer themselves with one only and simple couering, light and easie enough, without fashion, or cost; for our maner of attiring is not good, yea worse than to goe naked, to be so fast wrapped and bound, with such a multitude and varietie of couerings of diuers stufes, euen to the number of foure, fiue, six, one vpon another, and whereof some are double, that they hold vs prest and packt vp with so many tyes, binding, butnings (not to speake of that dissolute and abominable excesse condemned by all good lawes) that we can hardlie stirre our selues in them. I will content my selfe with these examples. The selfesame a man may say of all lawes, customes, maners, and of that which is *de facto*, and much more of opinions, and that which is *de iure*.

4
An obie-
ction.

If any man shall say that I haue iudged amisse in these examples; and that generally, if libertie be giuen to iudge of all things, the spirit will wander and lose it selfe, filling and furnishing it selfe with follies and false opinions; I answere to the first, which toucheth me in particular, that it is very easie to erre in finding the truth in all these instances, and yet it is ouer-boldnes to accuse any man; for it is as much as if he should say, that a man knowes where and what the truth is in things, which who can perfectlie know or iudge of? Now not to find the truth, is not to iudge amisse; to iudge amisse, is to wey, and ballance, and compare amisse, that is to say, not to examin the reasons, and to ponder them according to the first and vniuersall nature, (both which though a man do, yet it followeth not that he must needs find out the truth.) Now I beleue nothing that is but simplie affirmed, if it be not likewise proued; but if any man by contrarie reasons more strong and forcible shall make good what he saith, of all others he is the welcomest man vnto me, and the man I looke for; for oppositions and contradictions well vrged, and with reason, are the true meanes to exercise this iudging office. I had neuer set downe these opinions, but that I looked that some one or
other

other should abrogate them, and help me to better, and to answer more effectually; and to that generall obiection of the danger that there is in this libertie, besides that which hath been spoken, and shall more expressly be said in the third lesson of Wisdome and Chapter following, that the rule which we ought to hold in iudging, and in all things is nature, naturall and vniuersall reason, following which a man can neuer erre. See heere the other member of this iudicious libertie which we are about to handle, which will furnish vs with a remedie against this pretended danger.

The other point of this lord-like libertie of spirit, is an indifferencie of taste, and a differring of a settled resolution, whereby a wise man considering coldly and without passion all things, as is said, is not obstinate, doth not sweare, tye, bind himselfe to any opinion; keeping himselfe alwaies readie to receiue the truth, or that which seemes to him to haue best semblance of truth; and saying in his inward and secret iudgement, that which our ancients were wont to say in their outward and publicke, *ita videtur*, it seemeth so; there is great appearence of truth on this side; and if any man do contradict and oppose himselfe, with patience he is readie to vnderstand the contrarie reasons and to receiue them, finding them more strong & better; and when he hath heard what he can heare, he still thinketh that either there is, or may be better, though as yet it appeareth not. This dilation and putting off of a mans iudgement is founded first vpon those propositions so much celebrated among the wise, That there is nothing certaine; that we know nothing; that there is nothing in nature but doubt; nothing certaine but incertaintie, *Solum certum, nihil esse certi; hoc unum scio, quod nihil scio*; That of all things a man may dispute alike; that we do nothing but search, enquire, and grope after appearances, *scimus nihil, opinamur verisimilia*; That veritie is not a thing of our owne inuention and purchase, and when it yeelds it selfe into our hands, we haue nothing in our selues whereby we may challenge it, possesse it, or assure our selues of it; That truth and falshood enter into vs by one and the same gate, and there hold the same place and credit, and maintaine themselves by the same meanes; That there is no opinion held by all, or currant in all places,

none

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2 Not to
binde our
selues to any
thing.

none that is not debated and disputed, that hath not another held and maintained quite contrarie vnto it; That all things haue two handles and two visages, and there is reason for all, and there is not any that hath not his contrarie, it is of lead, it turneth and accommodateth it selfe to whatsoeuer a man will haue it: To be short, it is the doctrine and practise of all the wisest, greatest, and most noble Philosophers, who haue made profession of ignorance, doubting, enquiring, searching. Others notwithstanding they haue beene dogmatists, and affirmers, yet it hath beene of gestures and words only, and that to shew how far they could wade in the purchase and search of the truth, *quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt*; giuing vnto all things no other nor stronger title, than probabilitie and true likelihood; and handling them diuersly, sometimes with one visage and in one sense, sometimes in another, by problematicall questions, rather enquiring than instructing; and many times shewing that they speake not in earnest, but in sport and for exercise; *non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quam exercere ingenia materiae difficultate voluisse videntur*. And who will belecue that it was the purpose of *Plato* to tie men to his Common-wealth and his *Idees*, of *Pythagoras* to his numbers, of *Epicurus* to his *Atomes*, or to giue them for currant coine? They tooke pleasure to solace their spirits with pleasant and subtile inuentions, *quae ex ingenio finguntur, non ex scientia vi*. Sometimes likewise they haue studied after difficultie, to couer the vanitie of their subiect, and to employ the curiositie of their spirits. And *Aristotle* the most resolute of all the rest, the prince of dogmatists, and peremptorie affirmers, the god of pedanties, how often hath he been crost in his opinions, not knowing what to resolute in that point of the soule, wherein he is almost alwaies vnlike to himselfe, and in many other things more base which he knew not how to find or vnderstand, ingeniously confessing sometimes the great weakenes of man in finding and knowing the truth.

6
Obiects.

They that haue come after, of a pedanticall and presumptuous spirit, who make *Aristotle* and others say what they please, and are more obstinate in their opinions than euer they were, disauowing those for disciples that faint in their opinions, hate & arrogantlie condemne this rule of wisdom, this

this modestie, and academicall stayednes, glorying in their obstinate opinions, whether they be right or wrong; louing better a headie froward affirmer against their owne opinions, and against whom they may exercise their wit and skill, than a modest peaceable man, who doubteth and maketh stay of his iudgement, against whom their wits are dulled, that is to say, a foole than a wise man; like to women, who loue better to be contradicted, euen with iniurie, than that a man either out of the coldnes of his nature, or contempt should say nothing to them, whereby they imagin they are either scorned or condemned, wherein they shew their iniquitie. For why should it not be as lawfull to doubt, and consider of things as doubtfull, not determining of any thing, as it is to them to affirm? Why should it not be lawfull ingenuously to confesse that which a man knoweth not, since in veritie he knoweth it not, and to hold in suspence that which he is not assured of, and against which there are many reasons and oppositions? It is certaine according to the opinion of the wisest, that we are ignorant of much more than we know, that all our knowledge is the lesser part, and almost nothing, in regard of that we know not: the causes of our ignorances are infinit, and both in respect of the things themselues either too farre from vs, or too neere, too great, or too little, too durable, or not durable enough, perpetuallie changing; and in respect of our selues, and the maner of knowing them, which as yet is not sufficientlie learned. And that which we thinke we know, we know not, neither can we hold it well, for with violence it is got from vs, and if it may not be gotten because our obstinacie in opinion is strong, yet we are contended with, and much troubled. Now how should we be capable to know more or lesse, if we grow resolute in our opinions, settle and repose our selues in certaine things, and in such maner, that we seeke no farther, nor examine any more that which we thinke to hold? They thinke this suspension a shame and a weaknes, because they know not what it is, and they perceiue not that the greatest men that are haue made profession thereof; they blush, and haue not the heart freely to say, I know not, so much are they possessed with the opinion and presumption of science; and they know not that there is a kind of ignorance & doubt,
more

more learned, and more certaine, more noble and generous, than all their science and certaintie. This is that that hath made *Socrates* so renoumed and held for the wisest man: It is the science of sciences, and the fruit of all our studies: It is a modest, mild, innocent, and hartie acknowledgement of the mysticall height of truth, and of the pouertie of our humane condition full of darknes, weaknes, vncertaintie; *cogitationes mortalium timida, incerta adinventiones nostrae: Deus nouit cogitationes hominum quoniam uanae sunt.* Heere I would tell you, that I caused to be grauen ouer the gate of my little house which I built at *Condom* in the yeare 1600, this word, *I know not.*

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But they will needs that we submit our selues in all dutie to certaine principles, which is an vniust tyrannie. I yeeld my consent, that a man employ them in all iudgement, and make vse of them, but yet not so as that a man may not spurne against them, for against that opinion I oppose my selfe. Who is he in the whole world, that hath right to command, and giue lawes to the world, to subiect the spirits of men, and to giue principles which may be no more examined, that a man may no more denie or doubt of, but God himselfe the soueraigne spirit, and true principle of the world, who is only to be beleued because he saith it? All other things are subiect to triall and opposition, and it is weaknes to subiect our selues vnto it. If they will that I submit my selfe to principles, I will say to them as the Curat said to his parishoners in a matter of time, and as a Prince of ours to the Secretaries of this age in a point of religion, Do you first agree to these principles, and then I will submit my selfe vnto them. Now there is as great doubt and dispute in the principles, as in the conclusions, in the *Theses*, as in the *Hypotheses*, whereby there are so many sects among them, that if I yeeld my selfe to the one, I offend all the rest. They say likewise, that it is a great affliction not to be resolued, to remaine alwaies in doubt, yea, that it is a matter of difficultie for a man to continue long in that state. They haue reason to say it, for they find it so in themselves, being the propertie of fooles, and weake minds, of presumptuous fooles, passionate and obstinate in certaine opinions, who condemne all others, and although they be overcome, neuer

neuer yeeld themselves, vexing and putting themselves into choler, neuer acknowledging any reason. If they be constrained to change their opinions, being altered, they are as resolute and obstinate in their new, as they were before in their first opinion, not knowing how to hold any thing without passion, and neuer disputing to learne and find the truth, but to maintaine that which they haue sworne and bound themselves vnto. These kind of people know nothing, neither know they what it is to know, because they thinke to know and to hold the truth in their sleeue: Because thou thinkest thou seest, thou seest nothing, saith the Doctor of truth to the glorious and presumptuous man; *Si quis existimet se scire aliquid, nondum cognouit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire.* It is fit that weake men that haue not strength, to keepe themselves vpright vpon their feet, be kept vp with props; they cannot liue but in bonds, nor maintaine themselves free, a people borne to seruitude, they feare Bug-bears, or that the Wolfe will eate them if they be alone. But in wise, modest, and stayed men it is quite contrarie, the surest stay and most happie estate of the spirit, which by this meanes keepeth it selfe firme, vpright, constant, inflexible, alwaies free and to it selfe: *hoc liberiores & solutiores sumus, quia integra nobis indicandi potestas manet.* It is a very sweet, peaceable, and pleasant sojorne or delay, where a man feareth not to faile or miscount himselfe, where a man is in the calme, vnder couert, and out of danger of participating so many errors produced by the fantasie of man, and whereof the world is full of entangling himselfe in complaints, diuisions, disputes, of offending diuers parts, of belying and gainsayng his owne beleefe, of changing, repenting, and readuising himselfe. For how often hath time made vs see that we haue beene deceived in our thoughts, and hath enforced vs to change our opinions? To be breefe, it is to keepe the mind in peace and tranquillitie, farre from agitations and vices, which proceed from that opinion of science which we thinke to haue in things; for from thence do spring pride, ambition, immoderate desires, obstinacie in opinion, presumption, loue of nouelties, rebellion, disobedience: from whence come troubles, sects, heresies, seditions, but from men fierce, obstinate, & resolute in opinion.

not from Academiques, neuters, modest, indifferent, staied, that is to say, wise men. Moreouer let me tell them, that it is a thing that doth more seruice to piety, religion, and diuine operation, than any thing whatsoeuer. I say seruice as well in the generation and propagation, as the conseruation thereof. Diuinity, yea the mysticall part thereof, teacheth vs, that well to prepare our soules for God and the receiuing of his holy spirit, we must empty, cleanse, purifie them, and leaue them naked of all opinion, beleefe, affection; make them like a white paper, dead to it selfe and to the world, that God might liue and worke in it, driue away the old master, to establish the new, *expurgate vetus fermentum, exuite veterem hominem*. So that it seemeth, that to plant and establish Christianity among infidels, or mis-beleeuing people, as in these daies in *China*, it were a very excellent method to begin with these propositions and perswasions: That all the wisdom of the world is but vanity and leasing: That the world is wholly composed, torne, and vilefied with the forged phantasticall opinions of euery priuate mans braine: That God hath created man to know the truth, but that hee cannot know it of himself, nor by any humane meanes: And That it is necessary that God himselfe, in whose bosome it resideth, and who hath wrought a desire thereof in man, should reueale it as he doth. But That the better to prepare himselfe for this reuelation, man must first renounce and chase away all opinions and beleefs, wherewith the spirit is already anticipated and besotted, and present himselfe white, naked, and ready to receiue it. Hauing well beaten and gained this point, and made men as it were Academicks and Pyrrhonians, it is necessary that we propose the principles of Christianity as sent from heauen, brought by the Embassadour and perfect messenger of the diuinity, authorised and confirmed in his time by so many maruellous proofes and authentick testimonies. So that we see that this innocent and modest delay from resolution, is a great meanes to true piety, not only to receiue it, as hath been said, but to preserue it, for with it there neuer are heresies, and selected particular extrauagant opinions. An *Academicke* or *Pyrrhonian* was neuer hereticke, they are things opposite. It may be some man will say that he will neuer bee either good Christian

Christian or Catholike, because he will as well be a neuter and irresolute in the one, as the other. This is to vnderstand amisse that which hath bene spoken, because there is no delay to be made, nor place to iudge, nor liberty in that which concerneth God, but wee must suffer him to put and engraue that which pleaseth him, and none other. I haue made heere a digression for the honour of this our rule against such as contradict it. Let vs now returne to the matter.

After these two, to iudge of all, to bestow in determining, there commeth in the third place, the vniuersality of spirit, ⁷ 3. The third part, vniuersality of spirit. whereby a wise man taketh a view and entreth into consideration of the whole Vniuerse, hee is a citizen of the world like *Socrates*, hee containeth in his affection all humanekind, hee walketh through all, as if they were neere vnto him; hee seeth like the sunne, with an equall, setled, and indifferent regard, as from a high watch-tower all the changes and interchangeable courses of things, not changing himselfe; but alwaies continuing one and the same, which is a liuery of the diuinitie, and a high priuiledge of a wise man, who is the image of God vpon earth. *Magna & generosa res animus humanus, nullos sibi poni nisi communes & cum Deo terminos patitur. Non idem sapientem qui ceteros terminos includit, omnia illa secula ut Deo seruiunt. Nullum seculum magnis ingenijs clausum, nullum non cogitationi peruium tempus. Quam naturale in immensum mentem suam extendere, in hoc a natura formatus homo ut paria dijs velit, ac se in spatium suum extendat.* The most beautifull and greatest spirits are the more vniuersall, as the more base and blunt are the more particular. It is a sottish weakenesse to thinke that a man must beleue, doe, liue in all respects as at home in his owne village and country, or that the accidents that fall out heere, concerne and are common with the rest of the world. A foole, if a man tell him that there are diuers maners, customes, lawes, opinions, contrary to those which hee seeth in vse, either he will not beleue them, and saith they are fables; or hee presently refuseth and condemneth them as barbarous, so partiall is hee, and so much enthralled with those his municipall maners, which hee accounteth the onely true, naturall, vniuersall. Euery man calleth that barbarous that agreeth not with his palat and custome, and it seemeth that

we have no other touch of truth and reason, than the example and the ~~idea~~ of the opinions and customes of that countrie where we live. These kind of people iudge of nothing, neither can they, they are slaves to that they hold, a strong pre-vention and anticipation of opinions doth whollie possesse them, they are so besotted, that they can neither say, nor do otherwise. Now partialitie is an enemy to libertie, and over-lulleth the mind already tainted and preoccupied with a particular custome, that it cannot iudge aright of others; an indifferent man iudgeth all things. He that is fastned to one place, is banished and deprived from all others. The paper that is blurred with another colour, is no more capable of any other, whereas the white is fit to receive any. A iudge that heares a cause with a preiudicate opinion, and inclineth to one part more than to another, cannot be a iust, vpright, and true iudge. Now a wise man must free himselfe from this brutish blockishnes, and present vnto himselfe as in a table this great image of our mother Nature in her entire maiestie, marke and consider hir in a Realme, an Empire, yea in this whole visible world, as in the figure of a small point, and there reade that generall and constant varietie in all things, so many humours, iudgements, beleeves, customes, lawes; so many alterations of states, changes of fortune; so many victories and conquests buried and forgotten, so many pomps and great-nesses vanished, as if they had neuer been. Heereby a man may learne to know himselfe, to admire nothing, to thinke nothing new, or strange, to settle and resolve himselfe in all things. For the better attaining of this vniuersall spirit, this generall indifferencie, we are to consider these foure or five points.

1 The great inequality and difference of men in their nature, forme, composition, whereof we haue spoken.

2 The great diuersitie of lawes, customes, maners, religions, opinions, whereof we will speake heereafter.

3 The diuers opinions, reasons, sayings of Philosophers; touching the vnitie and pluralitie, the eternitie and temporalitie, the beginning and end, the durance and continuance, the ages, estates, changes, and interchangeable courses of the world and the parts thereof. The Egyptian priests told *Herodotus* that

that since their first King (which was aboue eleuen thousand yeares before, the picture and statue of whom, and of all that succeeded him, they shewed him drawne to the life) the Sun had changed his course four times. The *Chaldeans* in the time of *Diodorus* (as he saith) & *Cicero*, had a register of seuen hundred thousand yeares. *Plato* saith they of the citie of *Sais*, had memorials in writing of eight thousand yeares; and that the citie of *Athens* was built a thousand yeares before the said citie of *Sais*. *Zoroaster*, *Plinie*, and others haue affirmed, that *Socrates* liued six thousand yeares before the time of *Plato*. Some haue said, that the world hath been from all eternitie, mortall, and growing and being againe by interchangeable courses. Others and the more noble Philosophers, haue held the world for a god, made by another god greater than it, or as *Plato* auerreth; and others argue from the motions thereof, that it is a creature composed of a bodie and of a soule, which soule lodging in the centre thereof, disperseth and spreadeth it selfe by muscicall numbers into the circumference, and parts thereof, the heauen, the starres, composed of bodies and of a soule, mortall by reason of their composition, immortall by the decree and determination of the Creator. *Plato* saith, that the world changeth countenance in all respects: that the heauen, the starres, the sunne change and quite alter by turnes their motions, in such sort, that that which was first is last, the East is made the West; and according to the ancient and most authenticall opinion, and of the more famous spirits, worthie the greatnes of God, and founded vpon reason, there are many worlds, in so much that there is nothing one and only in this world, all kinds are multiplied in number, whereby it seemeth not to haue semblance of truth, that God hath made this only worke, without companion, and that all is concluded in this one *individuum*; at the least diuinitie saith that God could make many, and infinite worlds, for if he could make no more but this one visible, his power should be finite, because the world is such.

By that which we haue learned of the discoverie of the new world, the East and West Indies, we see first that all our ancient writers haue beene deceived, thinking to haue found the measure of the habitable earth, and to haue comprehended

ded the whole *Cosmographie*, except some scattered Ilands, doubting of the *Antipodes*: for now behold another world, almost such as ours is, and that all vpon firme land, inhabited, peopled, politiquely gouerned, distinguished by realmes, and Empires, beautified with cities, that excell in beautie, greatness, opulencie, all those of *Asia*, *Africa*, *Europe*, many thousand yeares ago: And who doubteth but that in time heereafter there will be discovered diuers others? If *Ptolemy* and other our ancient Writers haue been heeretofore deceiued, why should not he be likewise deceiued that affirmeth, that all is alreadie found and discovered? Say it he that will, I will beleeeue him as I list.

5 Secondly, we see that the Zones which were thought inhabitable by reason of their excessiue heate and cold, are habitable.

6 Thirdly, that in these new countries, almost all things which we so much esteeme of heere, and hold that they were first reuealed and sent from heauen, were commonly beleeeued and obserued (from whence they came, I will not say, who dares determine it?) Yea many of them were in vse a thousand yeares before we heard any tidings of them, both in the matter of religion, as the beleefe of one only man the father of vs all, of the vniuersall deluge, of one God, who sometimes liued in the forme of a man vndefiled and holy, of the day of iudgement, the resurrection of the dead, circumcision like to that of the Iewes, and *Mahumet*: And in the matter of policie, as that the elder sonne should succeed in the inheritance, that he that is exalted to a dignitie, loseth his owne name & takes a new; tyrannicall subsidies, armories, tumblers, muscical instruments; all sorts of sports, Artillerie, Printing. From all these discourses we may easily draw these conclusions: That this great bodie which we call the world, is not that which we thinke and iudge it to be; That neither in the whole, nor parts thereof, it is alwaies the same, but in perpetuall flux and reflux; That there is nothing said, held, beleeeued at one time and in one place, which is not likewise said, held, beleeeued in another, yea and contradicted, reprooued, condemned else-where; the spirit of man being capable of all things, the world alwaies tumbling, sometime the same, sometimes

times diuers; That all things are fetled and comprehended in this course and reuolution of nature, subiect to increase, changing, ending, to the mutation of times, places, climats, hea- uens, aires, countries. And from these conclusions we learne, to marie our selues, to sweare to nothing, to admire, to trouble our selues at nothing; but whatsoeuer shall happen, what- soeuer men talke of and trouble themselves about, to resolute vpon this point, that it is the course of the world, that it is nature that worketh these things; but yet wisely to prouide that nothing hurt vs by our own weaknes and deiection of mind. Enough is said of this perfect libertie of iudgement, established by these three parts, to iudge of all, to iudge nothing, to be vniuersall, wherein I haue the rather insisted, because I know that it pleaseth not the palat of the world, it is an enemie to pedanterie as well as wisdom, but yet it is a faire floure or ornament of wisdom, which preserveth vs from two contrarie rocks, whereon the vulgar sort do commonly lose themselves, that is to say, from being headie, opinatiue, shamefull gainfayers, repenters, mutable; and a man maintaineth himselfe in a sweet, peaceable, and assured modestie and great libertie of spirit, noble and magnificall vniuersalitie. This is that great qualitie and sufficiencie of *Socrates*, the *Coriarius* of the wise, by the confession of all, of whom it is said as *Plutarch* discourses, That he neuer brought forth, but serving as a Midwife, he made others to bring forth. This is very neere and in some sense the disorder of the *Pyrhonians*, the neutralitie and indifferencie of the *Academicks*, from whence proceedeth, not to be astonished at any thing, not to admire any thing, the soueraigne good of *Pythagoras*, the magnanimitie of *Aristotle*.

Nil admirari, prope res est, vna Numici

Solaq, qua possit facere, & seruare beatum.

It is a strange thing that man will not so much as taste it, yea is offended to heare speach thereof, loueth better to continue a slaue to runne from one part to another, than to be to himselfe, to liue of his owne, to be aboue all, and to passe equallie through all. s. Hath he not reason to cry with *Tiberius*, and farre more iustly, *O homines ad seruitutem nati*? What monster is this, to desire to haue all things free, his bodie, his members,

his goods, and not his spirit, which neuerthelesse is only borne vnto libertie? A man will willinglie make benefit of whatsoever is in the world, that comes from the East or the West, for the good and seruice of his bodie, nourishment, health, ornament, and accommodate it all vnto his vse, but not for the culture of his spirit, benefit and enriching, giuing his bodie the libertie of the fields, and holding his spirit in close prison.

7
2 The second
part, libertie
of will.

The other libertie which is of the will, must likewise be in high esteeme with a wise man. We speake not heere of the free will of man, according to the maner of Diuines: we say, that a wise man to maintaine himselfe in rest and libertie, must manage his will and his affections, in giuing himselfe and affecting but few things, and those iust (for the iust are but few in number if a man iudge well) and that without violence and asperitie. There enter heere into combat (or to speake more mildly, there are to be explicated and vnderstood) two popular and plausible opinions in the world; the one teacheth to be readie and willing in the seruice of another, to forget our selues for our neighbor, and principallie for the weale-publike, in respect whereof the particular is not to be respected: the other to cary our selues couragiously with actiuitie, zeale, affection. He that doth not the first, is accused not to haue any charitie; He that doth not the second, suspected to be cold, not to be a friend, and not to haue that zeale or sufficiencie that he ought. Some would haue these two opinions to preuaile beyond reason and measure, and there is not any thing which hath not been spoken heereof: for the heads or Cheeftaines many times preach things according to that vse for which they serue, not according as they are: And many times the truest opinions are not the more profitable. And afterwards seeing we hold our selues too much to our selues, and with a tye too naturall, they would distract vs and draw vs along, as they that go about to streighten a crooked staffe, bend it as much more the contrary way.

8
The descrip-
tion of others.

But these opinions ill vnderstood and ill taken, as they are by diuers, bring with them iniustice, trouble, paine, and much euill, as a man may see in those who backbite and detract from all, giuing themselves to hire, and the seruice of another: They do not only suffer themselves to be caried, and feased vpon,

vpon, but they likewise thrust themselves into all matters, as well into those that concerne them not, as those that do, as well into small as great, and many times for no other cause, but to employ and busie themselves, *in negotijs sunt negotij causa*; and because they cannot hold and stay themselves, as if they had nothing to doe, with and within themselves, and that for want of inward, essentiall, proper and domesticall affaires, they seeke and vndergoe those that are strange vnto them. They are good husbands and frugall enough of their purse, but prodigall of their soules, their liues, their time, affection, and willes, the good husbandrie whereof is only profitable and commendable. And if they giue themselves to any thing, it is with such passion and violence, that they are no more their owne men, so whollie doe they engage and insinuate themselves thereinto. Great men seeke after such people, that will grow into passion and kill themselves for them, and they allure them with faire promises and much Arte, to win them vnto them; and they alwaies find fooles enow that beleeue them, but they that are wise will take heed of them.

This is first vniust, it wholly troubleth the state, driues away the rest, and libertie of the spirit. It is, not to know that which euery one ought to know, and by how many offices euery man is obliged vnto himselfe; whilest they seeke to be officious and seruiceable to another, they are vniust to themselves. Wee haue all businesse enough with and within our selves, and neede not seeke meanes to lose our selves without, and to giue our selves vnto others: euery man must hold him to himselfe. He that knowes not how to liue honestly, healthfully, and merrily, is ill aduised, and takes an ill and vnnaturall course, if he thinke to doe it by seruing another. He must affect and tie himselfe but to a few things and those iust.

Secondly, this sharpe intention and passionate affection, troubleth all, and hindreth the conduct of those affaires to which he so much giueth himselfe; as in a precipitate pafe too much hast makes a man stumble and enterfeare, and so staies him whether he will or no: *Ipsa se velocitas implicat, unde festinatio tarda est. Qui nimium properat serius absoluit.* So likewise a man being drunken with this violent intention, he entang-

entangleth and fettereth himselfe, commits many indiscretions and wrongs, growes into hard conceits and suspicions of others, becomes impatient in crosse or slow occurrents that fall not out according to his owne desire : *male cuncta ministrat impetus*. This is seene not only in serious affaires, but also vaine and friuolous, as in play, where hee that is carried with an ardent thirst of gaining, troubleth himselfe, and the more hee troubleth himselfe, the more hee loseth. Hee that walkes moderately, is alwaies with himselfe, directeth his businesse with better aduantage, and more surely and cheerfully : he dissembleth, applieth, deferreth all to his owne leasure, and as his occasions shall fall out : if hee chance to be conuicted in a matter, it is without torment and affliction, being alwaies readie for a new charge : hee alwaies marcheth with the bridle in his hand, *festinat lentè*.

I I

Thirdly, this violent affection infecteth and corrupteth euen the iudgement it selfe : for following one part and desiring the aduantage thereof, they wax mad if they be contradicted, attributing to their partie false praises and conditions, and to the contrary false accusations ; interpreting all prognostications and occurrents at their owne pleasure, and making them serue their owne designements. All that are of the contrary part, must needs be wicked and of contrarie conditions, yea and they that speake anie good, or descrie anie good thing in them, are likewise suspected to be of their part. Can it not possible be that a man honest in all things else, or at least in some thing, may follow a wicked person, maintaine a wicked cause ? It is enough that passion enforce the will, but that it cary likewise the iudgement, and make that a foole, this is too much. It is the soueraigne and last part that should alwaies maintaine it owne authority ; and we must ingenuously, and in good sooth acknowledge the good that is in our aduersaries, and the euill that is in those whom wee follow. The ground and foundation of the controuersie being laid aside we must keepe moderation and indifferency, and out of the businesse it selfe banish all choler, all discontent. And thus we see the euils that this ouergreat affection to any thing whatsoeuer bringeth with it ; of all, yea of goodnesse and wisdom it selfe a man may haue too much.

But

But for a rule heerein, we must remember, that the principle and most lawfull charge that we haue, is in euery man the conduct and guide of himselfe. The reason why we are here, 12
An aduise-
ment. is, that we should maintaine our selues in tranquillitie and libertie. And to do this, the best remedie is, to lend our selues to others, and to giue our selues to none but to our selues; to take our affaires into our hands, not to place them in our hearts; to take businesse vpon vs, but not incorporate them into vs; to be diligent, not passionate, not to tie our selues but to a few, but rather alwaies to reserue our selues vnto our selues. This counsell condemneth not those offices due to the weale-publike, to our friends, our neighbour, yea it is so farre from it, that a wise man must be officious and charitable, applie vnto himselfe the customes of other men and the world, and the rather to do it, he must contribute to publike societie those offices and duties which concerne him. *Qui sibi amicus est, hunc omnibus scito esse amicum.* But I require a double moderation and discretion heerein; the one, that a man applie not himselfe to all that is presented vnto him, but to that which is iust and necessarie; and that is not hard to be done: the other, that it be without violence and trouble. He must desire little, and that little moderately; busie himselfe little, and that peaceably: and in those charges that he vndertaketh, employ his pasc, his speech, his attentions, his sweatings, his meanes, and if need be, his blood, his life; but yet without vexation and passion, keeping himselfe alwayes to himselfe in health and tranquillitie. A man may performe his dutie sufficiently without this ardencie, and this so great contention of will. And they deceiue themselves very much, that thinke that a businesse is not well done, and there is no manner of affection, if it be not done with tempest, clamour and clatter: for contrariwise, it is that that hindreth and troubleth the good guide and conduct thereof, as hath been said. O how many men hazzard their lues every day in those warres which no way concerne them, and thrust themselves into the danger of that battell, the losse whereof doth no way trouble their sleepe: and all to the end they may not faile in their dutie! whilst there is another in his owne house, that dares not enter the danger, or looke the enemy in the face, is more

more affected with the issue of that warre, and hath his mind more troubled than the souldier that aduentureth his blood and life in the field.

13

Finally, we must know how to distinguish and separate our selues from our publike charges: euery one of vs playeth two parts, two persons; the one strange and apparent, the other proper and essentiall: we must discern the skinne from the shirt. An actiue man will performe his charge, and yet withall not leaue to iudge of the follie, vice, deceit that is therein: he will conforme himselfe to euery thing, because the custome of his countrey requireth it, it is profitable to the weale-publike: the world liues so, and therefore it must be done. A man must serue and make vse of the world such as he findeth it; in the meane time, he must likewise consider it as a thing estranged from it selfe, know how to keepe and carie himselfe apart, and to communicate himselfe to his owne trustie good, howsoeuer things fall out with himselfe.

CHAP. III.

True and essentiall honestie, the first and fundamentall part of wisdom.

HAuing prepared and disposed our scholar to wisdom by these precedent aduiselements, that is to say, hauing purified and freed him from all euils, and placed him in a good estate, of a full and vniuersall libertie, to the end he may haue a perfect view, knowledge and power ouer all things (which is the priuiledge of a wise and spirituall man, *spiritualis omnia diiudicat*) it is now time to giue him instructions and generall rules of wisdom. The two first shall be as preambles and foundations, whereof the first and principall is honestie or probitie.

1

It will not be, perhaps, any matter of difficultie, to make good this proposition, That honestie is the first principall and fundamentall part of wisdom: for all (whether in truth and good earnest, or in outward shew, for shame or feare to say the contrarie) doe applaud it; they alwayes honour it in the first place, confessing themselves seruitours and affectionate followers thereof: but it will cost me some labour to
shew

shew and perswade, which is that true and essentiall probitie we heere require. For that which is in authoritie and credit, wherewith the whole world contenteth it selfe, that which is only knowne, sought for, and possessed (I alwaies except some few of the wiser) is bastardly, artificiall, false, and counterfeit.

First we know that many times we are lead & pricked forward to vertue and honorable actions, by wicked and condemned meanes, by default & naturall impotencie, by passion, and vice it selfe; chastitie, sobrietie, temperancie may be in vs by reason of our corporall imbecillitie; the contempt of the world, patience in aduersitie, constancie in danger, proceede many times from want of apprehension and iudgement: valor, liberalitie, iustice it selfe, from ambition: discretion, prudence, from feare, from avarice. And how many beautifull actions hath presumption and temeritie brought forth? So that the actions of vertue are many times no other but masques, they carie the outward countenance, but they haue not the essence; they may very well be termed vertuous in consideration of another, and of the visage they cary outwardly and in publike, but in truth and with the actor himselfe they are nothing so; for it will appeare at the last, that profit, glorie, custome, and other the like strange causes haue induced him to do them.

2
Masques of
honestie.

Sometimes they arise from stupiditie and brutish fottishnes, and therefore it is said, that wisdom and fottish simplicitie do meete in one and the same point, touching the bearing and suffering of humane actions. It is then very dangerous to iudge of the probitie or improbitie of a man by his actions: we must sound him within, from what foundation these motions doe arise: wicked men performe many times many good and excellent actions, and both good and euill preferue themselves alike from doing euill, *oderunt peccare boni & mali*. To discover therefore and to know which is the true Honestie, we must not stay in the outward action, that is but the signe, the simplest token, and many times a cloke and maske to couer villanie: we must penetrate into the inward part, and know the motiue which causeth the strings to play, which is the soule and the life that giueth motion to all. It is that whereby we must iudge, it is that wherein euery man should

should provide to be good and entire, and that which we seeke.

3
Vulgar honestie, and according to the stile of the world.

That honestie which is commonly accounted true, and so much preached and commended of the world, whereof they make expresse profession, who haue the title and publike reputation to be men of honestie and settled constancie, is scholasticall, and pedanticall, seruant to the lawes, enforced by hope, and feare, acquired, learned and practised out of a submission too, & a consideration of the religion, lawes, customes, commaunds of superiors, other mens examples, subiect to prescript formes, effeminate, fearefull, and troubled with scruples and doubts; *sunt quibus innocentia nisi metu non placet*: which is not only in respect of the world diuers and variable, according to the diuersitie of religions, lawes, examples, formes, (for the iurisdctions changing, the motions must likewise alter) but also in it selfe vnequall, wauering, deambulatorie, according to the accessse, recesse, and successe of the affaires, the occasions which are presented, the persons with whom a man hath to do, as a ship driuen with the winds and the oares, is caried away with an vnequall tottering pase, with many blowes, blasts, and billows. To be breefe, these are honest men by accident and occasion, by outward and strange euent, and not in veritie and essence; they vnderstand it not, and therefore it is easie to discouer them, and to conuince them, by shaking of a little their bridle, and sounding them somewhat nearer, but aboue all, by that inequality and diuersitie which is found in them: for in one and the same action they will giue diuers iudgements, and cary themselves altogether after a diuers fashion, going sometimes a slow pase, sometimes running a maine gallop. This vnequall diuersitie proceedeth from this, that the outward occasions which moue and stirre them, do either puffe them vp, multiplie and increase them, or make them luke-warme and deiect them, more or lesse like accidents, *que recipiunt magis & minus*.

4
The description of true honestie.

Now that true honestie, which I require in him that will be wise, is free, manly, and generous, pleasant, and cheerefull, equall, vniforme, and constant, which marcheth with a stayed pase, stately and hawtie, going alwaies his owne way, neither looking on this side, or behind him, without staying or altering

ring his pafe, or gate for the wind, the times, the occasions, which are changed, but that is not, I meane in iudgement and will, that is in the foule, where honestie resideth and hath it feate. For outward actions, especiallie the publike haue another iurisdiction, as shall be said in his place: This honestie I will describe in this place, giuing you first to vnderstand, that following the designment of this booke declared in the Preface, I speake of humane honestie and wisdome, as it is humane, whereby a man is called an honest man and a wise, and not of Christian, though in the end I may chaunce to speake a word or two thereof.

The iurisdiction of this honestie is Nature, which bindeth euery man to be, and to make himselfe such as he ought, that is to say, to conforme and rule himselfe according vnto it. ⁵ Nature enioyneth honestie. Nature is together both a mistris which enioyneth and commaundeth honestie, and a law and instruction which teacheth it vnto vs. As touching the first, there is a naturall obligation inward and vniuersall in euery man to be honest, iust, vp-right, following the intention of his author and maker. A man ought not to attend or seeke any other cause, obligation, instinct, or motiue of this honestie; and he can neuer know how to haue a more iust and lawfull, more powerfull, more ancient, it is altogether as soone as himselfe, borne with himselfe. Euery man should be, or should desire to be an honest man, because he is a man, and he that takes no care to be such is a monster, renounceth himselfe, belieth, destroyeth himselfe, by right he is no more a man, and in effect should desist to be a man. It is necessarie that honestie grow in him by himselfe, that is to say, by that inward instinct which God hath put in him, and not from any other outward and strange cause, any occasion, or induction. A man will not, out of a iust and regular will, any thing that is depraued, or corrupt, or other than it owne nature requireth, it implieth a contradiction to desire or accept a thing, and nothing to care whether it be worth the caring for; a man would haue all his parts good and sound, his bodie, his head, his eies, his iudgement, his memorie, yea his hose and shooes; and why will he not likewise haue his will, and his conscience good, that is to say, be whollie good and sound? I will therefore that he be good, and

and haue his will firme and resolved to equity and honesty, for the loue of himselfe, and because he is a man, knowing that he can be no other, without the renouncing and destruction of himselfe, and so his honesty shall be proper, inward, essentiall, euen as his owne essence is vnto him, and he vnto himselfe. It must not then be for any outward consideration, and proceeding from without, whatsoever it bee, for such a cause being accidentall and outward, may happen to faile, grow weake, and alter, and consequently all that honesty that is grounded thereupon, must doe the like. If he be an honest man, for honour, or reputation, or other recompence, being in a solitary place, where he hath no hope to be knowen, hee either ceaseth to be honest, or putteth it in practise very coldly and negligently. If for feare of the lawes, magistrates, punishments, if he can deceiue the lawes, circumuent the iudges, auoid or disprooue the proofes, and hide himselfe from the knowledge of another, there is an end of his honesty. And this honestie is but fraile, occasioned, accidentall and miserable; and yet it is that which is in authoritie and vse, no man knowes of any other, there is not an honest man, but such as is enforced or inuited by some cause, or occasion, *nemo gratis bonus est*. Now I would haue in this my wise man an essentiall and inuincible honestie, which dependeth of it selfe, and ariseth from it owne root, and may as hardlie bee separated, and rooted out, as humanitie from a man. I will that he neuer consent vnto euill, and though his honestie be not made knowen to any, yet if he know it himselfe, what needs any more? If all the world besides should know it, it is not so much, *quid tibi prodest non habere consciunt, habenti conscientiam?* And what though he receiue no great recompence for it? For what may it be that concerneth him so neere, as his own proper essence? This were not to care how bad the horse is, so the saddle bee faire. I will then that these things be inseparable, to be, and to consent to liue a man, to be, and to be willing to bee an honest man. This first hath beene sufficientlie pressed. Let vs come to the second.

6
Nature teacheth honesty.

Now the paterne and rule to bee honest, is this nature it selfe, which absolutely requireth that wee be such, it is, I say, this equitie and vniuersall reason which shinech in euery one of

of vs. Hee which worketh according to it, worketh truly according to God, for it is God, or at least, his first fundamentall and vniuersall law, which hath brought it into the world, and which came first from God; for God and nature are in the world, as in a state, the king, the author and founder, and the fundamentall law which he hath made for the preservation and gouernment of the said estate. This is a lightning and ray of the diuinitie, a streame and dependance of the eternall law, which is God himselfe and his will: *quid natura nisi Deus, & diuina ratio toti mundo, & partibus eius inserta?* He worketh also according to himselfe, for he worketh according to the sterne, and animated instinct, which he hath within himselfe mouing and stirring him: and so he is an honest man essentially, and not by accident and occasion; for this law and light is essentiall and naturall in vs, and therefore it is called Nature, and the law of nature. He is also by consequent an honest man, alwaies and perpetually, vniiformly and equally at all times and in all places: for this law of equitie, and naturall reason is perpetuall in vs, *edictum perpetuum*, inuiolable, which can neuer be extinct nor defaced, *quam nec ipsa delet iniquitas; vermis eorum non morietur*, vniuersall and constant in all things, and alwaies the same, equall vniiforme, which neither time nor place can alter nor disguise, receiue neither accesse nor recesso, more nor lesse, *substantia non recipit magis & minus*. What seekest thou elsewhere, either law or rule in the world? What may a man say or alleadge which thou hast not about thee and within, if thou wilt but feele and hearken to thy selfe? A man may say to thee, as to a bad debtor, who asked for what the debt is, and will see the bill which he hath about him, *Quod petis intus habes*; Thou demandest that which thou hast in thy owne bosome. *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui. Gentes naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt: ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis; lex scripta in cordibus nostris.* The law of Moses in his decalogue, is an outward and publike copie, the law of the twelue tables, and the Romane law, the morall instructions of diuines and Philosophers, the aduiselements and counsels of Lawyers, the edicts and ordinances of Princes are no other but petie and particular pourtraies thereof: so that if

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there

Psal. 4.

Rom. 1.

August.

there be any law, that straveth the least that may be from this first and originall mistress, it is a monster, fallhood, and error. To be brieft, all the lawes of the world, are no other but copies and abstracts brought forth into iudgement, against thee that holdest hidden the originall, and makest as if thou knewest it not, extinguishing as much as in thee lieth this light, which enlightheth thee within, *qui veritatem dei detinent in iniustitia*, for these lawes had neuer beene published abroad, but because that law which was inward, whollie celestiaall and diuine, hath been too much contemned and forgotten. These are all riuers, but such as neither haue so much water, nor so pure as the source and inuible fountaine, which is within thee, if thou suffer it not to perish, and to be lost: I say not so much water, *Quam multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, fides exigunt, quae extra tabulas sunt.* O the miserable honestie of formalists, who hold themselves to the words of the law, and so thinke themselves discharged! How many duties are there required besides? *Quam angusta innocentia ad legem bonum esse: latius officiorum patet quam iuris regula.* The rule of our dutie is farre larger than that of the law, which is neither so strong, nor so liuely, witnes this one thing, that well to vnderstand and know their intention to quit our selues of ambiguities, difficultie, contrarietie, we must bring them to the source, and reentring into the inward part, put them to the touch and rule of nature, *Anima legis ratio.* Behold then an essentiall, radicall, and fundamentall honestie, sprung in vs from it owne proper rootes by the seed of that vniuersall reason which is in the soule, as the springe and ballance in a clock, as the naturall heate in the bodie, maintaining it selfe of it selfe strong and inuincible, whereby a man worketh according to God, according to himselfe, nature, the vniuersall order and policie of the world, quietly, sweetly, and as silently without noyse, as a Ship that is not driuen but by the naturall and ordinarie course of the water: All other is ingrafted by arte and by accidentall discipline, as the heate and cold of feuers, acquired and conducted by strange occasions and considerations, working with clamor and clatter ambitiously.

7
We must follow nature.

This is the reason why the doctrine of all the Sages doth teach, that to liue well, is to liue according to nature, that the chiefest

chiefest good in this world is to consent to nature, that in following nature as our guide and mistress, we can neuer erre, *Naturam si sequaris ducem nusquam aberrabis: bonum est quod secundum naturam, omnia vitia contra naturam sunt: Idem beatè vivere & secundum naturam: vnderstanding by nature that equitie and vniuersall reason which shineth in vs, which containeth and hatcheth in it the seeds of all vertues, probitie, iustice, and is the matrix from whence all good and excellent lawes do spring and arise, yea those true and iust iudgements that are sometimes pronounced by the mouth of an idiot. Nature hath disposed all things in the best state that they could be, and hath giuen them the first motion to good, and the end which they should seeke, in such sort, that he that will follow hir, need not obtaine and possesse his owne good and his owne end, *Sapientia est in naturam conuerti, & eò restitui vnde publicus error expulerit; Ab illa non deerrare, ad illius legem exemplumq; formari sapientia est.* Men are naturallie good, and follow not euill, but for profit or pleasure, and therefore law-makers to induce them to follow their naturall and good inclination, and not to enforce their wils, haue proposed two contrarie things, punishment and reward.*

Doubtlesse, Nature in euery one of vs is sufficient, and a sweet Mistress and rule to all things, if we will hearken vnto hir, employ and awaken hir; and wee need not seeke else-where, nor begge of Arte and the Sciences, the meanes, the remedies, and the rules which we haue need of: Every one of vs if he will, may liue at his pleasure of his owne. To liue content and happie, a man neede not be wise, a courtier, nor so actiue; all this sufficiencie that is beyond the common and naturall is vaine and superfluous, yea it bringeth more euill with it than good. We see ignorant people, idiots, and simple men, leade their liues more sweetly and cheerefully, resist the assaults of death, of want, of sorrow, more constantly and contentedly, than the wisest men and most actiue. And if a man marke it well, he shall finde among pefants and other poore people examples of patience, constancie, equanimitie, more pure than all those that are taught in Schooles; they follow simplic the reason and conduct of nature, they trauell quietly and contentedly in their affaires, not enflaming or eleuating them.

8

As a good
and sufficient
mistress.

themselves, and consequently more soundly : Others mount themselves vpon their great horses, play the light horsemen, bandie themselves one against the other, keepe their braines alwaies in worke and agitation. A great master and admirable doctor in nature was *Socrates*, as *Aristotle* in arte and science. *Socrates* by simple and naturall discourses, by vulgar similitudes and inductions, speaking like a country swaine, did furnish vs with precepts and rules of good life, and remedies against all euils, so substantiall and strong, that all the arte and science of the world could not deuise better or the like.

9
We alter it
wholly.
By violence.

By arte.

By ceremonie.

But we doe not only not hearken vnto it, beleue and follow it according to the counsell of the wise, but also (not to speake of those monsters who by the violence of their vices, inordinate and peruerse delights and pleasures suffocate and extinguish, as much as in them lieth, the light, mortifie the feed thereof) we endeouour to auoid it, we suffer it to sleepe and to cease, louing better to begge elsewhere our first rudiments, to runne to studie and arte, than to content our selues with that which is bred within vs. We haue a busie troublesome spirit, which offereth it selfe to rule and gouerne in all things, and which carrieth it selfe after our owne willes, disguiseth, changeth, and troubleth all, will adde, inuent, alter, and can not stay it selfe in home-borne simplicitie, it thinketh nothing good wherein there is not craft and subtiltie, *simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientiam versa est.* And it is a vice common amongst vs, not to account of any thing that is in vs, we esteeme only of that which is bought, which is costly, and is brought from farre : we preferre arte before nature, we shut the windowes at high noone, and light candles. This fault and follie proceedeth from another, that is, that we esteeme not of things according to their true and essentiall value, but according to the shew and report. How many are there more scrupulous and exact in those things that belong to the positieue and municipall law, than the naturall? Truly almost all, yea euen in the ceremoniall, and law of ciuilitie, which we haue framed to our selues, in respect whereof we disdain and are ashamed of nature. We speake little, we make a faire shew, and carefully keepe a *decorum* or decencie, and make no difficultie to goe directly against nature,

ture, dutie, conscience. So that the shadow is more vnto vs than the bodie, the roote, the countenance more than the substance and sound veritie. That we may not offend a ceremonie, we couer and hide things naturall; we dare not name, and we blush at the sound of things, which we doe in no sort feare to do, both lawfull and vnlawfull. We dare not speake that which is permitted to doe, we dare not directly to name our owne proper members, and yet we feare not to employ them in all manner of wickednesse: we pronounce, speake, and do, without feare and without shame, wicked things, and such as are against nature and reason, forswear, betray, assault, kill, deceiue; and we blush to speake of things good, naturall, necessarie, iust and lawfull. There is not a husband, which is not more ashamed to embrace his wife in the open view of the world, than to kill, lie, assault; nor a woman that will not rather vtter any wickednesse in the world, than name that wherein she taketh most delight, and may lawfully doe. Euen to treasons and murders, they tie themselves to the lawes of a ceremonie, and there fasten their deuouires. A strange thing, that iniustice should complaine of inciuility, malice of indiseretion! The act of a ceremonie, doth it not preuaile against nature? The ceremonie forbiddeth vs to expresse naturall things and lawfull, and we giue credit thereto: Nature and reason forbiddeth vs things vnlawfull, and no man beleeueth it: A man sends his conscience to the brothell-house, and keeps his outward countenance in order. All this is monstrous, and the like is not found amongst beasts. I will not for all this say (as I perceiue malice doth already mutter) that ceremonie and decencie ought not carefully be kept, which is the salt and seasoning of our actions and conuersations. *Amo verecundiam, in ea ornatus vite, & Cicer. vis decori.* But I say to them as our Sauiour to men of the like spirit: *O hypocritae et colubae dulcissimi, camelum deglutientes, Matth. 23. qui minima curatis, grauia spernitis: Hac oportet primum facere, tum illa non omittere.*

From this generall and vniuersall alteration and corruption it is come to passe, that there is nothing of Nature known in vs. If we must say what the lawes thereof are, and how many they are, we are much hindred. The ensigne & marke

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In such sort,
that it is no
more known
en in man.

of a naturall law is the vniuersitie of approbation : for that which Nature shall haue truly ordeined for vs, we with a common consent shall follow without doubting ; and not on- ly euery nation, but euery particular person.

Now there is not any thing in the world which is not de- nied and contradicted, not by one nation, but by diuers : and there is not any thing so strange and vnaturall in the opini- on of diuers, which is not approued and authorisid in many places by common vse. The little care of hauing children, the murther of parents, of children, of himselfe, mariage of the neereft in bloud, theft, publike marchandize of their libertie and bodies, as well of males as females, are receiued by pub- like vse in many nations.

11
And we must
seeke it else-
where.

Doubtlesse there remaineth no more any image or trace of nature in vs, we must go seeke it in beasts, where this trouble- some and vnquiet spirit, this quick-siluer, neither arte, nor beautifull ceremonie hath power to alter it ; they haue it pure and entire, if it be not corrupted by our vsage and contagion, as sometimes it is. All the world followeth nature, the first and vniuersall rule which the author thereof hath giuen and established, except man only who troubleth the policie and state of the world with his gentle spirit, and his free-will to wickednesse ; he is the only irregular creature, and enemy of nature.

12
True hone-
stie.

So then the true honestie (the foundation and pillar of wis- dome) is to follow nature, that is to say, reason. The good and the end of man, in whom consisteth his rest, his libertie, his contentment, and in a word, his perfection in this world, is to liue and do according to nature, when that which is the most excellent thing in him commaundeth, that is to say, reason. True honestie is a right and firme disposition of the will to follow the counsell of reason : And as the heedle touched with the adamant neuer resteth it selfe vntill he see the north point, and thereby ordereth and directeth the nauigation ; so a man is neuer well, yea, he is as it were vndone, and dislo- cated, vntill he see this law, and directeth the course of his life, his manners, his iudgements and willes, according to the first, diuine, naturall law, which is an inward domesticall light, whereof all the rest are but beames.

But

But to effect it, and to come to the practise, it is farre more
easie to some, than to others. There are some that haue their
particular nature, that is to say, their temper and temperature
so good and pleasing (which especially proceedeth from the
first formation in the womb of the mother, and afterwards
from the milke of the nurse, and this first and tender educa-
tion) that they find themselves without endeuor, and with-
out arte or discipline, whollie caried and disposed to good-
nesse and honestie, that is to say, to follow and conforme
themselves to the vniuersall nature, whereby they are tear-
med well-borne; *gaudeant bene nati.*

13

The distin-
ction of true
honestie.

This kind of naturall and easie honestie, and as it were
borne with vs, is properly called goodnesse, a qualitie of a
soule well borne and well gouerned, it is a sweetnesse, facilitie,
and debonairie mildnesse of nature: and not (lest any bodie
should be deceiued) a softnesse, a feminine, sottish calmenesse
and vtious facilitie, whereby a man delighteth to please all,
and not to displease or offend any, although he haue a iust
and a lawfull cause, and it be for the seruice of reason and
iustice; whereby it comes to passe, that they will not employ
themselves in lawfull actions, when it is against those that
take offence thereat; nor altogether refuse the vnlawfull,
when they please thereby those that consent thereunto. Of
these kind of people it is said (and this commendation is iniu-
rious) He is good, since he is good euen to the wicked; and
this accusation true, How should he be good, since he is not
euill, to those that are euill? We should rather call this kind of
goodnesse innocencie, as men call little children sheepe, and
the like, innocent creatures. But an active, valiant, manly, and
effectuall goodnesse is that I require, which is a readie, easie,
and constant affection vnto that which is good, right, iust,
according to reason and nature.

There are others so ill borne and bred, that it seemeth (that
like monsters) their particular natures are made, as it were in
despite of the vniuersall nature, so crosse and contrarie are
they thereunto. In this case the remedie to correct, reforme,
sweeten, make tame, and amend this euill, rough, sauage, and
crooked nature, to bend it and applie it to the rule of this ge-
nerall and great mistris the vniuersall nature, is to haue re-

Acquired
virtue.

course to the study of philosophie (as *Socrates* did) and vnto vertue, which is a combate and painfull endeavor against vice, a labourious studie, which requireth time, labour, and discipline. *Virtus in arduo & circa difficile: ad ianuam virtutis excubant labor & sudor. Diu mortalibus virtutem laboris pretio vendiderunt.* This is not to bring in a new, strange, or artificiall honestie, and so accidentall, and such, as I haue said before, is not the true; but it is by taking away the lets and hinderances, to stirre vp and enlighten this light almost extinct and languishing, and to reuiue those seeds almost choked by the particular vice, and ill temperature of the particular person; as by taking away the moat from the eie, the sight is recovered, and the dust from off the glasse, a man seeth the clearer.

14
Three degrees of perfection.

By all this that hath beene said, it appeareth that there are two sorts of true honestie; the one naturall, sweet, easie, iust, called goodnesse; the other acquired, difficult, painfull, and laborious, called vertue. But to say the truth, there is also a third, which is, as it were, composed of the two, and so there should be three degrees of perfection. The lowest of the three is a facill and debonairie nature, distasted by it selfe by reason of vice; we haue named it goodnesse, innocencie. The second more high, which wee haue named vertue, is with a liuelie force to hinder the progresse of vice, and hauing suffered himselfe to be surprised, with the first motions of the passions, to arme and bend himselfe to staie their course, and to overcome them. The third and chiefe, is out of a high resolution, and a perfect habit, to be so well framed, that temptations cannot so much as grow in him, and the seedes of vice are whollie rooted out, in so much that his vertue is turned into a complexion, and into nature. This last may be called perfection. That & the first, which is called goodnesse, do resemble one the other, and differ from the second, in that they are without stirre, paine, or endeavour. This is the true tincture of the soule, hir naturall and ordinary course, which costeth nothing. The second is alwaies in care and in awe. The last and perfect is acquired by the long studie and serious exercise of the rules of philosophie, ioined to a beautifull and rich nature. For both are necessarie, the naturall and the acquired. This

is

is that those two sects did so much studie, the *Stoicks* and much more the *Epicures* (which would haue seemed strange if *Seneca* and other ancient Philosophers did not testify of, who are rather to be credited, than all the other more moderne) who made a sport and play game of shame, want, sickness, griefes, tortures, deaths. They did not only contemne, patiently endure and vanquish all asperities and difficulties, but they sought them, they tooke pleasure and delight in them, and all to keepe their vertue in breath, and in action, which made them not only firme, constant, graue and seuer, as *Cato* and the *Stoicks*, but cheerefull, merry, wanton, and if a man may so say, foole-hardy too.

By the comparison of these three together, it seemeth to some (who vnderstand not the height and value of the third) that the second, which we call vertue, by reason of the difficulties, dangers, endeouours thereof, carrieth the honour, and that as *Metellus* said, to doe euill is an idle and a base thing, to doe good where there is neither paine nor danger, is a common thing and too easie, but to doe good where there is danger and paine, is the part of an honest man, and of vertue. It is the mot of that diuine Philosopher *κατα τα καλά*. But to speake in truth that which it is, besides that difficultie (as itselfe hath beene said) is no true, nor iust and lawfull cause, why a thing should be the more esteemed, it is certaine that in the like thing the naturall is more worth than the acquired, that it is far more noble, more excellent and diuine to worke by nature than by Art, easily, equally, vniiformedly, than painfully, vnequally, with doubt and danger. God is good after the first manner, that is, the naturall and essentiall goodnesse, we dare not call him vertuous, nor the Angels and spirits fortunate: they are called good. But because vertue maketh a greater clamor and stire, and worketh with greater vehemencie than goodnesse, it is more admired and esteemed of the vulgar sort (who are but foolish iudges) but wrongfully. For these great exalters and extravagant productions, which seeme to be almightie and sure, are no part of the play, and do not in any sort appertaine to true honesty, they are rather maladies and furious entrances, farre distant from that wisdom we here require, which is sweet, equal, & vniforme.

Thus

Thus much he spoken in grasse of honestie, for the parts
 thereof and the duties shall be handled in the third booke,
 especially in the vertue of iudice. I will heere adde a word or
 two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of
 detraction, and to stay the plaints of those, that dislike that I
 attribute so much to nature (although it be God as hath been
 said, and this booke speaketh not but of the naturall and hu-
 mane) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be re-
 quired. Wherefore besides all that hath been said, there re-
 maineth yet one thing to make this worke complete and
 perfect, and that is the grace of God, whereby this hone-
 stie, goodnes, vertue, hath life, is brought forth in his due
 time, and receiveth it last and perfect portraict, it is elcuated,
 christned, crowned, that is to say, accepted, verified, appro-
 ued by God, and made (after a sort) worthie it due reward.
 Honestie is like to a good Organist, who toucheth well and
 truly according to arte: the grace and spirit of God, is the
 blast and wind which expresseth the touch, giueth life, and
 maketh the instrument to speake, and to make a pleasant me-
 lodie. Now this good consisteth not in long discourse, pre-
 cepts and instructions, neither is it attained by our owne pro-
 per act and labour, it is a free gift from aboue, whereof it ta-
 keth the name, Grace: but we must desire it, aske, implore it,
 both humble and ardentlie: O God, vouchsafe of thy infinit
 goodnesse to looke vpon me with the eye of thy clemencie,
 to accept & to like of my desire, mine essaye, my little worke,
 which comes originallie from thee, by that obligation and in-
 struction, which thou hast giuen me in the law of nature,
 which thou hast planted in me, to the end it may returne vn-
 to thee, and that thou mayest end that thou hast begun, that
 so thou mayest be both my ~~aid~~ aid: Sprinkle me with thy
 grace, keepe me, and account me thine, and so forth. The bet-
 ter to obtaine it, that is to say to incline God vnto vs, is this
 honestie (as hath been said in the Preface, whither (that I may
 not iterate it) I resend the reader) the matter being well pre-
 pared, is the fitter for the forme, the grace, it is not contrarie,
 neither doth it enforce or destroy nature, but sweetly it rele-
 ueth and perfecteth it, so that it must not oppose it selfe there-
 vnto as to it contrarie, but put it on as a crowne. They are
 both

both of God, they must not therefore be confounded; every one hath his jurisdiction, his action apart: The organist and he that worketh at the bellows are two, so are honestie and grace, the action good in it selfe naturally, morally, humainly, and that by grace made acceptable. That may well be without this, and hath his worth, as in those philosophers & great men in times past, admirable in nature, and in all kind of morall vertue, and is likewise found in misbeleeuers or Infidels; but this cannot be without that, no more than the cowering, the crowne and perfection can be without the entire bodie. The player or organist may in every point exercise his arte, without the bellows-blower, and so likewise honestie without grace. It is true that this cannot be but *as sonans*, and *cymbalum tinniens*, but this requireth that, wherein I see many to mistake themselves very grossely, who neuer haue any talley or do euer conceiue the image of true honestie, and continue puffed vp with a perswasion of grace, which they thinke to practise, to attract, to attaine by certaine easie & idle meanes, after the manner of the Pharisees, wherewith they rest contented, not troubling themselves any further for the true honestie, *promoti per saltum*, Masters without apprenticeship, Doctors and nobles in parchment. Now I see many of these kind of people in the world; but very few such as *Aristides*, *Bru-cion*, *Cato*, *Regulus*, *Socrates*, *Scipio*, *Epaminondas*, that is to say, professors of an exact, true, and solid morall vertue, and philosophical probitie. That complaint and reproch so frequent of the soueraigne Doctor of the truth, against hypocriticall Pharisees, will alwaies haue place; for such people will neuer be wanting, no not amongst the Censors and reformers of the world. Now hauing spoken much of honestie, we must likewise in a word or two touch the contrarie therunto.

Wickednes is against nature, it is foule, deformed, and vnprofitable, it offendeth euery good iudgement, it breedeth a hatred of it selfe being well known, whereupon some haue said, that it was bred and brought forth by idlenesse and ignorance. Againe, wickednes ingendreth offence and repentance in the soule, which like an vlcen in the flesh, eateth and fretteth it, malice and mischief buildeth vp torments against it selfe: *malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit: malum consiliu*.

consilium consultori pessimum: like the waspe, which with his sting offendeth another, but much more himselfe, for he lea- ueth behind him, and that for euer, both his sting and his strength: vice hath pleasure in it, otherwise it would not be receiued, nor find place in the world; *nemo enim animi trans- malus est*; but it doth withall ingender displeasure and offence, paine followeth sinne, saith *Plato*, yea it groweth with it, saith *Hesiodus*, which is quite contrarie to the will and to vertue, which reioyeth and contenteth. There is a congratulation, a pleasing contentment and satisfaction in well doing; it is the true and essentiall reward of a good soule, which can neuer faile him, and wherewith he must content himselfe in this world.

18
Whether it
be neuer per-
mitted to
sinne.

Lib. 3. cap. 2.

19
Whether all
sinne inge-
der repen-
tance.
The distin-
ction of vice
or wicked-
nesse.

There is no man maketh a doubt, whether vice be to be a- uoided, and hated aboue all things; but it is a question, whe- ther there may be any such profit or pleasure, as may carrie with it a sufficient excuse for the committing of such or such a sinne. It seemeth to diuers, that there may. Touching pro- fit, if it be publike, there is no doubt (but yet with limitation, as shall be sayd in the vertue of politike prudence) but some will say as much of particular profit and pleasure. A man might speake and iudge heereof more certainly, if some cer- taine fact or example were proposed: but to speake sumple, we are firmly to holde the negative.

But that sinne can not inwardly furnish vs with such pleasure and content, as honestie doth, there is no doubt; but that it tormenteth (as hath been sayd) it is not yniuersally and in all senses true; we must therefore distinguish it. There are three sorts of wickednesse and wicked people: some are incorpo- rated into euill, by discouise and resolution, or by long habit, in such sort, that their vnderstanding it selfe approoueth it and consenteth thereto. This falleth out, when sinne hauing met with a strong and vigorous heart, is in such sort rooted therein, that it is there formed and as it were naturalized, and the soule infected and wholly tainted therewith. Others con- trariwise do ill by impulsions, according as the violent winde of temptation troubleth, stirreth and precipitatech the soule vnto sinne, and as they are surprised and caried by the force of passion. The third, as midlings betwixt these two, account their

their vice such as it is, they accuse and condemne it, contrarie to the first, and they are not carried by passion or temptation as the second; but in colde blood, hauing well thought thereof, they enter into the market, they ballance it with some great pleasure or profit, and in the end at a certaine price and measure they yeeld thereunto, and they thinke they haue some excuse to doe it. Of this sort of finnes are vsuries, obscenities or venereous pleasures, and other finnes manie times resumed, consulted, deliberated, as also the finnes of complexion.

Of these three, the first do neuer repent, without some extraordinary touch from heauen: for being setled and hardened in wickednesse, they feele not the pricke and sting thereof: for since the vnderstanding approueth it, and the soule is wholly tainted therewith, the will hath no will to gainsay it. The third repent, or seeme in a certaine fashion, that is to say, simply considering the dishonest action in it selfe, but afterwards weighing it with profit or pleasure, they repent not at all: and to say the truth, and to speake properly, they do not repent, since both their reason and conscience willeth and consenteth to the fault. The second are they that repent and readuise themselves, and of whom properly it is called repentance; whereof I will heere take occasion to speake a word or two.

Repentance is a disauowing or deniall, and a retraction of the will, that is, a sorrow or griefe ingendred in vs by reason, which driueth away all other sorrowes and griefs which proceed from outward causes. Repentance is inward, inwardly ingendred, and therefore more strong than any other, as the heat and colde of a feauer is more violent than that which is outward. Repentance is the medicine of the soule, the death of sinne, the cure of our willes and consciences: but it is necessarie that we well know it. First, it is not of euerie sinne, as hath beene sayd, not of that which is inueterate, habituated, authorized by the iudgement it selfe, but of the accidentall, and that which happeneth either by surprise or by force; nor of things that are not in our power, whereof we are forrie we cannot repent; neither can it be in vs, by reason of bad issues, and contrary to our counsels and designments.

If

If a matter fall out besides a mans thought, conceipt, and ad-
 uice; for that he must not repent him of his counsell and ad-
 uice, if he therein carrie himselfe as he ought, for a man cannot
 diuine of euent; and if a man did know them, yet he hath no
 place to consult of them; and we neuer are to iudge of coun-
 sels by their issues; neither must it grow in him by the age,
 impotencie, & distaste of things, this were to suffer his iudge-
 ment to be corrupted: for the things are not changed, be-
 cause we are changed, by age, sicknesse, or other accidents.
 The growing wise, or amendment, which comes by anxietie,
 distaste, or feeblenes, is not true and religious, but idle and lan-
 guishing. The weaknesse of the bodie is no fit post to carie vs
 to God, and to our dutie and repentance, but true repentance
 is the gift of God, which toucheth our heart, and must grow
 in vs not by the weaknesse of the bodie, but by the force of
 the soule and of reason.

22
*Of confession
 and excuse.*

Now from true repentance there ariseth a true, free, and re-
 ligious confession of our faults. As in the maladies of the bo-
 die we see two kinds of remedies, the one which healeth, ta-
 king away the cause and roote of the maladie, the other
 which doth only couer it and bring it asleepe, and therefore
 the former is more forcible and more wholsome. So likewise
 in the maladies of the soule, the true remedie which clenseth
 and healeth, is a serious and modest confession of our faults;
 the other false which doth only disguise and couer, is excuse,
 a remedie inuented by the author of euill it selfe, whereof the
 prouerb is, That sinne soweth it selfe a garment, that is, excuse,
 the garment made of figge leaues by the first offenders, who
 couered themselves both with words and deeds, but it was a
 garment without warmth. We should therefore learne to ac-
 cuse our selues, boldly to confesse all our actions & thoughts;
 for besides that it were a faire and generous libertie, it were
 likewise a meane not to do or thinke any thing, which were
 not honest and fit to be published: for he that will be content
 to be bound to tell all, will be likewise content to bind him-
 selfe to do nothing that a man is constrained to hide; but con-
 trarily, euery man is discret and secret in confession, but not in
 action. Boldnes to sinne, is in some sort bridled by boldnes to
 confesse. If it be vndecent to do a thing, it is farre more vnde-
 cent

cent not to dare to auouch it. Many great and holy men, as *Saint Austin, Origen, Hippocrates*, haue published the errours of their opinions, and we should doe the like of our maners. By going about to hide them, a man falleth many times into greater euils, as he that solemnly denieth that he hath abused his bodie with another, by thinking to mend the matter marres it, at leastwise multiplies his sinne. This is not to excuse vice, but to adde thereunto.

CHAP. III.

To haue a certaine end and forme of life, the second foundation of Wisdome.

After this first foundation of true and inward honestie, there commeth as it were by way of preamble, a second foundation, necessarie for the gouernment of our life, which is to prepare and frame our selues to a certaine and assured course of life, to make choyce of that calling which doth best besit vs, and is proper vnto vs; that is to say, which our particular nature (following alwaies the vniuersall, our great and generall mistris and gouernor) doth willinglie accommodate and applie it selfe vnto. Wisdome is a sweet and regular conduct and cariage of our soule, guiding it with measure and proportion, and consisteth in an equalitie of life and maners.

This choyce then is a matter of great difficultie, wherein a man carieth himselfe very diuerslie, and wherein he findeth himselfe hindered by diuers considerations, which draw him into diuers parts, and many times hurt and hinder one another. Some are happie therein, who by a great goodnes and felicitie of nature, haue knowne both speedily and easily how to choose, and either by a certaine good hap, without any great deliberation, are, as it were, whollie caried into that course of life, which doth best besit them, in such sort that fortune hath been their chooser, and led them vnto it, or by the friendly and prouident hand of another, they haue been guided and directed. Others contrarily are vnhappy, who hauing failed euen from the entrance, and wanting the spirit or industrie to know themselves, and in a good houre to be readuised how they might cunningly withdraw their stake in

*This choyce
a difficult
thing, wher-
in a man ca-
rieth him-
self diuersly.*

in the midst of the game, are in such sort engaged, that they can no more recall themselves, and so constrained to lead a life full of inconuenience and repentance.

But it likewise proceedeth many times from the great default of him that deliberateth, either in not knowing himselfe well, and presuming too much of himselfe, whereby it falleth out that he must either shamefully desist from that which he hath vndertaken, or endure much paine and torment in persisting therein. Hee must remember that to carrie a burthen, it is necessary there be more strength than burthen, otherwise a man is constrained either to leaue it, or to sinke vnder it. A wise man doth neuer charge himselfe with more businesse, than he knoweth how to goe thorow: or in not settling himselfe in any thing, but changing from day to day, as they doe that are neuer pleased nor satisfied with any thing, but that which they haue not, euery thing discontenteth them, as well ease, as businesse, to command as to obey. These kind of people liue miserablie, and without rest, as men constrained. The other likewise cannot hold themselves quiet, they cease not to go and come to no purpose, they seeme to do much and do nothing; the actions of a wise man do alwaies tend to some certaine end, *Magnam rem puta unum hominem agere, prater sapientem nemo unum agit, multiformes sumus.* But the most part doe not deliberate, and consult of any thing, they suffer themselves to be led like oxen, or carried according to the times, company, occasion, and they know not how to giue a reason, why they are rather of this calling than another, except it be because their father profest the same, or that they were vnawares carried into it, and so haue continued therein, in such sort, that as they did neuer well consider of their entrance, so they know not which way to get out, *Pauci sunt qui consilio se suaque disponant, ceteri eorum more qui fluminibus innatant, non eunt sed feruntur.*

3
Counsell in
these affairs.

Now that a man may carrie himselfe well heerein, choose well, and well acquite himselfe, he must know two things and two natures; his owne, that is, his complexion, his port and capacity, his temperature, in what a man excelleth, in what he is feeble, what he is fit for, for what he is vnfit: For to goe against his owne nature, is to tempt God, to spit against the heaucns

heauens, to leaue the businesse vndone, because hee cannot doe it, *nec quidquam sequi quod assequi nequeas*, and to expose himselfe to laughter and mockery. Afterwards hee must know that which belongs to his affaires, that is to say, the estate, profession, and kinde of life that is proposed. There are some wherein the affaires are great and weighty, others where they are dangerous, others where they are not so great, but are mingled, and full of entanglements, and that draw after them many other businesse; these charges doe much afflict the spirit. Euery profession requireth more specially one certaine facultie of the soule, one the vnderstanding, another the imagination, another the memorie. Now to know these two natures, his owne, and that of the profession and course of life, that which hath beene said of the diuers temperatures of the inward parts and faculties, will helpe much. Knowing these two natures, we must compare them together, to see whether they can well ioine and endure together, for it is necessarie that they agree; if a man be to contest with his owne nature, and to enforce it for the seruice and performance of a function and charge which he vnder-taketh; or contrarily, if to follow his nature, whether willingly, or that by force and insensibly it draw him, a man happen to faile or erre in his dutie, what disorder is there? Where is equitie? Where is decencie? *Si quicquam decorum, nihil profecto magis quam aequabilitas vite vniuersae, & singularum actionum, quam conseruare non possis: si aliorum imiteris naturam, omittas tuam.* This is the account wee must make, when we thinke to doe any thing that hath worth or grace in it, if nature it selfe be wanting,

Tu nihil inuita dices faciesue Minerva:

Id quemque decet quod est suum maximè: sic est faciendum, ut contra naturam vniuersam nil contendamus, ea seruata propriam sequamur. And if it fall out, that by mishap, imprudency or otherwise a man finde himselfe engaged in a vocation and course of life painfull and vnprofitable, and that a man cannot flie backe; it is the part of wisdom, to resolute to beare it, to sweeten it, to accommodate it vnto himselfe as much as he can; doing as in a game at hazard, according to the counsell of *Plato*, wherein if the die or card fall not out to be good,

a man taketh it patientlie, and indeuoreth to mend his ill chaunce by his good play; and like Bees, who from Tyme, a sharp and dry herbe, gather sweet hony, and as the prouerb is, make a vertue of necessitie.

C H A P. V.

To studie true pietie, the first office of Wisdome.

THe preparatiues made, and the two foundations laid, it is time to build, and to set downe the rules of wisdome, whereof the first and most noble concerneth the religion and worship of God. Pietie holdeth the first place in the ranke of our duties, and it is a thing of great importance, wherein it is dangerous and very easie to erre and be mistaken. It is necessarie therefore to be aduised, and to know how he that studieth wisdome should gouerne himselfe; which we purpose to do, hauing a little discoursed of the state and successe of religions in the world, referring the rest vnto that which I haue said in my three Verities.

1
Diuerfitie of
religions.

It is first a very fearefull thing, to consider the great diuerfitie of religions which haue beene and are in the world, and much more of the strangenes of some of them, so fantastick and exorbitant, that it is a wonder that the vnderstanding of man should be so much befotted and made drunken with impostures; for it seemeth, that there is nothing in the world high or low, which hath not been deified in some place or other, and that hath not found a place wherein to be worshipped.

2
That all agree in many
principles.

They all agree in many things, and haue likewise taken their beginning in the same climat. *Palestina* and *Agræa* which ioyn together (I meane the more renowned and famous mistris of the rest) haue their principles and foundations almost alike; The beliefe of one God the author of all things, of his prouidence and loue towards mankinde, the immortalitie of the soule, reward for the good, chastisement for the wicked after this life, a certaine outward profession of praying, inuocating, honoring and seruing God. To win them credit, and that they may be receiued, they alledge and furnish themselves, whether indeed and in veritie,

as

as the true, or by imposture and faire semblance, with reuelations, apparitions, prophets, miracles, prodigies, holie mysteries, Saints. All haue their fountaine and beginning small, feeble, humble, but by little and little by the imitation and contagious acclamation of the people, with some fictions as forerunners, they haue taken footing, and been authorised, in so much that they all are held with affirmation and deuotion, yea the absurdest amongst them. All hold and teach that God is appeased and woon by prayers, presents, vowes, and promises, and the like: All beleue that the principall and most pleasant seruice of God, and the powerfulllest meane to appease him, and to obtaine his grace, is to punish, to cut themselues, to impose vpon themselues some painefull and difficult labour; witnes throughout the world, and almost in all religions, and rather in the false than in the true, in Mahometisme, than Christianitie, so many orders, companies, hermitages and frieries destinated to certaine and diuers exercises very painefull and of a strict profession, euen to the lancing and cutting of their bodies; thinking thereby to merit much more than the common sort, who purifie not themselues with afflictions and torments as they do, and euery day they prouide new: and the nature of man doth neuer cease to inuent meanes of paine and torment, which proceedeth from the opinion that God taketh pleasure, and is pleased with the torment and ruine of his creatures; which opinion is founded vpon the sacrifices, which were vniuersall throughout the world before the birth of Christianitie, and exercised not only vpon innocent beasts, which were masacred, with the effusion of their bloud, for a pretious present vnto God, but (a strange thing that man should be so sottish) vpon infants, innocents, and men, as well good and honest as offenders, a custome practised with great religion almost in all nations: As the Geta a people of Scythia, who among other ceremonies and sacrifices dispatched vnto their god Zamolxis, from fiue yeares to fiue, a man amongst them to demaund things necessarie for them. And because it was thought necessarie that one should die suddainly, at an instant, and that they did expose themselues vnto death after a doubtfull maner, by run-

T. 2

ning

ning themselves vpon the points of three iavelins, wherby it fell out, that many were dispatched in their order, vntill there came one that lighted vpon a mortall wound, and died suddenly, accounting him the fittest messenger, and in greatest fauour with their god, and not the rest: as the *Persians*, witnesse that fact of *Amestris* the mother of *Xerxes*, who at one instant buried aliue foureteene yoong men of the best houses, according to the religion of the countrey: as the ancient *Gawles*, the *Carthaginians*, who sacrificed to *Saturne* their children, their fathers and mothers being present: the *Lacedemonians*, who flattered their goddesse *Diana*, by whipping their youths in fauour of her, many times euen to death: the *Greeks*, witnesse the sacrifice of *Iphigenia*: the *Romans*, witnesse the two *Decij*; *qua fuit tanta iniquitas deorum vt placari pop. Rom. non possent, nisi tales viri occidissent*: *Turks*, who so massacre their visage, their breasts, their members, to gratifie their Prophet: the new East and West *Indies*; and in *Themistitan*, where they cement their idols with the blood of children. What madnesse was this, to thinke to flatter the Diuinitie with inhumanitie; to content the Diuine Goodnes with our affliction, and to satisfie the iustice of God with crueltie! Iustice then thirsting after humane blood, innocent blood, drawen and shed with so much paine and torment, *Vt sic dii placentur quemadmodum ne homines quidem saniant*. From whence can this opinion and beleefe spring, that God taketh pleasure in torment, and in the ruine of his works, and humane nature? Following this opinion, of what nature should God be? But all this hath beene abolished thorowout Christendome, as before hath been sayd.

Seneca.

3
They differ. They haue also their differences, their particular articles, wherby they are distinguished amongst themselves, and euery one preferres it selfe aboue the rest, assuring himselfe it is the better, and more true than the rest, reproching the one the other with some things, and so condemne and reiect one another.

4
Christian religion above all. But no man doubteth, neither is it a matter of labour to know which is the truest, the Christian religion hauing so many aduantages and priuileges, so high and so authentically aboue

aboue others, and especially these. It is the subiect of my second veritie, where is shewed how farre all others are inferior vnto it.

Now as they spring vp one after another, the younger doth alwayes build vpon the more ancient and next precedent, ⁵ *The latter are built vpon the former.* which from the toppe to the bottome it doth not wholly disproue & condemn; for then it could not be heard or take footing: but it only accuseth it either of imperfection, or of the end, and that therefore it commeth to succeed it and to perfect it; and so by little and little ouerthroweth it, and enricheth it selfe with the spoiles therof: as the Iudaicall, which hath retained many things of the Gentile Egyptian religion the elder, the Hebrewes not being easily purified of their customes: the Christian built vpon the verities and promises of the Iudaicall; the Turkish vpon them both, retaining almost all the verities of Christ Iesus, except the first and principall, which is his Diuinity: so that if a man will leape from Iudaisme to Mahumatisme, he must passe by Christianity: and such there haue beene among the Mahumatists as haue exposed themselves to torments, to maintaine the trueth of Christian religion, as a Christian would do to maintaine the truth of the Old Testament. But yet the elder and more ancient doe wholly condemne the yonger, and holde them for capitall enemies.

All religions haue this in them, that they are strange and ⁶ *All are strange to nature.* horrible to the common sense; for they propose and are built and composed of parts, whereof some seeme to the iudgement of man base, vnworthy and vnbesitting, wherewith the spirit of man somewhat strong and vigorous, iesteth and sporteth it selfe; others too high, bright, wonderfull, and mysticall, where he can know nothing, wherewith it is offended. Now the spirit of man is not capable but of indifferent things, it contemneth and disdaineth the small, it is astonished and confounded with the great; and therefore it is no maruell if it be hardly perswaded at the first onset to receiue all religion, where there is nothing indifferent and common, and therefore must be drawen thereunto by some occasion: for if it be strong, it disdaineth and laugheth at it; if it be feeble and superstitious, it is astonished and scandalized: *predicamus Iesum crucifixum, Iudæis scandalum, gentibus stultitiam.* Where-

of it comes to passe, that there are so many mis-beleeuers and irreligious persons, because they consult and hearken too much to their owne iudgements, thinking to examine and iudge of the affaires of religion according to their owne capacitie, and to handle it with their owne proper and naturall instruments. We must be simple, obedient, and debonaire, if we will be fit to receiue religion, to beleeue and liue vnder the law, by reuerence and obedience to subiect our iudgement, and to suffer our selues to be led and conducted by publike authoritie, *Captiuantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei.*

But it was required so to proceed, otherwise religion should not be respected and had in admiration as it ought; now it is necessarie that it be receiued and sworne to, as well authentically and reuerentlie, as difficultlie: If it were such as were whollie pleasing to the palat and nature of man without strangenes, it would be thought more easily, yet lesse reuerently receiued.

7
Why they
are not to be
gotten by hu-
mane means.

Now the religions and beliefs being such as hath been said, strange vnto the common sense, very farre exceeding all the reach and vnderstanding of man, they must not, nor cannot be gotten nor fetled in vs by naturall and humane meanes (for then among so many great minds as there haue been rare and excellent, some had attained thereunto) but it must needs be, that they be giuen vs by extraordinarie and heauenlie reuelation, gotten and receiued by diuine inspiration, and as sent from heauen. In this maner likewise all do affirme, that they hold their religion and beleeue it, not from men, or any other creature, but from God.

8
And yet they
are gotten
by humane
meanes.

But to say the truth and not to flatter or disguise, this is nothing; they are, whatsoeuer some say, held by humane hands and meanes, which is true in euery respect, in false religions, being nothing but prayers, and humane or diabolical inuentions: the true, as they haue another iurisdiction, so are they both receiued and held by another hand; neuerthelesse we must distinguish. As touching the receiuing of them, the first and generall publication and installation of them hath beene *domino cooperante, sermonem confirmante sequentes signis*, diuine and wonderfull, the particular is done by humane hands and meanes; the nation, countrie, place, giues the religion,

gion, and that a man professeth which is in force in that place and among those persons where he is borne, and where he liueth; He is circumcised, baptised, a Jew, a Christian, before he knowes that he is a man; for religion is not of our choyce or election, but man without his knowledge is made a Jew or a Christian, because he is borne in Iudaisme or Christianitie; and if he had been borne elsewhere among the Gentiles, or Mahumetans, he had bene likewise a Gentile or a Mahumetan. As touching the obseruation, the true and good professors thereof, besides the outward profession, which is common to all, yea to misbeleeuers, they attribute to the gift of God, the testimonie of the Holy Ghost within; but this is a thing not common nor ordinarie, what faire colour soeuer they giue it, witness the liues and maners of men, so ill agreeing with their beleefe, who for humane occasions and those very light, goe against the tenor of their religion. If they were held & planted with a diuine hand, nothing in the world could shake vs, such a tye would not be so easily broken: If it had any touch or ray of diuinitie, it would appeare in all, it would produce wonderfull effects that could not be hid, as Truth it selfe hath said, If you haue but as much faith as a mustard seed, you should remoue mountaines. But what proportion or agreement is there betwixt the perswasion of the immortalitie of the soule, and a future reward so glorious and blessed, or so inglorious and accursed, and the life that a man leadeth? The only apprehension of those things that a man saith he doth firmly beleeeue, wil take his senses from him: The only apprehension and feare to die by iustice, and in publike place, or by some other shamefull and dishonorable action, hath made many to lose their senses, and cast them into strange trances: and what is that in respect of the worth of that which religion teacheth vs is to come? But is it possible in truth to beleeeue, to hope for that immortalitie so happie, and yet to feare death a necessarie passage thereunto? to feare and apprehend that infernall punishment, and liue as we do? These are things as incompatible as fire and water. They say they beleeeue it, they make themselves beleeeue they beleeeue it, and they will make others beleeeue it too; but it is nothing, neither do they know what it is to beleeeue. For a beleefe, I meane such as

the scripture calleth historicall, is diabolicall, dead, informed, vnprofitable, and which many times doth more hurt than good: Such beleeuers (saith an ancient Writer) are mockers and impostors; and another saith, that they are in one respect, the most fierce and glorious, in another the most loose, d'solute, and villanous of the world; more than men in the articles of their beleefe, and worse than swine in their liues. Doubtlesse if we hold our selues vnto God, and our religion, I say not by a diuine grace as we should, but only after a simple and common maner, as we beleue a historie, or a friend or companion, wee should place them farre aboue all other things for that infinite goodnesse that shineth in them, at the least they should be put in the same ranke or degree with honour, riches, friends. Now there are very few that doe not feare lesse to commit an offence against God, and any point of his religion, than against his father, his master, his friend, his equalls. All this hurteth not the dignitie, puritie, and height of Christianitie, no more than the dunghill infecteth the beames of the Sunne, which shines vpon it; for as one saith, *Fides non à personis, sed contrà*: But a man cannot pronounce so great a *Va* against those false hypocrites, whom Verity it selfe so much condemneth, as they belch out of their owne mouthes against themselues.

Matth. 23.

9
A distinction
betwixt
the true and
false reli-
gion.

Tacit.

The better to know true pietie, it is necessarie first to separate it from the false, fained and counterfette, to the end wee may not equiuocate as the most part of the world doth. There is nothing that maketh a fairer shew, and that taketh greater paines to resemble true pietie and religion, and yet that is more contrarie and enemy thereunto, than superstition: like the Woulfe, which doth not a little resemble the dogge, but yet hath a spirit and humour quite contrarie: and the flatterer who counterfetteth a zealous friend, and is nothing lesse; or like false coine which maketh a more glittering shew than the true. *Gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus aduersa*. It is likewise enuious and ieaious like an amorous adulteresse, who with her smooth speeches makes shew of greater affection, and care of the husband, than the true and lawfull wife, whom she endeouoreth to make odious vnto him. Now the notable differences of these two are, that religion loueth
and

and honoureth God, setleth a man in peace and rest, and lodgeth in a liberall, free and generous soule : Superstition troubleth a man, and makes him wild, and iniureth God himselfe, teaching to feare with horror and astonishment, to hide himselfe, and to flie from him, if it were possible ; it is a weake, poore, and base malady of the soule ; *Superstitio error insanus*, August.
amandos timet, quos colit violat : morbus pusilli animi, qui superstitione imbutus est, quietus esse nusquam potest. Varro ait Deum a religioso vereri, a supersticioso timeri. Let vs speake of them both apart.

A superstitious man suffereth neither God nor man to liue in peace. Hee apprehendeth God as one anxious, spitefull, hardly contented, easily moued, with difficulty appeased, examining our actions after the humane fashion of a seuerer Iudge, that watcheth our steps ; which he prooueth true by his maner of seruing him, which is all after one fashion. He trembleth for feare, he is neuer secure, fearing hee neuer doth well enough, and that he hath left something vndone, by the omission whereof all is worth nothing that he hath done ; hee doubteth whether God be well content, and laboureth to flatter him, to the end he may appease and winne him ; he importuneth him with praiers, vowes, offerings ; he faineth to himselfe miracles, easily beleeueth and receiue such as are counterfitted by others, and interpreteth all things though purely naturall, as expresse sent and done by God ; and runneth after whatsoeuer a man saith with all the care that may be, *duo superstitionis propria, nimius timor, nimius cultus.* What is all this but by punishing himselfe, vilely, basely, and vnworthily to deale with God, and more mechanically, than a man would doe with a man of honour ? Generally al superstition and fault in religion, proceedeth from this, that wee make not that account of God that we should, we reuoke him, and compell him into order, wee iudge of him according to our selues, we put vpon him our humours. O what blasphemie is this !

Now this vice and malady is almost naturall vnto vs, and we haue all a kind of inclination thereunto. *Plutarch* deplo-
 reth the infirmity of man, who neuer knoweth how to keepe a measure, or to settle himselfe vpon his feet : for it leaneth and degenerateth

IO
 Superstition
 described.

II
 It is natu-
 rall.

degenerateth either into superstition and vanitie, or into a contempt and carelesnesse of diuine things. We are like to an ill aduised husband, besotted and coufened with the coyning subtilties of a light woman, with whom he conuerseth more by reason of hir artificiall flatteries, than with his honest spouse, who honoreth and serueth him with a simple and naturall shamefastnes: and euen so superstition pleaseth vs more than true religion.

12
Popular.

Plutarch. in
sectorio.

It is likewise vulgar, it proceedeth from a weaknesse of the soule, an ignorance or mis-knowledge of God, and that very grosse, and therefore it is most commonly found in children, women, old men, sick and such as haue been assaulted with some violent accident. To be brieft, it is in barbarous natures, *Inclinant natura ad superstitionem barbari.* Of this then it is said, and not of true religion, that it is true that *Plato* affirmeth, that the weaknesse and idlenesse of men hath brought in religion, and made it preuaile, whereby children, women, and old men should be most capable of religion, more scrupulous and deuout: this were to wrong true religion to giue it so poore and fraile a foundation.

13
Nourished
and main-
tained by
humane
reason.

Curtius.

Besides these seeds and naturall inclinations to superstition, there are many that shake hands with it, and fauour it greatly for the great gaine and profit they receiue by it. Great men likewise and mightie, though they know what it is, will not trouble nor hinder it, because they know it is a very fit instrument to leade a people withall, and therefore they do not only enflame and nourish that which is alreadie grafted in nature, but when neede requireth they forge and inuent new, as *Scipio, Sertorius, Sylla*, and others, *qui faciunt animos humiles formidine diuū, depressosq; premunt ad terram. Nulla res multitudinem efficacius regit, quam superstitio.*

14
An entrance
to the dis-
course of
true religion.

Now quitting our selues of this foule and base superstition (which I would haue him to abhorre, whom I desire to instruct vnto wisdom) let vs learne to guide our selues to true religion and pietie, whereof I will giue some grounds and pourtraies as lesser lights thereunto. But before we enter thereinto, let me heere say in generall, and by way of preface, that of so many diuers religions, and maners of seruing God, which are, or may be in the world, they seeme to be the most noble,

noble, and to haue greatest appearance of truth, which without great externall and corporall seruice, draw the soule into it selfe, and raise it by pure contemplation to admire and adore the greatnesse and infinite maiestie of the first cause of all things, and the essence of essences, without any great declaration or determination thereof, or prescription of his seruice; but acknowledging it indefinitely, to be goodnes, perfection, and infinitnes, whollie incomprehensible & not to be known, as the *Pythagoreans*, and most famous Philosophers do teach. This is to approach vnto the religion of the angels, and to put in practise that word of the sonne of God, to adore in spirit and truth, for God accounteth such worshippers the best. There are others on the other side, and in another extremitie, who will haue a visible Deitie, capable by the senses, which base and grosse error hath mocked almost all the world, euen Israel in the desert, in framing to themselves a molten calfe. And of these they that haue chosen the sunne for their god, seeme to haue more reason than the rest, because of the greatnes, beautie, and resplendent and vnknowne vertue thereof, euen such as enforce the whole world to the admiration and reuerence of it selfe. The eye seeth nothing that is like vnto it, or that approacheth neere vnto it in the whole vniuerse, it is one sunne, and without companion. Christianitie, as in the middle, tempereth the sensible and outward with the insensible and inward, seruing God with spirit and body, and accommodating it selfe to great and little, whereby it is better established, and more durable. But euen in that too, as there is a diuersitie, and degrees of soules, of sufficiencie and capacitie of diuine grace; so is there a difference in the maner of seruing of God; the more high & perfect incline more to the first maner more spirituall and contemplatiue, and lesse externall, the lesse and imperfect *quasi sub pedagogo* remaine in the other, and do participate of the outward and vulgar deformities.

Religion consisteth in the knowledge of God, and of our selues: (for it is a relative action betweene both) the office thereof is to extoll God to the vttermost of our power, and to beate downe man as low as low may be, as if he were vtterly lost, and afterwards to furnish himselfe with meanes to rise againe, to make him feeble his misery & his nothing, to the end
he

15

Diuers descriptions of religion.

he may put his whole confidence in God alone.

16

The office of religion is to ioyne vs to the author and principall cause of all our good, to reunite, and fasten man to his first cause, as to his roote, wherein so long as he continueth firme and settled, he preferueth himselfe in his owne perfection; and contrariwise when he is separated, he instantly faineth and languisheth.

17

The end and effect of religion is faithfullie to yeeld all the honor and glorie vnto God, and all the benefit vnto man. All good things may be reduced to these two; The profit, which is an amendment, and an essentiall and inward good, is due vnto poore, wretched, and in all points miserable man: the glory, which is an outward ornament, is due vnto God alone, who is the perfection and fulnes of all good, whereunto nothing can be added, *Gloria in excelsis Deo, & in terra pax hominibus.*

18

An instruction
to pietie.

1. To know
God.

Thus much being first knowen, our instruction to pietie is first to learn to know God: for from the knowledge of things proceedeth that honor we do vnto them. First then we must beleue that he is, that he hath created the world by his power, goodnesse, wisdom, and that by it he gouerneth it; that his prouidence watcheth ouer all things, yea the least that are; that whatsoeuer he sendeth vs is for our good, and that whatsoeuer is euill proceedeth from our selues. If we account those fortunes euill that he sendeth vs, we blaspheme his holy name, because naturally we honour those that do vs good, and hate those that hurt vs. We must then resolute to obey him, and to take all in good part which commeth from his hand, to commit and submit our selues vnto him:

19

2. To honor
him.

Secondly, we must honour him: and the most excellent and deuoutest way to doe it, is first, to mount vp our spirits from all carnall, earthly, and corruptible imagination, and by the chastest, highest and holiest conceits exercise our selues in the contemplation of the Diuinitie; and after that we haue adorned it, with all the most magnificall and excellent names and praises that our spirit can imagine, that we acknowledge that we haue presented nothing vnto it woorthy it selfe: but that the fault is in our weaknesse and imbecillitie, which can conceiue nothing more high. God is the last endeavour and highest

highest pitch of our imagination, every man amplifying the Idea according to his owne capacitie, and to speake better, God is infinitely above all our last and highest endowments and imaginations of perfection.

Againe, we must serue him with our heart and spirit, it is the seruice answerable to his nature: *Deus spiritus est: si Deus est animus, sit tibi pura mente colendus.* It is that which he requieth, that which pleaseth him: *Prior tales quare adoratores.* The most acceptable sacrifice vnto his Maiestie, is a pure, free, and humble heart: *Sacrificium Deo spiritus.* An innocent soule, an innocent life: *Optimus animus, pulcherrimus Dei cultus: religiosissimus cultus inuicem: unus Dei cultus, non esse malum.* A wise man is a true sacrifice of the great God, his spirit is his temple, his soule is his image, his affections are his offerings, his greatest and most solemne sacrifice, is to imitate him, to serue and implore him: for it is the part of those that are great, to giue; of those that are poore, to aske: *Beatus dare quam accipere.*

Neuerthelesse, we are not to contemne and disdain the outward and publike seruice, which must be as an assistant to the other; by obseruing the ceremonies, ordinances and customs with moderation without vanity, without ambition, or hypocrisie; without auarice, & alwaies with this thought, That God wil be serued in spirit: and That that which is outwardly done, is rather for our selues than for God; for humane vnitie and edification than for diuine veritie: *qua potius ad morem quam ad rem pertinent.*

Our vowes and prayers vnto God should be all subiect vnto his will: we should neither desire nor aske any thing, but as he hath ordeined, hauing alwayes for our bridle, *Fiat voluntas tua.* To aske any thing against his providence, is to corrupt the Iudge and Governour of the world; to thinke to flatter him, and to winne him by presents and promises, is to wrong him. God doth not desire our goods: neither, to say the truth, haue we any: all is his: *non accipiam de domo tua vitulos, &c. meus est enim orbis terra, & plenitudo eius:* but his will is, that we only make our selues fit to receiue from him, neuer expecting that we should giue vnto him, but aske and receiue: for it is his office to giue as being great, and it belongeth

20

3. To serue him in spirit.

Seneca.
Lactan.
Merc.
Trism.

21

4. To serue him with our bodies.

22

5. To pray vnto him.

geth to man as being poore and needie to beg and to receiue; to prescribe vnto him that which we want, and we will, is to expose our selues to the inconueniences of *Midas*, but that is alwayes best, which pleaseth him best. To be brieft, we must thinke, speake, and deale with God, as if all the world did behold vs; we must liue and conuerse with the world, as if God saw vs.

23
Well to vse
his name.

It is not with respect to honour the name of God as we ought, but rather to violate it, lightly and promiscuously to mingle it in all our actions and speeches, as it were by acclamation or by custome, either not thinking thereof, or cursorily to passe him over; we must speake of God and his works soberly, but yet seriously with shamesfastnes, feare, and reuerence, and neuer presume to iudge of him.

24
The conclu-
sion.

And thus much summarily of pietie, which should be in high esteeme, contemplating alwaies God, with a free, cheerful, and filiall soule, not walde, nor troubled, as the superstitious are. Touching the particularities as well of the beleefe as obseruation, it is necessarie that we tye our selues to the Christian, as to the true, more rich, high, and honorable to God, commodious and comfortable to man, as we haue shewed in our second Veritie; and therein remaining, we must with a sweet submission submit and settle our selues to that which the Catholike Church in all times hath vniuersally held, and holdeth, and not intangling our selues with nouelties, or selected and particular opinions, for the reasons set downe in my third Veritie, and especiallie in the first & last Chapters, which may suffice vnto him, that cannot, or will not reade the whole booke.

25
An aduise-
ment to ioyne
pietie and
probitie to-
gether.

Let me only giue this one aduice necessarie for him that intendeth to be wise, and that is, not to separate pietie from true honestie, whereof we haue spoken before, and so content himselfe with one of them, much lesse to confound and mingle them together. These are two things very different, & which haue diuers iurisdictions, pietie and probitie, religion and honestie, deuotion and conscience; I will that both of them be iointly in him whom I heere instruct, because the one cannot be without the other entire and perfect, but confused. Behold heere two rocks whereof we must take heed, and few there be
that

that know them, to separate them, and so rest contented with the one, to confound and mingle them, in such sort, that the one be the jurisdiction of the other.

The first that separate them, and that haue but one of them, are of two sorts, for some doe wholly give themselves to the worship and seruice of God, taking no care at all of true ver- tue and honestie, whereof they haue no taste; a vice noted as naturall to the Iewes especiallie (a race aboue all others super- stitious, and for that cause odious to all) and much displayed by their prophets, and afterwards by the *Messias*, who repro- ched them, that of their temple they had made a denne of theeues, a cloake and excuse for many wickednesses, which they perceived not; so were they besotted with this outward deuotion, wherein putting their whole confidence, they thought themselves discharged of all dutie, yea they were made more hardie to do any wickednesse. Many are touched with this feminine and popular spirit, wholly attentue to those small exercises of outward deuotion, whereby they are made neuer the better; from whence came that proverbe, *An angell in the Church, a diuell in the house*; they lend the shew and outward part vnto God, like the Pharises, they are sepul- chers, white walles, *populus hic labijs me honorat, cor eorum lon- ge à me*; yea they make pietie a couer for impietie, they make it (as they say) an occupation or a merchandize, and alleadge their offices of deuotion, to extenuate and recompence their sinne and iniquitie. Others quite contrary make no account but of vertue and honestie, little caring for any thing that be- longs to religion, a fault of many Philosophers, and which is likewise too common amongst our Atheists. These are two vitious extremities, but which is the more or the lesse ex- treame, or which of the two is the more worthe, religion, or honestie, it is not my purpose to determine; I will only say (to compare them in three points) that the first is far more easie, of greater shew, of simple and vulgar spirits: the second is far more difficult and laborious in the performance, of lesse shew, of spirits valiant and generous.

I come to others, who differ not much from the first, who take no care but of religion. They peruert all order, and trouble all, confounding honestie, religion, the grace of God

26
Of those
which haue
piety with-
out probitie.

Matth. 15.
and 22.

27
A compari-
son.

28
Against
those that
confound
pietie and
(as probitie.

(as hath beene said before) whereby it comes to passe that they haue neither true honestie, nor true religion, nor consequently the grace of God; as they thinke, a people only content with themselves; and ready to censure and condemne others, *qui confidunt in se, & aspernant alios*. They thinke that religion is a generalitie of all good and of all vertue, that all vertues are contained in it, and necessarily follow it, whereby they acknowledge no other vertue nor honestie but that which is opened with the key of religion. Now it is quite contrarie; for religion which is the latter, is a speciall and particular vertue, distinguished from all other vertues, which may be without them and without probitie, as hath beene said of the Pharisees, religious and wicked; and they without religion, as in many Philosophers good and vertuous, but yet irreligious. It is likewise, as all diuinitie teacheth, a morall humane vertue, appertaining to iustice, one of the foure cardinall vertues, which teacheth vs in generall to giue vnto euery one that which belongeth vnto him, reseruing to euery one his place. Now God being aboue all, the vniuersall author and master; wee must giue vnto him all soueraigne honour, seruice, obedience, and this subalterne religion, and the *Hypothesis* of iustice, which is the generall *Thesis*, more ancient and naturall. They on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that religion (which is acquired and gotten by an outward cause, *ex auditu; Quomodo credent sine predicante?*) engendreth honestie, which we haue shewed should proceed from nature, from that law and light which God hath put into vs, from our first beginning. This is an inuerred order. These men will that a man be an honest man, because there is a Paradise and a hell: so that if they did not feare God, or feare to be damned (for that is often their language) they would make a goodly peece of worke. O miserable honestie! What thanks deseruest thou, for that thou doest? ô cowardly and idle innocencie, *qua nisi metum non placeat*! Thou keepest thy selfe from wickednesse, because thou darest not be wicked, and thou fearest to be beaten, and euen therein art thou wicked, *Oderunt peccare mali formidine pœne*. Now I will that thou dare, but yet that thou wilt not though thou be neuer chidden; I will that thou be an honest man,

Thom. p. 2.
2. q. 81.

man, not because thou wouldest goe to paradise, but because nature, reason, God willeth it, because the law and the generall policy of the world, whereof thou art a part, requireth it; so as that thou canst not consent to be any other, except thou goe against thy selfe, thy essence, thy end. Doubtlesse such honestie occasioned by the spirit of religion, besides that it is not true and essentiall, but accidentall, it is likewise very dangerous, producing many times very base and scandalous effects (as experience in all times hath taught vs) vnder the faire and glorious pretext of piety. What execrable wickednesses hath the zeale of religion brought foorth? Is there any other subiect or occasion that hath yeelded the like? It belongeth to so great and noble a subiect, to worke great and wonderfull effects:

Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum

Quae peperit saepe scelerosa atq; impia facta.

Not to loue him, yea to look vpon him with a wicked eie, as a man should looke vpon a monster, that beleueth not as he beleueth. To think to be polluted by speaking, or conuersing with him, is one of the sweetest and most pleasing actions of these kind of people. Hee that is an honest man by scruple, and a religious bridle, take heed of him, and account of him as he is. And he that hath religion without honestie, I will not say he is more wicked, but farre more dangerous than he that hath neither the one, nor the other, *Omnis qui interficiet vos, putabit se obsequium prestare Deo*; not because religion teacheth, or any way fauoureth wickednesse, as some very foolishly and malitioussie from this place do obiekt, for the most absurd and falsest religion that is, doth it not; but the reason is, that hauing no taste, nor image, nor conceit of honestie, but by imitation, and for the seruice of religion, and thinking that to be an honest man is no other thing, than to be carefull to aduance religion, they beleue all things whatsoeuer, be it treason, treacherie, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not onlie lawfull and sufferable, being coloured with zeale and the care of religion, but also commendable, meritorious, yea worthy canonization, if it serue for the progresse and aduancement of religion, and the ouerthrow of their aduersaries. The Iewes were wicked and cruell to their parents, vniust to-

wards their neighbors, neither lending, nor paying their debts, and all because they gaue vnto the temple, thinking to be quit of all duties, and reiecting the whole world, by saying

Math. 15. 5.

Marc. 7. 11.

6. Hierom.

Corban.

I will then (to conclude this discourse) that there be in this my wise man a true honestie, and a true pietie, ioyned and married together, and both of them compleat and crowned with the grace of God, which he denieth none that shall aske it of him, *Deus dat spiritum bonum omnibus potentibus eum*, as hath been said in the preface, article the 14.

CHAP. VI.

To gouerne his desires and pleasures.

IT is a principall dutie of a wise man, to know well how to moderate and rule his desires and pleasures; for wholly to renounce them, I am so farre from requiring it in this my wise man, that I hold this opinion to be not only fantastically, but vitious and vnnaturall. First then we must confute this opinion, which banisheth and whollie condemneth all pleasures, and afterwards learne how to gouerne them. See p. 85.

I
The first
part.

An opinion
of the con-
tempt of the
world.

It is a plausible opinion, and studied by those that would seeme to be men of vnderstanding, and professors of singular sanctitie, generally to contemne and tread vnder-foote all sorts of pleasures, and all care of the bodie, retiring the spirit vnto it selfe, not hauing any commerce with the bodie, but eleuating it selfe to high things, and so to passe this life as it were insensiblie neither tasting it, nor attending it. With these kind of people that ordinarie phrase of passing the time, doth very well agree; for it seemeth to them, that well to vse and employ this life, is silently to passe it ouer, and as it were to escape it, and rob themselves of it, as if it were a miserable, burthensome, and tedious thing, being desirous so to slide through the world, as that not only recreations and pastimes are suspected, yea odious vnto them, but also naturall necessities, which God hath seasoned with some pleasure. They come not where any delight is, but vnwillinglie, and being where it is, they hold their breath till they be gone, as if they were in a place of infection: and to be briefe, their life is of-
fensue

fenſiue vnto them, and death a ſolace, pleaſing themſelues with that ſaying, which may be as well ill taken and vnderſtood, as well, *vitam habere in patientia, mortem in deſiderio.*

But the iniquitie of this opinion, may many wayes be ſhewed. Firſt, there is nothing ſo faire and lawfull, as well and ² *Reiected.* duly to play the man, well to know how to leade this life. It is a diuine knowledge & very difficult, for a man to know how he ſhould lawfully enioy his owne eſſence, leade his life according to the common and naturall modell, to his proper conditions, not ſeeking thoſe that are ſtrange; for all thoſe extrauagancies, all thoſe artificiall and ſtudied endeuors, thoſe wandring wayes from the naturall and common, proceede from follie and paſſion: theſe are maladies, without which whileſt theſe men would liue, not by playing the men, but the diuines, they play the fooles; they would transforme themſelues into angels, and they turne themſelues into beaſts: *aut deus aut beſtia: homo ſum, humani à me nihil alienum puto:* Man is a bodie and a ſoule, and it is not well done to diſmember this building, to diuide and ſeparate this brotherlie and naturall coniunction; but contrariwiſe, we ſhould renue it by mutuall offices, the ſpirit muſt awaken and reuiue the heauie bodie, the bodie muſt ſtay the lightnes of the ſpirit, which many times prooues but a trouble-feaſt; the ſpirit muſt aſſiſt and fauor the bodie, as the husband the wife, and not reiect it, not hate it. It muſt not reſuſe to participate the naturall pleaſures thereof, which are iuſt, and ſuch as beſit that mariage that is betwixt them, alwaies holding therein, as the more wiſe, a true moderation. A man muſt ſtudie, know, and meditate on this life, to the end he may returne condigne thanks vnto him who hath lent it. There is nothing which God hath made for vs in this preſent life vnworthie our care, and we are accountable for them, euen to the very haire of our head; for it is no friuolous warrant or commiſſion for a man to direct himſelfe and his life according to his naturall condition, but God hath giuen it him ſeriously and expreſſly.

But what greater follie is there, and more againſt nature, than to account our actions vicious, becauſe they are naturall; vnworthie becauſe they are neceſſarie? Now this neceſſitie and pleaſure is an excellent mariage made by God himſelfe. ³ *Lib. 3. cap. 38. p. 537.*

Nature willeth very wisely, that those actions which it hath enioyned vs for our necessitie, be also delightfull, inuiting vs thereunto not only by reason, but also by appetite; and these rules these kind of men goe about to breake. It is an equall fault and iniustice, to loath and condemne all pleasures, and to abuse them, by louing them ouer-much, we must neither run to them, nor flie from them, but receiue them, and vse them discretely and moderatly, as shall presently be said in the rule. Temperance which is the rule of our pleasures, condemneth as well the insensibilitie and priuation of all pleasure, *stuporem natura*, which is the failing extremitie, as intemperancie, *libidinem*, which is the exceeding extremitie. *Contra naturam est torquere corpus suum, faciles odisse munditias & squallorem appetere: delicatas res cupere luxuria est, uisitas & non magno parabiles fugere dementia est.*

4

He that desireth to discard his soule, let him boldly do it if he can, when his bodie is not in health, but endureth some torment, to the end he may disburthen himselfe of that contagion: but he cannot do it, as likewise he ought not to do it; for to speake according to right and reason, it should neuer abandon the bodie; it is apishnes to do it, it should behold pleasure and sorrow with a like setled countenance, in the one line seuerely, the other cheerefully: but in all cases it should assist the bodie, to maintaine it alwaies in order.

5

To contemne the world, is a braue proposition, and many delight, nay glory to speake, to discourse thereof, but I can not perceiue that they well vnderstand it, much lesse that they practise it: what is it to contemne the world? What is this world? Is it the heauen, the earth, and in a word the creatures that are therein? No I thinke not so; What then? Is it the vse, the profit, the seruice, and commoditie that we gather thereby? If so, what ingratitude is this against the authour that hath made them to these ends? What accusation against nature? What reason to contemne them? If (in the end) thou wilt say that it is neither the one, nor the other, but it is the abuse of them, the vanities, follies, excesse and wickednes that is in the world; I may answere that it were well said, if this were of the world, but they are not so, but against the world, and the policie thereof, they are thy owne additions, not naturall,

turall, but artificiall. To preferue thy selfe from them as wisdom and the rule following teacheth, is not to contemne the world, which remaineth whollie entire without it; but it is well to vse the world, well to gouerne thy selfe in the world, and as diuinitie teacheth, to make vse and benefit of the world, and not to enioy it, *uti, non frui*. Now these kind of people thinke to practise the contempt of the world, by certaine outward particular maners and fashions, separated from the common course of the world: but this is but mockerie; There is nothing in the world so exquisite; the world laugheth not, and is not so wanton within it selfe, as without, in those places where men make profession of flying it, and trampling it vnder foot, which is spoken against hypocrites, who haue so much degenerated from their beginning, that there remaineth nothing but the habit, and is also very much changed, if not in forme, at the least in matter, which serueth them for no other vse, than to puffe them vp, to make them more bold and impudent, which is quite contrarie to their institution, *uæ vobis qui circuitis mare & aridam, ut faciatis unum proselytum, & cum factus fuerit, facitis filium gehennæ*: and not against the good, much lesse against the estate in it selfe which is the schoole of true and holy Philosophie. It is then a fantasticall and vnnatural opinion, generally to reiect and condemne all desires and pleasures. God is the creator and authour of pleasure, *Plantauit dominus paradisum voluptatis, posuit hominem in paradiso voluptatis, protulit omne lignum pulchrum, suauē, delectabile*, as shal be said. But we must first learne how to cary our selues therein.

This instruction may be reduced to foure points (which if these mortified men, and great contemners of the world did know how to put in practise, they would worke wonders) to know little, naturally, moderately, and by a short relation to himselfe. These foure go almost alwayes together, and make an entire and perfect rule, and he that will may gather and comprehend all these foure in this word, Naturally, for nature is the fundamentall and sufficient rule for all. But yet to make the matter more cleare and easie, we will distinguish these foure points. The first point of this rule, is to desire little: A short good, but an assured meanes to braue fortune, taking

6

The second
part the rule
in our pleasures
and
desires.

Little.

from it all accidents, and all power ouer vs to hinder the happy content of our life : and in a word, to be wise, is to shorten our desires, to desire either little, or nothing at all. He that desireth nothing, although he haue nothing, is as rich as he that possesseth the whole world, for both come to one end : *Nihil interest an habeas, an non concupiscas* : and therefore it was well sayd, That it is not multitude and abundance that contenteth and enricheth, but want, yea nothing. It is the want of desire, for he that is poore in desires is rich in contentment, *summa opes inopia cupiditatum*. To be brieft, he that desireth nothing is in some sort like vnto God, and those that are already blessed, who are happy and blessed, not because they haue and possesse all, but because they desire nothing : *qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Ioue de felicitate contendit*. Contrarily, if we let loose the bridle to our appetite to follow abundance and delicacie, we shall continue in perpetuall paine and labour ; superfluous things will become necessarie, our soules will be made slaues to our bodies, and we can liue no longer, than that we liue in pleasure and delight. If we moderate not our pleasures and desires, and measure them not by the compasse of reason, opinion will carie vs into a headlong downfall, where there is neither bottome nor brinke : as for example, we will make our shooes of veluet, afterwards of cloth of golde, and lastly of embroderie with pearles and diamonds ; we will build our houses of marble, afterwards of iasper and porpherie. Now this meane for a man to enrich himselfe, and to make him content, is very iust, and in the power of euery man : he need not to seeke this contentment elsewhere and without himselfe, let him but aske it, and he presently obtaineth it of himselfe. Let him stay the course of his desires ; it is iniustice to importune God, Nature, the world by vowes and prayers, to giue him any thing, since he hath so excellent a meane in his owne power to attaine thereunto. Why should I rather desire another to giue vnto me, than my selfe not to desire ? *Quare potius a fortuna impetrem vt det, quam a me ne petam ? quare autem petam oblitus fragilitatis humane ?* If I can not or will not obtaine of my selfe not to desire, how and with what face can I presse another to giue, ouer whom I haue no right nor power ? The first rule then touching

touching our desires and pleasures is, that this (little) or at least a mediocritie and sufficiencie is that which doth best content a wise man and keepes him in peace. And this is the reason why I haue chosen for my deuice, *Peace and pouertie*. With a foole nothing sufficeth, nothing hath certaintie or content: hee is like the Moone, who asked a garment that might fit it; but it was answered, That that was not possible, because it was sometimes great, sometimes little, and alwaies changeable. Plutarch.

The other point couzen-germane to this, is (naturally): for we know that there are two sorts of desires and pleasures, the one naturall, and these are iust and lawfull, and are likewise in beasts limited and short, whose end a man may see: according to these, no man is indigent, for euery thing yeelds something to content. Nature is contented with little, and hath so provided, that in all things, that which sufficeth is at hand and in our owne power, *parabile est quod natura desiderat* & Seneca. *expositum: ad manum est quod sat est*. It is this which nature demandeth for the preservation of it owne essence, it is a fauour for which we are to thanke Nature, that those things that are necessarie for this life, it hath made easie to finde, and such as are hardly obtained are not so necessarie; and that seeking without passion that which nature desireth, fortune can no way depriue vs of it. To these kinde of desires a man may adde (though they be not truly naturall, yet they come very neere) those that respect the vse and condition of euery one of vs, which are somewhat beyond, and more at large than those that are exactly naturall, and so are iust and lawfull in the second place. The other desires are beyond nature, proceeding from an opinion and fantasie, artificiall, superfluous, and truly passions, which we may to distinguish them by name from others, call cupidities or lusts, whereof we haue spoken before at large in the passions: from which a wise man must wholly and absolutely defend himselfe. 7

The third, which is moderately and without excesse, hath a large field and diuers parts, but which may be drawn to two heads; that is to say, to desire without the hurt of another, of himselfe; of another without his scandall, offence, losse, prejudice; of himselfe, without the losse of his health, 8

his leasure, his functions and affaires, his honour, his duty.

9
By relation.

The fourth is a short and essentiall relation to himselfe; besides that the carriere of our desires and pleasures must be circumscribed, limited, and short, their course likewise must be managed, not in a right line, which makes an end elsewhere and without it selfe; but in a circle, the two points whereof doe meet and end in our selues. Those actions that are directed without this reflexion, and this short and essentiall turning, as of couetous and ambitious men, and diuers others, who runne point blanke, and are alwayes without them, are vaine and vnfound. *see p. 534.*

CHAP. VII.

To carie himselfe moderately and equally in prosperitie and aduersitie.

2

There is a twofolde fortune, wherewith we are to enter the list, good and ill, prosperitie and aduersitie; these are the two combats, the two dangerous times, wherein it standeth vs vpon to stand vpon our guard, and to gather our wits about vs: they are the two schooles, essayes, and touch-stones of the spirit of man.

2
The opinion
of the vul-
gar.

The vulgar ignorant sort doe acknowledge but one: they do not beleue that we haue any thing to do, that there is any difficultie, any fight or contradiction with prosperitie and good fortune; wherein they are so transported with ioy, that they know not what they do, there is no rule with them: and in affliction they are as much astonished and beaten downe as they that are dangerously sicke, and are in continuall anguish, not being able to endure either heat or colde.

3
Which of the
two is more
difficult to
beare, pro-
speritie, or
aduersitie.
Arist.
Senec.

The wise men of the world acknowledge both, and impute it to one and the same vice and follie, not to know how to command in prosperitie, and how to carie our selues in aduersitie: but which is the more difficult and dangerous, they are not wholly of one accord, some saying it is aduersitie, by reason of the horror and bitterness thereof, *difficilius est tristitiam sustinere quam a delectabilibus abstinere: maius est difficultia perstringere quam lata moderari.* Some affirming it to be prosperitie, which by her sweet and pleasing flatteries doth abate

abate and mollifie the spirit, and insensibly robbeth it of it due temperature, force and vigor, as *Dalila* did *Samson*, in such sort that many that are obdurate, obstinate, and inuincible in aduersitie, haue suffered themselues to be taken by the flattering allurements of prosperitie, *magni laboris est ferre prosperitatem: segetem nimia sternit ubertas, sic immoderata felicitas rumpit.* And againe, affliction moueth euen our enemies to pitie, prosperitie our friends to enuie. In aduersitie a man seeing himselfe abandoned by all, and that all his hopes are reduced vnto himselfe, he taketh heart at grasse, he rowzeth himselfe, calles his wits about him, and with all his power addes his owne endeouours to his owne helpe: in prosperitie seeing himselfe assisted by all that laugh at him, and applaud all that he doth, he groweth lazie and carelesse, trusting in others, without any apprehension of danger or difficultie, and perswading himselfe that all is in safetie, when he is many times therein much deceiued. It may be, that according to the diuersitie of natures and complexions both opinions are true: but touching the vtilitie of either, it is certaine, that aduersitie hath this preheminance, it is the seed, the occasion, the matter of well-doing, the field of heroicall vertues, *virescit vulnere virtus, agre fortuna sana consilia melius in malis sapimus, secundare rectum auferunt.*

Now wisdom teacheth vs to holde our selues indifferent and vpright in all our life, and to keepe alwayes one and the same countenance, pleasant and constant. A wise man is a skilfull artificer, who maketh profit of all; of euery matter he worketh and formeth vertue, as that excellent Painter *Phidias*, all maner of images; whatsoeuer lighteth into his hands he maketh it a fit subiect to doe good, and with one and the same countenance hee beholdeth the two different faces of Fortune. *Ad virosque casus sapiens aptus est, bonorum rector, malorum victor: In secundis non confidit, in aduersis non deficit, nec auidus periculi, nec fugax, prosperitatem non expectans, ad utrumque paratus; aduersus utrumque intrepidus, nec illius tumultu, nec huius fulgore percussus. Contra calamitates fortis & contumax, luxurie non aduersus tantum, sed & infestus: hoc principium in humanis rebus exigere animum supra minas & promissa fortune.* Wisdom furnisheth vs with armes and discipline for

4

The aduice
of the wise
vpon both.

for both combats; against aduersitie with a spurre, teaching vs to raise, to strengthen and incite our courage; and this is the vertue of fortitude: against prosperitie, it furnisheth vs with a bridle, and teacheth vs to keepe and clap downe our wings, and to keepe our selues within the bounds of modestie; and this is the vertue of temperancie: these are the two morall vertues, against the two fortunes, which that great Philosopher *Epictetus* did very wel signifie, conteining in two words all morall Philosophie, *sustine & abstine*, beare the euill, that is, aduersitie; abstaine from the good, that is, from pleasure and prosperitie. The particular aduiselements against the particular prosperities and aduersities shall be in the third booke following, in the vertue of fortitude and temperancie. Heere we will only set downe the generall instructions and remedies against all prosperitie and aduersitie, because in this booke we teach the way in generall vnto wisdom, as hath been said in the preface thereof.

5
Of Prosper-
itie.

Against all prosperitie, the common doctrine and counsell consisteth in three points: The first, that honors, riches, and the fauours of fortune, are ill and wrongfullie accounted and called goods, since they neither make a man good, nor reforme a wicked man, and are common both to good and wicked. He that calleth them goods, and in them hath placed the good of man, hath fastned our felicitie to a rotten cable, and ancred it in the quick-sands. For what is there more vncertaine and inconstant, than the possession of such goods, which come and goe, passe and runne on like a riuer? like a riuer they make a noyse at their comming in, they are full of violence, they are troubled; their entrance is full of vexation, and they vanish in a moment; and when they are quite dried vp, there remaineth nothing in the bottome but the mud.

6

The second point is to remember, that prosperitie is like a honnied poison, sweet and pleasant, but dangerous, whereof we must take very good heed. When fortune laugheth, and euery thing falleth out according to our owne hearts, then should we feare most, and stand vpon our gard, bridle our affections, compose our actions by reason, aboue all auoid presumption, which ordinarily followeth the fauour of the time. Prosperitie is a slipperie pafe, wherein a man must take sure footing,

footing, for there is no time wherein men doe more forget God. It is a rare and difficult thing to find a man who doth willingly attribute unto him the cause of his felicitie. And this is the cause why in the greatest prosperitie we must vse the counsell of our friends, and giue them more authoritie ouer vs, than at other times; and therefore we must cary our selues as in an euill and dangerous way, go with feare and doubt, desiring the hand and help of another. In these times of prosperitie, aduersitie is a medicine, because it leadeth vs to the knowledge of our selues.

The third is to retaine our desires, and to set a measure vnto them. Prosperitie puffeth vp the heart, spurreth vs forward, findeth nothing difficult, breedeth alwayes a desire of great matters (as they that by eating get an appetite) and it carrieth vs beyond our selues, and in this state it is where a man loseth himselfe, drowneth & maketh a mockery of himselfe. He playeth the Monkey, who leapeth from bough to bough, till he come to the top of the tree, and then sheweth his taile. O how many haue been lost, and haue perished miserablie, by the want of discretion to moderate themselves in their prosperitie! We must therefore either stay our selues, or go forward with a slower pace, if we will inioy the benefit of our prosperitie, and not hold our selues alwaies in chase and pursuit. It is wisdom to know how to settle our owne rest, our owne contentment, which cannot be where there is no stay, no end. *Si qua finire non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt.* See *infr.* p. 931, & 933.

Against all aduersitie, these are the generall aduise-
ments. In the first place, we must take heed of the common and vulgar opinion, erroneous and alwaies different from true reason, for to discredit and to bring into hatred and horror all aduersitie and afflictions, they call them euils, disasters, mischiefs, although all outward things be neither good nor euill. Neuer did aduersitie make a man wicked, but hath rather serued as a meane to mend those that are wicked, and are common both to the good and to the wicked. Doubtlesse, crosses and heauie accidents are common to all, but they worke diuers effects, according to that subject whereupon they light. To fooles and reprobate persons they serue to drine them into despaire, to afflict and enrage them:

Perhaps

Perhaps they enforce them (if they be heauie & extreame) to stoope, to crie vnto God, to looke vp vnto Heauen; but that is all: To sinners and offenders they are so many liuely instructions, and compulsions to put them in minde of their dutie, and to bring them to the knowledge of God: To vertuous people, they are the lists and theaters wherein to exercise their vertue, to winne vnto themselves greater commendations and a neerer alliance with God: To wise men they are matter of good, and sometimes stages and degrees whereby to passe and mount vp to all height and greatnesse, as wee see and may read of diuers, who being assailed by such and so great crosses, as a man would haue thought them their vtter ouerthrow and vndoing, haue beene raised by the selfesame meanes to the highest pitch of their owne desires, and contrariwise without that infelicitie, had still remained vnder hatches, as that great Athenian Captaine knew well when hee said, *perieramus nisi perissemus*. A very excellent example heereof was *Ioseph* the sonne of *Iacob*. It is true that these are blowes from heauen, but the vertue and wisdom of man serueth as a proper instrument, from whence came that wise saying of the Sages, *To make of necessitie a vertue*. It is a very good husbandrie, and the first propertie of a wise man, to draw good from euill, to handle his affaires with such dexterity, and so to winne the winde, and to set the bias, that of that which is ill, he may make good vse, and better his owne condition.

IO Afflictions and aduersities proceede from three causes, which are the three authors & workers of our punishments; *It hath three causes and three effects.* sinne the first inuentor which hath brought them into nature; the anger and iustice of God, which setteth them a worke as his Commissaries and executioners; the policie of the world troubled and changed by sinne, wherein as a generall reuolt, and cruell tumult, things not being in their due places, and not doing their office, all euils do spring and arise; as in a body the disioining of the members, the dislocation of the bones bringeth great paine, and much vnquietnesse. These three are not fauourable vnto vs, the first is to be hated of all as our enemy, the second to be feared as terrible, the third to be auoided as an imposture. That a man may the better defend

fend and quit himfelfe from all three, there is no better way than to ufe their owne proper armes, wherewith they punifh vs, as *David* cut off *Goliaths* head with his owne fword, making of neceffity a vertue, profit of paine and affliction, turning them againft themfelues. Affliction is the true fruit or fciſce of finne, being well taken is the death and ruine thereof, and it doth that to the author therof, which the viper doth to his damme that brought him foorth. It is the oile of the Scorpion, which healeth his owne ſting, to the end it may periſh by it owne inuention: *perijt arte ſua: patimur quia peccauimus: patimur vt non peccemus*. It is the file of the ſoule, which ſcoureth, purifieth and clenſeth it from all finne. And conſequently it appeaſeth the anger of God, and freeth vs from the priſons and bands of Iuſtice, to bring vs into the faire and cleare ſun-ſhine of grace and mercy. Finally, it weaneth vs from the world, it plucketh vs from the dug, and maketh vs diſtaſte with the bitterneſſe thereof, like wormwood vpon the teat of the nurſe, the ſweet milke and food of this deceitfull world.

A great and principall meane for a man to carrie himſelfe well in aduerſitie, is to be an honeſt man. A vertuous man is more peaceable in aduerſitie, than a vitious in proſperitie: like thoſe that haue a feuer, who feele and find more harme and violence in the heat and cold thereof, and in the extremitie of their fittes, than ſuch as are found in the heat and cold of Summer and Winter. And euen ſo they that haue their conſciences ſicke, are much more tormented, than they that are ſound, that are honeſt men. For hauing the inward part whole and healthfull, they can no way bee endangered by the outward, eſpecially oppoſing againſt it a good courage.

Aduerſities are of two ſorts: ſome are true and naturall, as ſicknelle, griefes, loſſe of thoſe things we loue: others are falſe and fained, either by a common or particular opinion, and not in veritie. That it is ſo, man hath his ſpirit and body as much at command, as before they hapned. To theſe kind of men, only this one word; That which thou complaineſt of, is neither painfull nor troubleſome, but thou makeſt it ſuch, and makeſt thy ſelfe to belecue it.

As

11

A generall
advice.

12

An aduice
more ſpeciall.

13
Naturall.

To endure is
naturall and
humane.

As touching the true and naturall, the more prompt and popular and more sound opinions are the more naturall and more iust. First we must remember, that a man indureth nothing against the humane and naturall law, since euen at the birth of man all these things are annexed, and giuen as ordinarie. In whatsoeuer doth afflict vs, let vs consider two things, the nature of that that hapneth vnto vs, and that which is in our selues: and vsing things according to nature, we can receiue no tediousnesse or offence thereby. For offence is a maladie of the soule contrarie to nature, and therefore should by no meanes come neere vnto vs. There is not any accident in the world which may happen vnto vs, wherein nature hath not prepared an aptnesse in vs to receiue it, and to turne it to our contentment. There is no maner of life so strait that hath not some solace and recreation. There is no prison so strong and darke that giues not place to a song sometimes to comfort a prisoner. *Jonas* had leasure to make his prayers vnto God euen in the bellie of the Whale, and was heard. It is a fauor of nature that it findeth a remedie and ease vnto our euils in the bearing of them, it being so that man is borne to be subiect to all sorts of miseries, *omnia ad quae gemimus, quae expanescimus tributa vita sunt.*

14
It toucheth
but the lesser
part of man.

Secondly, we must remember, that there is only the lesser part of man subiect to fortune; we haue the principall in our owne power, and it cannot be ouercome without our owne consent. Fortune may make a man poore, sick, afflicted, but not vitious, dissolute, deiected; it cannot take from vs probitie, courage, vertue.

15
It is not a-
gainst reason
and iustice.

Afterwards we must come to fidelitie, reason, iustice. Many times a man complaineth vniustlie, for though he be sometimes surprised with some ill accident, yet he is more often with a good, and so the one must recompence the other. And if a man consider well thereof, he shall find more reason to content himselfe with his good fortunes, than to complaine of his bad: and as we turne our eyes from those things that offend vs, and delight to cast them vpon greene and pleasant colours, so must we diuert our thoughts from heauie and melancholike occurrents, and applie them to those that are pleasant and pleasing vnto vs. But we are malicious resembling cupping-

cupping-glasses, which draw the corrupt bloud, and leaue the good; like a couetous man who selleth the best wine, and drinks the worst, like little children, from whom if you take away one of their play-games, in a furie they cast away all the rest. For if any misfortune happen vnto vs, we torment our selues, and forget all the rest that may any way comfort vs: yea some there are that for small losses terme themselves vnfortunate in all things, and forget that they euer receiued any good, in such sort that an ounce of aduersitie brings them more hartie grieffe then ten thousand of prosperitie, pleasure or delight.

We must likewise cast our eyes vpon those that are of a far worse condition than our selues, who would thinke themselves happie if they were in our place.

16
It is little in
comparison.

*Cum tibi displiceat rerum fortuna tuarum,
Alterius specta, quo sis discrimine peior.*

It were good and necessarie that these complainers did practise the saying and aduice of a wise man, that if all the euils that men suffer should be compared with the blessings they enioy, the diuision being equallie made, they may see by the ouerplus of that good they enioy, the iniustice of their complaint.

17

After all these opinions, we may conclude that there are two great remedies against all euils and aduersities, which may be reduced almost to one: Custom for the vulgar and baser sort, and meditation for the wiser. Both of them haue their force from time, the common and strongest salve against all euils; but the wise take it before hand, this is foresight, and the feeble and vulgar sort after hand. That Custom preuaileth much it doth plainly appeare, in that those things that are most tedious and offensive, are made thereby easie and pleasing. *Natura calamitatum mollimentum consuetudinem inuenit.* Slaues weepe when they enter into the gallies, and before three months be ended they sing. They that haue not beene accustomed to the sea, are afeard, though it be at the calmest, when they wey anckor, whereas the mariners laugh in the midst of a tempest. The wife groweth desperate at the death of hir husband, and before a yeare be expired she loues another. Time and Custom brings all things to passe; that

that which offendeth vs is the noueltie of that which happeneth vnto vs, *omnia nouitate grauiora sunt.*

18
Forefight or
prouidence.

See p. 141

Meditation performeth the same office with wise men, and by the force thereof things are made familiar and ordinarie, *quæ alij diu patiendoleuia faciunt, sapiens leuia facit diu cogitando.* Hee considereth exactly the nature of all things that may offend him, and presenteth vnto himselfe whatsoeuer may happen vnto him most grieuous and insupportable, as sicknelle, pouerty, exile, iniuries, and examineth in them all that which is according to nature or contrary to it. For forefight or prouidence is a great remedy against all euils, which cannot bring any great alteration or change, hapning to a man that attendeth them; whereas contrarily they wound and hurt him greatly, that suffereth himselfe to bee surprised by them. Meditation and discourse is that which giueth the true temper to the soule, prepareth it, confirmeth it against all assaults, makes it hard, steely, impenetrable against whatsoeuer would wound or hurt it. Sudden accidents how great soeuer, can giue no great blow to him that keepes himselfe vpon his guard, and is alwaies readie to receiue them, *præmeditati mali mollis ictus venit: quicquid expectatum est diu, leuius accidit.* Now to attaine this foresight, we must first know that nature hath placed vs heere, as in a thorny and slipppery place; that that which is happened vnto another, may also light vpon vs; that that which hangeth ouer all, may fall vpon euery one of vs; and that in all the affaires that wee vndertake wee premeditate the inconueniences and euill encounters which may happen vnto vs, to the end wee bee not surprised vnawares. O how much are wee deceiued, and how little iudgement haue we, when wee thinke that that which hapneth to others cannot likewise fall vpon vs! When wee will not bee wary and prouident, for feare lest wee should bee thought fearefull. Contrariwise, if wee take knowledge of things, as reason would haue vs, we would rather wonder that so few crosse happen vnto vs, and that those accidents that follow vs so neare, haue staied so long before they catch vs, and hauing caught vs, how they should handle vs so mildly. He that taketh heede, and considereth the aduersitie of another, as a thing that may happen vnto himselfe, before it shall happen,

happen, is sufficiently armed. We must thinke of all, and expect the worst; they are fooles and ill aduised, that say, I had not thought it. It is an old saying, that he that is suddenly surprised, is halfe beaten, and he that is warned is halfe armed, nay is two against one. A wise man in time of peace makes his preparation for warre: A good mariner before hee goe forth of the hauen, makes prouision of what is necessarie to resist the violence of a tempest; it is too late to prouide against an euill, when it is already come. In whatsoever we are prepared before hand, wee finde our selues apt and admirable, what difficultie soeuer it haue; and contrariwise there is not any thing so easie that doth not hurt and hinder vs, if wee bee but nouelists therein; *Id videndum ne quid inopinatum sit nobis, quia omnia nouitate grauiora sunt*. Doubtlesse it seemeth that if we were so prouident as we should and may be, we should wonder at nothing. That which thou sawest before it came, is hapned vnto thee, why then wonderest thou? Let vs then take a course that accidents doe not surprise vs; let vs euer stand vpon our gard, and foresee what is to come. *Animus aduersus omnia firmendus, ut dicere possimus, non vlla laborum, O virgo, noua mi facies inopinane surgit, Omnia percepi atq; animo mecum ipse peregi. Tu hodie ista denuntias; ego semper denuntiaui mihi: hominem parauit ad humana.* See p. 504, 520.

CHAP. VIII.

To obey and obserue the Lawes, Customes, and Ceremonies of the Country, how and in what sense.

EVEN as a sauage and vntamed beast, will not suffer himselfe to be taken, led, and handled by man, but either flieth and hideth himselfe from him, or armeth himselfe against him, and with furie assaulteth him, if he approach neere vnto him; in such sort that a man must vse force mingled with Art and subtiltie to take and tame him: So follie will not be handled by reason, or wisdom, but striueth and stirreth against it, and addeth follie vnto follie; and therefore it must be taken, and led, like a wilde beast, (that which a man is to a beast, a wise man is to a foole) astonished, feared, and kept short, that with the more ease it may be instructed and won.

I
The beginning, institution and authoritie of the lawes.

August.

Now the proper meane or helpe thereunto, is a great authoritie, a thundring power and grauitie, which may dazell it with the splendor of his lightning, *Sola authoritas est que cogit stultos ut ad sapientiam festinent.* In a popular fight or sedition, if some great, wise, ancient and vertuous personage come in presence, that hath wonne the publike reputation of honour and vertue, presently the mutinous people being stricken and blinded with the bright splendor of this authoritie, are quieted, attending what he will say vnto them.

*Veluti magni in populo cum saepe coorta
Seditio est, sanique animis ignobile vulgus,
Iamque faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:
Tum pietate grauem ac meritis, si forte virum quem
Conspexere, silent, erectisque auribus astant,
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

There is nothing greater in this world than authoritie, which is an image of God, a messenger from Heauen: if it be soueraigne it is called maiestie, if subalterne, authoritie: and by two things it is maintained, admiration and feare mingled together. Now this maiestie and authoritie is first and properly in the person of the soueraigne prince and lawmaker, where it is liuely, actuall and mouing; afterwards in his commandements and ordinances, that is to say, in the law, which is the head of the worke of the prince, and the image of a liuely and originall maiestie. By this are fooles reduced, conducted, and guided. Behold then of what weight, necessitie and vtilitie, authoritie and the law is in the world.

²
Of Custome.

The next authoritie and that which is likest to the law, is custome, which is another powerfull and Emperious mistris; It seafeth vpon this power, and vsurpeth it traiterously and violently, for it planteth this authoritie by little and little, by stealth, as it were insensibly, by a little pleasing, and humble beginning; hauing settled and established it selfe by the helpe of time, it discouereth afterwards a furious and tyrannicall visage, against which there is no more libertie or power left, so much as to lift vp ones eies; It taketh it authoritie from the possession and vse thereof, it increaseth and ennobleth it selfe by continuance like a riuer; it is dangerous to bring it back to his originall fountaine.

Law

Law & custome establish their authoritie diuersly, custome by little and little, with long time, sweetly and without force, ³ *A comparison of them both.* by the common consent of all, or the greater part, and the author thereof are the people. The law springeth vp in a moment with authoritie and power, and taketh his force from him that hath power to command all, yea many times against the liking of the subiects, whereupon some compare it to a tyrant, and custome to a king. Againe, custome hath with it neither reward nor punishment; the law hath them both, at least punishment, neuerthelesse they may mutuallie help and hinder one another. For custome which is but of sufferance, authorized by the soueraigne, is better confirmed: and the law likewise setteth it owne authoritie by possession and vse; and contrariwise custome may be caschiered by a contrarie law, and the law loseth the force thereof by suffering a contrarie custome: but ordinarily they are together, that is law and custome; wise and spirituall men considering it as a law, idiots and simple men as a custome.

There is not a thing more strange, than the diuersitie and strangenes of some lawes and customes in the world; Neither ⁴ *Their diuersitie and strangenesse.* is there any opinion or imagination so variable, so mad, which is not established by lawes and customes in some place or other. I am content to recite some of them, to shew those that are hard of beleefe heerein, how farre this proposition doth go. Yet omitting to speake of those things that belong to religion, which is the subiect where the greatest wonderments and grossest impostures are: but because it is without the commerce of men, and that it is not properly a custome, and where it is easie to be deceiued, I will not meddle with it. See then a brief of those that for the strangenes are best worth the noting. To account it an office of pietie in a certaine age to kill their parents & to eate them. In Innes to pay the shot, by yeelding their children, wiues and daughters to the pleasure of the hoste: publike brothelhouses of males: old men lending their wiues vnto yong: women common: an honor to women to haue accompanied with many men, and to cary their locks in the hembes of their garments: daughters to go with their priue parts vncouered, and married women carefullie to keepe them couered: to leaue the daughters to their pleasures,

pleasures, and being great with child to enforce an abort in the sight and knowledge of all men; but married women to keepe themselves chaste and faithfull to their husbands: women the first night before they companie with their husbands, to receiue all the males of the estate and profession of their husbands, inuited to the mariage, and euer after to be faithfull to their husbands: yong married women to present their virginitie to their prince, before they lie with their husbands: mariages of males: women to go to warre with their husbands: to die and to kill themselves at the decease of their husbands, or shortly after: to permit widowes to marie againe, if their husbands die a violent death, and not otherwise: husbands to be diuorced from their wiues without alledging any cause: to seil them if they be barren, to kill them for no other cause but because they are women, and afterwards to borrow women of others at their neede: women to be deliuered without paine or feare: to kill their children because they are not faire, well featured, or without cause: at meate to wipe their fingers vpon their priuities and their feete: to liue with mans flesh: to eat flesh and fish raw: many men and women to lie together to the number of tenne or twelue: to salute one another by putting the finger to the ground, and afterwards lifting it towards heauen: to turne the back when they salute, and neuer to looke him on the face whom a man will honor: to take into the hand the spittle of the prince: not to speake to the king but at a peepe-hole: in a mans whole life neuer to cut his haire nor nailes: to cut the haire on one side, and the nailes of one hand, and not of the other: men to pisse sitting, women standing: to make holes and pits in the flesh of the face, and the dugs, to hang rings and iewels in: to contemne death, to receiue it with ioy, to sue for it, to pleade in publike for the honor thereof, as for a dignitie and fauour: to account it an honorable buriall to be eaten with dogs, birds, to be boyled, cut in peeces and pounded, and the powder to be cast into their ordinarie drinke.

*Examination
and iudgement.*

When we come to iudge of these customes, that is the complaint and the trouble: the vulgar sort and pedante, are not troubled herewith, for every seditious rout condemneth as barbarous and beastly whatsoeuer pleaseth not their palat, that

that is to say, the common vse and custome of their countrie. And if a man shall tell them, that others do speake and iudge the same of ours, and are as much offended with ours, as we with theirs, they cut a man short after their maner, tearing them beasts and barbarians, which is alwaies to say the same thing. A wise man is more aduised, as shall be said, he maketh not such haste to iudge, for feare lest he wrong his owne iudgment: and to say the truth, there are many lawes and customes which seeme at the first view to be sauage, inhumane, and contrarie to all reason, which if they were without passion, and soundly considered of, if they were not found to be altogether iust and good, yet at the least they would not be without some reason and defence. Let vs take amongst the rest for example the two first which wee haue spoken of, which seeme to be both the strangest and farthest off from the dutie of pietie; to kill their owne parents at a certaine age, and to eat them. They that haue this custome do take it to be a testimonie of pietie and good affection, endeuoring thereby first of meere pitie to deliuer their old parents, not only vnprofitable to themselues and others, but burthensome, languishing, and leading a painfull and troublesome life, and to place them in rest and ease: afterwards giuing them the most worthie and commendable sepulchre, lodging in themselues and their owne bowels the bodies and reliques of their parents, in a maner reuiuing them againe, and regenerating them by a kind of transmutation into their liuing flesh, by the meanes of the digestion and nourishment. These reasons would not seeme ouer-light to him that is not possessed with a contrarie opinion: and it is an easie matter to consider, what crueltie and abomination it had been to these people, to see their parents before their owne eies to suffer such griefe and torment, and they not able to succour them, and afterwards to cast their spoiles to the corruption of the earth, to stench and rottennes, and the foode of wormes, which is the worst that can be done vnto it. *Darius* made a triall, asking some Greekes for what they would be perswaded to follow the custome of the Indians in eating their dead fathers. To whom they answered, that they would not do it for any thing in the world. And on the other side assaying to perswade the Indians to burne

the bodies of their dead parents as the Greekes did, it seemed to them a matter of such difficultie and horror, as that they would neuer be drawne vnto it. I will adde only one other, which concerneth only matter of decencie and comelinesse, and is more light and more pleasant: One that alwaies blew his nose with his hand, being reprehended for inciuitie, in the defence of himselfe, asked what priuiledge that filthie excrement had, that a man must affoord it a faire handkerchiefe to receiue, and afterwards carefullie wrap & fold it vp, which he thought was a matter of greater lothsomnesse than to cast it frō him. So that we see that for all things there may be found some seeming reason, and therefore we are not suddenly and lightlie to condemne any thing.

6
The authoritie thereof.

Gen. 11. 20.
29. 35.
Exod. 6.
Leuit. 28.

Deut. 25.
2. Reg. 12.
3. Reg. 2.

Chrysost.
Ambrose.
August.

But who would belecue how great and imperious the authoritie of custome is? He that said it was another nature, did not sufficientlie expresse it, for it doth more than nature, it conquereth nature: for hence it is that the most beautifull daughters of men draw not vnto loue their naturall parents; nor brethren, though excellent in beautie, winne not the loue of their sisters. This kind of chastitie is not properly of nature, but of the vse of lawes and customes, which forbid them, and make of incest a great sinne, as we may see in the fact not only of the children of *Adam*, where there was an inforced necessitie, but of *Abraham* and *Nachor* brethren; of *Iacob* and *Iudas* Patriarches, *Amram* the father of *Moses*, and other holy men: And it is the law of *Moses* which forbad it in these first degrees; but it hath also sometimes dispensed therewith not only in the colaterall line, and betwixt brothers, and their brothers wiues, which was a commandement, and not a dispensation: and which is more, betweene the naturall brother and sister of diuers wombs, but also in the right line of alliance, that is to say, of the sonne with the mother in law; for in the right line of bloud, it seemeth to be altogether against nature, notwithstanding the fact of the daughters of *Lot* with their father, which neuerthelesse was produced purely by nature, in that extreame apprehension and feare of the end of humane kind, for which cause they haue beene excused by great and learned doctores. Now against nature there is not any dispensation, if God the only superior thereunto giue it not.

not. Finally of casuall incests and not voluntarie the world is full, as *Tertullian* teacheth. Moreouer, custome doth enforce *In Apolog.* the rules of nature, witnes those Physitians who many times leaue the naturall reasons of their arte by their owne authoritie, as they that by custome do liue and sustaine their liues with poyson, Spiders, Emmets, Lizards, Toades, which is a common practise amongst the people of the West Indies. It likewise dulleth our senses, witnes they that liue neere the fall of the riuer of *Nilus*, neere clocks, armories, milles, and the whole world according to some Philosophers, with the sound of a heauenly kind of musick, and the continuall and diuers motions of the heauens dulleth our senses, that we heare not that which we heare. To conclude, (and it is the principall fruit thereof) it ouercommeth all difficultie, maketh things easie that seeme impossible, sweetneth all sower, and therefore by the meanes heereof a man liues in all things content, but yet it mastereth our soules, our beliefs, our iudgements, with a most vniust and tyrannicall authoritie. It doth and vndoeth, authoriseth and disauthoriseth whatsoeuer it please, without rhyme or reason, yea many times against all reason: It establisheth in the world against reason & iudgement all the opinions, religions, beleefs, obseruances, maners, and sorts of life most fantastickall and rude, as before hath been said. And contrarily, it wrongfully degradeth, robbeth, beateth downe in things that are truly great and admirable, their price and estimation, and maketh them base and vile.

Nil adeo magnum, nec tam mirabile quidquam

Principio, quod non cessent mirari omnes

Paulatim. —

So that we see that custome is a thing great and powerfull. *Plato* hauing reprehended a youth for playing at cobnut, or chery-pit, and receiuing this answere from him, That he controuled him for a matter of small moment, replied, My child, custome is not a matter of small moment. A speech wel worth the noting for all such as haue youth to bring vp. But it exerciseth it power with so absolute authoritie, that there is no struing against it, neither is it lawfull to reason, or call into question the ordinances therof: it enchanteth vs in such sort, that it maketh vs beleue that what is without the bounds thereof,

Senec.

thereof, is without the bounds of reason, and there is nothing good and iust, but what it approueth; *ratione non componimur, sed consuetudine abducimur: honestius putamus quod frequentius: recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus fablus.* This is tolerable with idiots and the vulgar sort, who wanting sufficiencie to looke into the depth of things, to trie and to iudge, do well to hold and settle themselves to that which is commonlie held and receiued: but to wise men, who play another part, it is a base thing to suffer themselves to be caried with customes.

7
An aduice.

see p. 233.

Now the aduice which I heere giue vnto him that would be wise, is to keepe and obserue both in word and deede the lawes & customes which he findeth established in the countrie where he is: and in like maner to respect and obey the magistrates and all superiors, but alwaies with a noble spirit, and after a generous maner, and not seruilely, pedanticallie, superstitiously, and withall not taking offence, nor lightly condemning other strange lawes and customes, but freely and foundly iudging and examining the one and the other, as hath been said, and not binding his iudgement and beleefe but vnto reason only. Heereof a word or two.

I
Lawes and
customes are
to be obser-
ued.

In the first place according to all the wisest, the rule of rules, and the generall law of lawes, is to follow and obserue the lawes and customes of the countrie where he is, *νόμοις ἐπειδὴ πῶς ἐγγράφει καλόν*, auoyding carefullie all singularitie, and strange extrauagant particularitie, different from the common and ordinarie; for whatsoeuer it be, it alwaies hurteth and woundeth another, is suspected of follie, hypocrisie, ambitious passion, though perhaps it proceede from a sicke and weake soule. *Non conturbabit sapiens publicos mores, nec populum in se, noxitate vita conuertet.* We must alwaies walke vnder the couert of the lawes, customes, superiours, without disputation or tergiuersation, without vndertaking sometimes to dispence with the lawes, sometimes like a frugall seruant to enhaunce the price.

2
Not for their
iustice and
equity.

But that it be (which is the second rule) out of a good mind and after a good maner; nobly and wisely, neither for the loue nor feare of them, nor for the iustice or equitie that is in them, nor for feare of that punishment that may follow for not obei-
ing

ing them : to be briefe, not of superstition, nor constrained, scrupulous, fearefull seruitude, *eadem qua populus, sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito faciet sapiens*, but freely and simply for publike reuerence, and for their authoritie. Lawes and customes are maintained in credit, not because they are iust and good, but because they are lawes and customes; this is the mysticall foundation of their authoritie, they haue no other; and so is it with superiours, because they are superiours, *quia supra Cathedram sedent*, not because they are vertuous and honest, *qua faciunt, nolite facere*. Hee that obeyeth them for any other cause, obeyeth them not because hee should, this is an euill and a dangerous subiect, it is not true obedience, which must be pure and simple, *unde vocatur depositio discretionis mera executio, abnegatio sui*. Now to goe about to measure one obedience by the iustice and goodnesse of lawes and superiours, were by submitting them to our iudgement, to serue them with processe, and to call our obedience into doubt, and disputation, and consequently the state and the policie according to the inconstancie and diuersitie of iudgements. How many vniust and strange lawes are there in the world, not only in the particular iudgements of men, but of vniuersall reason, wherewith the world hath liued a long time in continuall peace and rest, with as great satisfaction as if they had beene very iust and reasonable? And he that should goe about to change or mend them, would be accounted an enemy to the weale-publike, and neuer bee admitted : The nature of man doth accommodate it selfe to all with the times, and hauing once caught his fish, it is an act of hostilitie to goe about to alter any thing : we must leaue the world where it is, these trouble-houses and newfangled spirits, vnder a pretext of reformation marre all.

All change and alteration of lawes, beleeves, customes and obseruances is very dangerous, and yeeldeth alwaies more euill than good; it bringeth with it certaine and present euils, for a good that is vncertaine and to come. Innouatours haue alwaies glorious and plausible titles, but they are but the more suspected, and they cannot escape the note of ambitious presumption, in that they thinke to see more cleerely than others, and that to establish their opinions, the state, policie,

Against innovations.

policie, peace and publike quiet must be turned topsy turvy.

3
Strange
things are
not lightly
to be con-
demned.

I will not say for all this that hath beene said before, that we must absolutely obey all lawes, all commandements of superiours, for such as a man knoweth euidently to be either against God or nature, hee is not to obey, and yet not to rebell and to trouble the state: how he should gouerne himselfe in such a case shall be taught heereafter, in the obedience due vnto princes; for to say the truth, this inconuenience and infelicitee, is rather, and more common in the commandements of princes, than in the lawes: neither is it sufficient to obey the lawes and superiours because of their worth and merrit, nor seruilely and for feare, as the common and prophane sort doe; but a wise man doth nothing by force or feare, *soli hoc sapienti contingit, ut nil faciat inuitus, recta sequitur, gaudet officio*, he doth that which he should, and keepes the lawes, not for feare of them, but for the loue of himselfe, being iea-lous of his dutie; he hath not to doe with the lawes, to doe well; that is that wherein he differeth from the common sort, who cannot do well, nor know what they ought to do, without lawes; *at in isto & sapienti non est lex posita*. By right a wise man is aboue the lawes, but in outward and publike effect, he is their voluntarie and free obedient subiect. In the third place thereof, it is an act of lightnesse and iniurious presumption, yea a testimonie of weakenesse and insufficiencie, to condemne that which agreeth not with the law and custome of his countrie. This proceedeth either from want of leasure or sufficiencie to consider the reasons and grounds of others; this is to wrong and shame his owne iudgement, whereby he is enforced many times to recant, and not to remember that the nature of man is capable of all things; It is to suffer the eie of his spirit to be hoodwinked, and brought asleepe by a long custome, and prescription to haue power ouer iudgement.

4
Wise-ly to e-
xamine all
things.

see p. 233.

Finally it is the office of a generous spirit and a wise man (whom I heere endeouour to describe) to examine all things, to consider apart, and afterwards to compare together all the lawes and customes of the world, which shall come to his knowledge, and to iudge of them (not to rule his obedience by them, as hath beene said, but to exercise his office, since he

he hath a spirit to that end) faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of truth and vniuersall reason and nature, whereunto he is first obliged, not flattering himselfe, or staining his iudgement with error: and to content himselfe to yeeld obedience vnto those whereunto hee is secondly and particularly bound, whereby none shall haue cause to complaine of him. It may fall out sometimes, that wee may doe that, by a second particular and municipall obligation (obeying the lawes and customes of the country) which is against the first and more ancient, that is to say, vniuersall nature and reason; but yet we satisfie nature by keeping our iudgements and opinions true and iust according to it. For wee haue nothing so much ours, and whereof we may freely dispose; the world hath nothing to do with our thoughts, but the outward man is engaged to the publicke course of the world, and must giue an account thereof: so that manie times, wee doe iustlie that, which iustly we approoue not. There is no remedie, for so goes the world.

After these two mistresses, Law and Custome, comes the third, which hath no lesse authority & power with many, yea ⁸ *Of Ceremonies.* is more rough & tyrannicall to those that too much tie themselves thereunto. This is the ceremony of the world, which to say the truth, is for the most part but vanity; yet holdeth such place, and vsurpeth such authority, by the remifnesse and contagious corruption of the world, that manie thinke that wisdom consisteth in the obseruation thereof, and in such sort do voluntarilie enthrall themselves thereunto, that rather than they wil contradict it, they preiudice their health, benefit, businesse, libertie, conscience and all; which is a very great follie, and the fault and infelicity of manie Courtiers, who aboue others are the idolaters of ceremonie. Now my will is, that this my Wise-man, do carefullie defend himselfe from this captivity. I doe not meane, that out of a kind of loose incivilitie, he abuse a ceremonie, for we must forgiue the world in some thing, and as much as may be outwardlie conforme our selues to that which is in practise; but my will is, that he tie not, and enthrall himselfe thereunto, but that with a gallant and generous boldnesse hee know how to leaue it when he will, and when it is fit, and in such maner, as that he
giue

giue all men to know, that it is not out of carelesnes, or delicacie, or ignorance, or contempt, but because he would not seeme ignorant how to esteeme of it as is fit, not suffer his iudgement and will to be corrupted with such a vanitie, and that he lendeth himselfe to the world when it pleaseth him, but neuer giueth himselfe.

C H A P. IX.

To carie himselfe well with another.

See pag. 426.

THIS matter belongeth to the vertue of iustice, which teacheth how to liue well with all, and to giue to euery one that which appertaineth vnto him, which shall be handled in the booke following, where shall be set downe the particular and diuers opinions according to the diuersitie of persons. Heere are only the generall, following the purpose and subiect of this booke.

There is heere a two-fold consideration (and consequently two parts in this Chapter) according to the two maners of conuersing with the world, the one is simple, generall and common; the ordinarie commerce of the world, whereunto the times, the affaires, the voyages, and encounters do daily leade, and change acquaintance from those we know, to those we know not, strangers, without our choice, or voluntarie consents: the other speciall is in affected and desired companie and acquaintance, either sought after and chosen, or being offered and presented, hath beene embraced, and that either for spirituall or corporall profit or pleasure, wherein there is conference, communication, priuie, and familiaritie: each of them haue their aduiselements apart. But before we enter into them, it shall not be amisse by way of preface, to giue you some generall and fundamentall aduice of all the rest.

It is a great vice (whereof this our Wise-man must take heed) and a defect incommenient both to himselfe and to another, to be bound and subiect to certaine humours and complexions, to one only course, that is, to be a slaue to himselfe, so to be captiuated to his proper inclinations, that he cannot be bent to any other, a testimonie of an anxious scrupulous mind, and ill bred, too amorous, and too partiall to it selfe.

These

3
Facilitie and
vniuersalitie
of humours.

These kind of people haue much to endure and to contest; and contrariwise it is a great sufficiencie and wisdom to accommodate himselfe to all, *Istud est sapere, qui ubicunq; opus sit animum possit flectere*, to be supple and maniaible, to know how to rise and fall, to bring himselfe into order when there is neede. The fairest minds, and the best borne, are the more vniuersall, the more common, appliable to all vnderstandings, communicatiue and open to all people. It is a beautifull qualitie, which resembleth and imitareth the goodnes of God, it is the honor which was giuen to old Cato, *huic versatile ingenium, sic pariter ad omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceret, quodcunque ageret.*

Let vs see the aduifements of the first consideration, of the simple and common conuersation, I wil heere set downe some, whereof the first shall be, to keepe silence and modestie.

4
The first
part. Advice
touching
simple and
common con-
uersation.

The second, not to be ouer-formall, in not applying himselfe to the follies, indiscretions and lightnesses which may be committed in his presence; for it is an indiscretion to condemn all that pleaseth not our palat.

The third, to spare, and thriftily to order that which a man knoweth, and that sufficiencie that he hath attained, and to be more willing to heare than to speake, to learne than to teach; for it is a vice to be more readie and forward to make himselfe knowne, to talke of himselfe, and to shew all that is in him, than to learne knowledge of another, and to spend his owne stock than to get new.

5
6

The fourth, not to enter into discourse and contestation against all, neither against great men to whom we owe a dutie and respect, nor against our inferiours, where the match is not equall.

7

The fift, to be honestlie curious in the enquire of all things, and knowing them, to order them frugallie, to make profit by them.

8

The sixt and principall is, to employ his iudgement in all things, which is the chiefe part which worketh, ruleth, and doth all; without the vnderstanding all other things are blind, deafe, and without a soule, it is least to know the historie, the iudgement is all.

9 see p. 232.

The

10

The seventh is, neuer to speake affirmatiuely, and imperiously, with obstinacie and resolution; that hurteth and woundeth all.

The conclusion.

Peremptorie affirmation and obstinacie in opinion, are ordinarie signes of senselesnesse and ignorance. The stile of the ancient *Romans* was, that the witnesses deposing, and the iudges determining that which of their owne proper knowledge they knew to be true, they expressed their mind by this word, It seemeth (*ita videtur*). And if these did thus, what should others do? It were good to learne to vse such words as may sweeten and moderate the temeritie of our propositions, as, It may be, It is said, I thinke, It seemeth, and the like: and in answering, I vnderstand it not, What is that to say? It may be, It is true. I will shut vp this generall part in these few words; To haue the countenance and the outward shew open and agreeable to all, his mind and thought couered and hid from all, his tongue sober and discreet, alwaies to keepe himselfe to himselfe, and to stand on his gard, *frons aperta, lingua parca, mens clausa, nulli fidere*, to see and heare much, to speake little, to iudge of all, *vide, audi, indica*.

11
The second
part, of spe-
ciall conuer-
sation.

see p. 224.

Let vs come to the other consideration, and kind of conuersation more speciall, whereof the instructions are these. The first is to seeke, to conferre, and conuerse with men of constancie and dexteritie; for thereby the mind is confirmed and fortified, and is eleuated aboue it selfe, as with base and weake spirits it is debased, and vtterly lost: the contagion heerein is, as in the bodie, and also more.

see p. 238. 12
243.

The second is not to be astonished at the opinions of another, for how contrarie soeuer to the common sort, how strange, how friuolous or extrauagant they seeme, yet they are sutable to the spirit of man, which is capable to produce all things, and therefore it is weaknes to be astonished at them.

13

The third is not to feare or to be troubled with the rude inciuilitie and bitter speeches of men, whereunto he must harden and accustome himselfe. Gallant men beare them with courage; this tendernes, and fearefull & ceremonious mildnes is for women. This societie and familiaritie must be valiant and manly, it must be couragious both to giue hard speeches, and

and to endure them, to correct and to be corrected. It is a fading pleasure, to haue to do with a people that yeeld, flatter, and applaud a man in all things.

The fourth is to aime alwaies at the truth, to acknowledge it, ingenuously and cheerefully to yeeld vnto it, of what side soeuer it be; vsing alwaies and in all things sinceritie, and not as many, especiallie pedanties, by right or by wrong to defend himselfe, and to quell his aduersarie. It is a fairer victorie to range himselfe according to reason, and to vanquish himselfe, than to ouercome his aduersarie, whereunto his own weaknesse doth many times help, being farre from all passion. To acknowledge his fault, to confesse his doubt and ignorance, to yeeld when there is occasion, are actes of iudgement, gentlenes and sinceritie, which are the principall qualities of an honest and wise man; whereas obstinacie in opinion accuseth a man of many vices and imperfections.

The fift is, in disputation not to employ all the meanes that a man may haue, but such as are best and fittest, that are more pertinent and pressing, and that with breuitie; for euen in a good cause a man may say too much; for long discourses, amplifications and repetitions are a testimonie of ostentation, desire to speake, and tedious to the whole companie.

The sixt and principall is, in all things to keepe a forme, order and aptnes. O what a troublesome thing it is to dispute and conferre with a foole, a trifler, that vttereth nothing but matter impertinent to the matter! It is the only iust excuse to cut off all conference: for what can a man gaine but torment, that knowes not how, or what to speake as he should? Not to vnderstand the argument that is made, to wed himselfe to his owne opinion, not to answer directly, to tie himselfe to words, and to leaue the principall, to mingle and trouble the conference with vaine amplifications, to denie all, not to follow the forme of disputation, to vse vnprofitable prefaces and digressions, to be obstinate in opinion, and to mouth it out, to tie himselfe to formes, and neuer to diue into the bottome, are things that are ordinarily practised by pedanties and Sophisters. See heere how wisdom is discerned from follic; this is presumptuous, rash, obstinate, assured; that neuer satisfieth it selfe, is fearefull, aduised, modest: this pleaseth it

it selfe, goes forth of the lists merrily and gloriously, as hauing wonne the victorie, when it neuer came neere it.

17

The seuenth, if there be place of contradiction, hee must take heede that he be not bold, obltinate, bitter, for either of these three makes it vnwelcome, & doth more hurt himselfe, than an other. That it may winne good entertainment of the companie, it must arise from that very houre of the controuerfie that is handled, from the present occasion, and not from elsewhere, nor from any former precedent ground; neither must it touch the person, but the matter onely, with some commendation of the person, if there be cause.

CHAP. X.

To cary himselfe wisely in his affaires.

THis doth properly belong to the vertue of prudence, whereof wee shall speake in the beginning of the booke following, where shall bee set downe in particular diuers counsels and aduiselements according to the diuers kindes of prudence and occurrents in our affaires. But I will heere set downe the principall points and heads of wisdom, which are generall & common aduiselements to instruct in grosse our disciple, to carrie himselfe well and wisely in the trafficke and commerce of the world, and the managing of all affaires; and they are eight.

1
Knowledge
of the persons
and affaires.

The first consisteth in vnderstanding, that is, well to know the persons with whom a man hath to deale, their proper and particular nature, their humour, their spirit, inclination, designement, and intention, their proceedings: to know likewise the nature of the businesse which he hath in hand, and which is proposed vnto him, not only in their superficial and outward appearance, but to penetrate into the inside thereof, not only to see and know things in themselves, but the accidents and consequents that belong thereunto. The better to doe this, he must looke into them with all manner of visages, consider them in all senses; for there are some that in one side are very pretious and pleasing, and on the other base and pernicious. Now it is certaine, that according to the diuers natures of the persons and affaires, we must change our stile

stile and maner of proceeding, like a Seaman, who according to the diuers state of the sea, and the diuersitie of the windes, doth diuersly turne and guide his sailes and his oares. For he that in all things shall direct and carrie himselfe after one and the same fashion, would quickly marre all, play the foole, and make himselfe ridiculous. Now this twofold knowledge of the persons and affaires is no easie matter, so much is man disguised and counterfeited; but the way to attaine thereunto, is to consider them attentiuely and aduisedly, reuoluing them many times in our munes, and that without passion.

Wee must likewise learne to esteeme of things according to their true worth, giuing vnto them that price and place ³ *Estimation of things.* which appertaineth vnto them, which is the true office of wisdom and sufficiencie. This is a high point of philosophie; but the better to attaine thereunto, we must take heede of passion, and the iudgement of the vulgar sort. There are *Not according to the vulgar iudgement.* six or seuen things which moue and leade vulgar spirits, and make them to esteeme of things by false ensignes, whereof wise men will take heed; which are, noueltie, raritie, strangenesse, difficultie, Art, inuention, abscence, and priuation or deniall, and aboue all, report, shew, and prouision. They esteeme not of things if they be not polished by Art and science, if they be not pointed and painted out. The simple and naturall, of what value soeuer they be, they attend not; they escape and droppe away insensibly, or at least are accounted plaine, base, and foolish; a great testimonie of humane vanitie and imbecillitie, which is paired with winde. with false and counterfeit mony, in steede of currant, from whence it is, that a man preferreth Art before nature, that which is studied and difficult, before that which is easie; vehement motions, and impulsions, before complexion, constitution, habit; the extraordinary before the ordinary; ostentation & pompe, before true and secret veritie; another mans, and that which is strange, which is borrowed, before that which is proper and naturall. And what greater follie can there bee than all this? Now the rule of the wise is not to suffer themselves by all this, to be caught and carried, but to measure and iudge and esteeme of things, first by their true, naturall and essenti- *But according to the wise.* all value, which is many times inward and secret; and then

Y

by

Difficult.
Excellent.
Necessary.
Seneca.

Precedence
of the
rank of
things

Eight prin-
cipall heads
of goods spi-
rituall and
corporall.

by their profit and commoditie; the rest is but deceit or mockerie. This is a matter of difficultie, all things being so disguised and sophisticated: many times the false and wicked being more plausible, than the true and good. And *Aristotle* faith, that there are many falsehoods, which are more probable, and haue a better outward appearance, than verities. But as it is difficult, so is it excellent and diuine: *Si separaueris pretioſum a vili, quaſi os meum eris*: And necessarie before all workes; *quam neceſſarium pretia rebus imponere*; for to small purpose doth a man endeouour to know the precepts of a good life, if first he know not in what ranke to place things, riches, health, beauty, nobility, science, and so forth, with their contraries. This precedency & preheminance of things is a high and excellent knowledge, and yet difficult, especially when many present themselves, for plurality hindreth, and heerein men are neuer of one accord. The particular tastes and iudgements of men are diuers, and it is fit and commodious it should be so, to the end that all runne not together after one and the same thing, and so bee a let or hindrance to another. For example, let vs take the eight principall heads, of all goods spirituall and corporall, foure of each kind, that is to say, *Honesty, Health, Wisdome, Beauty, Ability or Aptnesse, Nobility, Science, Riches*. We do heere take the words according to the common sense and vse, wisdome for a prudent and discreet maner of life and carriage with and towards all; Abilitie for sufficiency in affaires; Science for the knowledge of things acquired out of bookes: the other are cleare enough. Now touching the ranging of these eight, how many diuers opinions are there? I haue told my owne, and I haue mingled and in such sort enterlaced them together, that after and next vnto a spirituall, there is a corporall corospondent therunto, to the end we may couple the soule and the body together. Health is in the body, that which honestie is in the soule; the health of the soule, is the honestie of the body, *mens sana in corpore sano*: Beauty, is as wisdome, the measure, proportion, and comelinesse of the body, and wisdome a spirituall beauty. Nobility is a great aptnesse and disposition to vertue. Sciences are the riches of the spirit. Others do range these parts otherwise, some place all the spirituall first, before they come to

to the first corporall, and the least of the spirit aboue the greatest of the bodie: some place them apart, and all diuersly, e- uery one aboundeth in his owne sense.

After and from this sufficiencie and part of prudence, to know well how to esteeme of things, doth spring and arise ³ *choice and* another, that is, to know well how to choose, where not only *election of* the conscience, but also the sufficiencie and prudence is like- *things.* wise many times shewed. There are choices very easie, as of a difficultie, & of a vice, of that which is honest, and that which is commodious, of dutie and of profit: for the preheminance of the one is so great aboue the other, that when they come to encounter, honestie alwaies winneth the field, except (it may be) some exception very rare, and with great circumstance, and in publike affaires only, as shall be said heereafter in the vertue of Prudence: but there are other choices farre more hard and troublesome, as when a man is caught or driuen in- to a narrow streit betweene two vices, as was that Doctor *Origen*, either to become an Idolater, or to prostitute himselfe to the carnall pleasure of a base impure *Aethiopian*. The rule is, that when a man findeth himselfe in any doubt or perplex- itie touching the choice of those things that are not euill, he must choose that part that hath most honestie and iustice in it; for though it faile out otherwise than well, yet it shall be al- waies some comfort and glorie to a man to haue chosen the better; and besides a man knoweth not (if he had chosen the contrarie part) what would haue hapned, or whether he had escaped his destinie: when a man doubteth which is the bet- ter and shortest way, hee must take the streitest. And in those things that are euill (whereof there is neuer any choice) a man must auoid the more base and vniust: this is a rule of conscience, and belongeth to honestie. But to know which is the more honest, iust, and profitable, which the more disho- nest, vniust, and vnprofitable, it is many times very difficult, and belongeth to prudence and sufficiencie. It seemeth that in such like streits and extremities the surer and better way is to follow nature, and to iudge that the more iust and honest which commeth neereſt vnto nature, that the more vniust and dishonest which is farthest from it. Before we leaue this discourse of the choice & election of things, in two words let

vs remove this question: From whence cometh in our soules the choice of two indifferent things in all things alike? The Stoicks say, from an extraordinarie, immoderate, strange and rash operation of the soule. But a man may say, that neuer do two things present themselves vnto vs, wherein there is not some difference or other be it neuer so little, and that there is alwaies something in the one, which moueth vs to that choice, although it be insensible, and such as we cannot expresse. He that is equallie ballanced betwixt two desires, can neuer choose, for euery choice and inclination doth inferre an inequality.

4
Consultation.

Another precept in this matter, is to take aduice and counsell of another: for, for a man to belecue himselfe, and to trust only in himselfe, is very dangerous. Now heere are required two aduertisements of Prudence; the one is in the choice of those, to whom a man must addresse himselfe for counsell; for there are some whose counsell we should rather auoid, and flie from. First, they must be honest and faithfull men (which is heere all one) and secondly, men sensible, aduised, wise, and of experience. These are the two qualities of good counsellers, honestie, and sufficiencie. A man may adde a third, and that is, that neither they nor their neere and inward friends haue any particular interest in the businesse; for although a man may say, that this cannot hinder them to giue good counsell, being, as is said, honest men; yet I may answer, that besides that this so great and philosophicall honestie, which is no way touched with it owne proper interest, be very rare, it is also a great point of follie to bring it into doubt and anxiety, and as it were to put the finger betwixt two stones. The other aduertisement is, well to heare and entertaine the counsels, receiuing them without attending the euent, with iudgement and gentlenes, delighting in the free deliuerie of the truth. Having entertained and followed it as good, and coming from a good hand and a friendly, he must not repent himselfe of it, although it succeed not well, and according to expectation. Many times good counsels haue bad euent. But a wise man must rather content himselfe to haue followed good counsell which hath brought forth bad effects, than bad counsell which hath had a happie euent, as *Marinus*; sic correct;

correcti Marij temeritas gloriam ex culpa inuenit, and not to do like fooles, who hauing aduisedly deliberated and chofen, thinke afterwards to haue chofen the worfe, because they weigh only thereasons of the contrarie opinion, neuer counterpoising them with those which first induced them thereunto. Thus much breefly be said of those that seeke counsell: Lib. 3. ca. 2. of those that giue it, we shal speake in the vertue of Prudence, art. 17. p. 369. whereof the counsell is a great and sufficient part.

The fift aduice which I heere giue, to carie himselfe well in his affaires, is a temperature and mediocritie betwixt too great a confidence, and distrust, feare and assurance. To trust and secure himselfe, doth many times hurt, and to distrust offendeth: he must take speciall heed of making any shew of distrust, euen when there is cause; for it displeaseth, yea offendeth much, and many times maketh a friend an enemy. But yet a man is not to be over-credulous, and confident, except it be of his best assured friends, he must alwaies keepe the bridle in his hands, holding it neither too loose nor too tight. He must neuer speake all, and let that which he speaketh be euer true. He must neuer deceiue, but yet let him take heed he be not deceiued. He must euer temper and moderate that columbine innocencie and simplicitie, in not offending any man with his serpentine wisdom and subtiltie, and keeping himselfe vpon his gard, and preserving himselfe from the deceits, treasons, and ambushments of another. Subtiltie to defend, is as commendable, as it is dishonest to offend. He must neuer therefore aduance and engage himselfe so farre, but that he haue alwaies a meane when he will, and when it shall be necessarie to retire himselfe without great damage or dislike. He must neuer forsake his owne hold, nor so much despise another, and presume of himselfe, that he fall into a kind of presumption and carelesnes of his affaires; like those that thinke that no man sees so cleere as themselves, that looke that euery man should yeeld vnto them, that no man should dare to entertaine a thought to displease them, and by that meanes become dissolute, and cast away care, and in the end they are blinded, surprised, and deceiued.

Another aduice and very important, is to take all things in

To take time
and occasion.

Against pre-
cipitation.

Idlenesse.

their times and seasons, and to good purpose; and for that cause, he must about all things avoid precipitation, an enemy to wisdom, the step-mother of all good actions, a vice much to be feared in young and youthful people. It is in truth the worke of a skilfull and active man, to apply every thing to his true end, well to manage all occasions and commodities, to make use both of the times and the meanes. All things haue their seasons, and euen the good which a man may doe without purpose. Now too much speed and precipitation is contrarie heereunto, which troubleth, marreth, and confoundeth all: *canis festinans cecos facit catulos*. It proceedeth commonly from that passion which carieth vs, *Nam qui cupit festinat: qui festinat euerit: unde festinatio improuida & ceca: duo aduersissima recte menti celeritas & ira*: and often enough from insufficiencie. The contrarie vice, lazinesse, sloth, carelesnesse, which seemeth sometimes to haue some aire of maturitie and wisdom, is likewise pernicious and dangerous especiallie in the execution. For it is said, that it is lawfull to be slow and long in deliberation and consultation, but not in the execution; and therefore the wisest say, That a man must consult slowly, execute speedely, deliberate with leisure, and with speede accomplish. It falleth out sometimes that the contrarie is practised with good successe, and that a man is happie in the event, though he haue been suddaine and rash in his deliberation; *Subiti consilij, euentu felices*, but this is very seldom, and by chaunce or fortune; according to which wee must not rule and direct ourselues; but take heed lest enuie and emulation ouertake vs; for commonly a long and vnprofitable repentance is the reward of headlong hastinesse. Behold then two rocks and extremities which we must equallic auoid; for it is as great a fault to take occasions before they be readie, whilst they be greene and raw, as to suffer them to grow till they be ouer-ripe & past the taking. The first fault, young men and forward hot-spurres commit, who for want of patience, giue no leasure to time and the heauen to do any thing for them, they runne, but they catch nothing. The second, heauie, lazie dull spirited men do commonly fall into. To know the occasion, and to take it, a man must haue his spirit

rit valiant and vigilant; and likewise patient: he must foresee it, watch, attend it, see it coming, and prepare for it, and so take it iust at that instant when it is readie.

The seventh aduice is, well to cary himselfe with these two masters & superintendants of the affaires of the world, which are industrie or vertue, and fortune. It is an ancient question which of these two hath most credit, force, and authoritie: for it is out of all doubt, that both haue, and it is clearely false, that one only doth all, and the other nothing. It were perhaps to be wished that it were true, and that one only had the whole empire, the businesse would go the better, a man would wholly attend that, whereby it would be the more easie; the difficultie is to ioyne them together, and to attend them both. Commonly they that settle themselves vnto the one, contemne the other, the yonger and bolder sort respect, and trust to fortune, hoping much good from it, and many times by them it worketh great matters, in somuch that it seemes to fauour them; the more ancient and stayed, trust to their industrie; and these of the two, haue the more reason. If we should compare them, and chuse one of the two, industrie is the more honest, the more certaine, glorious; for though fortune be contrarie to it, and shall make all industrie & diligence vaine, yet neuerthelesse there remaineth great contentment, in that a man hath not kept holy day, hath performed his office or dutie, hath caried himselfe like a man of courage. They that follow the other part, are in danger to attend in vaine, and though perhaps things succeed according to their owne desires, yet they want that honor and glory that the former hath. Now the aduice of wisdom is, not wholly, and so much to settle our selues to the one, that we contemne, and exclude the other; for they haue both a good part, yea many times they help, and do mutually attend one the other. A wise man then must cary himselfe with them both, but yet vnequally, for the aduantage and preheminance must be giuen, as hath beene said, to vertue, industrie; *virtute duce, comite fortuna.* This aduice likewise is required, to keepe discretion, which seasoneth and giueth a taste or relish to all things; this is not a particular qualitie, but common, which mingleth it selfe in all: Indiscretion marreth all, and taketh away the grace from

the best actions, whether it be to doe good to another; for all gratifications are not well bestowed vpon all sorts of people; or to excuse himselfe; for inconsiderate excuses serue for accusations, or to play the part of an honest and curteous man, for a man may excede and degenerate into rusticitie, or whether it be to offer, or to accept.

CHAP. XI.

To keepe himselfe alwaies ready for death, a fruit of wisdom.

I
The day
of death.

THe day of death is the master day, and iudge of all other daies, the triall and touchstone of all the actions of our life. Then doe we make our greatest assay, and gather the whole fruit of all our studies. He that iudgeth of the life of a man, must looke how he carried himselfe at his death; for the end crowneth the worke, and a good death honoureth a mans whole life, as an euill defameth and dishonoureth it: A man cannot well iudge of any, without wronging of him, before hee hath plaied the last act of his Comedie, which is without all doubt the most difficult. *Epaminondas* one of the wise men of *Greece*, being demanded whom of three men he esteemed most, himselfe, *Chabrias*, or *Iphicrates*, answered, We must first see all three die, before we resolute that question: the reason is, because in all the rest a man may be masked, but in this last part, it is to no purpose to dissemble,

*Nam vera voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Eiciuntur, & eripitur persona, manet res.*

Fortune from farre seemeth to watch, and lie in wait for vs, against this last day, as a day long since named and appointed, to shew her power, and in a moment to ouerthrow all that wee haue built, and gathered together in many yeers, and to make vs crie out with *Laberius*, *Nimirum hac die vna plus vixi mihi, quam viuendum fuit*: And so was it well and wisely said of *Solon* to *Cræsus*; *Ante obitum nemo beatus*:

2
To know
how to die.

It is an excellent thing to learne to die, it is the studie of wisdom, which aimeth wholly at this end: hee hath not spent his life ill, that hath learned to die well; and hee hath lost his whole time, that knowes not well how to end it. Ma-
le

le viuet, quisquis nesciet bene mori : non frustra nascitur qui be- Sence.
ne moritur : nec inutiliter vixit, qui feliciter desijt : Morito-
ta vita discendum est, & precipuum ex vita officijs est. Hee
shootes not well, that lookes not on the marke ; and he can-
not liue well that hath not an eie to his death. To be briefe,
the science of dying is the science of libertie, the way to feare
nothing, to liue well, contentedly and peaceably ; without
this knowledge there is no more pleasure in life, than in the
fruition of that thing which a man feareth alwaies to lose.

First and aboue all, we must endeuour, that our sinnes die
before our selues : Secondly, that we be alwaies ready and
prepared for death. O what an excellent thing is it for a man
to end his life before his death, in such sort, that at that houre
he haue no other thing to doe, but to die ! that hee haue no
more neede of any thing, not of time, not of himselfe, but
sweetly and contentedly departeth this life, saying :

Vixi, & quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi.

Thirdly, wee must endeuour, that our death be voluntarie;
for to die well, is to die willingly.

It seemeth that a man may carry himselfe in death fīue di-
uers waies : He may feare and flie it, as a very great euill ; at-
tend it sweetly and patiently, as a thing naturall, ineuitable,
reasonable ; contemne it, as a thing indifferent, and of no
great importance ; desire and seeke after it, as the only ha-
uen of rest from all the torments of this life, yea a very great
gaine ; giue it to himselfe, by taking away his owne life. Of
these fīue, the three middlemost are good, befitting a good
and settled soule, although diuersly, and in a different condi-
tion of life ; the two extreames are vitious and out of weake-
nesse, though it be with diuers visages. A word or two of
them all. *see p. 113.*

The first is not approued by men of vnderstanding, though
by the greater part it be practised : a testimonie of great weak-
nesse. Against these kinde of men, and for your better com-
fort, either against your owne death, or the death of another,
thus much briefly. There is not a thing that men feare more,
or haue more in horroure than death : neuerthelesse, there is
not a thing where there is lesse occasion or matter of feare, or
that contrarily yeeldeth greater reasons to perswade vs with
resolution

3

4

*A fīuefold
maner of
carriage in
death.*

5

*To feare
death.*

It is opinion.

resolution to accept of it. And therefore we must say, that it is a meere opinion, and a vulgar error that hath woon the world thus to thinke of it. Wee giue too much credit to the inconsiderate vulgar sort, who tell vs, That it is a very great euill; and to little credit to wisdom it selfe which teacheth vs, that it is a freedome from all euils and the haue of life. Neuer did a present death do hurt to any man; and some that haue made triall, and partly knew what it is, complaine not of it: and if death be counted an euill, it is of all the euils the only that doth no harme, that hath no euill in it; it is the imagination only of death before it come, that maketh vs to feare it when it is come. It is then but opinion, not verity; and it is truely where opinion bandeth it selfe most against reason, and goeth about to deface it in vs, with the maske of death: there cannot be any reason to feare it, because no man knowes what it is, that hee should feare it: for why, or how should a man feare that he knoweth not? And therefore wisely said he, that of all others was accounted the wisest, that to feare death is to make shew of greater vnderstanding and sufficiency than can be in a man, by seeming to know that, that no man knoweth: and what he spake he practised himselfe; for being sollicitated at his death by his friends, to pleade before the Iudges, for his iustification, and for his life, this oration he made vnto them: My masters and friends, if I should plead for my life, and desire you that I may not die, I doubt I may speak against my selfe, and desire my owne losse and hinderance, because I know not what it is to die, nor what good or ill there is in death: they that feare to die presume to know it, as for my selfe I am vtterly ignorant what it is, or what is done in the other world; perhaps death is a thing indifferent, perhaps a good thing, and to be desired. Those things that I know to be euill, as to offend my neighbour, I flie and auoid; those that I know not to be euill, as death, I cannot feare. And therefore I commit my selfe vnto your selues; and because I cannot know whether it is more expedient for me to die, or not to dy, determine you thereof as you shall thinke good.

6

It is weaknes. For a man to torment himselfe with the feare of death, it is first great weaknesse and cowardlinesse: There is not a woman that in few daies is not appealed and content with the death,

death, yea the most painefull that may be, either of her husband or her child; And why should not reason and wisdom do that in an houre, at an instant (as we haue a thousand examples) which time performeth in a foole, in the weakest sex? What vse is there of wisdom and constancie in man, to what end serue they, if they speed him not in a good action, if he can do no more with their help, than a foole with his follie? From this weaknes it is, that the most part of men dying, cannot resolue themselves, that it is their last houre, and there is not any thing where this deceitfull hope doth more busie man; which it may be, doth likewise proceed from this, that we account our death a great matter, and that all things haue an interest in vs, and at our death must suffer with vs, so much do we esteeme our selues.

Againe a man sheweth himselfe heerein vniust; for if death be a good thing, as it is, why doth he feare it? If an euill thing, ⁷ *Iniustice.* why doth he make it worse, and adde vnto death euill vpon euill, sorrow and griefe where there is none? like him that being robbed of a part of his goods by the enemy, casteth the rest into the sea, to let men know how little he is greeued with his losses.

Finally to feare death, is for a man to be an enemy to himselfe, and to his owne life: for he can neuer liue at ease and ⁸ *To be enemy to his owne life.* contentedlie, that feareth to dye. That man is only a free man, which feareth not death; and contrarily, life is but a slavery if it were not made free by death: For death is the only stay of our libertie, the common and readie receptacle of all cuils: It is then a miserie (and miserable are all that do it) to trouble our life with the care and feare of death, and our death with the care of life.

But to say the truth, what complaints and murmuring would there be against nature, if death were not, if we should haue continued heere will we, nill we, with and against our owne wils? doubtlesse men would haue cursed nature for it. Imagin with thy selfe how much more insupportable, and painefull a durable life would haue beene, then a life with a condition to leaue it. *Chiron* refused immortalitie, being informed of the conditions therof by the god of Time, *Saturne* his father. Doubtlesse death is a very beautifull and rich in-
uention

uention of nature, *optimum natura inuentum nusquam satis laudatum*, and a very proper and profitable necessarie to many things; If it were quite taken from vs, we should desire it more, than now we feare it, yea thirst after it more than life it selfe; such a remedie is it against so many euils; such a meane to so many goods. What were it on the other side, if there were not mingled with death some little bitternesse? doubtlesse men would runne vnto it with great desire and indiscretion. To keepe therefore a moderation, that is, that men might neither loue life too much, nor flie it, feare death, nor runne after it, both of them, sweetnes and sharpnes, are therein tempered together.

IO
Remedies
not to feare
death.

The remedie that the vulgar sort do giue heerein, is too simple; and that is, neuer to thinke or speake thereof: Besides that such a kind of carelesnes cannot lodge in the head of a man of vnderstanding, it would likewise at the last cost him deere: for death comming vnawares, and vnexpected, what torments, outcries, furies and dispaire are there commonlie seene? Wisdome aduiseeth much better, that is, to attend and expect death with a constant foot, and to encounter it: and the better to do this, it giueth vs contrarie counsell to the vulgar sort, that is, to haue it alwaies in our thoughts, to practise it, to accustome our selues vnto it, to tame it, to present it vnto vs at all houres, to expect it, not only in places suspected and dangerous, but in the middest of feasts and sports: that the burthen of our song be, *Remember thy end*; that others are dead, that thought to haue liued as long as our selues; that, that which hapned then to them may happen now to vs; following heerein the custome of the Egyptians, who in their solemne banquets placed the image of death before their eies; and of the Christians and all other, who haue their Church-yards neere their temples, and other publike and frequented places, that men might alwaies (as saith *Licurgus*) be put in mind of death. It is vncertaine in what place death attends vs, and therefore let vs attend death in all places, and be alwaies readie to receiue it.

Omnes crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum.

Grata superueniet qua non sperabitur hora.

II

But let vs consider the excuses and greouances that these poore

poore people alleadge to couer and colour their complaints, *The grie-
uances and
excuses of
fearefull men
answered.*
which are all vaine and friuolous : It grieueth them to die
young, and they complaine as well in regard of others as
themselues, that death preuenteth them and cutteth them off
in the flowre and strength of their yeares. The complaint of
the vulgar sort, who measure all by the ell, and account no-
thing pretious, but that which is long, and durable, whereas
contrarily, things exquisite and excellent are commonly thin,
fine, and delicate. It is the marke of a skilfull worke-master to
enclose much in a little space : and a man may say, that it is fa-
tall to great and glorious men, not to liue long ; Great vertue,
and great or long life do seldome or neuer meet together. Life
is measured by the end, provided that that be good, and all
the rest hath a proportion thereunto : the quantitie is no-
thing to make it more or lesse happie, no more than the great-
nes of a circle makes the circle more round than the lesse ; the
figure heere doth all : A little man is as perfect a man as a
greater : Neither men nor their liues are measured by the ell.

Againe, it troubleth them to die farre from their friends,
or to be slaine, and to remaine vnburied : they desire to die in
peace, in their beds, amongst their friends, being comforted
by them & comforting them. All they that follow the warres,
and ride post to be in the battell, are not of this mind : these
men runne willinglie to their end, and seeke a tombe amongst
the dead bodies of their enemies. Little children feare men
when they are masked ; discouer their faces, and they feare
them no more : And euen so beleue it, fire and sword asto-
nish vs, when we thinke of them ; take off their maske, the
death wherewith they threaten vs, is but the same death
wherewith women and children die.

They are troubled to thinke they must leaue all the world.
And why ? They haue seene all, one day is like another, there
is no other light, nor other night, nor other sunne, nor other
course of the world. One yeare telleth vs that all things grow
euery yeare worse and worse, they haue seene the childhood,
the youth, the virilitie, the old age of the world : there is no
arte, no way to begin againe.

Yea, but they leaue their parents and their friends. Where
they go they shall find more, and such as they haue neuer yet
scene,

scene, and they they leaue behind them and desire so much shall shortly follow them.

5 But what shall become of their small children and orphans left without guide, without support? As if those their children were more theirs than Gods, or as if they could loue them more than he that is their first and their truest father; and how many such so left haue risen to higher place and greater abilitie than other men?

6 But it may be they feare to go alone. This is great simplicitie, so many people dying with them, and at the selfe-same houre.

7 Finallie, they go into a place where they shall not desire this life. How desire it? If it were lawfull to resume it, they would refuse it; and if a man were worthie to know what it is before he receiueth it, he would neuer accept of it, *vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus*. Why, or how should they desire it, since they are either wholly nothing as miscreants beleue, or in farre better state than before, as the wisest of the world do affirme? Why then are they offended with death, since it quits them of all griefe? The selfe-same iourney they haue made from death, that is to say, from nothing to life, without passion, without feare, they make againe from life vnto death; *reueris unde veneris, quid graue est?*

8 But it may be that the spectacle of death displeaseth them, because they that die looke gastle. It is true, but this is not death, but the maske of death, that which is hid vnder it, is very beautifull, for death hath nothing in it that is fearefull: we haue sent idle and poore spies to know it, who report not what they haue scene, but what they haue heard, and what they feare.

9 But it taketh out of our hands so many things, or rather taketh vs from them, and vs from our selues, it taketh vs from that we know, and haue been accustomed vnto, and bringeth vs to an estate vnknowne, *at horremus ignota*, it taketh vs from the light, to bring vs into darknes; and to conclude, it is our end, our ruine, our dissolution. These are the weightiest obiections: whereunto in a word a man may answere, that death being the ineuitable law of nature (as shall be said hereafter) we neede not dispute so much thereof, for it is a follie to
feare

feare that which a man cannot auoid. *Dementis est timere mortem, quia certa expectantur, dubia metuntur, mors habet necessitatem equam & iniustam.* But these kind of people make not their count well, for it is quite contrarie to that which they say, for instead of taking any thing from vs, it giueth vs all; instead of taking vs from our selues, it sets vs in libertie, and makes vs free to our selues; instead of bringing vs into darknes, it taketh it from vs, and puts vs into the light; and it doth the same to vs, that we do to all fruits, spoyling them of their barks, their shells, their foldings, their speres, their skinnes, to bring them into sight, vse, nature; *ita solet fieri, pereunt semper velamenta nascentium*; it taketh vs from a strait, incommodious, rumatike darke place, where we see but a small part of the heauens, and the light but afarre off, through the two narrow holes of our eyes, to bring vs into an open libertie, an assured health, a perpetuall light, into such a place, such an estate, where we may wholly see the whole heauens, and the light in his naturall place; *equaliter tibi splendeat omne celi latius, totam lucem suo loco prope totus aspicias quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias procul intueris & miraris.* To conclude, it taketh vs from that death, which began in the wombe of our mother, and now endeth, to bring vs to that life which shall neuer end. *Dies iste quem tanquam extremum reformidas, aeterni natalis est.*

The second maner of the cariage of man in this matter of death, is of a good, sweete, and moderate soule, and is iustly practised in a common and peaceable life, by those that with reason make account of this condition of life, and content themselves to indure it, but gouerning themselves according to reason, and accepting of death when it commeth. This is a well tempered mediocritie, sutable to such a condition of life, betweene the extremities (which are to desire and feare, to seeke and to flie, vitious and faultie, *summum ne metuas diem, nec optes (mortem concupiscentes, & timentes aequè obiurgat Epicurus)* if they be not couered and excused by some reason not common and ordinarie, as shall be said in his place. To seeke and desire death is ill; it is iniustice to desire death without a cause, and to be out of charitie with the world, which our liues may be beneficiall vnto. It is to be vnthankfull to nature to

12

2 To attend death it is good.

contentine it, and not to make the best vse thereof; to be ouer anxious and scrupulous, and not to endure that estate that is not burthensome, and wee are called vnto. To flie and feare death on the other side, is against nature, reason, iustice, and all durie.

13
Death is
naturall.

For to die is a thing naturall, necessarie, and ineuitable, iust and reasonable; Naturall, for it is a part of the order of the whole Vniuerse, & of the life of the world: wilt thou then that the world be ruinated, and a new made for thy selfe? Death holdeth a high place in the policie & great common-wealth of the world, and it is very profitable for the succession and continuance of the workes of nature: the fading or corruption of one life, is the passage to a thousand others: *Sic rerum summa renatur.* And it is not only a part of this great whole Vniuerse, but of our particular essence, not lesse essential than to liue, to be borne. In flying death, thou fliest thy selfe; thy essence is equally parted into these two, life and death, it is the condition of thy creation. If it grieueth thee to die, why wert thou borne? Men come not into the world with any other purpose but to goe forth againe, and therefore he that is not willing to goe forth, let him not come in. The first day of thy birth bindeth thee, and setteth thee as well in the way to deat, as to life.

Nascentes morimur finisque ab origine pendet.

Sola mors ius aequum est generis humani, viuere noluit qui mori non vult, vita cum exceptione mortis data est, tam stultus qui timet mortem, quam qui senectutem.

To be vnwilling to die, is to be vnwilling to be a man, for all men are mortall, and therefore a wise man said, and that without passion, hauing receiued newes of the death of his sonne; I knew I begot, and bred him vp a mortall man. Death being then a thing so naturall and essential, both for the world in grosse, and for thy self in particular, why should it be horrible vnto thee? Thou goest against nature, the feare of griefe and paine is naturall, but not of death: for being so seruiceable to nature, and nature hauing instituted it, to what end should it imprint in vs a hatred and horror thereof? Children and beasts feare not death, yea many times they suffer it cheerefully: it is not then nature that teacheth

vs to feare it, but rather to attend and receiue it, as being sent by it.

Secondly, it is necessarie, fatale, ineuitable; and this thou knowest that fearest and weepst. What greater follie can there be, than for a man to torment himselfe for nothing, and that willingly and of purpose, to pray and importune him, whom he knowes to bee inexorable; to knocke at that dore that cannot be opened? What is there more inexorable and deafe than death? Wee must therefore feare things vncertaine, doe our best endeouours in things that are not remediable; but such as are certaine, as death, we must attend, and grow resolute in things past remedie. The sot feareth and flieth death, the foole seekes it and runs after it; the wise man attendeth it: It is folie to grieue at that, that cannot be mended; to feare that, that cannot be auoided; *Feras non culpes, quod vitari non potest.* The example of *David* is excellent, who vnderstanding of the death of his deare childe, put on his best apparell, and made himselfe merry, saying to those that wondered at this kinde of carriage, that whilest his son liued, he importuned God for his recouerie, but being dead, that care was ended, and there was no remedie. The foole thinks he maketh a better answer to say, that that is the cause of his grieue, and that he tormenteth himselfe, because there is no remedie; but he doubleth and perfecteth his owne folie thereby, *Scienter frustra niti extrema dementia est.* Now death being so necessarie and ineuitable, it is not on'y to no purpose to feare, but making of necessitie a vertue, wee must welcome it and receiue it kindly; for it is better for vs to goe to death, than that death should come to vs, to catch that, before that catch vs.

14
Necessarie.

Thirdly, to die is a thing reasonable and iust, it is reason to ariue to that place, towards which we are alwaies walking; and if a man feare to come thither, let him not walke, but stay himselfe, or turne backe againe, which is impossible to doe. It is reason that thou giue place to others, since others haue giuen place to thee: If thou haue made thy commoditie of this life, thou must be satisfied and be gone, as he that is inuited to a banquet takes his refection and departeth. If thou haue not known how to make vse and profit thereof, what needest thou

15
Iust and
reasonable.

thou care, if thou lose it, or to what end wouldest thou keepe it? It is a debt that must be paid, a pawne that must bee restored, whensoever it is demanded. Why pleadest thou against thy own schedule, thy faith, thy duty? It is then against reason to spurne against death, since that thereby thou acquitest thy selfe of so much, and dischargest thy selfe of so great an account. It is a thing generall and common to all to die, why then troublest thou thy selfe? Wilt thou haue a new priuiledge, that was yet neuer seene, and bee a lone man by thy selfe? Why fearest thou to goe whither all the world goeth, where so many millions are gone before thee, and so many millions shall follow thee? Death is equally certaine to all, and equallity is the first part of equity, *omnes eodem cogimur: omnium uersatur urna: serius ocyus fors exitura, &c.*

16
To contemne
death is
good, if it be
for a thing
that de-
serues it.

The third is the part of a valiant and generous minde, which is practised with reason, in a publike, eleuated, difficult, and busie condition of life, where there are many things to be preferred before life, and for which a man should not doubt to die. In such a case howsoever matters go a man must more account thereof than of his life, which is placed vpon the stage and scaffold of this world: hee must runne his race with resolution, that he may giue a lustre to his other actions, and performe those things that are profitable and exemplary. Hee must lay downe his life, and let it runne his fortune. He that knoweth not how to contemne death, shall neuer not only performe any thing of worth, but he exposeth himselfe to diuers dangers; for whilest he goeth about to keepe his life safe and sure, hee laieth open and hazardeth his deuoir, his honour, his vertue and honestie. The contempt of death is that which produceth the boldest, and most honourable exploits whether in good or euill. Hee that feareth not to die, feares nothing: he doth whatsoever he will, hee makes himselfe a master both of his owne life, and of anothers: the contempt of death is the true and liuely source of all the beautifull and generous actions of men: from hence are deriued the braue resolutions and free speeches of vertue vttered by so many great personages. *Eluidius Priscus* whom the Emperour *Vespasian* had commanded not to come to the senat, or comming, to speake as he would haue him, answered, That
as

as he was a Senator it was fit he should be at the Senate; and if being there he were required to giue his aduice, he would speake freely that which his conscience commaunded him. Being threatned by the same man, that if he spake he should die; Did I euer tell you (saith he) that I was immortall? Do you what you will, and I will do what I ought: It is in your power to put me vniustlie to death, and in me to die constantlie. The *Lacedemonians* being threatned much hard dealing, if they did not speedily yeeld themselves to *Philip* the father of *Alexander*, who was entred into their countrie with a great power; one for the rest answered, What hard dealing can they suffer that feare not to die? And being told by the same *Philip* that he would breake and hinder all their designments, What, say they, will he likewise hinder vs from dying? Another being asked by what meanes a man may liue free, answered, By contemning death. And another youth being taken and sold for a slaue, said to him that bought him, Thou shalt see what thou hast bought, I were a foole to liue a slaue whilest I may be free, and whilest he spake cast himself down from the top of the house. A wise man said vnto another, deliberating with himselfe how he might take away his life to free himselfe from an euil that at that time pressed him sore, Thou doest not deliberate of any great matter: it is no great thing to liue, thy slaues, thy beasts do liue, but it is a great matter to die honestlie, wisely, constantly. To conclude and crowne this article, our religion hath not had a more firme and assured foundation, and wherein the authour thereof hath more insisted, than the contempt of this life. But many there are that make a shew of contemning death, when they feare it. Many there are that care not to be dead, yea they wish they were dead, but it grieueth them to die. *Emori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihili astimo.* Many deliberate in their health and soundest iudgements to suffer death with constancie, nay to murder themselves, a part played by many, & for which end *Heliogabalus* made many sumptuous preparations; but being come to the point, some wer terrified by the bleeding of their nose, as *Lucius Domitius*, who repented that he had poysoned himselfe. Others haue turned away their eyes and their thoughts, as if they would steale vpon it, swallowing it downe

insensible as men take pilles, according to that saying of *Cæsar*, that the best death was the shortest; and of *Plinie*, that a short death was the happiest houre of a mans life. Now no man can be said to be resolute to die, that feareth to confront it, and to suffer with his eyes open, as *Socrates* did, who had thirtie whole daies to ruminate and to digest the sentence of his death, which he did without any passion or alteration, yea without any shew of endeavor, mildly and cheerfullie. *Romulus*, *Atticus*, *Tullius Marcellinus*, Romans, *Cicero* the Philosopher, all three almost after one maner: for hauing assayed to die by abstinence, hoping thereby to quit themselves of those maladies that did torment them, but finding themselves rather cured thereby, neuertheless they would not desist till they had ended that they went about, taking pleasure by little and little to pine away, and to consider the course and progresse of death. *Otho* and *Cato* hauing prepared all things fit for their death, vpon the very point of the execution settled themselves to sleepe, and slept profoundly, being no more astonished at death, than at any other ordinarie and light accident.

17
To desire
death.

The fourth is the part of a valiant and resolute mind, practised in former times by great and holie personages, and that in two cases; the one the more naturall and lawfull is a painfull and troublesome life, or an apprehension of a far worse death: To be brieve, a miserable estate which a man cannot remedie. This is to desire death as the retrait and only haven from the torments of this life, the soueraigne good of nature, the only stay and pillar of our libertie. It is imbecillitie to yeeld vnto euils, but it is follie to nourish them. It is a good time to die, when to liue is rather a burthen than a blessing, and there is more ill in life than good; for, to preserue our life, to increase our torment, is against nature. There are some that say, that we should desire to die, to auoid those pleasures that are according to nature; how much more then to flie those miseries that are against nature? There are many things in life farre worse than death, for which we should rather die and not liue at all, than liue. And therefore the *Lacedæmonians* being cruelly threatned by *Antipater*, if they yeelded not to his demaund, answered, If thou threaten vs with any thing that is worse than

that death, death shall be welcome vnto vs. And the wisest were wont to say, That a wise man liueth as long as he should, not so long as he can, death being more at his command and in his power, than life. Life hath but one entrance, and that too dependeth vpon the will of another. Our death dependeth on our owne willes, and the more voluntarie it is, the more honorable; and there are a thousand waies vnto it. We may want meanes wherby to liue, but not to die. Life may be taken away from euery man by euery man, but not death, *ubi mors est, optime hoc cauit deus, eripere vitam nemo non homini potest, at nemo mortem: mille ad hanc aditus patent.* The most fauorable present that nature hath bestowed vpon vs, and that taketh away from vs all meanes of complaint, is, that it hath left vnto vs the key of the closet, libertie to die when we will. Wherefore complaineest thou in this world? It holdeth thee not; if thou liue in paine, thy idlenes and feare is the cause; for to die, there is nothing necessarie, but a will.

The other case is a liuely apprehension and desire of the life to come, which maketh a man to thirst after death, as after a great gaine, the seed of a better life, the bridge vnto paradise, the way to all good, and an earnest pennie of the resurrection. A firme beleefe and hope of these things is incompatible with the feare and horror of death: it perswadeth vs rather to be wearie of this life, and to desire death, *vitam habere in patientia, & mortem in desiderio*, to haue life in affliction, and death in affection: their life is a crosse, their death a comfort, and therefore their vowes and their voices are, *cupio dissolui: mihi mors lacrum: quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?* And for this cause those Philosophers and Christians haue been iustlie reproched (which is to be vnderstood of those that are weake and idle, and not of all) that play the publike dissemblers, and do not in veritie belecue that which they do so much talke of, and so highlie commend touching that happie immortalitie, and those vnspeakable pleasures in the second life, since they doubt, and feare death so much, the necessarie passage thereunto.

The fift and last, is the execution of this precedent desire, which is for a man to be his owne executioner, and the author of his owne death. This seemeth to proceed from ver-
18
To kill him-
selfe.

tue, and the greatnes of a mans courage, hauing been ancientlie practised by the greatest and most excellent men and women of euerie nation and religion, *Greekes, Romanes, Egyptians, Persians, Medes, French, Indians*, Philosophers of all sects, *Iewes*, witnes that good old man *Razis*, called the father of the *Iewes* for his vertue; and his wiues, who vnder *Antiochus*, hauing circumcised their children, cast themselves headlong from the rock with them: And Christians too, witnes those two canonized Saints, *Pelagius* and *Sophronia*, whereof the first, with his mother and sisters cast himselfe into the riuer, and the other killed hir selfe with a knife, to auoid the violence of *Maxentius* the Emperour: Yea witnes diuers people and whole cities, as *Capona* in *Italy*, *Astupa*, *Numantia* in *Spaine* besieged by the *Romans*; the *Abideens* enforced by *Philip*, a citie in *India* besieged by *Alexander*. But this resolution hath been likewise approued and authorized by many common-weales, by lawes and rules established thereupon, as at *Marseilles*, in the Ile of *Cea*; in *Nigropont*, and other nations, as in the *Hyperborean* Ilands, and iustified by many great reasons, drawne from the precedent article, which is of the iust desire of death. For if it be permitted to desire, to aske, to seeke after death, why should it be an ill acte to giue it vnto our selues? If a mans owne death be iust in the will, why should it not be as iust in the hand, and the execution? Why should I expect that from another, which I can do my selfe? and why should it not be better to giue it, than to suffer another to giue it; to meete, than to attend it? for the fairest death is the more voluntarie. Finallie, I offend not the law made against theeues and robbers, when I take but my owne goods; and cut but my owne purse; neither am I guiltie of the lawes made against murtherers by taking away my owne life. But this opinion is reprobued by diuers, not only Christians, but *Iewes*, as *Iosephus* disputeth against his captaines in the caue *du Puis*: and Philosophers, as *Plato*, *Scipio*, who held this proceeding not only for a vice of cowardlines and impatiencie, for it is for a man to hide himselfe from the blowes of fortune. Now a true and liuely vertue must neuer yeeld, for euils and crosses are nourishments thereunto, and it is greater constancie well to vse the chaine wherewith we are tied, than to breake

breake it; and more setled resolution in *Regulus*, than in *Caro*.

Rebus in aduersis facile est contemnere vitam,

Fortius ille facit, qui miser esse potest.

Si fractus illabitur orbis

Impavidum ferient ruinae.

But also for a fault of desertion; for a man ought not to abandon his charge without the expresse commaundement of him that gaue it him; we are not heere for our selues, nor our owne masters. This then is not a matter beyond all doubt or dispute.

It is first beyond all doubt, that wee are not to attempe this last exploit without very great and iust cause (nay I cannot see how any cause should be great and iust enough) to the end that it be as they say *εὐλογος εἰς ἀπογῆν*, an honest and reasonable departure. It must not then be for any light occasion, whatsoeuer some say, that a man may die for light causes, since they that hold vs in life are not weightie. It is ingratitude to nature not to accept and vse hir present, it is a signe of lightnes to be too anxious and scrupulous, to breake companie for matters of no moment, and not for such as are iust and lawfull, if there be any such. And therefore they had not a sufficient excuse, and iust cause of their death of whom I made mention before, *Pomponius Atticus*, *Marcellinus*, and *Cleantes*, who would not stay the course of their death, for this only reason, because they were already neere vnto it. The wiues of *Petus*, of *Scaurus*, of *Labio*, of *Fulvius* the friend of *Augustus*, of *Seneca*, and diuers others, who died only to accompanie their husbands in death, or rather to encourage them therein. *Caro* and others, who died because their businesse succeeded not well, and because they would not fall into the hands of their enemies, notwithstanding they feared no ill vsage at their hands. They that haue murthered themselves because they would not liue at the mercie, and by the grace and fauor of those whom they hated, as *Granius Siluanus*, and *Statius Proximus*, being pardoned by *Nero*. They that die to recouer a shame and dishonor past, as that *Romane Lucretia*, *Spartan* pizes the sonne of *Queene Tomyris*, *Boges* the Lieutenant of king *Xerxes*. They that for no particular cause, but only because they see the weale-publike in a bad and declining estate

7

murder themselves, as *Nerva* that great Lawyer, *Vibius Viricus*, *Iubellius* in the taking of *Capona*. They that are weary with living, or for private causes loath to live any longer. Neither is it sufficient that the cause be great and iust, but that it be necessarie and remediable; and that all manner of meanes to preserve life be first put in practise. For precipitation and anticipated despaire is very vitious, as in *Brutus* and *Cassius*, who killing themselves before the time and occasion, lost the reliques of the Roman libertie whereof they were protectors. A man, saith *Cleomenes*, must manage his life, and make use thereof to the vttermost: for to take it away, a man neuer wants time, it is a remedie which he hath alwaies in his owne hands; but the state of things may change and grow better. *Ioseph* and diuers others haue to their great benefit practised this counsell; things that seeme altogether desperate, do many times change and haue a happie successe; *aliquis carnifici suo superstes fuit.*

Multa dies variusque labor mutabilis aui

Retulit in melius.

A man must carie himselfe in his place and calling as a defendant against him that assaileth him, *cum moderamine inculpate tutele*, he must trie all manner of meanes before he come to this extremitie. Secondly and without doubt it is farre better and more commendable to suffer, and to continue constant and firme to the end, than fearefullie & cowardlie to flie or die: but forasmuch as it is a gift not giuen vnto all no more than continencie is, *non omnes capiunt verbum istud, unde melius nubere quam vri*: the question is, whether an insupportable and remediable euill hapning, which may vtterlie vndoe and turne topsy-turue our whole resolution, and driue vs into despaire, despite and murmuring against God, it be more expedient, or a lesse euill for a man couragiously to deliuer himselfe, hauing his senses sound and settled, than by standing to it, for feare of failing in his dutie, expose himselfe to the danger of sinking and being vtterly lost. It is not a lesse euill to quit the place, than to be obstinate and perish, to flie, than to be taken. It is true that it seemeth by all humane and philosoph call reason to be practised, as hath been said, by so many famous people of all countries and climats. But Christianitie

flatterie doth no way approue it, nor alloweth therein any dispensation.

Finally, it is a great point of wisdom to learne to know the point and period, to chuse a fit houre to die: Euery man hath his time and season to die; some preuent it, others prolong it: there is weakenesse and valour in them both, but there is required discretion. How many men haue suruiued their glorie, and by a desire to lengthen their life but a little, haue darkened it againe, and liued to helpe bury their owne honour? And that which lastly sticketh by them, hath no reish or feeling of what is past, but continueth like an old filthy clout sowed to the hemme of a rich and beautifull ornament. There is a time to gather fruit from the tree, which if it hang too long, it rotteth and growes worse and worse; and the losse is as great too, if it bee gathered too soone. Many saints and holy men haue fled from death, because they are yet profitable to the church and weale-publike, though in respect of their owne particular they could be content to die. It is an act of charitie to desire to liue for the benefit of an other: *Si populo tuo sum necessarius, non recuso laborem.*

Death hath diuers formes, some more easie than other, and taketh diuers qualities according to the fantasie of euery one. Among those that are naturall they that proceed from weakenesse and a numnesse of the members, are the sweetest and the easiest: among those that are violent, the best is the shortest, & the least premeditated. Some desire to make an exemplarie and demonstratiue death of constancie and sufficiencie; this is to consider another thing, and to seeke their owne reputation: but this is vanitie, for this is no act of societie, but of one only person, who hath enough to doe with himselfe, to minister to himselfe inward comfort, and hath no neede to trouble himselfe with what belongeth to another, especially all the interest hee hath in his reputation, ceasing with his death. That is the best death which is well recollected in it selfe, quiet, solitarie, and attendeth wholly to that, which at that time is fittest. That great assistance of parents & friends, bringeth a thousand discommodities, it oppresseth and smothereth him that is dying, one tormenteth his eares, another his eies, another his mouth; their cries and complaints, if they be

20

21

Formes of
deaths di-
uers.

be true, stifle the heart ; if fained, afflict and torment it. Many great personages haue sought to die farre from their friends, to auoide this inconuenience, accounting it a childish thing, and a foolish humour, to be willing by their miseries to moue sorrow and compassion in their friends ; wee commend constancie to suffer bad fortune, wee accuse and hate it in our friends, and when it is our owne case, it is not sufficient that they suffer with vs, but they must afflict themselves too : A wise man that is sicke, should content himselfe with the settled countenance of his assistants.

C H A P. XII.

To maintaine himselfe in true tranquillitie of spirit, the fruit and crowne of wisdom, and the conclusion of this booke.

THe tranquillitie of the spirit is the souereigne good of man. This is that great and rich treasure, which the wisest seeke by sea and by land, on foote and a horsebacke ; all our care should tend thereunto, it is the fruit of all our labors and studies, the crowne of wisdom. But lest a man should mistake himselfe heerein, you must know that this tranquillitie is not a retrait or vacation from all affaires, a delightfull solitarinesse and corporally pleasant, or a profound carelesnesse of all things : if it were so, many women, idle, dissolute and voluptuous persons, would at their pleasure enioy as great a good, as the wisest can aspire vnto with all their studie : Neither multitude nor scarcitie of businesse doth any thing heerein. It is a beautifull, sweete, equall, iust, firme and pleasant estate of the soule, which neither businesse nor idlenesse, nor good accidents, nor ill, nor time can any way trouble, alter, mend, or depresse ; *Vera tranquillitas non concuti-*

2 The meanes to attaine thereunto, to get and preferue it, are the points that I haue handled in this second booke, whereof this is a brieve collection. They consist in freeing and disfurnishing of a man from all lets and impediments, and furnishing him with those things that entertaine and preferue it. The things that doe most hinder and trouble the rest and tranquillitie of the spirit, are common and vulgar opinions, which for the most part are erroneous ; and secondly desires and passions, which ingender in vs a kinde of delicacy and difficulty :

culty: which are the cause that a man is neuer content, and these are kindled and stirred in him by those two contrary fortunes, prosperity and aduersity, as with two violent and mighty winds: and finally that vile and base captiuity wherewith the spirit (that is to say, the iudgement and will) is enthralled like a beast vnder the yoke of certaine locall and particular rules and opinions. Now he must emancipate and free himselfe from these stockes and vniust subiections, and bring his spirit into libertie, restore himselfe to himselfe, free, vniuersall, open, seeing into all, and wandring through the beautifull and vniuersall circuit of the world and of nature. *In commune genitus mundum ut vnā domum spectans toti se inferens mundo, & in omnes eius actus contemplationem suam mittens.*

The place being thus trimmed and made ready, the first foundations that are to be laid, are a true honesty, and to liue in such an estate and vocation whereunto a man is fit. The principall parts wherewith he must raise, assure, and settle this building, are first true piety, whereby, with a soule not astonished, but settled, pure, free, deuout, a man contemplateth God, the great, soueraigne, and absolute work-master of all things, who can neither be seene nor knowen: but yet he must be knowen, adored, worshipped, serued with the whole heart, from whom he is to hope for all maner of good, and to feare no euill: afterwards he must walke roundly in simplicity and truth, according to the lawes and customes, liue with a heart open both to the eies of God and the world, *Conscientiam suam aperiens semperque tanquam in publico viuens, se magis veritus, quam alios.* Againe hee must keepe in himselfe and with others, and generally in all things, in his thoughts, speeches, designments, actions, a moderation the mother or nurse of tranquillity, laying aside all pompe and vanity, rule his desires, content himselfe with a mediocrity and sufficiency, *quod sit esse velit, nihilq; malit*, reioice in his fortunes. A tempest hath a great deale lesse force, and doth lesse hurt when the sailes are taken downe, than when they are hoised vp, and laid open to the windes. He must bee constant against whatsoever may wound or hurt him, raise himselfe aboue and beyond all feare, contemning all the blowes of fortune, of death, holding it as the end of all euils, and not the cause of any, *con-*
temptor

temptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, supra omnia que contingunt acciduntque eminens. Imperiturbatus, intrepidus. And so hold himselfe firme vnto himselfe, agree with himselfe, liue at ease without any paine or inward contention, full of ioy, of peace, of comfort and content in himselfe; *Sapiens plenus gaudio, hilaris, placidus cum dijs ex pari viuit: Sapientia effectus gaudij equalitas, solus sapiens gaudet:* He must I say entertaine himselfe, and continue content in himselfe, which is the proper fruit and effect of wisdom; *Nisi sapienti sua non placent: omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui. Non est beatus, esse se qui non putat.*

To conclude, to this tranquillitie of spirit two things are necessarie, innocencie, and a good conscience, this is the first and principall part which doth maruellously arme and confirme him with assurance; but this is not alwaies sufficient, in the force of the tempest, as it is many times seene in diuers that are troubled and lost: *Erit tanta tribulatio vt seducantur iusti.* And therefore the other is likewise necessarie, which is force and constancie of courage, as likewise this alone were not sufficient: for the force and resistance of the conscience is marvellous, it makes vs to betray, to accuse our selues, & for want of other witnesses, it is as a thousand witnesses against vs.

Occultum quatiens animo tortore flagellum.

It frameth an enditement, condemneth & executeth vs, there is no closet close enough for wicked men, saith *Epicurus*, because they neuer can assure themselves to be hid, their owne conscience alwaies discovering them to themselves. *Prima est hac ultio, quod se iudice nemo nocens absoluitur.* So likewise neither a weake & fearefull soule, be it neuer so holy, nor a strong and couragious, if it be not sound & pure, can neuer enioy this so rich & happie tranquillitie, but he that hath them all worketh wonders, as *Socrates*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato*, *Scipio*, of whom ther are three admirable exploits touching this subiect. These two Romanes being publikely accused, made their accusers to blush, woon the Iudges and the whole assemblie being stricken with an admiration. He had a heart too great by nature, saith *Titus Livius* of *Scipio*, to know how to be faultie, and to debase himselfe so much, as to defend his owne innocencie.

FINIS.

OF



OF WISDOME

WISDOME,

THE
THIRD BOOKE.

*Wherein are handled the particular
aduifements of Wisdome, by the foure
morall vertues.*

THE PREFACE.



Orasmuch as our purpose in this Booke, is by peecemeale to instruct vnto wisdom, and to giue the particular aduifements after the generall handled in the Second Booke, that we may the better hold a certaine course and order therein, we haue thought that we cannot do better, than to follow the foure mistris and morall vertues, Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, and Temperance; for in these foure almost all the duties of our life are comprehended. Prudence, is as a generall guide and conduct of the other vertues, and of our whole life, though properlie it be exercised in the affaires that belong thereunto. Iustice concerneth the persons of men; for it is to giue vnto euery one that which belongeth vnto him. Fortitude and Temperance, concerneth all accidents good and euill, pleasant and painefull, good and ill fortune. Now in these three, persons, affaires, and accidents,

dents, is contained all our life and humane condition, and the trafficke of this world.

Of Prudence, the first Vertue.

CHAP. I.

Of Prudence in generall.

1
The excel-
lencie there-
of.

PRudence is with reason put in the first rancke, as the generall Queene, superintendent, and guide of all other vertues, *auriga virtutum*; without which there is nothing good, beautifull, fit, and decent; it is the salt of our life, the lustre, the ornament, the sauce or seasoning of our actions, the square and rule of our affaires; and in a word, the Arte of our life, as Phylicke the arte of our health.

2
The defini-
tion.

It is the knowledge and choice of those things we must either desire, or flie; it is the iust estimation & triall of things; it is the eye that seeth all, that directeth and ordaineth all. It consisteth in three things, which are all of one ranke; to consult and deliberate well, to iudge and resolute well, to conduct and execute well.

3
It is vniuer-
sall.

It is a vniuersall vertue, for it extendeth it selfe generally to all humane things, not only in grosse, but by peecemeale to euery particular thing, & is as infinite, as are the indiuiduals.

4
Difficult.
Senec.

It is very difficult, both by reason of the aforesaid infinitenes, for the particulars are without knowledge, as without number, *si qua finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt*; and of the great vncertaintie and inconstancie of humane things, which are the greater by reason of their accidents, circumstances, appertenances, dependancies, times, places, persons; in such sort, that in the change of one only, and that the least circumstance, the whole thing it selfe is altered: And likewise in the office thereof, which is the gathering together and temperature of contrarie things, the distinction and triall of those that are like one another; the contrarietie and resemblance hindereth much.

5
Obscure.

It is very obscure, because the causes and iurisdiccions of things are vnknowne, the seeds and roots are hidden, and such as the nature of man cannot find, nor ought to seeke after. Oc-

cultat

cultat eorum semina deus, & plerumque bonorum malorumq; causa sub diuersa specie latent. Moreover, fortune, destinie, (vse what words you will) a soueraigne secret, and vnknowne power and authoritie hath alwaies the aduantage, and maintaineth it against all counsels, foresights, and preuentions whatsoeuer: whereby it many times comes to passe, that the best counsels haue the worst issues, that one and the same counsell doth very happily succcede to one, vntrappily to another, in one and the same case, and with one and the same man, things went luckily yesterday, vntrappily to day. It is an opinion iustly receiued, that we ought not to iudge of counsels, nor of the sufficiencie and capacitie of persons by the euent. And therefore one answered those well that maruelled and were astonished at the ill successe of their businesse, considering with how wise and mature deliberation they were vnderaken, That they were masters of their deliberations, not of the successe of their affaires: for that was in the power of fortune, which seemeth to sport it selfe with all our fairest designments & counsels, ouerthroweth in a moment that which hath a long time been projected and deliberated, and seemeth to be strongly fortified, choking, as they say, our artillarie. And indeed fortune to shew it authoritie in all things, and to abate our presumption, not being able to make men wise, that are not apt thereunto, maketh them neuerthelesse happie in despite of vertue, whereby it many times comes to passe, that simple men bring to a happie end great matters both publike and priuate. Prudence then is a sea without either bottome or brinke, and which cannot be limited and prescribed by precepts and aduiselements. It doth but compasse things and goeth about them, like a darke cloude, many times vaine and frivulous.

Neuerthelesse it is of such weight and necessitie, that alone and of it selfe it can do much, and without it all the rest is nothing, no not riches, meanes, force, *vis consilij expertis mole ruit sua, Mens una sapiens plurimum vincit manus. Et multa qua naturae impedita sunt, consilio expediuntur.* And the principall cause of this necessitie is the peruerse nature of man, the roughest and hardest to tame of all other creatures; *Impatiens equi, ne dum seruitur is;* and which must be handled with arte and industrie,

Plin. In
Paneg.

6
Necessarie.
Horat. 3.
od.
Euripid.
Liuius.
Senec. 1.
de clemet.

Xenoph.in
pædag.

7
The acqui-
sition thereof.

dustrie, for it doth not more willinglie set it selfe against any, than against those that would contemne it. Now Prudence is the arte to handle it, and a gentle bridle, that holdeth it within the compasse of obedience.

Now though the seed of Prudence, as of other vertues, be in vs by nature, yet it is acquired and learnt more than any other, and that in some sort by precepts and aduise-ments; this is the Theorick: but much better and principally (though with more time) by experience and practise, which is two-fold: the one, and the true, is that which is proper and personall, whereof it takes the name; this is the knowledge of those things which we haue seene and handled: the other is strange by the acte of another; this is historie which we know by relation or by reading. Now experience and vse is more firme and more assured; *usus efficacissimus omnium rerum magister*, the father and mistress of the artes, but more long; it is old, *seris venit usus ab annis*, more difficult, painefull, rare. The knowledge of historie, as it is lesse firme and assured, so is it more easie, more frequent, open and common to all. A man is made more resolute and assured at his owne charges, but it is more easie at the charge of another. Now from these two properly, Experience, and Historie, doth Prudence arise, *usus me genuit, mater peperit memoria, seu memoria anima & uita historia*.

8
The distin-
ction.

Now Prudence may and must be diuerslie distinguished according to the persons and the affaires. In regard of the persons there is private prudence, whether it be solitarie and individuall, which can hardlie be tearmed prudence; or sociable & Economica among a small companie, and prudence publike and politike. This more high, excellent, difficult, and vnto which those foresaid qualities do properlie belong; and it is two-fold, peaceable, and militarie.

In regard of the affaires, forasmuch as they are of two sorts, the one ordinarie, easie; the other extraordinarie. These are accidents which bring with them some new difficultie and ambiguitie. A man may likewise say that there is an ordinarie and easie prudence, which walketh according to the lawes, customes, and course already established, another extraordinarie and more difficult.

There

There is likewise another distinction of prudence both in ^{Hesiod.} respect of the persons, and of the affaires, which concerneth ^{Liuius.} rather the degrees, than the kindes thereof, that is to say, ^{Cicero.} proper prudence whereby a man is wise, and taketh counsell of himselfe; the other borrowed, whereby a man followeth the counsell of another. The wise say that there are two sorts and degrees of wise men; the first and chiefest is of those that haue a cleere insight into all things, and know of themselves how to finde the remedies and helps; but where are these to be found? Doubtlesse they are rare and singular: the other is of those that know how to take, to follow, to make vse of the good counsels of another; for they that know neither how to giue, nor to take counsell, are fooles.

The generall and common aduiselements, which belong to all sorts of prudence, all sorts of persons and affaires, hath beene touched and briefly deliuered in the second booke, and they are eight; first, knowledge of the persons and affaires; secondly, estimation of things; thirdly, choice and elections; fourthly, from them to take counsell vpon all; fifthly, temperature betweene feare and assurance, confidence and diffidence; sixthly, to take all things in their season, and to sease vpon the occasion; seuenthly, to carrie himselfe well, with industrie and fortune; lastly, discretion in all. Wee must now handle the particulars, first of publike wisdom, which respecteth the persons, afterwards of that which respecteth the affaires.

9
Chap. 10. p. 320.

*Of the politike prudence of a souereigne
to gouerne states.*

THE PREFACE.

THis doctrine belongeth to souereignes and gouernours of states. It is vncertaine, infinite, difficult, and almost impossible to be ranged into order, to be limited and prescribed by rules and precepts: but wee must endeavour to giue some small light, and brieve instruction thereof. Wee may referre this whole doctrine to two principall heads, which are the two duties of a souereigne. The one comprehendeth and intreateth of the props and pillars of a state, principall & essentiall

essentiall parts of publike gouernment, as the bones and sinewes of this great bodie, to the end that a souereigne may provide for himselfe and his state; which are seuen principall, that is to say, knowledge of the state; vertue; maners and fashions; counfels; treasure; forces and armes; alliances. The three first are in the person of the souereigne, the fourth in him and neere him, the three latter without him. The other is to act, well to employ and to make vse of the aforsaid meanes, that is to say, in grosse, and in a word, well to gouerne and maintaine himselfe in authoritie, and the loue both of his subiects and of strangers, but distinctly; this part is twofold, peaceable and militarie. Behold heere summarily and grossely the worke cut out, and the first great draughts that are to be handled heereafter. We will diuide then this politicke matter, and of state, into two parts; the first shall be of prouision, that is to say, of the seuen necessarie things; the second, and which presupposeth the first, shall be of the action of the prince. This matter is excellently handled by *Lipsius*, according as he thought good: the marrow of his booke is heere: I haue not taken, nor wholly followed his method, nor his order, as you may already see in this generall diuision, and more you shall heereafter: I haue likewise left somewhat of his, and added something of my owne, and other mens.

C H A P. II.

The first part of this politicke prudence and gouernment of state, which is of prouision.

See p. 488.

The chiefe
point of this
prouision, to
know the
state.

THe first thing that is required before all others, is the knowledge of the state: for the first rule of all prudence consisteth in knowledge, as hath beene said in the second booke. The first in all things, is to know with whom a man hath to deale. For in as much as this ruling and moderating prudence of states, which is a knowledge and sufficiency to gouerne in publike, is a thing relatiue, which is handled betweene the souereigne and the subiects; the first dutie and office thereof is in the knowledge of the two parts, that is, of the people, and the souereigntie, that is to say, of the state.

First

First then the humours and natures of the people must be knowne. This knowledge formeth, and giueth aduice vnto him that should gouerne them. The nature of the people in generall, hath beene described at large in the first booke, (light, inconstant, mutinous, vaine, a louer of nouelties, fierce and insupportable in prosperitie, cowardly and dejected in aduersitie) but it must likewise be knowne in particular: so many cities and persons, so many diuers humours. There are people cholericke, audacious, warriors, fearefull, giuen to wine, subiect to women, some more than others, *nosceda natura vulgi est, & quibus modis temperanter habeatur*. And in this sense is that saying of the wise to be vnderstood: He that hath not obeyed, cannot tell how to command; *nemo bene imperat, nisi qui ante paruerit imperio*. Not because soueraignes should or can alwaies take vpon them the name of subiects; for many are borne kings and princes: and many states are successiue: but that he that wil wel command, should acquaint himselfe with the humors and willes of his subiects, as if himselfe were of their ranke, and in their place. He must likewise know the nature of the state, not only in generall, such as it hath beene described, but in particular that which hee hath now in hand, the forme, establishment, birth thereof; that is to say, whether it be old or new, fallen by succession, or by election, obtained by the lawes, or by armes, of what extent it is, what neighbours, meanes, power it hath. For according to these and other circumstances, hee must diuerslie manage the scepter, loose and straiten the raines of his government.

Senec.

After this knowledge of the state, which is as a preamble, the first of those things that are required, is vertue, necessary in a soueraigne, as well for himselfe as for the state. It is first necessary and conuenient that hee that is about all should be better than all, according to the saying of *Cyrus*. And then it standeth him vpon for his credit and reputation. For common fame and report gathereth and spreadeth abroad the speeches and actions of him that gouerneth. Hee is in the eie of all, and can no more hide himselfe than the sun; and therefore what good or ill soeuer he doth, shall not want meanes to blasen it, shall be talked of enough. And it importeth him

2
The second
head of this
provision is
vertue.

Salust. ad
Cæsar.

Plin. Pan.

Salust ad
Cæsar.

Pli. Paneg.

3
Especially
4. vertues.

much, both in respect of himselfe and his state; that his subiects haue a good opinion of him. Now a soueraigne ought not only in himselfe, and in his life and conuersation to be vertuous, but he must likewise endeouour that his subiects be like vnto himselfe. For as all the wisest of the world haue euer taught, a state, a city, a company cannot long continue nor prosper where vertue is banished; and they do grossly æquiuocate, who thinke that princes are so much the more assured in their states, by how much the more wicked their subiects are, because, say they, they are more proper and as it were borne to seruitude and the yoke, *patientiores seruitutis, quos non decet nisi esse seruos*. For contrarily, wicked men beare their yoke impatientlie; and they that are good and debonaire feare much more than their cause is. *Pessimus quisq; asperime rectorem patitur: Contrà facile imperium in bonos, qui metuentes magis quàm metuendi*. Now the most powerfull meanes to induce them, and to forme them vnto vertue, is the example of the Prince; for as experience telleth vs, all men doe frame themselves to the paterne and modell of the Prince. The reason is, because example presseth more than law. It is a mute law which carieth more credit than a commaund, *nec tam imperio nobis opus quàm exemplo: & mitius iubetur exemplo*. Now the eyes and thoughts of the lesser are alwaies vpon the great; they admire and simplie belecue, that all is good and excellent that they do: and on the other side, they that commaund, thinke they sufficientlie enioyne and bind their inferiors to imitate them by acting only. Vertue then is honorable and profitable in a soueraigne, yea, all vertue.

But especiallie and aboue all, Pietie, Iustice, Valour, Clemencie. These are the foure principall and princely vertues in principallitie. And therefore that great Prince *Augustus* was wont to say, that Pietie and Iustice did deifie Princes. And *Seneca* saith, that clemencie agreeth better with a Prince, than any other. The pietie of a soueraigne consisteth in his care for the maintenance and preferuation of religion, as the protector thereof. This maketh for his owne honor, and preferuation of himselfe: for they that feare God, dare not attempt, nay thinke of any thing either against their Prince, who is the image of God vpon earth, or against the state. For

as

as *Lactantius* doth many times teach, it is a religion that maintaineth humane societie, which cannot otherwise subsist, and would soone be filled with all maner of wickednes and sauage cruelties, if the respect and feare of religion did not bridle men and keepe them in order. The state of the Romans did increase, and flourish more by religion, saith *Cicero* himselfe, than by all other meanes. Wherefore a Prince must take care and endeuer that religion be preserved in it puritie, according to the ancient lawes and ceremonies of the countrie, and hinder all innouation, and controuersies therein, roughlie chastising those that goe about to breake the peace thereof. For doubtlesse change in religion, and a wrong done thereunto, draweth with it a change and declination in the Common-wealth, as *Mecenas* well discourseth to *Augustus*. Dion.

After pietie commeth Iustice, without which states are but robberies; which a Prince must keepe and practise both in 4
 himselfe and others: In himselfe, for he must detest all those tyrannicall & barbarous speeches, which dispence with soveraignes, quitting them from all lawes, reason, equitie, obligation; which tell them that they are not bound vnto any other dutie, than to their owne willes and pleasures; that there is no law for them; that all is good and iust that serueth their turnes; that their equitie is their force, their dutie is in their power. *Principi leges nemo scripsit: licet, si libet. In summa fortuna, id equius quod validius: nihil iniustum quod fructuosum: Sanctitas, pietas, fides, priuata bona sunt: quæ iuuat reges eant.* Plin. Pan. Tacitus. Senec. in tr.
 And he must oppose against them those excellent and holy counsels of the wise, that he that hath most power in him to breake lawes, should take most care to keepe them, and liue most in order. The greatest power should be the straightest bridle; the rule of power is dutie: *minimum decet libere, cui minimum licet, non fas potentes posse, fieri quod nefas.* Senec. Euripides.
 The Prince then must first be iust, keeping well and inuiolable his faith, the foundation of iustice to all and euery one whosoever he be. Then he must cause that his iustice be kept and maintained in others, for it is his proper charge, and for that cause he is installed. He must vnderstand the causes and the persons, giue vnto euery one that which appertaineth to him, iustly according to the lawes, without delay, labyrinths of suits and

Colum.
Tacit.

Plin. Pan.

An aduer-
tisement.

For the
weale-pub.

For defence
and conser-
vation.

controuerfies, inuolution of proceffe; abolifhing that villanous and pernicious myfterie of pleading, which is an open fayre, or marchandize, a lawfull and honorable robbery, *conceffum latrocinium*; auoiding the multiplicite of lawes and ordinances, a testimonie of a ficke Common-weale, *Corruptiffime reipublica plurima leges*, as medicines and plaifters of a bodie ill difpofed: and all this, to the end that that which is eftablifhed by good lawes be not deftroyed by too many lawes. But you muft know, that the iuftice, vertue, and probitie of a foueraigne goeth after another maner, than that of priuate men: it hath a gate more large and more free, by reafon of the great weight and dangerous charge which he carrieth and fwayeth, for which caufe it is fit to march with a pafe, which feemeth to others vneafie and irregular, but yet is neceffarie and lawfull for him. He muft fometimes ftep afide, and goe out of the way, mingle prudence with iuftice, and as they fay, couer himfelfe with the skin of the Lion, if that of the Foxe ferue not the turne. But this is not alwaies to be done, and in all cafes, but with thefe three conditions, that it be for the euident and important neceffitie of the weale-publike, (that is to fay, of the State and of the Prince, which are things conioyned) vnto which he muft runne; this is a naturall obligation, and not to be difpensed with: and to procure the good of the Common-weale, is but to do his dutie.

Salus populi fuprema lex eſto.

That it be to defend, and not to offend; to preferue himfelfe, and not to increafe his greatnes, to faue and fhield himfelfe either from deceits and fubtilties, or from wicked and dangerous enterprifes, and not to praetife them. It is lawfull by fubtiltie to preuent fubtiltie, and among foxes to counterfet the foxe. The world is full of arte and malicious coufenage; and by deceits and cunning fubtilties, ſtates are commonlie ouerthrowne, faith *Aristotle*. Why then ſhould it not be lawfull, nay why ſhould it not be neceffarie to hinder, and to diuert ſuch euill, and to faue the weale-publike by the ſelfe-fame meanes that others would vndermine and overthrow it? Alwaies to deale ſimplic and plainly with ſuch people, and to follow the ſtreight line of true reafon and equitie, were many times to betray the State, and to vndo it.

Thirdly

Thirdly it must be with discretion, to the end that others abuse it not, and such as are wicked take from thence occasion to giue credit and countenance to their owne wickednes. ⁵ *Discreetly without wickednes.* For it is neuer permitted to leaue vertue and honestie, to follow vice and dishonestie. There is no composition or compensation betwixt these two extremities. And therefore away with all iniustice, treacherie, treason, and disloyaltie. Cursed be the doctrine of those, who teach (as hath beene said) that all things are good and lawfull for soueraignes: but yet it is sometimes necessarie and required, that he mingle profit with honestie, and that he enter into composition with both. He must neuer turne his back to honestie, but yet sometimes goe about and coast it, employing therein his skill and cunning, which is good, honest and lawfull, as saith that great *S. Basil*, καλὴν καὶ ἐπαινετὴν πανουργίαν; and doing for the weale-publike as mothers and physitians, who feede their children and sick with faire speeches, & deceiue them for their health. To be brief, doing that closely which he may not do openly, ioyne wisdom to valor, arte and spirit, where nature and the hand sufficeth not; be, as *Pindarus* saith, a Lyon in his blowes, a Fox in his counsell; a Dove and a Serpent as diuine veritie speaketh.

And to this matter more distinctly, there is required in a ⁶ *Distrust required in a Prince.* soueraigne distrust, and that he keepe himselfe close, yet so, as that he be still vertuous and iust. Distrust, which is the first, is wholly necessary, as the contrary, which is credulitie; and a carelesse trust or confidence, is vitious, and very dangerous in a soueraigne. He watcheth ouer all, and must answer for all, his faults are not light, and therefore he must be well aduised. If he trust much, he discouereth himselfe, and is exposed to shame, and many dangers, *opportunus fit iniuria*, yea, he encourageth such as are false and treacherous, who may with little danger, and much recompence commit great wickednesse, *aditum nocendi perfido præstat fides*. It is necessary therefore *Senec.* that he couer himselfe with this buckler of distrust, which the wisest haue thought to be a great part of prudence, and the finowes of wisdom, that is to say, that he watch, beleue nothing, take heed of all: and heereunto doth the nature of the *Epichar. Euripid. Cicero.* world induce him, wholly composed of lies, coloured, counterfeit,

terfait, and dangerous, namely such as are neere vnto him in the court and houses of great personages. He must then trust but few, and those knowne by long experience and often trials: Neither is it necessarie that he abandon them, and in such sort leaue all the cord, that he still hold it not by one end, and haue an eye vnto them: But he must couer and disguise his diffidence, yea when he distrusteth, he must make a shew and countenance of great trust and confidence. For open distrust wrongeth, and inuiteth as much to deceiue, as an ouer-carelesse confidence, and many by making too great a shew of feare to be deceiued, shew the way how they may be deceiued. *Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli*: as contrarily a professed and open trust, hath taken away the desire to deceiue, hath obliged to loyaltie, and ingendred fidelitie; *uult quisque sibi credi, & habita fides ipsam plerumque obligat fidem*.

Senec.

7
And dissimulation.

From distrust comes dissimulation the science or seed thereof; for if that were not, and that there were trust and fidelitie in all, dissimulation which openeth the front, and couereth the thought, could haue no place. Now dissimulation which is vitious in priuat persons, is very necessarie in Princes, who otherwise could not know how to reigne, or well to command. And they must many times dissemble not only in warre, with strangers and enemies, but also in time of peace, and with their subiects, though more sparinglie. Simple and open men, and such as cary, as they say, their hearts in their foreheads, are not in any sort fit for this mysterie of commanding, and betray many times both themselves and their state: But yet he must play this part with arte and dexteritie, and to the purpose, neither so openly nor so simplie as that it may be discerned. For to what purpose doest thou hide and couer thy selfe, if a man may see thee obliquely or sidewaies? Wilie deceits and cunning subtilties, are no more deceits and subtilties when they are knowne and vented out. A Prince then the better to couer his arte, must make profession of loving simplicitie, must make much of free and open minded men, as being enemies to dissimulation; and in matters of lesse importance he must proceed openly, to the end he may be taken for such as he seemeth.

8
Practise.

All this is in omission, in reteining himselfe, not acting: but
it

it is likewise required sometimes that he passe farther and come to action, and this is two-fold. The one is to make and frame secret practises and intelligences, cunningly to winne and draw vnto him the hearts and seruices either of the officers, seruants, and trustiest friends of other Princes and foraine Lords, or of his owne subiects. This is a subtiltie which is much in request and authoritie, and very common among Princes, and a great point of prudence, saith *Cicero*. It is wrought in some sort by perswasion, but especiallie by presents and pensions, meanes so powerfull, that not only the Secretaries, the chiefe of the counsell, the most inward friends and favorites, haue been thereby drawne to giue aduice, and to diuert the designments of their master, yea, great captaines to giue their helping hand in the warre, but also wiues haue beene woon to discouer the secrets of their husbands. Now this subtile policie is all allowed and approoued by many without difficultie or scruple. And to say the truth, if it be against an enemy, against a subiect whom he suspecteth, and likewise against any stranger, with whom he hath no alliance nor league of fidelitie and amitie, it is not greatly to be doubted: But against his alliance, his friends and confederates, it cannot be good; and it is a kind of treacherie, which is neuer permitted.

The other is to winne some aduantage, and to obtaine his purpose, by close and couert meanes, by equiuocations and subtilties, to circumuent by faire speeches and promises, letters, ambassages, working and obtaining by subtile meanes, that which the difficultie of times and affaires will not permit him otherwise to doe, and to doe that closely which he cannot doe openly. Many great and wisemen say that this is lawfull and to be permitted, *Crebro mendacio & fraude uti imperantes debent ad commodum subditorum. Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est.* It were ouerboldnesse simply to affirm that it is permitted. But a man may say, that in a case of great necessitie, in troublesome and tumultuous times, when it is not only to procure the great good, but to diuert a great mischief from the state, and against such as are wicked and traiterous, that it is no great fault, if it be a fault.

But there is a greater doubt and difficultie in other things, because

9
Subtilties.

Plato.
Plin.
Val. Max.

*Injustice
profitable to
the weale-
publike.*

because they haue a smell of much iniustice in them. I say much, and not wholly, because with their iniustice there are mingled in them some graines of iustice. That which is wholly and apparently iniust, is reprobued of all, euen of the wicked, at leastwise in word and shew, if not in earnest and in deede. But of these actions ill mingled, there are so many reasons and authorities on the one side and the other, that a man hardly knoweth how to resolu^e himselfe. I will reduce them heere to certaine heads. To dispatch and secretly to put to death, or otherwise without forme of iustice, some certaine man that is troublesome and dangerous to the state, and who well deserueth death, but yet cannot without trouble and danger be enterprised and repressed by an ordinarie course; heerein there is nothing violated but the forme. And the prince, is he not about formes?

To cut the wings, and to lessen the great meanes of any one, that shall raise and fortifie himselfe too much in the state, and maketh himselfe fearefull to his souereigne; not staying till hee bee inuincible and able to attempt any thing against the state, and the head of his souereigne when it pleaseth him.

To take by authoritie the riches of the richest in a great necessitie and pouertie of the state.

To weaken and cancell the lawes and priuiledges of some subiects, who hold them to the preiudice and diminution of the authoritie of the souereigne.

To take by preuention, and to possesse himselfe of a place, city or prouince, very commodious for the state, rather than to suffer another strong and fearefull neighbour to take and possesse it, to the great hurt, subiection and perpetuall alarm of the said state.

Plutarch.

Tacit.

All these things are approued as iust and lawfull by many great and wise men, prouided that they succede well and happily; of whom these are the sayings and sentences: To doe iustice in great matters, a man may sometimes goe astray in small; and To execute iustice in grosse, it is permitted to doe wrong by retaile: for commonly the greatest actions and examples haue some iniustice, which satisfieth particular men by the profit which ariseth to all in generall, *Omne ma-*

gnus

gnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod aduersus singulos Plutarch.
utilitate publica rependitur: That a prudent and wise prince in flam.
 should not only know how to command according to the
 lawes, but also the lawes themselves, if necessitie require; and
 they must make the lawes to will it, when they cannot doe
 that they would. In confused and desperate affaires, a prince
 must not follow that which may be well spoken of, but that Senec.
 which is necessarie to be executed. Necessitie, a great sup-
 port, and excuse to humane fragility infringeth all law, and
 therefore he is not very wicked, that doth ill by constraint.
Necessitas magnum imbecillitatis humane patrocinium, omnem le-
gem frangit: non est nocens quicunque non sponte est nocens. If a Aristot. in:
 prince cannot be wholly good, it sufficeth if he be halfe good, Politico.
 and that he be not wholly wicked: That it cannot possibly be Democrit.
 that good princes should commit no iniustice. To all this I
 would adde for their iustification, or diminution of their faults
 that princes finding themselves in such extremities, they
 ought not to proceed in such actions, but with great vnwil-
 lingnesse and grieve of mind, acknowledging that it is an in-
 felicity and a disfaueur from heauen, and so carrying them-
 selves therein as a father when hee is enforced to cauterise or
 cut off a member of his childe, to saue his life, or to plucke out
 a tooth to purchase ease. As for other speeches more bolde,
 which referre all to profit, which they either equall or pre-
 ferre before honestie, an honest man must euer abhorre
 them.

Wee haue staid long vpon this point of the vertue of iu-
 stice, because of the doubts & difficulties that arise from the
 accidents and necessities of states, and which doe many times
 hinder the most resolute and best aduised.

After iustice commeth valour. I meane that militarie
 vertue, wisdom, courage, and sufficiency to play the war-
 riour, necessarie in a Prince for the defence and safetie of
 himselfe, the state, his subiects, of the publicke peace and
 libertie, and without which hee can hardly deserue the name
 of a prince. II
 Valour.

But let vs come to the fourth princely vertue, which is cle-
 mency, a vertue which enclineth the Prince to a sweet kinde
 of mildnesse and lenity, whereby he lesseneth and qualificth
 the
 I 2
 Clemency.

the rigor of iustice, with iudgement and discretion. It moderateth and sweetly manageth all things, deliuereth those that are faulty, relieueth those that are fallen, faueth those that are like to be lost. It is that in a prince, which humanity is in a common person. It is contrary to cruelty, and extreame rigour, not to iustice, from which it differeth not much, but it sweetneth and moderateth it. It is necessarie by reason of our humane infirmity, the frequency of offences, the facilitie to offend; for an ouer great and continuall rigour and seueritie, ruinateth all, and maketh chastisements contemptible; *Senec. Seueritas amittit assiduitate auctoritatem*: It stirreth malice and rancor, moueth rebellions, and men by despite are made wicked. For feare that keepeth men in their dutie, must be sweete and temperate; if it be too sharp and continuall, it is changed into rage and reuenge. *Senec. Temperatus timor est qui cohibet, assiduus & acer in vindictam excitat.* It is likewise very profitable to a Prince and a State, it winneth the loue and good willes of his subiects, and consequently confirmeth and assueth the state, *firmissimum id imperium quo obediētes gaudent,* as shall be said heereafter. It is likewise very honorable to a soueraigne, for his subiects will honour and adore him as a god, as their tutor, their father, and in stead of fearing him, they will feare all for him, lest any ill happen vnto him. This then shall be the lesson of the Prince, to know all that passeth, not to beleuee all, yea, many times to dissemble, wishing rather to be thought to haue found good subiects, than to haue made them such, to pardon light faults, to lessen the rigour of the great: not to be ouer-streight and exact in punishing, (which is as great a dishonor and infamie to a Prince, as to a Physitian many patients that die vnder his hand) to content himselfe many times with repentance as a sufficient chastisement.

— *ignoscere pulchrum*

Iam misero, pœnæq, genus vidisse precantem.

And let him not feare that which some obiekt very vnruly, that it debaseth, vilifieth, and weakneth the authoritie of the soueraigne and of the state; for contrarily it fortifieth it, and giues credit and vigour thereunto: And a Prince beloued, shall do more by loue, than by feare, which makes men feare
and

and tremble, but not obey : and as *Salust* discoursed to *Caesar*, Salust. ad Caesar. those states that are gouerned with feare, are neuer durable. No man can be feared by many, but he must likewise feare many, and that feare which he would put vpon all, falleth vpon his owne head. That life is doubtfull wherein a man neither before nor behind, nor on any side is couered, but is alwaies in agitation, in danger, in feare. It is true, as hath been said in the beginning, that it must be with iudgement ; for, as tempered and well conducted it is very venerable, so being too loose, too remisse, it is very pernicious.

After these foure principall and royall vertues, there are also others, though lesse worthie and necessarie, yet in a second place very profitable, and requisit in a soueraigne, that is to say, liberalitie, so fit and necessarie for a Prince, as it is lesse befitting him to be vanquished by armes, than by magnificence. But yet there is heerein required a great discretion, otherwise it will be more hurtfull, than commodious. 13
After which
are required
also libera-
litie.

There is a two-fold liberalitie, the one consisteth in charge and shew, and this serues to small purpose. For it is an idle thing in soueraignes, and to little end, to indeuor by great and excessiue charges to make shew of themselues, or to increase their credit especiallie with their subiects where they haue power to doe what they list. It is a testimonie of pusillanimitie, and that they vnderstand not what they are, and besides that, it seemeth to their subiects, the spectators of these triumphs, that they make this glorious shew with their owne spoiles, that they feast it at their charges, that they feede their eyes with that, that should feede their bellies. And againe a Prince should thinke that he hath nothing properlie his : he oweth himselfe to another. The other liberalitie, consisteth in gifts bestowed vpon another, and this is farre more commodious and commendable, but then it must be well gouerned, and he must be well aduised to whom, how, and how much he must giue. He must giue to those that haue deserued it, that haue done seruice to the weale-publike, that haue runne their fortunes, and spent themselues in the warres. No man will enuy them, if they be not very wicked. Whereas contrarily, great gifts, bestowed without respect and merit, shame the giuer, and purchase enuie to the receiuer, and is receiued without

without thankfulness and acknowledgement. Some tyrants haue been sacrificed to the malice of the people, euen by those whom they haue aduanced, railing on them with the rest of the people, and securing their goods, by making knowne how much they contemne and hate him from whom they receiued them. Againe, this liberalitie must be with measure, for if it be not, and that he giue vnto all, and vpon all occasions, the ruine of the state and soueraigne must needs ensue: This is to play, and to lose all. For men will neuer be satisfied, but be as excessiue in asking as the Prince shall be in giuing, framing themselves not according to reason, but example; so that when the common treasure shall faile, he shall be enforced to lay hands vpon the goods of another, and supplie by iniustice, that which ambition and prodigalitie did dissipate, *quod ambitione exhaustum, per scelera supplendum*. Now it is farre better not to giue at all, than to take away to giue, for a man shall neuer inioy in so high a degree the loue and good will of those whom he hath clothed, as the hatred and ill will of those whom he hath robbed and spoiled. And againe, this liberalitie without measure, worketh the ruine of himselfe, for a fountaine drieth vp if it be ouer-much drawne.

Hieronym. *Liberalitate liberalitas perit*. Liberalitie likewise must be spun with a gentle thread by little & little, and not all together, for that which is done ouer-speedily, be it neuer so great, is in a maner insensible, and soone forgotten. Pleasant and pleasing things must be exercised with ease and leasure, that a man may haue time to taste them: Things rude and cruell (if they must needs be done) must contrarily be executed speedily.

Tacit.

There is then arte and prudence in giuing, and in the practise of liberalitie. *Falluntur quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit: perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt*. And to say the truth, liberalitie is not properlie any of the royall vertues, for it agreeth and carieth it selfe well with tyrannie it selfe. And such as are the gouernours of young Princes do wrong in working so strong an impression of this vertue of bountie in their minds and willes, that they should refuse no meanes to put it in practise, and thinke nothing well employed but that which they giue (this is their common language) but they do it either for their owne benefit, or else they know not to whom they

they speake it. For it is a dangerous thing to imprint liberalitie in the mind of him that hath meanes to furnish himselfe as much as he will at the charges of another. A prodigall or liberall Prince without discretion and measure, is worse than a couetous: but if this liberalitie be well ruled and ordered, as hath been said, it is well becomming a Prince, and very profitable both to himselfe, and the state.

Another vertue requisite in a Prince in a second degree, is magnanimitie and greatnes of courage, to contemne iniuries and bad speeches, and to moderate his choler; neuer to vex himselfe for the outrages and indiscretions of another, *magnanimus fortunam magnus animus decet: Iniurias & offensiones superne despicere indignus Cesaris ira.* For a man to afflict himselfe, and to be moued, is to confesse himselfe to be faultie, whereas by neglect and light account it easily vanisheth.

14

Magnanimitie and moderation of choler. Senec.

Coniugia si irascere, agnita videntur: sprete exolescunt. And if there be fit place, and a man must be angrie, let it be openly, and without dissimulation, in such sort that he giue not occasion to suspect a hidden grudge and purpose of reuenge: this is a token of a bad and incurable nature, and best befitting the baser sort: *Obscuri & irrenocabiles reponunt odia: Saeua cogitationis indicium secreto suo satiari.* It doth better become a great personage to offend, than to hate. The other vertues are lesse royall and more common.

Tacit.

Tacit.

After vertue come the maners, cariages, and countenances that become and belong vnto Maiestie, very requisit in a Prince. I will not stand vpon this point: I only say as it were passing by, that not only nature helpeth much heereunto, but also arte and studie. Heereunto do appertaine the good and beautifull composition of the visage, his port, paise, speech, habilliments. The generall rule in all these points, is a sweet, moderate and venerable grauitie, walking betwixt feare and loue, worthie of all honor and reuerence. There is likewise his residence and conuersation or familiaritie. Touching his residence or abode, let it be in some glorious, magnificent, and eminent place, and as neere as may be in the middle of the whole state, to the end he may haue an eye ouer all, like the Sunne, which from the middle of heauen giueth light to all: for keeping himselfe at one end, he giueth occasion to those that

15

The third head of this prouision: The maners of the Prince

that are farthest from him to rise against him, as he that standeth vpon one end of a table, maketh the other end to rise vp. His conuersation and companie, let it be rare, for to shew and to communicate himselfe too much, breedeth contempt and deiecteth maiestie, *continuus aspectus minus verendos magnos homines ipsa satietate facit. Maestati maior ex longinquo reuerentia, quia omne ignotum pro magnifico est.*

Liuius.
Tacit.

16
The fourth
head of this
provision,
Counsell.

Chap. 1.

Tacit.

Tit. Liui.
Tacit.

Plin.

After these three things, knowledge of the state, vertue and maners, which are in the person of the prince, come those things which are neere and about the prince; That is to say, in the fourth place Counsell, the great and principall point of this politike doctrine, and so important that it is in a maner all in all. It is the soule of the state, and the spirit that giueth life, motion and action to al the other parts: and for that cause it is said that the managing of affaires consisteth in prudence. Now it were to be wished that a prince had in himselfe counsell and prudence sufficient to gouerne and to prouide for all, which is the first and highest degree of wisdom, as hath beene said; and if so it were, the affaires would goe farre better: but this is rather to be wished than hoped for, whether it be for want of a good nature, or a good institution; and it is almost impossible that one only head should be sufficiently furnished for so many matters, *Nequit princeps sua scientia cuncta complecti, nec unius mens tanta molis est capax.* A lone man seeth and heareth but little. Now kings haue neede of many eies, and many eares; and great burthens, and great affaires haue neede of great helpes. And therefore it is requisite that he prouide and furnish himselfe with good counsell, and such men as know how to giue it: for he, whosoever hee be, that will take all vpon himselfe, is rather held to bee proud, than discreet or wise. A Prince then had neede of faithfull friends and seruitours to be his assistants, *quos assumat in partem curarum.* These are his true treasures, and profitable instruments of the state. In the choice whereof hee should especially labour and imploy his whole iudgement, to the end he may haue them good. There are two sorts of them, the one aide the prince with their dutie, counsell and tongue, and are called Counsellors; the other serue him with their hands and actions, and may be called Officers. The first are farre

farre more honourable : for the two greatest philosophers say, that it is a sacred and diuine thing, well to deliberate, and to giue good counsell.

Now Counsellors must be first faithfull, that is to say in a word, honest men, *Optimum quemque fidelissimum puto.* Secondly, they must be sufficient in this point, that is to say, skilfull in the state, diuersly experimented and tried (for difficulties and afflictions are excellent lessons and instructions; *mibi fortuna multis rebus ereptis usum dedit bene suadendi*) And in a word, they must be wise and prudent, indifferent quicke and not ouer sharpe: for such kind of men are too moueable, *nouandis quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignea.* And that they may be such, it is requisite, that they bee old and ripe, for besides that yong men by reason of the soft and delicate tendernesse of their age, are easily deceiued, they do as easily beleue and receiue euery impression. It is good that about Princes there be some wise, some subtile; but much more such as are wise, who are required for honour and for all times, the subtile only sometimes for necessitie. Thirdly, it is necessary that in proposing and giuing good and holesome counsell, they carrie themselves freely and couragiously, without flattery, or ambiguity, or disguisement, not accommodating their language to the present state of the prince; *Ne cum fortuna potius principis loquantur quam cum ipso,* but without sparing the truth, speake that which is fit and requisite. For although liberty, roundnesse of speech and fidelity, hurt and offend for the time, those against whom it opposeth it selfe, yet afterwards it is reuerenced and esteemed. *In praesentia quibus resistis, offendis, deinde illis ipsis suspicitur laudaturque.* And fourthly, constantly, without yeelding, varying and changing at euery meeting to please and follow the humour, pleasure and passion of another, but without opinatiue obstinacy, and a spirit of contradiction, which troubleth and hindereth all good deliberation, he must sometimes change his opinion, which is not inconstancy but prudence. For a wise man marcheth not alwaies with one and the same pafe, although hee follow the same waie, he changeth not, but accommodateth himselfe; *Seneca. non semper it uno gradu, sed una via; non se mutat, sed aptat.* As a good mariner ordereth his sailes according to the times, and

17
The conditi-
on of good
counsellors.
Fidelitie.
Plin.
Sufficiencie.

Curtius.

Liberty.

Tacit.

Seneca.

Silence.

Curtius.

Tacit.

The vices
that counsel-
lers must
auoid.Presumptu-
ous confi-
dence.

Tit. Liuius.

Passion.

Tacit.

Precipita-
tion.See lib. 2.
cap. 10.

Tacit.

18

The duty of
the prince in
choosing good
counsellors.

the winde, it is necessary many times to turne and winde, and to arriue to that place, obliquely by fetching a compasse, when he can not doe it directly, and by a straight line. Again, a religious dexteritie to keepe secret the counsels and deliberations of Princes, is a thing verie necessarie in the managing of affaires, *res magna sustineri nequeunt ab eo cui tacere graue est.*

And it sufficeth not to bee secret, but hee must not prie and search into the secrets of his Prince, this is an ill, and a dangerous thing; *exquirere abditos principis sensus illicitum & anceps*: yea he must be vnwilling and auoid all meanes to know them. And these are the principall good conditions and qualities of a counsellor, as the euill which they must warily auoid are presumptuous confidence, which maketh a man to deliberate and determine ouer boldly and obstinately; for a wise man in deliberating, thinketh and rethinketh, redoubting whatsoeuer may happen, that he may be the bolder to execute. *Nam animus vereri qui scit, scit tuto aggredi.* Contrarily the foole is hardie and violent in his deliberations: but when he comes to the issue, his nose fals a bleeding, *Consilia calida & audacia prima specie leta sunt, tractatu dura, euentu tristia.* Secondly, all passion of choler, enuy, hatred, auarice, concupiscence, and all priuate and particular affection, the deadly poison of iudgement, and all good vnderstanding, *privata res semper offecere officientque publicis consilijs, pessimum veri affectus & indicij venenum sua cuique utilitas.* Lastly precipitation an enemy to all good counsell, and only fit to doe mischief. And thus you see what maner of men good counsellors ought to be.

Now a prince must make choice of such as are good, either by his owne knowledge and iudgement, or if hee cannot so doe, by their reputation, which doth seldome deceiue; whereupon one of them said to his prince, Hold vs for such as we are esteemed to be. *Nam singuli decipere & decipi possunt, nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt.* And let him take heede that he chuse not his minions and fauorites, courtiers, flatterers, slaues who shame their masters and betray them. There is nothing more dangerous than the counsell of the cabinet. And hauing chosen and found them, he must wisely make vse of them, by taking counsell of them at due times and houres,

not attending the euent and execution, and losing the time whilest he harkneth to them; and this must he do with iudgement, not suffering himselfe to be caried ouer-loosely by their counsels, as that simple Emperour *Claudius* was; and with mildnesse, without roughnesse, being more reasonable, as that wise *Marc. Antonius* was wont to say, to follow the counsell of a good number of friends, than such as are constrained to bend vnto his will. And making vse of them, do it with an indifferent authoritie, neither rewarding them with presents for their good counsell, lest by the hope of the like presents he draw such as are wicked vnto him, nor vse them ouer-roughlie for their bad counsels; for he shall hardlie find any to giue him counsell, if there be danger in giuing it: and againe, many times bad counsell hath a better successe than good, by the prouident care and direction of the soueraigne. And such as giue good counsell, that is to say, happie and certaine, are not therefore alwaies the best, and most faithfull seruitors, nor for their libertie of speech neither, which hee should rather agree vnto, looking into such as are fearefull and flatterers with a warie eye. For miserable is that prince with whom men hide or disguise the truth, *cuius aures ita formate sunt, ut aspera quae utilia, & nil nisi incundum & lesurum accipiant.* And lastly, he must conceale his owne iudgement and resolution, secrecie being the soule of counsell, *nulla meliora consilia, quam quae ignorauerit aduersarius antequam fierent.*

Curtius.

Tacit.

Veget.

As touching officers which are in the next place, and who serue the Prince and state in some charge, hee must make choice of honest men, of good and honest families. It is to be thought that such as serue the Prince, are the best sort of people, and it is not fit that base people should be neere him, and commaund others, except they raise themselves by some great, and singular vertue, which may supplie the want of Nobilitie: but by no meanes let them be infamous, double, dangerous, and men of some odious condition. So likewise they should be men of vnderstanding, and employed according to their natures. For some are fit for the affaires of the warre, others for peace. Some are of opinion that it is best to choose men of a sweet cariage, and indifferent vertue, for these excellent surpassing spirits, that keepe themselves alwaies vpon the point,

19

Of Officers.

point, and will pardon nothing, are not commonly fit for affaires, *ut pares negotijs, neq; supra: sint recti, non erecti.*

After counsell, we place treasure, a great & puissant meane.

20
The fift head
of prouision:
Treasure.

Exchequer
knowledge in
three points.

This is the sinewes, the feet, the hands of the state. There is no sword so sharp and penetrable, as that of siluer, nor master so imperious, nor orator that winneth the hearts and willes of men, or conquer Castles and Cities, as riches. And therefore a Prince must provide that his treasurie neuer faile, neuer be dried vp. This science consisteth in three points, to lay the foundation of them, to imploy them well, to haue alwaies a seruation, and to lay vp some good part thereof for all needs and occasions that may happen. In all these three a Prince must auoid two things, iniustice, and base nigardlines, in preserving right towards all, and honor for himselfe.

21
To lay the
foundation.

1

2

3

4

Touching the first, which is to lay the foundation and to increase the treasurie, there are diuers meanes, and the sources are diuers, which are not all perpetuall, nor alike assured; that is to say, the demaine and publike reuenue of the state, which must be managed and vsed, without the alienating of it in any fort, forasmuch as by nature it is sacred and inalienable. Conquests made vpon the enemy, which must be profitablie employed, and not prodigallie dissipated, as the ancient Romans were wont to doe, carying to the Exchequer very great summes, and the treasuries of conquered cities and countries, as *Liuy* reporteth of *Camillus Flaminius*, *Paulus Emilius*, of the *Scipioes*, *Lucullus*, *Cesar*; and afterwards receiuing from those conquered countries, whether from their naturall countries left behind them, or from colonies sent thither, a certaine annuall reuenue. Presents, gratuities, pensions, free donations, tributes of friends, allies, and subiects, by testaments, by donations amongst the liuing, as the lawyers tearme it, or otherwise. The entrance, comming and going, and passages of merchandize, into docks, hauens, riuers, as well vpon strangers as subiects, a meanes iust, lawfull, ancient, generall, and very commodious with these conditions: Not to permit the trafficke and transportation of things necessarie for life, that the subiects may be furnished; nor of raw vnwrought wares, to the end the subiect may be set on worke, and gaine the profit of his owne labours. But to permit the trafficke of things wrought

wrought and dressed, and the bringing in of such wares as are rawe, and not of such as are wrought; and in all things to charge the stranger much more than the subiect. For a great forraigne imposition increaseth the treasure, & comforteth the subiect: to moderate neuerthelesse the imposts vpon those things that are brought in, necessarie for life. These foure meanes are not only permitted, but iust, lawfull, and honest. The fift which is hardly honest, is the trafficke which the so-
 ueraigne vseth by his factors, and is practised in diuers man-
 ners more or lesse base; but the vilest and most pernicious is of
 honors, estates, offices, benefices. There is a meane that com-
 meth neere to trafficke, and therefore may be placed in this
 ranke, which is not very dishonest, and hath beene practised
 by very great and wise princes, which is, to imploy the coine
 of the treasure or exchequer to some small profit, as fme in the
 hundred, and to take good securitie for it, either gages, or some
 other sound and sufficient assurance. This hath a three-fold
 vse, it increaseth the treasure, giueth meanes to particular
 men to traffick and to make gaine; and which is best of all, it
 saueth the publike treasure from the pawes of our theeuing
 courtiers, the importunate demaunds and flatteries of fauo-
 rites, and the ouer-great facilitie of the prince. And for this
 only cause, some princes haue lent their publike treasure
 without any profit or interest, but only vpon paine of a double
 forfeiture for not paiement at the day. The sixt and last is in
 the lones and subsidies of subiects, whereunto he must not
 come but vnwillinglie, and then when other meanes do faile,
 and necessitie presseth the state. For in this case it is iust, ac-
 cording to that rule, That all is iust that is necessarie. But it is
 requisit, that these conditions be added, after this first of ne-
 cessitie, To leuy by way of lone (for this way will yeeld most
 siluer, because of the hope men haue to recouer their owne a-
 gaine, and that they shall lose nothing, besides the credit
 they receiue by succoring the weale-publike) and afterwards
 the necessitie being past, and the warres ended, to repay it a-
 gaine, as the *Romans* did, being put to an extremitie by *Ha-
 nibal*. And if the common treasure be so poore that it cannot
 repay it, and that they must needs proceed by way of im-
 position, it is necessarie that it be with the consent of the sub-
 iects,

Antoninus
Pius.
Seuerus.
August.

6.

1

2

ieets, making knowne vnto them the pouertie and necessitie, and preaching the word of that king of kings, *Dominus ijs opus habet*, inso much that they make them see, if need be, both the receit, and the charge. And, if it may be, let perswasion preuaile without constraint, as *Themistocles* said, *Impetrare melius quàm imperare*. It is true that the prayers of soueraignes are commandements, *Satis imperat qui rogat potentiâ, armata sunt preces regum*; but yet let it be in the forme of a free donation, at the least that they be extraordinarie monies; for a certaine prefixt time, and not ordinarie; and neuer prescribe this law vpon the subiects, except it be with their owne consent. Thirdly, that such impositions be leuied vpon the goods, and not the heads of men (capitation being odious to all honest people) be reall and not personall (being vniust that the rich, the great, the nobles, should not pay at all, and the poorer people of the countrie should pay all.) Fourthly that they be equallie vpon all. Inequalitie afflicteth much, and to these ends these monies must be bestowed vpon such things as the whole world hath need of, as salt, wine, to the end that all may contribute to the present necessitie. Well may a man, and he ought, to lay ordinarie imposts and great, vpon such marchandize and other things as are vitious, and that serue to no other end, than to corrupt the subiects, as whatsoever serueth for the increase of luxurie, insolencie, curiositie, superfluitie in viands, apparell, pleasures, and all maner of licentious liuing, without any other prohibition of these things. For the deniall of a thing sharpneth the appetite.

22
To employ
the treasure. The second point of this science, is well to employ the treasure. And these in order are the articles of this employment and charge; The maintenance of the kings house, the pay of men of warre, the wages of officers, the iust rewards of those that haue deserued well of the Common-weale, pensions and charitable succor to poore, yet commendable persons. These five are necessarie, after which come those that are very profitable, to repaire cities, to fortifie and to defend the frontiers, to mend the high waies, bridges, and passages, to establish colledges of honor, of vertue, and learning; to build publike houses. From these five sorts of reparations, fortifications, and foundations, cometh very great profit, besides

besides the publike good: artes and artificers are maintained; the enuie and malice of the people because of the leuie of monies ceaseth, when they see them well employed; and these two plagues of a common-weale, idlenesse and pouertie, are driuen away. Contrarily, the great bounties, and vnreasonable gifts, to some particular fauorites; the great, proud, and vnneccessarie edifices, superfluous and vaine charges are odious to the subiects, who murmure that a man should spoile a thousand to cloath one; that others should braue it with their substance, build vpon their bloud and their labours.

The third point consisteth in the reseruati²³on, which a man must make for necessitie, to the end he be not constrained at a need to haue recourse to ready, vniust, & violent means & remedies: this is that which is called the treasury or exchequer. ^{3 To make spare and reseruati^{on}.}

Now as to gather together too great abundance of treasure of gold and siluer, though it be by honest and iust meanes, is not alwaies the best, because it is an occasion of warre actiue or passiue, either by breeding enuie in others to see it done, when there is no cause, there being plentie of other meanes, or else because it is a bait to allure an enemy to come, and it were more honorable to employ them as hath been said: So to spend all and to leaue nothing in the Exchequer is far worse, for this were to play to lose all; wise princes take heed of this. The greatest treasuries that haue beene in former times, are that of *Darius* the last king of the *Persians*, where *Alexander* found foure score millions of gold. That of *Tiberius* 67. millions; of *Traian* 55. millions kept in *Egypt*. But that of *David* ^{2. Paralip.} did farre exceed all these (a thing almost incredible in so small a state) wherein there were fixe score millions. Now to provide that these great treasuries be not spent, violated or robbed, the ancients caused them to be melted, and cast into great wedges and bowles, as the *Persians* and *Romans*: or they put them into the temples of their gods as the safest places, as the *Greekes* in the temple of *Apollo*, which neuerthelesse hath bin many times pilled and robbed; the *Romans* in the temple of *Saturne*. But the best and securest way and most profitable is, as hath been said, to lend them with some small profit to particular persons, vpon good gages, or sufficient securitie. So likewise for the safer custodie of the treasures from theues

and robbers; the managing of them, and the exchequer offices must not be sold to base and mechanical persons, but given to gentlemen, and men of honor, as the ancient *Romans* were accustomed to do, who chose out young men from amongst their nobles and great houses, and such as aspired to the greatest honors and charges of the common-wealth.

24
The sixth
head of this
prouision.
An armed
power.

In the chap-
ter follow-
ing.

After counsell and treasure I thinke it not amisse to put armes, which cannot subsist, nor be well and happily leuied and conducted without these two. Now an armed power is very necessarie for a prince, to guard his person and his state: for it is an abuse to thinke to gouerne a state long without armes. There is neuer any surety betweene the weake and the strong; and there are alwaies some that will bee stirring either within or without the state. Now this power is either ordinarie at all times, or extraordinarie in times of warre. The ordinarie consisteth in the persons and places; The persons are of two sorts; the guard for the bodie and person of the souereigne, which serue not only for the surety and conseruation, but also for his honour and ornament: for that good saying of *Agessilaus* is not perpetually true, and it were too dangerous to trie & trust vnto it, That a prince may liue safely enough without guard, if hee command his subiects, as a good father doth his children (for the malice of man stayeth not it selfe in so faire a way). And certaine companies, maintained and alwaies ready for those necessities and sudden occurrences that may fall out. For at such times to be busied in leuying powers is great imprudencie. Touching the places, they are the fortresses and cittadels in the frontiers, in place of which, some, and they ancient too, doe more allow of the colonies. The extraordinarie force consisteth in armes, which he must leuie and furnish in times of warre. How he should gouerne himselfe therein, that is to say, enterprise and make warre, it belongeth to the second part, which is of the action: this first belongeth to prouision. Only I heere say, that a wise prince should besides the guards of his body, haue certaine people alwaies prepared, and experienced in armes, either in great number or lesse, according to the extent or largeness of his state, to repress a sudden rebellion or commotion, which may happen either without or within his state,

state, reseruing the raising of greater forces, vntill hee must make warre, either offensive or defensive, willingly and of purpose; and in the meane time keeping his arsenals and store-houses well furnished, and provided with all sorts of offensive and defensive armes, to furnish both foote and horsemen, as likewise with munitions, engins, and instruments for warre. Such preparation is not only necessarie to make warre, (for these things are not found and prepared in a short time) but to let and hinder it. For no man is so foole-hardy, as to attempt a state, which he knoweth to be ready to receiue him, and thoroughly furnished. A man must arme himselfe against warres, to the end he may not be troubled with it, *qui cupit pacem, paret bellum.*

After all these necessarie and essentiall prouisions, wee will lastly put alliances or leagues, which is no small proppe and stay of a state. But wisdom is very necessarie in the choice thereof, to build well and to take heede with whom and how he ioyne in alliance; which hee must doe with those that are neighbours and puissant: For if they be weake and farre off, wherewith can they giue aide? It is rather likely, that if they be assaulted, that from their ruine ours may follow. For then are wee bound to succour them, and to ioyne with them because of this league, whosoeuer they be. And if there be danger in making this alliance openly, let it be done secretly, for it is the part of a wise man to treat of peace and alliance with one, in the view and knowledge of all, with another secretly; but yet so, as that it be without treacherie and wickednesse, which is vtterly forbidden, but not wisdom and policie, especially for the defence and surety of his state.

Finally, there are many sorts and degrees of leagues or alliances: the lesser and more simple is for commerce and traffike only, but commonly it comprehendeth amitie, commerce and hospitalitie; and it is either defensive only, or defensive and offensive together, and with exception of certaine princes and states, or without exception. The more strait and perfect is that which is offensive and defensive towards all, and against all, to be a friend to his friends, and an enemy to his enemies: and such it is good to make with those that are strong and puissant, and by equall alliance. Leagues are likewise

25

The seventh
head of this
provision.

Alliance or
leagues.

With whom.

2. How.

likewise either perpetuall, or limited to certaine times ; commonly they are perpetuall, but the berter and surest is, to limit it to certaine times, to the end he may haue meanes to reforme, to take away, or adde to the articles, or wholly to depart if neede be, as he shall see it most expedient. And though a man would iudge them to be such, as should be perpetuall, yet it is better to renew them (which a man may and must do before the time be expired) than to make them perpetuall. For they languish and grow cold, and whosocuer findeth himselfe aggriued will sooner breake them, if they be perpetuall than if they bee limited, in which case hee will rather stay the time. And thus much of these seuen necessarie prouisions.

CHAP. III.

The second part of this politike prudence and gouernment of the state, which concerneth the action and gouernment of the Prince.

^I *A summary description of the action of the prince.* **H**Auing discoursed of the prouision, and instructed a soueraigne with what and how he should furnish and defend himselfe and his state, let vs come to the action, and let vs see how hee should emploie himselfe, and make vse of these things, that is to say, in a word, well to command and gouern. But before we come to handle this distinctlie, according to the diuision which we haue made, wee may say in grosse that well to gouerne and to maintaine himselfe in his state, consisteth in the acquisition of two things, goodwill and authoritie. Goodwill is a loue and affection towards the soueraigne and his state. Authoritie is a great and good opinion, an honourable esteeme of the soueraigne and his state. By the first, the soueraigne and the state is loued, by the second feared. These are not contrary things, but different, as loue and feare. Both of them respect the subiects and strangers, but it seemeth that more properlie, Beneuolence belongeth to the subiect, and authoritie to the stranger ; *amorem apud populares, metum apud hostes querat*. To speake simplic and absolutelie, authoritie is the more strong and vigorous, more large and durable. The temperature and harmonie of both is a perfect thing, but according to the diuersity of states, of peoples, their

Beneuolence, Authoritie two pillars of a prince and state.

Tacit.

natures

natures and humours, the one is more easie and more necessarie in some places, than in others. The meanes to attaine them both, are contained and handled in that which hath beene said before, especiallie of the maners and vertue of a soueraigne; neuerthelesse of each we will speake a little.

Beneuolence or goodwill (a thing very profitable and almost wholly necessarie, insomuch that of it selfe it preuaileth much, and without it all the rest hath but little assurance) is attained by three meanes, gentlenes or clemencie, not only in words and deeds, but much more in his commaunds and the administration of the state; for so doe the natures of men require, who are impatient both of seruing wholly, and maintaining themselves in entire libertie, *nec totam seruitutem pati, nec totam libertatem.* Tacit. They obey willingly as subiects, not as slaues, *domiti vt pareant, non vt seruiant.* And to say the truth, a man doth more willinglie obey him which commandeth gentle and mildly; *remissius imperanti melius paretur: qui vult amari languida regnet manu.* Senec. Power (saith Caesar a great doctor in this matter) indifferentlie exercised preferueth all; but he that keepeth not a moderation in his commaunds, is neuer beloued nor assured. But yet it must not be an ouer-loose, and soft effeminate mildnes, lest a man thereby come into contempt, which is worse than feare, *Sed incorrupto ducis honore.* Tacit. It is the part of wisdom to temper this, neither seeking to be feared by making himselfe terrible, nor loued by too much debasing himselfe.

The second meane to attaine beneuolence is beneficence, I meane first towards all, especiallie the meaner people, by prouidence and good policie, whereby corne and all other necessarie things for the sustenance of this life may not be wanting, but sold at an indifferent price, yea may abound if it be possible, that dearenesse and dearth afflict not the subiect. For the meaner sort haue no care for the publike good, but for this end, *vulgo vna ex republica annona cura.* Tacit.

The third meane is liberalitie (beneficence more speciall) which is a bait, yea, an enchantment, to draw, to winne and captivate the willes of men: So sweet a thing is it to receiue, honorable to giue. In such sort, that a wise man hath said, That a state did better defend it selfe by good deeds, than by armes.

Chap. 2.
act. 23.
Tacit.

armes. This vertue is alwaies requisite, but especiallie in the entrance and in a new state. To whom, how much, and how liberalitie must be exercised, hath beene said before. The meanes of beneuolence haue beene wisely practised by *Augustus, qui militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine ory pellexit.*

5
Authority.

Authoritie is another pillar of state, *maiestas imperij, salutis tutela*; The inuincible fortresse of a prince, whereby he bringeth into reason all those, that dare to contemne or make head against him. Yea because of this they dare not attempt, and all men desire to be in grace and fauor with him. It is composed of feare and respect, by which two a prince and his state is feared of all, and secured. To attaine this authoritie, besides the prouision of things aboue named, there are three meanes which must carefully be kept in the forme of commaunding.

By what it
is acquired.

6
Seuerity.

Cicero.

The first is seueritie, which is better, more wholsome, assured, durable, than common lenitie, and great facilitie, which proceedeth first from the nature of the people, which as *Aristotle* saith, is not so well borne and bred, as to be ranged into dutie and obedience by loue, or shame, but by force and feare of punishment; and secondly from the generall corruption of the maners, and contagious licentiousnes of the world, which a man must not thinke to mend by mildnes and lenitie, which doth rather giue aid to ill attempts. It ingendreth contempt, and hope of impunitie, which is the plague of Common-weales and states, *Illecebra peccandi maxima spes impunitatis*. It is a fauour done to many, and the whole weale-publike sometimes well to chastice some one. And he must sometimes cut off a finger, lest the Gangrene spread it selfe through the whole arme, according to that excellent answer of a king of *Thrace*, whom one telling that he played the mad man, and not the king, answered, That his madnes made his subiects sound and wise. Seueritie keepeth officers and magistrates in their deuoiere, driueth away flatterers, courtiers, wicked persons, impudent demaunders, and pety-tyrannies. Whereas contrariwise too great facilitie openeth the gate to all these kind of people, whereupon followeth an exhausting of the treasures, impunitie of the wicked, impoverishing

nerishing of the people, as rheumes & fluxes in a rheumatike & diseased bodie, fall vpon those parts that are weakest. The goodnes of *Pertinax*, the licentious libertie of *Heliogabalus* are thought to haue vndone and ruinated the Empire: The seueritie of *Seuerus*, and afterwards of *Alexander*, did reestablish it, and brought it into good estate. But yet this seueritie must be with some moderation, intermission, and to purpose, to the end that rigour towards a few might hold the whole world in feare, *ut pœna ad paucos, metus ad omnes*. And the more seldome punishments serue more for the reformation of a state, saith an ancient writer, than the more frequent. This is to be vnderstood, if vices gather not strength, and men grow not opinatiuely obstinate in them; for then he must not spare either sword or fire, *crudelem medicum intemperans ager facit*.

The second is constancie, which is a stayed resolution, whereby the prince marching alwaies with one and the same ⁷ *Constancy* pafe, without altering or changing, mainteineth alwaies, and enforceth the obseruation of the ancient lawes and customes. To change and to be readuised, besides that it is an argument of inconstancie and irresolution, it bringeth both to the lawes and to the soueraigne, and to the state contempt and sinister opinion. And this is the reason why the wiser sort do so much forbid the change, and rechange of any thing in the lawes and customes, though it were for the better: for the change or remoue bringeth alwaies more euill and discommoditie, besides the vncertaintie and the danger, than the noueltie can bring good. And therefore all innouators are suspected, dangerous, and to be chased away. And there cannot be any cause or occasion strong and sufficient enough to change, if it be not for a very great, euident, and certaine vtilitie, or publike necessitie. And in this case likewise he must proceed as it were stealthingly, sweetly and slowly, by little and little and almost insensible, *leuiter & lente*.

⁸ The third is to hold alwaies fast in the hand the sterne of the state, the raines of gouernment, that is to say, the honour and power to commaund and to ordaine, and not to trust or commit it to another, referring all things to his counsell, to the end that all may haue their eye vpon him, and may know that all dependeth vpon him. That soueraigne that loseth neuer so little of his authoritie marreth all. And therefore it standeth

Aristot.

standeth him vpon, not ouer-much to raise and make great any person, *Communis custodia principatus neminem unum magnum facere*. And if there be alreadie any such, he must draw him backe and bring him into order, but yet sweetly and gently; and neuer make great and high charges and offices perpetuall or for many yeares, to the end a man may not get meanes to fortifie himselfe against his master, as it many times falleth out. *Nil tam utile, quam breuem potestatem esse, qua magna sit.*

Senec.

9

Against vn-
iust authori-
ty and ty-
rannie.

Behold heere the iust and honest meanes in a soueraigne to maintaine with beneuolence and loue his authoritie, and to make himselfe to be loued and feared altogether: for the one without the other is neither secure nor reasonable. And therefore we abhorre a tyrannicall authoritie, and that feare that is an enemy to loue and beneuolence, and is with a publike hate, *oderint quem metuant*, which the wicked seeke after abusing their power. The conditions of a good prince and of a tyrant are nothing alike, and easily distinguished. They may be all reduced to these two points, the one to keepe the lawes of God and of nature, or to trample them vnder foot; the other to do all for the publike good and profit of the subiects, or to employ all to his particular profit & pleasure. Now a prince that he may be such as he should, must alwaies remember, that as it is a felicitie to haue power to do what a man will, so it is true greatnes to will that that a man should; *Cæsari cum omnia licent, propter hoc minus licet: ut felicitatis est posse quantum velis, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis, vel potius quantum debeas*. The greatest infelicitie that can happen to a prince, is to beleue that all things are lawfull that he can, and that please him. So soone as he consenteth to this thought, of good he is made wicked. Now this opinion is settled in them by the help of flatterers, who neuer cease alwaies to preach vnto them the greatnes of their power; and very few faithfull seruitors there are, that dare to tell them what their dutie is. But there is not in the world a more dangerous flattery, than that wherewith a man flattereth himselfe, when the flatterer and flattered is one and the same; there is no remedie for this disease. Neuerthelesse it falleth out sometimes in consideration of the times, persons, places, occasions, that a good king

Plin. de
Traia.

king must do those things which in outward appearance may seeme tyrannicall, as when it is a question of repressing another tyrannie, that is to say, of a furious people, the licentious libertie of whom, is a true tyrannie: or of the noble and rich, who tyrannize ouer the poore and meaner people: or when the king is poore and needie, not knowing where to get siluer, to raise loanes vpon the richest. And we must not thinke that the seueritie of a prince is alwaies tyrannie, or his gards & fortresses, or the maiestie of his imperious commaunds, which are sometimes profitable, yea necessarie, and are more to be desired than the sweet prayers of tyrants.

These are the two true stayes and pillars of a prince, and of a state, if by them a prince know how to maintaine and pre-^{IO}serue himselfe from the two contraries, which are the murthe-^{Hate and contempt,}rs of a prince and state, that is to say, hatred and contempt, ^{two murthe-}whereof the better to auoid them, and to take heed of them, a ^{vers of a}word or two. Hatred contrarie to beneuolence, is a wicked ^{prince.}and obstinate affection of subiects against the prince, and his ^{Arist.lib.5.}state: It ordinarily proceedeth from feare of what is to come, ^{Pol.}or desire of reuenge of what is past, or from them both. This ^{Hatred.}hatred when it is great, and of many, a prince can hardly escape it, *Multorum odijs nulla opes possunt resistere.* He is expo-^{Cicero.}sed to all, and there needs but one to make an end of all. *Multe illis manus, illi una cervix.* It standeth him vpon therefore to preferue himselfe, which he shall do by flying those things that ingender it, that is to say, crueltie and avarice, the contraries to the aforesaid instruments of beneuolence.

He must preferue himselfe pure and free from base cruelty, ^{II}vnworthie greatnes, very infamous to a prince: But contra-^{Hatred pro-}rily he must arme himselfe with clemencie, as hath been said ^{ceedeth from}before, in the vertues required in a prince. But forasmuch as ^{crueltie.}punishments, though they be iust and necessarie in a state, ^{Cap.2.}haue some image of crueltie, he must take heed to carie him-^{art. 12.}selfe therein with dexteritie, and for this end I will giue him this aduice: Let him not put his hand to the sword of iustice, ^{An aduice}but very seldome and vnwillinglie: *libenter damnat qui cito:* ^{for punish-}*ergo illi parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis:* 2. Enforced for ^{ments.}the publike good, and rather for example, & to terrifie others ^{Senec.}from the like offence: 3. That it be to punish the faultie, and that

that without choler, or ioy, or other passion: And if he must needs shew some passion, that it be compassion: 4. That it be according to the accustomed maner of the countrie, and not after a new, for new punishments are testimonies of crueltie: 5. Without giuing his assistance, or being present at the execution: 6. And if he must punish many, he must dispatch it speedily, and all at a blow; for to make delayes, and to vse one correction after another, is a token that he taketh delight, pleaseth and feedeth himselfe therewith.

12
Auarice.

He must likewise preferue himselfe from auarice, a sinne ill befitting a great personage. It is shewed either by exacting and gathering ouermuch, or by giuing too little. The first doth much displease the people, by nature couetous, to whom their goods are as their blood and their life: The second, men of seruice and merit, who haue laboured for the publike good, and haue reason to thinke that they deserue some recompence. Now how a prince should gouerne himselfe heerein, and in his treasure and exchequer affaires, either in laying their foundation, or spending or preferuing them, hath beene more at large discoursed in the second chapter. I will heere only say, that a prince must carefully preferue himselfe from three things; First, from resembling, by ouer great and excessiue impositions, these tyrants, subiect-mongers, canibals, *qui deuorant plebem sicut escam panis Suetonii, quorum ararium spoliarium ciuium cruentarumque pradarum receptaculum*, for this breeds danger of tumult, witnesse so many examples, and miserable accidents: Secondly, from base vnhonest parsimony, as well in gathering together, (*indignum lucrum ex omni occasione odorari; & ut dicitur, etiam a mortuo auferre*; and therefore hee must not serue his turne heerein, with accusations, confiscations, vniust spoiles) as in giuing nothing, or too little, and that mercenarily, and with long and importunate suite: Thirdly, from violence in the leuie of his prouision, and that if it be possible, he neuer sease vpon the moueables and vtensils of husbandrie. This doth principally belong to receiuers and puruoyers, who by their rigorous courses, expose the prince to the hatred of the people, and dishonour him, a people subtile, cruell, with six hands and three heads, as one saith. A prince therefore

therefore must provide that they be honest men, and if they faile in their duties, to correct them severely, with rough chastisement, and great amends, to the the end they may restore and disgorge like sponges, that which they haue sucked and drawne vniustly from the people.

Let vs come to the other worse enemy, contempt; which is a sinister, base, and abiect opinion of the prince, and the state: This is the death of a state, as authoritie is the soule and life thereof. What doth maintaine one only man, yea an old and worne man, ouer so many thousands of men, if not authoritie and the great esteeme of his person? which if it be once lost by contempt, the prince and state must necessarily fall to the ground. And euen as authoritie, as hath been said, is more strong and large than beneuolence, so contempt is more contrarie and dangerous than hatred, which dareth not any thing, being held backe by feare, if contempt which shaketh off feare, arme it not, and giue it courage to execute. It is true that contempt is not so common, especially if he be a true and lawfull prince, except he be such a one, as doth wholly degrade and prostitute himselfe, & *videatur exire de imperio*. Neuerthelesse wee must see from whence this contempt doth come, that wee may the better know how to auoid it. It proceedeth from things contrarie to those meanes that winne and get authoritie, and especially from three, that is to say, from too loose, effeminate, milde, languishing and carelesse, or very light forme of gouernment, without any hold or stay; this is a state without a state, vnder such princes the subjects are made bold, and insolent, all things being permitted, because the prince takes care of nothing. *Malum principem habere, sub quo nihil vlli liceat: peius sub quo omnia omnibus*. Secondly, from the ill hap and infelicitie of the prince, whether it be in his affaires, which succede not well, or in his line and issue, if hee haue no children, who are a great proppe and stay to a prince, or in the vncertaintie of his successours, whereof *Alexander* the great complained, *Orbitas mea quod sine liberis sum, spernitur: Munimen aula Manens. regis liberi*. Thirdly, from maners, especially dissolute, loose and voluptuous, drunkennesse, gluttonie, as also rusticitie, childishnesse, scurrilitie.

13

Contempt.

Art 5.

Plin. in Panch.

An ill forme of gouernment.

Infelicitie.

Maners.

14
The distinction
of the
action of a
prince.

Thus in grosse haue I spoken of the action of a prince. To handle it more distinctly and particularly, wee must remember, as hath beene said in the beginning, that it is twofold, peaceable and militarie; by the peaceable I heere vnderstand that ordinarie action, which is euerie day done, and at all times of peace and of warre; by the militarie, that which is not exercised, but in time of warre.

Of the peace-
able.

An aduice.

The peaceable and ordinarie action of a souereigne cannot be whollie prescribed, it is an infinite thing, and consisteth as well in taking heed to doe, as to doe. Wee will heere giue the principall and more necessary aduiselements. First therefore a Prince must provide that he be faithfullie and diligentlie aduertised of all things. This all things may bee reduced to two heads, whereupon there are two sorts of aduertisements and aduertisers, who must be faithfull and assured, wise and secret, though in some there be required, a greater libertie and constancy than in others. Some are to aduertise him of his honor and duty, of his defects, and to tell him the truth. There are no kind of people in the world, who haue so much need of such friends, as Princes haue; who neither see nor vnderstand, but by the eies and eares of another. They maintain and hold vp a publike life, are to satisfie so many people, haue so many things hid from them, that before they be aware, they fall into the hatred and detestation of their people, for matters that would be easily remedied and cured, if they had been in time aduertised of them. On the other side free aduertisements, which are the best offices of true amity, are perillous about soueraignes, though Princes be ouer delicate & shew great infirmitie, if for their good and profit, they cannot endure a free aduertisement, which enforceth nothing, it being in their power, whatsoeuer they heare, to do what they list. Others are to aduertise the Prince of whatsoeuer passeth, not onely amongst his subiects, and within the circuit of his state, but with his bordering neighbours. I say of all, that concerneth either a farre off, or neere at hand, his owne state or his neighbours. These two kind of people answer in some sort to those two friends of *Alexander*, *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, of whom the one loued the King, the other *Alexander*, that is to say, the one the state, the other the person.

Secondly,

Secondly, a Prince must alwaies haue in his hand a little booke or memoriall containing three things: first and principally a brieue register of the affaires of the state: to the end he may know what he must doe, what is begun to bee done, and that there remaine nothing imperfect, and ill executed: A catalogue or bedrowle of the most worthy personages that haue well deserued, or are likely to deserue well of the weale publike: A memoriall of the gifts which he hath bestowed, to whom and wherefore; otherwise without these three, there must necessarilie follow many inconueniences. The greatest princes and wisest polititians haue vsed it, *Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Traian, Adrian, the Antonies.*

15
2 To haue a memoriall of the Affaires.

2 Persons.

3 Gifts.

Thirdly, inasmuch as one of the principall duties of a prince, is to appoint and order both rewards and punishments, the one whereof is fauorable, the other odious, a prince must retaine vnto himselfe the distribution of rewards, as estates, honours, immunities, restitutions, graces and fauours, and leaue vnto his officers, to execute and pronounce condemnations, forfeitures, confiscations, deprivations, and other punishments.

16
3 To appoint rewards and punishments.

Fourthly in the distribution of rewards, gifts, and good deeds, he must alwaies be readie and willing, giue them before they be asked, if he can, and not to looke that he should refuse them; and he must giue them himselfe, if it may be, or cause them to be giuen in his presence. By this meanes gifts and good turnes shall be better receiued, and giuen to better purpose, and he shall auoid two great and common inconueniences, which depriue men of honour and worth of those rewards that are due vnto them: the one is a long pursuit, difficult and chargeable, which a man must vndergoe, to obtaine that which he would, and thinketh to haue deserued, which is no small grieue to honorable minds, and men of spirit: The other, that after a man hath obtained of the prince a gift, before he can possesse it, it costeth the one halfe, and more, of that it is worth, and many times comes to nothing.

17
4 To distribute rewards.

Let vs come to the militarie action, wholly necessarie for the preservation and defence of a prince, of the subiects, and the whole state, let vs speake thereof briefly. All this matter or subiect may be reduced to three heads, To enterprise, make, points.

18
Of the militarie action which consisteth in three

To enter-
prise, where
two things
are required.

Plin. in
Pan.

Salust.

19

Three things
make an en-
terprise iust.

20

Cic. pro
Milo.

In officijs.

Salust.

make, finish warre. In the enterpise there must be two things, iustice and prudence, and an auoidance of their contraries, in iustice and temeritie. First, the warre must be iust, yea iustice must march before valour, as deliberation before execution. These reasons must be of no force, yea abhorred, That right consisteth in force; That the issue or euent decideth it; That the stronger carieth it away. But a prince must looke into the cause, into the ground and foundation, and not into the issue; Warre hath it lawes and ordinances as well as peace. God fauoreth iust warres, and giueth the victorie to whom it pleaseth him, and therefore we must first make our selues capable of this fauor by the equitie of the enterpise. Warre then must not be begun and vndertaken for all causes, vpon euery occasion, *non ex omni occasione querere triumphum*: And aboue all a prince must take heed that ambition, auarice, choler, possesse him not, and cary him beyond reason, which are alwaies, to say the truth, the more ordinarie motiues to warre: *vna & ea vetus causa bellandi est profunda cupido imperij & diuitiarum: maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putant: Repere fœdus impius lucri furor, & ira praecept.*

That a warre may be in all points iust, three things are necessarie, that it be denounced and vndertaken by him that hath power to do it, which is only the foueraigne.

That it be for a iust cause, such as a defensiu war is, which is absolute iust, being iustified by all reason amongst the wise, by necessitie amongst barbarians, by nature amongst beasts: I say defensiu, of himselfe, that is, of his life, his libertie, his parents, his countrie: of his allies and confederates, in regard of that faith he hath giuen; of such as are vniustlie oppressed,

Qui non defendit, nec obsistit, si potest, iniuria, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes, aut patriam, aut socios deserat. These three heads of defence are within the bounds of iustice, according to S. Ambrose, *Fortitudo, quæ per bella tuetur à barbaris patria, vel defendit infirmos, vel à latronibus socios, plena iustitia est.* Another more briefly, diuideth it into two heads, faith & health; *Nullum bellum à ciuitate optima suscipitur, nisi aut pro fide, aut pro salute*: and to offensive warre he puts two conditions; That it proceede from some former offence giuen, as outrage or vsurpation, and hauing redemaunded openly by a herald that

that which hath beene surprised and taken away (*post clari-* Plin. l. 22.
gatum) and sought it by way of iustice, which must euer goe nat. hist.
formost. For if men be willing to submit themselves vnto iu- ca. 2.
stice, and reason; there let them stay themselves; if not, the
last, and therefore necessarie, is iust and lawfull, *iustum bellum*, Liuius.
quibus necessarium; pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinqui-
tur spes.

Thirdly to a good end, that is to say, peace and quietnes. 21
Sapientes pacis causa bellum gerunt, & laborem spe otij sustentant:
ut in pace sine iniuria viuant.

After iustice commeth prudence, whereby a man doth ad- 22
uisedly deliberate before by sound of trumpet he publisheth *Prudence.*
the warre. And therefore, that nothing be done out of passion,
and ouer-rashly, it is necessarie that he consider of the points:
of forces and meanes, as well his owne, as his enemies; se-
condly of the hazard and dangerous reuolution of humane
things especiallie of armes, which are variable, and wherein
fortune hath greatest credit, and exerciseth more hir empire,
than in any other thing, wherein the issue may be such, that in
an houre it carieth all, *simul parata ac sperata decora unius hora* Liuius,
fortuna euertere potest.

Thirdly, of those great euils, infelicities, and publike and
particular miseries, which warre doth necessarily bring with
it, and which be such as the only imagination is lamentable.
Fourthly of the calumnies, maledictions, and reproches that
are spread abroad against the authours of the warre, by reason
of those euils and miseries that follow it. For there is nothing
more subiect to the toongs and iudgements of men than war.
But all lighteth vpon the Chieftaine, *iniquissima bellorum con-* Tacit.
ditio haec est, prospera omnes sibi vendicant, aduersa uni imputan-
tur. All these things together make the iustest warre that may
be, detestable, saith *S. Augustine*; and therefore it standeth a
soueraigne vpon, not to enter into warres but vpon great ne-
cessitie, as it is said of *Augustus*; and not to suffer himselfe to
be caried by those incendiaries and fire-brands of warre,
who for some particular passion, are readie to kindle and en-
flame him: *quibus in pace durius seruitium est, in id nati, ut nec* Pindar.
ipsi quiescant, neque alios sinant. And these men are commonly
such, whose noses do bleed when they come to the fact it self.

Dulce bellum inexpertis. A wise soueraigne will keepe himselfe in peace, neither prouoking, nor fearing warre, neither disquieting either his owne state, or anothers, betwixt hope and feare, nor comming to those extremities of perishing himselfe, or making others to perish.

23
The second
head to make
warre, where-
unto three
things are
required.
Prouision,
and muni-
tion.

Caſſiod.

24

Men.

The second head of militarie action, is to make war, where-
unto are required three things, Munitions, Men, Rules of war.

The first is prouision and munition of all things necessarie for warre, which must be done in good time and at leasure, for it were great indiscretion in extremities to be employed about the search and prouision of those things which he should haue alwaies readie. *Diu apparandum est, ut vincas celerius.* Now of the ordinarie and perpetuall prouision required for the good of the prince and the state at all times, hath beene spoken in the first part of this Chapter, which is wholly of this subiect. The principall prouisions and munitions of war are three, Monie, which is the vitall spirit, and sinewes of war, whereof hath beene spoken in the second Chapter. 2. Armes both offensiue and defensiue, whereof likewise heeretofore. These two are ordinarie, and at all times. 3. Victualls, without which a man can neither conquer, nor liue, whole armies are ouerthrowne without a blow stricken, souldiers grow licentious, and vnrulie, and it is not possible to doe any good. *Disciplinam non seruat ieiunus exercitus.* But this is an extraordinarie prouision, and not perpetuall, and is not made but for warre. It is necessarie therefore that in the deliberating of warre, that there be great store-houses made for victualls, corne, poudered flesh, both for the armie which is in the field, and for the garisons in the frontiers, which may be besieged.

The second thing required to make warre, are men fit to assaile and to defend: we must distinguish them. The first distinction is, into souldiers, and leaders or captaines, both are necessarie. The souldiers are the bodie, the captaines the soule, the life of the armie, who giue motion and action: we wil speake first of the souldiers who make the bodie in grosse. There are diuers sorts of them: There are footmen and horsemen; naturall of the same countrie, and strangers; ordinarie and subsidiarie. We must first compare them all together, to the end we may know which are the better, and to be preferred,

ferred, and afterwards we will see how to make our choice, and lastly how to gouerne and discipline them.

In this comparison all are not of one accord. Some, especially rude and barbarous people, preferre horsemen before ²⁵ *Rather foote than horse.* footmen; others quite contrarie. A man may say that the foote are simplie and absolutely the better, for they serue both throughout the warre, and in all places, and at all occasions; whereas in hillie, rough, craggie, and strait places, and in sieges, the caualarie is almost vnprofitable. They are likewise more readie and lesse chargeable: and if they be well led and armed, as it is fit they should, they endure the chock of the horsemen. They are likewise preferred by such as are doctors in this arte. A man may say that the caualarie is better in a combat; and for a speedie dispatch; *Equestrium virium proprium cito parare, cito cedere victoriam*. For the foote are not so speedie, but what they do they performe more surely.

As for naturall souldiers and strangers, diuers men are like- ²⁶ *And naturall than strangers.* wise of diuers opinions touching their precedencie; but without all doubt the naturall are much better, because they are more loyall than mercenarie strangers.

Venalesq; manus, ibi fas, ubi maxima merces.

More patient and obedient, carying themselves with more honor and respect towards their leaders, more courage in combats; more affection to the victorie, and good of their countrie; They cost lesse, and are more readie than strangers, who are many times mutinous, yea in greatest necessities, making more stir, than doing seruice, and the most part of them are importunate, and burthen some to the Common-weale, cruell to those of the countrie, whom they forrage as enemies. Their comming and departure is chargeable, and many times they are expected and attended with great losse and inconvenience. If in some extremitie there be neede of them, be it so, but yet let them be in farre lesse number than the naturall, and let them make but a member and part of the armie, not the bodie. For there is danger that if they shall see themselves equall in force, or more strong than the naturall, they will make themselves their masters that called them, as many times it hath fallen out. For he is master of the state, that is master of the forces. And againe, if it be possible, let them be

drawne from allies and confederates, who bring with them more trust and seruice than they that are simplie strangers. For to make more vse of strangers, or to employ them more than naturall subiects, is to play the tyrants, who feare their subiects, and because they handle them like enemies, they make themselues odious vnto them, whereby they feare to arme them, or to employ them in the warres.

27

As well or-
dinary as
subsidiary.

As touching ordinarie souldiers and subsidiaries, both are necessarie; but the difference betweene them is, that the ordinarie are in lesse number, are alway a foote and in armes both in peace and in warre: and of these we haue spoken in the prouision, a pople wholly destinated and confined to the warres, formed to all exercise of armes, resolute. This is the ordinarie force of the prince, his honor in peace, his safegard in warre: such were the *Romane* legions. These should be diuided by troopes in times of peace, to the end they raise no commotions. The subsidiaries are in farre greater number, but they are not perpetuall, and wholly destinated to warre: they haue other vocations: At a neede and in times of warre they are called by the sound of a trumpet, enroled, mustred, and instructed to the warres; and in times of peace they returne, and retire themselues to their vocations.

28

Well to
choose.

We haue vnderstood their distinctions and differences, we must now consider of the good choice of them: A matter whereof we must be carefullie aduised, not to gather many, and in great numbers, for number winneth not the victorie, but valour; and commonly they are but few that giue the ouerthrow. An vnbridled multitude doth more hurt than good. *Non vires habet sed pondus, potius impedimentum quam auxilium.* Victorie then consisteth not in the number, but in the force and valor, *manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus.* There must therefore be a great care in the choice of them (not pressing them pell-mell) that they bee not voluntarie aduenturers, ignorant of warre, taken forth of cities, corrupt, vitious, dissolute in their maners, arrogant boasters, hardie and bold to pillage, farre enough off from blowes, leuerets in dangers, *Afucti latrocinijs bellorum, insolentes, galeati lepores, purgamenta urbiu, quibus ob egestatem & flagitia maxima peccandi necessitudo.*

To

To choosethem well, there needs iudgement, attention and instruction, and to this end five things must be considered of, ²⁹ *Election of* that is to say, the place of their birth and education. They *souldiers* must be taken out of the fields, the mountaines, barren and *consisteth in* hard places, countries neere adioining to the sea, and brought *five things.* vp in all maner of labor. *Ex agris supplendum præcipue robur* ¹ *Country.* *exercitus, aptior armis rustica plebs sub dio & in laboribus enu-* *trita, ipso terra sua solo & cælo acrius animantur. Et minus mor-* *tem timet, qui minus deliciarum nouit in vita.* For they that are brought vp in Cities, in the pleasant shadow and delights thereof, in gaine, are more idle, insolent, effeminate; *Vernaculo* ^{Tacit.} *multitudo, lasciuia sueta, laborum intolerans.* Secondly the age, ² *Age.* that they be taken young, at eighteene yeares of age, when they are most pliant and obedient: the elder are possessed with many vices, and not so fit for discipline. Thirdly the bo- ³ *Bodies.* dies, which some will haue to be of a great stature, as *Marius* and *Pirrhus*: but though it be but indifferent, so the bodie be strong, drie, vigorous, sinowie, of a fierce looke, it is all one. *Dura corpora stricti artus, minax vultus, maior animi vigor.* Fourthly the spirit, which must be liuely, resolute, bold, glo- ⁴ *Spirit.* rious, fearing nothing so much as dishonour and reproch. Fifthly the condition, which importeth much; for they that ⁵ *Condition.* are of a base and infamous condition, of dishonest qualities, or such as are mingled with effeminate artes, seruing for delicacie and for women, are no way fit for this profession.

After the choice and elections commeth discipline: for it is not enough to haue chosen those that are capable, and like- ³⁰ *well disci-* ly to prooue good souldiers, if a man make them not good; *plined.* and if he make them good, if he keepe and continue them not such. Nature makes few men valiant, it is good institution *Veget.* and discipline that doth it. Now it is hard to say how necessarie and profitable good discipline is in warre: This is all in all, it is this that made *Rome* to flourish, and that woon it the seignorie of the world: yea, it was in greater account, than the loue of their children. Now the principall point of discipline is obedience, to which end serued that ancient precept, That a souldier must more feare his captaine, than his enemy.

Now this discipline must tend to two ends; to make the souldiers

Discipline
hath two
parts.

1 Valour
which is at-
tained by
exercise.

2 Trauell.

3 Order.

souldiers valiant, and honest men : and therefore it hath two parts, valour, and maners. To valour three things are required ; daily exercise in armes, wherein they must alwaies keepe themselves in practise without intermission ; and from hence commeth the Latin word *Exercitus*, which signifieth an armie. This exercise in armes, is an instruction to manage and vse them well, to prepare themselves for combats, to draw benefit from armes, with dexteritie to defend themselves, to discover and present vnto them whatsoeuer may fall out in the fight, and come to the triall, as in a ranged battell : to propose rewards to the most apt and actiue, to enflame them. Secondly, trauell or paines, which is as well to harden them to labour, to sweatings, to dust, *exercitus labore proficit, otio consenescit*, as for the good and seruice of the army, and fortification of the field, whereby they must learne to digge, to plant a pallisade, to order a barricado, to runne, to carrie heauie burthens. These are necessarie things, as well to defend themselves, as to offend and surprise the enemy. Thirdly order, which is of great vse, and must be kept in warre for diuers causes, and after a diuers maner. First, in the distribution of the troopes, into battallions, regiments, ensignes, camerades. Secondly, in the situation of the campe, that it be disposed into quarters with proportion, hauing the places, entries, issues, lodgings fitted both for the horsemen and footemen, whereby it may bee easie for euerie man to finde his quarter, his companion. Thirdly, in the march in the field, and against the enemy, that euerie one hold his ranke ; that they be equally distant the one from the other, neither too neere, nor too farre from one an other. Now this order is very necessarie and serues for many purposes. It is very pleasing to the eie, cheereth vp friends, astonisheth the enemy, secureth the armie, maketh all the remooues, and the commands of the captaines easie ; in such sort, that without stir, without confusion the Generall commandeth, and from hand to hand his intents and purposes come euen to the least. *Imperium ducis simul omne copia sentiunt ; & ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondent*. To be briefe, this order well kept, maketh an armie almost inuincible ; and contrarily, many haue lost the field for want of this order, and good intelligence.

The

The second part of this military discipline concerneth manners, which are commonly very dissolute and in armies hardly ordered, *assidue dimicantibus difficile morum custodire mensuram*. Neuerthelesse there must be paines taken, and especially to enstale (if it may be) three vertues, Continencie, whereby all gluttonie, drunkenesse, whordome, and all manner of dishonest pleasures are chased away, which doe make a souldier loose and licentious. *Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum*; witnesse *Hannibal* who by delicacie and delights in a winter was effeminated, and he by vice was vanquished, that was inuincible, and by armes vanquished all others. Modestie in words, driuing away all vanitie, vaine boasting, brauerie of speech; for true valour stirreth not the tongue, but the hands, doth not speake but execute. *Virinatus militie factis magni, ad verborum linguaque certamina rudes: discrimen ipsum certaminis differt: viri fortes, in opere acres, ante id placidi*. And contrarily great speakers are small doers. *Nimij verbis lingua feroces*. Now the tongue is for counsell, the hand for combat, saith *Homer*; Modestie in action, (that is, a simple and readie obedience, without merchandizing or contradicting the commands of the captaines) *haec sunt bona militie, velle, vereri, obedire*. Abstinencie, whereby souldiers keepe their hands cleane from all violence, forraging, roberie. And this is a brieft summe in the militarie discipline; the which the Generall must strengthen by rewards and recompences of honour towards the good and valorous, and by seuer punishments against offenders: for indulgence vndoth souldiers.

Let this suffice of souldiers: Now a word or two of captaines, without whom the souldier can doe nothing: they are a body without a soule, a ship with oares without a master to hold the sterne. There are two sorts, the Generall and first; and afterwards the subalterne, the master of the Campe, Colonels: But the General (who must neuer be but one, vnder paine of losing all) is all in all. And therefore it is said, that an armie can doe as much as a General can doe; and as much account must be made of him as of all the rest, *plus in ducere pones, quam in exercitu*. Now this Generall is either the prince himselfe and souereigne, or such as hee hath committed the charge

32

Maners the
second part
of discipline.

Continencie.

Tacit.

Modestie.

Abstinencie.

33

Of captaines.

Of the General.

Tacit.

Tacit.

charge vnto, and made choice of. The presence of a prince is of great importance to the obtaining of a victorie; it doubleth the force and courage of his men; and it seemeth to be requisite when it standeth vpon the safegard and health of his state, and of a prouince. In warres of lesse consequence he may depute another: *dubijs praeliorum exemptus summa rerum & imperij seipsum reseruet*. Finallie, a Generall must haue these

Tacit.

qualities, he must be wise and experienced in the arte militarie, hauing seene and suffered both fortunes: *Secundarum ambiguarumque rerum sciens eoque interitus*. Secondly, hee must be prouident and well aduised; and therefore staide, cold, and settled; farre from all temerity and precipitation, which is

Sertori. in
Plut.

not only foolish, but vnfortunate. For faults in warre cannot be mended; *Non licet in bello his peccare*. And therefore hee must rather looke backe, than before him, *Ducem oportet potius respicere, quam prospicere*. Thirdly, hee must be vigilant and actiue, and by his owne example, teaching his souldiers to doe his will. Fourthlie happie, good fortune comes from heauen, but yet willinglie it followeth and accompanieth these three first qualities.

34
The third
head of the
rules and
counsels to
make warre.

After the munitions and men of warre, let vs come to the rules and generall aduiselements to make warre. This third point is a very great and necessarie instrument of war, without which both munitions and men, are but phantasies, *Plura consilio quam vi perficiuntur*. Now to prescribe certaine rules and perpetuall, it is impossible. For they depend of so many things that are to be considered of, and wherunto a man must accommodate himselfe, wherupon it was well said, That men giue not counsell to the affaires, but the affaires to men, that a man must order his warre by his eie. A man must take his counsell in the field, *Consilium in arena*: for new occurrents yeeld new counsels. Neuerthelesse there are some so generall, and certaine, that a man cannot faile in the deliuerie and obseruation of them. We will brieflie set down some few of them, whereunto a man may adde as occasions shall fall out. Some are to be obserued throughout a warre, which we will speake of in the first place, others are for certaine occasions and affaires.

Rules for the
whole time
of warre.

x The first is carefully to watch and to meet the occasions
not

not to lose any, nor to permit, if it be possible, the enemy to take his: occasion hath a great place in all humane affaires, especially in warre, where it helpeth more than force.

2 To make profit of rumours and reports that runne abroad, for whether they be true or false, they may doe much, especially in the beginning. *Fama bella constant, fama bellum conficit, in spem metumue impellit animos.*

3 But when a man is entred his course, let not reports trouble him: he may consider of them, but let them not hinder him to do that he should, and what he can, and let him stand firme to that which reason hath counselled him.

4 Aboueall, he must take heed of too great a confidence and assurance, whereby he growes into contempt of his enemy, and thereby becomes negligent and careless; it is the most dangerous euill that can fall out in warre. He that contemneth his enemy, discouereth and betrayeth himselfe, *Frequentissimum initium calamitatis securitas. Nemo celerius opprimitur quam qui non timet. Nil tuto in hoste despicitur: quem spreueris, valentiorum negligentia facies.* There is nothing in warre that must be despised: for therein there is nothing little: and many times that which seemeth to a man to be of small moment, yeeldeth great effects. *Sape paruis momentis magni casus: ut nihil timendi, sic nihil contemnendi.*

5 To enquire very carefullie, and to know the estate and affaires of the enemy, especially these points, 1. The nature, capacitie, and designments of the Chieftaine. 2. The nature, maners, and maner of life of his enemies, 3. The situation of the places, & the nature of the countrey where he is. *Hannibal* was excellent in this.

6 Touching the fight or maine battell, many things are aduisedly to be considered of, when, where, against whom, and how, to the end it be not to small purpose. And a man must not come to this extremitie, but with great deliberation, but rather make choice of any other meane, and seeke to breake the force of his enemy by patience, and to suffer him to beate himselfe with time, with the place, with the want of many things, before he come to this hazard. For the issue of battailes is very vncertaine, and dangerous: *Incenti exitus pugnarum.*

35
For the fight.

narum. Mars communis, qui saepe spoliante[m] & iam exultante[m] enervit; & perculit ab abiecto.

When.

7 A man then must not come to the battell, but seldome, that is to say, in great necessities, or for some great occasion. In necessitie, as if the difficulties grow on his part; his viands, his treasure faileth; his men begin to distaste the warres, and will be gone, and he cannot long continue, *capienda rebus in malis praeops via est*; vpon great occasion, as if his part be clearly the stronger; that the victorie seemeth to offer it self, that the enemy is weake, and will shortly be stronger, and will offer the battell; that he is out of doubt and feare, and thinketh his enemy farre off; that he is weary and faint, reuietualleth himselfe; his horses feede vpon their litter.

Where.

8 He must consider the place, for this is a matter of great consequence in battels. In generall, he must not attend (if he may preuent it) his enemy till he enter within his owne territories. He must goe forth to meete him, or at least stay him in the entrance. And if he be alreadie entered, not hazard the battell, before he haue another armie in readinesse, to make a supplie; otherwise he puts his state in hazard. More particularlie hee must consider the field where the battell is to be fought, whether it be fit for himselfe, or his enemy: for the field many times giues a great aduantage. The plaine champion is good for the caualarie; strait and narrow places, set with piles, full of diches, trees, for the infanterie.

With and
against
whom.

9 He must consider with whom he is to fight, not with the strongest, I meane not the strongest men, but the strongest and stoutest courages. Now there is not any thing that giueth more heart and courage, than necessitie, an enemy inuincible. And therefore I say, that a man must neuer fight with such as are desperate. This agreeth with the former, that is, not to hazard a battell within his owne countrie, for an enemy being entered fighteth desperatly, knowing if he be vanquished, he cannot escape death, hauing neither fortresse, nor any place of retrait or succor, *undo necessitas in loco, spes in virtute, salus ex victoria.*

How.

10 The maner of fight that brings best aduantage with it, whatsoeuer it be, is the best; whether it be surprise, subtiltie, close

close and covert faining to feare, to the end he may draw the enemy, and catch him in his ginne, *spe victorie inducere, ut vincantur*; to watch and marke his ouersights and faults, that he may the better preuaile against him, and giue the charge.

For ranged battels these things are required. The first and principall is a good and comely ordering of his people. 2. A supplie and succor alwaies readie, but close and hidden, to the end that comming suddainly and vnawares, it may astonish and confound the enemy. For all suddaine things though they be vaine and ridiculous, bring feare and astonishment with them.

36
Rules for
ranged bat-
tailes.

Primi in omnibus praelijs oculi vincuntur & aures.

3. To be first in the field, and ranged in battell ray. This a Generall doth with so much the more ease, and it much increaseth the courage of his souldiers, and abateth his enemies; for this is to make himselfe the assailant, who hath alwaies more heart than the defendant. 4. A beawtifull, gallant, bold, resolute countenance of the Generall and other leaders. 5. An oration to encourage the souldiers, and to lay open vnto them the honor, commoditie and suertie that there is in valor; That dishonor, danger, death, are the reward of cowards; *minus timoris minus periculi, audaciam pro muro esse, effugere mortem, qui eam contemnit.*

Being come to hand-strokes, if the army wauer, the Generall must hold himselfe firm, do the dutie of a resolute Leader, & braue man at armes, runne before his astonished souldiers, stay them recoyling, thrust himselfe into the throng, make all to know, both his owne, and his enemies, that his head, his hand, his tongue trembleth not.

37
Having ioy-
ned battaile.

And if it fall out that he haue the better, and the field be his, he must stay and with-hold them, lest they scatter and disband themselves, by too obstinate a pursuit of the vanquished. That is to be feared, which hath many times come to passe, that the vanquished gathering heart, make vse of despair, gather to a head, and vanquish the vanquishers, for this necessitie is a violent schoole-mistris. *Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia: & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma formido.* It is better to giue passage vnto them, and to remoue all lets and hindrances that may stay their flight. Much lesse must a Gene-
rall

rall suffer himselfe or his men to attend the booty, or to be allured therby ouer hastily, if he be conqueror. He must vse his victorie wisely, lest the abuse thereof turne to his own harme. And therefore he must not defile it with cruelty, depriving the enemy of all hope, for there is danger in it. *Ignaniam necessitas acuit; sepe desperatio spei causa est, grauissimi sunt morsus irrita necessitatis.* But contrarily, he must leaue some occasion of hope, and ouerture vnto peace, not spoiling and ransaking the country which he hath conquered; for fury and rage are dangerous beasts. Againe he must not staine his victorie with insolency, but carie himselfe modestly and alwaies remember the perpetuall flux and reflux of this world; & that alternatiue reuolution, wherby from aduersity springeth prosperity, from prosperity aduersity. There are some that cannot digest a good fortune, *Magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt. fortuna vireu est, tunc cum splendet frangitur: O infidam fiduciam!* & sepe *uictor victus*. If he be vanquished, wisdom is necessarie well to waigh and consider of his losse, it is foolishnesse to make himselfe beleue that it is nothing, and to feed himselfe with vaine hopes, to suppress the newes of the ouerthrow. He must consider thereof as it is at the worst, otherwise how shall he remedie it? And afterwards with a good courage hope for better fortunes, renew his forces, make a new leuy, seeke new succours, put good and strong garrisons into his strongest places. And though the heauens bee contrary vnto him, as sometimes they seeme to oppose themselves to holy and iust armes; it is neuerthelessse neuer forbidden to die in the bed of honour, which is farre better than to liue in dishonour.

38
A question
of the stratagems of
warre.

And thus wee haue ended the second head of this subiect, which is to make warre, except one scruple that remaineth: That is to say, whether it bee lawfull to vse subtilty, policie, stratagems in warre. There bee some that hold it negatiuely, that it is vnworthy men of honour and vertue, reiecting that excellent saying, *Dolus, an virtus quis in hoste requirat?* Alexander would take no aduantages of the obscurity of the night; saying, that he liked not of the euing victories, *malo me fortuna pigeat, quam victoria pudeat*. So likewise the first Romanes sent their schoolemaster to the Phaliscians; to Pyrrhus his traiterous Phyitian, making profession of vertue, disauowing those

those of their country that did otherwise, reprobating the subtilty of the Greekes and Aphricanes, and teaching that true victorie is by vertue, *qua salua fide & integra dignitate paratur*, that which is gotten by wit and subtiltie, is neither generous, nor honorable, nor secure. The vanquished hold not themselves to be well vanquished, *non virtute, sed occasione & arte ducis se victos rati: ergo non fraude neque occultis sed palam & armatum hostes suos vlcisci*. Now all this is well said and true, but to be vnderstood in two cases, in priuat quarrels, and against priuat enemies, or where faith is not giuen, or a league and alliance made. But without these two cases, that is to say, in warre, and without the preiudice of a mans faith, it is permitted by any means whatsoeuer to conquer the enemy that is alreadie condemned. This, besides the iudgement of the greatest warriors (who contrarily haue preferred the victorie gotten by occasion, and by subtile stratagems, before that which is woon by open force; whereupon to that they haue ordained an ox for a sacrifice, to this onlie a cocke) is the opinion of that great Christian Doctor, *Cum iustum bellum suscipitur, vt aperte pugnet quis, aut ex insidijs, nihil ad iustitiam interest*. Warre hath naturallie reasonable priuiledges, to the preiudice of reason. In time and place it is permitted to make vse and aduantage of the sottishnesse of an enemy, as well as of his weaknesse or idlenesse.

Polyb. lib.
Plut. in
Marcell.
Vlp. lib. 1.
de Prob.
Aug. quest.
sup. Iosue.

Let vs come to the third head of this militarie matter, more short and pleasing than the rest, which is to finish the warre by peace. The word is sweet, the thing pleasant, and good in all respects, *pax optima rerum quas homini nouisse daturum est, Pax vna triumphis innumeris potior*, and verie commodious to both parts, the conquerors and conquered. But first to the vanquished, who are the weaker: to whom I doe first giue this counsell, to continue armed, to make shew of securitie, assurance and resolution. For he that desireth peace, must be alwaies readie for war, wherupon it hath beene said, That treatises of peace do well and happily succeed when they are concluded vnder a buckler. But this peace must bee honest, and vpon reasonable conditions: otherwise, though it bee said, that a base peace is more profitable than a iust war, yet it is better to die free and with honour, than to serue disho-

39
The third
head of this
military
subiect, to
finish war.

Of peace in
respect of the
vanquished.

nourable. And againe it must be pure and free, without fraud and hypocrisie, which finisheth the warre, deferreth it not, *pax suspecta tutius bellum*. Neuerthelesse in times of necessitie a man must accomodate himselfe as he may. When a pilot feareth a shipwracke, hee casteth himselfe into the sea to saue himselfe; and manie times it succeedeth well, when a man committeth himselfe to the discretion of a generous aduersarie. *Victores qui sunt alto animo secunda res in miserationem ex ira vertunt*. To the vanquishers I giue this counsell, that they be not ouer hardly perswaded to peace, for though perhaps it be lesse profitable vnto them, than to the vanquished, yet some commoditie it bringeth, for the continuance of warre is odious and troublesome. And *Lycurgus* forbiddeth to make warre often against one and the same enemies, because they learne thereby to defend theselues, & in the end to assaile too. The bitings of dying beasts are mortall. *Fractis rebus violentior ultima virtus*. And againe the issue is alwaies vncertaine, *Melior tutiorque certa pax sperata victoria, illa in tua, hac in decum manu est*. And many times the poison lieth in the taile, and the more fauourable fortune is, the more it is to bee feared: *Nemo se tuto diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest*. But it is truly honorable, it is a glory hauing a victorie in his hands, to be facill and easily perswaded vnto peace: it is to make knowen that he vndertaketh a warre iustly, and doth wisely finish it. And contrariie, to refuse it, and afterwards by some ill successe to repent the refusall, it is very dishonourable, and will be said that glory hath vndone him. Hee refused peace, and would haue honour, and so hath lost them both. But hee must offer a gracious and a debonaire peace, to the end it may be durable. For if it be ouer rough and cruell, at the first advantage that may be offered, the vanquished will reuolt. *Si bonam dederitis fidam & perpetuam, si malam, haud diuturnam*. It is as great greatnesse to shew as much lenitie towards the suppliant vanquished, as valour against the enemy. The Romanes did verie well put this in practise, and it did them no harme.

In respect of
the vanqui-
shers.

Honorable.

S. Bernard.

Liuius.

CHAP. IIII.

*Of that prudence which is required in difficult affaires and
ill accidents, publicke and private.*

THE PREFACE.

HAuing spoken of that politicke prudence required in a
soueraigne, for the cariage of himselfe and his good go-
uernment, wee will heere seuerally speake of that prudence
that is necessarie for the preservation of himselfe, and the re-
medying of those affaires, and difficult and dangerous acci-
dents which may happen either to himselfe, or his particular
subiects.

First these affaires and accidents are very diuers: they are
either publike or particular: either to come, and such as threa-
ten vs, or present and pressing vs: the one are onely doubtfull
and ambiguous, the other dangerous and important because
of their violence. And they that are the greater and more dif-
ficult, are either secret and hid; and they are two, that is to
say, conspiracy against the person of the Prince, or the state,
and treason against the places and companies: or manifest and
open, and these are of diuers sorts. For they bee either with-
out forme of warre and certaine order, as popular commoti-
ons for small and light occasions, factions and leagues be-
tweene subiects, of the one against the other, in small and
great number, great or little; seditions of the people against
the prince or magistrate, rebellion against the authoritie and
head of the Prince: or they are ripe and formed into a warre,
and are called ciuill warres: which are of so many kindes, as
the aboue named troubles and commotions, which are the
causes, foundations and seedes of them: but haue growen,
and are come into consequence and continuance. Of them
all wee will speake distinctly, and wee will giue aduice and
counsell, as well to soueraignes, as particular persons, great
and small, how to carrie themselves wisely therein.

*The diuision
of this mat-
ter by distin-
ction of the
accidents.*

I. *Of the evils and accidents that doe threaten vs.*

IN those crosse and contrarie accidents, whereunto wee are subiect, there are two diuers maners of cariage: & they may be both good, according to the diuers natures both of the accidents, and of those to whom they happen. The one is strongly to contest, and to oppose a mans selfe against the accident, to remoue all things that may hinder the diuerting thereof, or at least to blunt the point, to dead the blow thereof, either to escape it, or to force it. This requireth a strong and obstinate mind, and hath need of hard and painfull care. The other is incontinently to take and receiue these accidents at the woorst, and to resolue himselfe to beare them sweetly and patiently, and in the meane time to attend peaceable whatsoeuer shall happen, without tormenting himselfe, or hindering it. The former studieth how to range the accidents; this himselfe. That seemeth to be more couragious; this more sure. That continueth in suspence, is tossed betweene feare and hope; this putteth himselfe into safetie, and lieth so low that he cannot fall lower. The lowest march is the surest, and the seat of constancie. That laboureth to escape; this to suffer: and many times this maketh the better bargaine. Often times it falleth out, that there is greater inconuenience and losse in pleading and contending, than in losing; in flying for safety, than in suffering. A couetous man tormenteth himselfe more than a poore, a zealous than a cuckold. In the former, prudence is more requisite, because hee is in action; in this patience. But what hindreth, but that a man may performe both in order: and that where prudence and vigilancie can do nothing, there patience may succeed? Doubtlesse in publicke evils a man must assay the first, which such are bound to do, as haue the charge and can do it; in particular let euerie one chuse the best.

II. *Of evils and accidents present, pressing, and extreame.*

THe proper meanes to lighten evils, and to sweeten passions, is not for a man to oppose himselfe, for opposition enflameth

enflameth and increaseth them much more. A man by the ieaiousie of contention and contradiction sharpneth and stirreth the euill: but it is either in diuerting them else-where, as Physicians vse to doe, who knowing not how to purge, and wholly to cure a disease, seeke to diuert it into some other part lesse dangerous, which must be done sweetly and insensiblie. This is an excellent remedie against all euils, and which is practised in all things, if a man marke it well, whereby we are made to swallow the sowrest morsels, yea death it selfe, and that insensiblie: *abducendus animus est ad alia studia, curas, negotia, loci denique mutatione tanquam agroti non conualescentes saepe curandus est.* As a man counselleth those that are to passe ouer some fearefull deepe place, either to shut or to diuert their eies. When a man hath occasion to launce a sore in a child, he flattereth him, and withdraweth his mind to some other matter. A man must practise the experiment and subtiltie of *Hypomenes*, who being to runne with *Atlanta*, a damsell of excellent beautie, and to lose his life if he lost the goale, to marrie the damsell if he woon it, furnished himselfe with three faire apples of gold, which at diuers times he let fall, to stay the course of the damsell whilest she tooke them vp, and so by diuerting hir, get the aduantage of hir, and gained hir selfe: so if the consideration of some present vnhappie accident, or the memorie of any that is past do much afflict vs, or some violent passion, which a man cannot tame, do moue and torment vs, we must change and turne our thoughts to something else, and substitute vnto our selues some other accident and passion lesse dangerous. If a man cannot vanquish it, he must escape it, goe out of the way, deale cunninglie, or weaken and dissolue it, with other thoughts and alienations of the mind, yea breake it into many pieces; and all this by diuersions. The other aduice, in the last and more dangerous extremities that are in a maner past hope, is a little to cast downe the head, to lend vnto the blow, to yeeld vnto necessitie, for there is great danger, that by too much obstinacie in not relenting at all, a man giueth occasion to violence to trample all vnder foot. It is better to make the lawes to will that they can, since they cannot do that they would. It was a reproch vnto *Cato* to haue been ouer-rough in the ciuill warres of his

time, and that he rather suffered the common-weale to runne into all extremities, than succored it by tying himselfe over-strictlie to the lawes. Contrarily *Epaminondas* in a necessitie, continued his charge beyond his time, though the law vpon the paine of his life did prohibit him: and *Philopemenes* is commended, that being borne to commaund, he did not only know how to gouerne according to the lawes, but also command the lawes themselues, when publike necessitie did require it. A Leader at a necessitie must stoupe a little, applic himselfe to the occasion, turne the table of the law, if not take it away, goe a little out of the way, that he lose not all; for this is prudence, which is no way contrarie either to reason or iustice.

III. Doubtfull and ambiguous affaires.

IN things doubtfull, where the reasons are strong on all parts, and the inabilityie to see and choole that which is most commodious, bringeth with it vncertaintie and perplexitie, the best and safest way is to leane to that part where there is most honestie and iustice: for notwithstanding it fall not out happily, yet there shall alwaies remaine an inward content, and an outward glorie to haue chosen the better part. Besides, a man knoweth not, if he had taken the contrarie part, what would haue hapned, and whether he had escaped his destinie. When a man doubteth which is the better and the shorter way, let him take the streighter.

IIII. Difficult and dangerous affaires.

IN difficult affaires, as in agreements, to be ouer-carefull to make them ouer-sure, is to make them lesse firme, lesse assured, because a man employeth therein more time, more people are hindred, more things, more claufes are mingled and interposed, than are needfull, from whence arise all differences. Adde hzereunto, that a man seemeth heereby to scorne fortune, and to exempt himselfe from hir iurisdiction, which cannot be, *vim suorum ingruentem refringi non vult*. It is better to make them briefly and quietly with a little danger, than to be so exact and curious.

In dangerous affaires a man must be wise and couragious, he must foresee and know all dangers, make them neither lesse nor greater than they are by want of iudgement, thinke that they will not all happen, or shall not all haue their effects, that a man may auoid many by industrie or by diligence, or otherwise; what they are from whom he may receiue aid and succour, and thereupon take courage, grow resolute, not fainting for them in an honest enterprise. A wise man is couragious, for he thinketh, discourseth, and prepareth himselfe for all, and a couragious man must likewise be wise.

V. Coniurations.

WE are come now to the greatest, most important, and dangerous accidents, which we will handle in order, expresse describing them one after the other, giuing afterwards in euery one of them some aduise-¹ments fit for a soueraigne, and in the end for euery particular person.

Coniuration is a conspiracie and enterprise of one or many against the person of the prince or the state; It is a dangerous thing hardly auoided or remedied, because it is close and hidden. How should a man defend himselfe against a couert enemy, such a one as carieth the countenance of a most officious friend? How can a man know the will and thoughts of another? And againe, he that contemneth his owne life, is master of the life of another, *contemnit omnes ille, qui mortem prius*. In such sort that the prince is exposed to the mercie of a priuat man, whosoever he be. *The description.*

Machiauell setteth downe at large, how a man should frame and order, and conduct a conspiracie; wee, how it may be broken, hindered, preuented.

¹ The counsels and remedies heereupon are, first a priuie search and counterminie by faithfull and discreet persons fit for such a purpose, who are the eyes and eares of the prince; These must discouer whatsoeuer is said and done, especiallie by the principall officers. Conspiratours do willingly heere and there defame the prince, or lend their eares to those, that blame and accuse him. Their discourse and conference then touching the prince must be knowne, and a prince must not

² Remedies
and aduise-
ments.

sticke to be bountifull in his rewards and immunities to such discoverers: But yet he must not over-lightlie giue credit to all reports; He must lend his eare to all, not his beliefe, and diligentlie examine, to the end he oppresse not the innocent, and so purchase vnto himselfe the hatred and hard speech of the people.

2 The second aduice is, that he endeuer by clemencie and innocencie to winne the loue of all, euen of his enemies, *fidissima custodia principis innocentia*. By offending no man, a man taketh a course to be offended by none: And it is to small purpose for a man to shew his power by wrongs and outrages, *male vim suam potestas aliorum contumelijs experitur*.

3 The third is to make a good shew, to shew a good countenance according to the accustomed maner, not changing or depressing any thing; and to publish in all places, that he is well perswaded of those meetings and assemblies that men appoint, and to make them beleue that he hath them not in the wind, that he descrieth not their plots and purposes. This was an experiment which *Denys* the tyrant made good vse of against an enemy of his, which cost him deere.

4 The fourth is to attend without astonishment & trouble whatsoeuer may happen vnto him. *Cesar* did well put in practise these three latter meanes, but not the first. It is better, saith he, to die once, than to liue, nay to die alwaies in a trance, and a continuall feuer of an accident, which is past remedie, and must be wholly referred vnto God. They that haue taken another course, and haue endeouored to preuent it by punishments and reuenge, haue very seldome found it the best way, and haue not for all that escaped the danger, as many Romane Emperours can well witnesse.

³
Punishment
of conspira-
tors, and the
aduice there-
upon. — But the conspiracie being discovered, the truth found out, what is to be done? The conspiratours must rigorously be punished: To spare such people, is cruelly to betray the weal-publike. They are enemies to the libertie, good, and peace of all: Iustice requireth it. But yet wisdom and discretion is necessarie heerein; and a man must not alwaies carie himselfe after one and the same maner. Sometimes he must execute suddainely, especiallie if the number of the conspiratours be small. But whether the number be little or great, he must not seeke

seeke by tortures to know the confederates (if otherwise and secretlie he may know them, and to make as though he knew them not, is good) for a man seeketh that which he would not find. It is sufficient that by the punishment of a small number good subiects are contained in their dutie, and they diuerted from their attempts, that either are not, or thinke not themselves bewrayed. To know all by tortures doth perhaps stirre vp mens hearts against him. Sometimes he must delay the punishment, but yet neuer be slow in procuring his safetie. But yet the conspiratours may be such, and the treason discovered at such a time, that a man must not dissemble, and to punish them instantlie is to play and lose all. The best way of all others is, to prevent the conspiracie, to frustrate it, faining nevertheless not to know the conspiratours, but so to cary himselfe, as if he would provide for another thing, as the Carthaginians did to Hannon their Captaine, *optimum & solum saepe insidiarum remedium, si non intelligantur*. And which is more, a prince must sometimes pardon, especiallie if he be a great man, that hath deserued well of the prince and state, and to whom they are both in some sort bound, whose children, parents, friends, are mightie. For what should he do? How should he breake this band? If with safetie he may, let him pardon, or at least lessen the punishment. Clemencie in this case is sometimes not only glorious to a prince, *nil gloriosius principe impune laeso*; but it helpeth much for safetie to come, diuerteth others from the like designments, and worketh either shame in them or repentance; the example of Augustus towards Cinna is very excellent.

Iustin. li. i.
Tacit.

V I. Treason.

TReason is a secret conspiracy or enterprise against a place, or a troupe or company: it is as a coniuration, a secret euill, dangerous and hardly auoided: for many times a traitour is in the middle and bosome of the company, or place which he selleth and betraieth. To this vnhappy mysterie are willingly subiect, such as are couetous, light spirits, hypocrites: and this is commonly in them, that they make a faire shew of trust and fidelity, they commend and keepe it carefully

I
Description.

carefully in small matters, and by that meanes endeououring to couet, they discouer themselues. It is the marke whereby to know them.

2
Aduise-
ments and
remedies.

The aduise-ments are almost the same, that belong to con- iurations: except in the punishments, which heere must bee speedie, gricuous, and irremissible: for they are a kinde of people ill borne and bred, incorrigible, pernicious to the world, whom to pitie, it is crueltie.

III. Commotions of the people.

1
2
Aduise-
ments and
remedies.

There are many sorts, according to the diuersitie of the causes, persons, maner and continuance, as wee shall see heereafter: faction, confederacie, sedition, tyrannie, ciuill warres. But we will speake heere simplie and in generall of those that are raised in a heat, as sudden tumults, that endure not long. The aduise-ments and remedies are to procure some one or other to speake, and shew himselte vnto them, that is of authoritie, vertue, and singular reputation, eloquent, ha- uing grauitie mingled with grace, and industrie with smooth speech to winne the people: for at the presence of such a man, as at a sudden lightning, the people grow calme and quiet:

*Veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta
Seditio est, seu itque animis ignobile vulgus
Iamq, faces, & saxa volant: furor arma ministrat.
Tum pietate grauem, ac meritis si forte virum quem
Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant.
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

Sometimes the captaine himselte must vndertake this bu- sinesse. But it must be done with an open front, a strong as- surance, hauing his mind free and pure from all imagination of death, and the worst that may happen vnto him: for to goe amongst them with a fearefull, and vnconstant counte- nance, with flatterie and humble cariage, is to wrong him- selte, and to doe little good. This Caesar did excellently put in practise vpon those mutinous legions and armies that rose vp against him.

stetit

— *stetit aggere fultis*

Cesspit is intrepidus vultu, mernit q̄ timeri

Nil metuens. —

And *Augustus* did as much to his *Actiaque* legions, saith *Tacitus*. There are then two meanes to quiet and appease a moued and furious people: the one is by rough vllage, and pure authority and reason. This is the better and more noble, and becommeth a captaine, if it stand him vpon; but yet he must take heed how he do it, as hath beene said. The other more ordinarie is by flatterie and faire speeches, for hee must not make an open resistance. Savage beasts are neuer tamed with blowes: and therefore a man must not be sparing of good words, and faire promises. In this case the wise haue permitted a man to lie, as men vse to doe with children and sicke folke. Heerein *Pericles* was excellent, who woone the people, by the eies, the eares, and the bellie, that is to say, by shewes, comedies, feasts, and heereby did what he list. This meanes more base and seruile, but yet necessarie, must be practised by him whom the captaine sendeth, as *Menenius Agrippa* did at *Rome*. For if he thinke to winne them by maine force, when they are without the bounds of reason, no way yeelding vnto them, as *Appius*, *Carcolanus*, *Cato*, *Phocion* endeouored to doe, he is mistaken, and deceiueth himselfe.

VIII. Faction and confederacy.

FAction or confederacie is a complot and association, of one *Description* against another betweene the subiects, whether it bee betweene the great or the small, in great numbers or little. It ariseth sometimes from the hatreds that are betweene priuate men and certaine families, but for the most part from ambition (the plague of states) euerie one coueting the first ranke. That which falleth out betweene great personages, is more pernicious. There are some that sticke not to say, that it is in some sort profitable for a soueraigne, and it doth the selfesame seruice to a common-weale that brawles of seruants doe in families, saith *Cato*: But that cannot be true, except it bee in tyrants, who feare lest their subiects should agree too well, or in small and light quarrels betweene cities, or betweene ladies of

2
The aduise-
ments and
remedies.

of the Court to know newes. But not important factions, which must bee extinguished in their first birth with their markes, names, habiliments, which are many times the seeds of villanous effects, witnesse that great deflagration, and those bloudy murthers happened in *Constantinople*, for the colours of greene and blew, vnder *Iustinian*. The aduise-
ments heereupon are, that if the factions be betwixt two great personages, the Prince must endeavour by good words or threatenings to make peace and atonement betwixt them, as *Alexander the Great* did betwixt *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, and *Archidamus* betwixt two of his friends. If he cannot doe it, let him appoint arbitrators, such as are free from suspicion and passion. The like he should do, if the faction be betwixt diuers subiects, or cities and communities. And if it fall out that it be necessarie that hee speake himselfe, hee must doe it with counsell, being called, to auoid the malice and hatred of those that are condemned. If the faction be betwixt great multitudes, and that it be so strong, that it cannot be appeased by iustice, the prince is to employ his force for the vtter extinguishment thereof. But he must take heed that he cary himselfe indifferent, not more affectioned to one than to another; for therein there is great danger, and many haue vndone themselves: And to say the truth, it is vnworthie the greatnes of a prince, and he that is master of all to make himselfe a companion to the one, and an enemy to the other: And if some must needs be punished, let it light vpon those that are the principall heads, and let that suffice.

IX. Sedition.

1
The descrip-
tion.

Sedition is a violent commotion of a multitude against a prince or a magistrate. It ariseth and groweth either from oppression or feare: For they that haue committed any great offence, feare punishment; others thinke & feare they shalbe oppressed, and both of them by the apprehension of an euill, are stirred to sedition to preuent the blow. It likewise springeth from a licentious libertie, from want and necessitie, in such sort, that men fit for this busines, are such as are indebted, malecontents, and men ill accommodated in all things,
light

light persons, and such as are blowen vp, and feare iustice. These kind of people cannot continue long in peace: peace is warre vnto them, they cannot sleepe but in the middest of sedition, they are not in liberty but by the meanes of confusi- on. The better to bring their purposes to passe, they conferre together in secret, they make great complaints, vse doubtfull speeches, afterwards speake more openly, seeme zealous of their libertie, and of the publike good, and ease of the people, and by these faire pretences they draw many vnto them. The aduise- ments and remedies are, First the selfesame that serued for popular commotions, to cause such to shew themselves and to speake vnto them, that are fit for such a purpose, as hath been said. Secondly, if that profit not, he must arme and fortifie himselfe, and for all that, not proceed against them, but rather giue them leasure and time to put water in their wine, to the wicked to repent, to the good to reunite themselves. Time is a great Physitian, especiallie in people more ready to mutine and rebell, than to fight. *Ferocior plebs ad rebellandum, quam bellandū: tentare magis quam tueri libertatem.* Thirdly, he must in the mean time trie all means to shake & dissolue them, both by hope and feare; for these are the 2. waies, *spem offer, metum intende.* Fourthly, endeuour to disioine them, and to breake the course of their intelligence. Fifthly, he must winne and draw vnto him vnder hand, some few amongst them by faire promises and secret rewards, whereby some of them withdrawing themselves from their company, and comming vnto him, others remaining with them to serue him and to giue intelligence of their cariages and purposes, they may the better be brought a sleepe, and their heat be somewhat allai- ed. Sixthly, to draw and winne the rest, by yeelding vnto them some part of that which they demand, and that with faire promises and doubtfull tearmes. It shall afterwards bee easie iustlie to reuoke that, which they haue iniustlie by sedi- tion extorted, *Irrita facies qua per seditionem expresserint,* and to make all whole with lenitie and clemencie. Lastly, if they retorne vnto reason and obedience, and become honest men, they must be handled gentlie, and a man must be contented with the chastisement and correction of some few of the prin- cipall authours and firebrands, without any further inquirie into

2
A 'uise-
ments and
remedies.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

into the rest of the confederates, that all may thinke themselves in safety and in grace and fauour.

X. Tyranny and rebellion.

The description.

TYrannie, that is to say, a violent rule or domination against the lawes and customes, is many times the cause of great and publike commotions, from whence commeth rebellion, which is an insurrection of the people against the Prince, because of his tyrannie, to the end they may driue him away and plucke him from his throne. And it differeth from sedition in this, they will not acknowledge the Prince for their master; whereas sedition proceedeth not so farre, being raised only from a discontent of the gouernment, complaining and desiring an amendment thereof. Now this tyranny is pactised by people ill bred, cruell, who loue wicked men, turbulent spirits, tale-bearers, hate and feare men of honesty and honour, *quibus semper aliena virtus formidolosa, nobilitas, opes, omissi gestique honores pro crimine, ob virtutes certissimum exitium: & non minus ex magna fama quam mala.* But they cary their punishment with them: being hated of all, and enemies to all. They liue in continuall feare and apprehension of terrour, they suspect all things: they are pricked and gauled inwardly in their consciences, and at last die an euill death, and that verie soone; For an old tyrant is seldome scene.

2

Chap. 16.
Plutarch.
de Bruto.

The aduifements and remedies in this case, shall bee set downe at large heereafter in his proper place. The counsels are reduced to two, at his entrance to stay and hinder him lest he get the mastreie; being enstalled and acknowledged, to suffer and obey him. It is better to tolerate him, than to moue sedition and ciuill warre, *peius, deteriusque tyrannide, sine iniusto imperio bellum ciuile*, for there is nothing gotten by rebelling or spurning against him, but it rather incenseth wicked princes and makes them more cruell: *Nihil tam exasperat feruorem vulneris, quam ferendi impatientia.* Modestie and obedience allaieth and pacifieth the fierce nature of a prince: for the clemency of a prince, saith that great prince Alexander, doth not onely consist in their owne natures, but also in the natures

natures of their subiects, who many times by their ill cariage and bad speeches, do prouoke a prince, and make him farre worse, *obsequio mitigantur imperia, & contra contumaciâ inferiorum lenitatem imperitantis diminui: contumaciam cum pernicië* Curt. Tacit. *quàm obsequium cum securitate malunt. See p. 491.*

XI. Ciuill warres.

VHen one of these forenamed publike commotions, popular insurrections, faction, sedition, rebellion, comes to fortifie it selfe, and to continue vntill it get an ordinarie traine and forme, it is a ciuill warre: which is no other thing, but a presse and conduct of armies by the subiects, either amongst themselues; and this is a popular commotion, or faction and confederacy: or against the prince, the state, the magistrate; and this is sedition or rebellion. Now there is not a mischiefe more miserable, nor more shamefull, it is a sea of infelicities. And a wise man said very well, That it is not properly warre, but a maladie of the state, a fierie sicknesse, and frensie. And to say the truth, hee that is the author thereof, should be put out from the number of men, and banished out of the borders of humane nature. There is no kind of wickednesse that it is freed from, impietie and crueltie betweene parents themselues, murders with all maner of impunitie, *Occidere palam, ignoscere non nisi fallendo licet, non atas, non dignitas quenquam protegit, nobilitas cum plebe perit, lateq; vagantur ensis.* All kind of disloyaltie, discipline abolisheth, *In omne fas, nefasque auidos aut venales, non sacro, non prophano abstinentes.* The inferiour and basest sort, are companions with the best. *Rheni mihi Caesar in undis dux erat, hic socius. Facinus quos inquinat, aequat.* He dareth not to open his mouth, for he is of the same profession, though he approoue it not, *obnoxius ducibus & prohibere non ausis.* It is a horrible confusion, *Meus ac necessitate huc illuc mutantur.* To conclude, it is nothing but miserie. But there is nothing so miserable as the victory. For though it fall into the hands of him that hath the right on his side, yet there followeth this inconuenience, that it maketh him insolent, cruell, inhumane, yea though hee were before of a mild and generous nature. So much doth this intestine

testine warre flesh a man in bloud, yea, it is a poison that consumeth all humanitie. Neither is it in the power of the captaines to withhold the rest.

²
The causes. There are two causes to be considered of ciuill warres. The one is Secret, which as it is neither knowne nor seene, so it cannot be hindred nor remedied: It is destinie, the will of God, who will chastise or wholly dispeople a state. *In se magna ruunt, latis hunc numina rebus crescendi posuere modum.* The other is well vnderstood by the wise, and may happily be remedied, if men will, and they to whom it appertaineth set to their helping hand. This is the dissolution and generall corruption of maners, whereby men of no woorth, and that haue nothing to do, endeuer to turne all topsy turue, to put all into combustion, couer their wounds with the hurt of the state, for they loue better to be ouerwhelmed with the publike ruine, than their owne particular. *Miscere cuncta & priuata vulnera reipublice malis operire: nam ita se res habet, ut publicarum quisque malis quam sua proteri, & idem passurus minus conspici.*

³
The counsels and remedies. Now the aduiselements and remedies for this mischiefe of ciuill warre, are to end it as soone as may be, which is done by two meanes, agreement, and victorie. The first is the better, although it be not such as a man desireth, time will help the rest. A man sometimes must suffer himselfe to be deceiued, to the end he may end a ciuill warre, as it is said of *Antipater*, *bellum finire cupienti, opus erat decipi.* Victorie is dangerous, because it is to be feared that the conquerour will abuse it, whereby a tyrannie may ensue. To the end a man may cary himselfe well heerein, hee must quit himselfe of all the authours of troubles and other commotions, and such like bloud-suckers, as well on the one part as the other, whether it be by sending them farre off with some charge, or vnder some faire pretext, and so diuiding them; or by employing them against the stranger; and handling the meaner sort with lenitie and gentlenes.

XII. *Aduiselements for particular persons touching the foresaid publike diuisions.*

Thus we haue seene many kinds of publike troubles and diuisions, for which and euery one of them, we haue giuen

uen counsels and remedies in respect of the prince, it remaineth that we now giue them for particular persons. This cannot be determined in a word: there are two questions; the one, whether it be lawfull for an honest man to ioyne himselfe to one part, or to remaine quiet and indifferent; the second, how a man must cary himselfe in both cases, that is to say, being ioyned to one part, or not ioyned to either. Touching the first point, it is proposed for such as are free, and are not yet engaged to any part, for if they be, this first question belongs not to them, but we send them to the second. This I say, because a man may ioyne himselfe to the one part, not of purpose and by election, yea to that part which he approueth not, but only because he findeth himselfe caried and bound with strong and puissant bands, which hee may not easily breake, which cary with them a sufficient excuse, being naturall and equiualent. Now the first question hath contrarie reasons and examples. It seemeth on the one side, that an honest man cannot do better than to keepe himselfe quiet, for he knoweth not how to betake himselfe to either part without offence, because all these diuisions are in their owne natures vnlawfull, and cannot be caried, nor subsist without inhumanitie and iniustice. And many good people haue abhorred it, as *Asinius Pollio* answered *Augustus*, who desired him to follow him against *Marc Anthony*. On the other side, is it not a thing reasonable for a man to ioyne with the good, and such as haue right on their side? Wise *Solon* hath iudged affirmatiuely, yea roughlie chastised him, that retireth himselfe and taketh not part. The professor of vertue, *Cato* hath likewise put it in practice, not being content to take one part, but commanding it. To determine this doubt, it seemeth that men of worth and renowne, who haue both publike charge and credit, and sufficiencie in the state, may and ought to range themselves into that part which they shall iudge the better: for they must not abandon in a tempest the sterne of that ship which in a calme sea they are content to gouerne; especiallie being an honorable part to provide for the safetie of the state; And secondly that priuat men, and such as are of a lower degree in the charge of the state, should stay and retire themselves into some peaceable and secure place, during the diuision:

sion: and both of them so to cary themselves as shall be said heereafter. Finally touching the choice of the part, sometimes there is no difficultie, for the one is so vniust, and so vnfortunate, that a man can not with any reason ioyne himselfe thereunto: But at another time the difficultie is very great, and there are many things to be thought of besides the iustice and equitie of the parts.

The second.

Let vs come to the other point, which concerneth the carriage of all. This is determined in a word, by the counsell and rule of moderation, following the example of *Atticus*, so renowned for his modestie and prudence in such tempests, alwaies held to fauour the good part, yet neuer troubling, nor intangling himselfe with armes, and without the offence of the contrarie part.

Outragious.
Moderate.

1. For they that are knowen to be of one part, must not be moued ouer-much, but cary themselves with moderation, not busying themselves with the affaires, if they be not wholly carried and pressed vnto it, and in this case cary themselves in such order and temperature, that the tempest being passed ouer their heads, without offence they haue not any part in these great disorders and insolencies that are committed, but contrarily swee ning & diuerting them as they can. 2. They that are not ingaged to any part (whose condition is sweetest and best) though it may be inwardly and in affection they incline rather to one then another, must not remaine as neu-

Neuters.

ters, that is, taking no care of the issue, and of the state of either the one or the other, liuing to themselves, and as spectators in a Theater, feeding vpon the miseries of other men. These kind of men are odious to all, and at the last they runne a dangerous fortune, as we reade of the Thebanes in the warre of *Xerxes*, and of *Iabes Gilead*. *Neutralitas nec amicos parit, nec inimicos tollit*. Neutralitie is neither faire nor honest, if it be not with consent of parts, as *Cesar*, who held neuters for his friends, contrarie to *Pompey*, who held them for enemies; or that he be a stranger, or such a one, as for his greatnes and dignitie ought not to mingle himselfe with such a rout, but rather reclame them if he can, arbitrating, and moderating all. Much lesse must men in such a case be inconstant, waivering mungrels, *Prothees*, farre more odious than neuters, and offensive to

Judg. 21.
Tit. Liu.

Inconstant.

all.

all. But they must (continuing partakers in affection if they will, for thought and affection is wholly our owne) be *Common.* common in their actions, offensive to none, officious and gracious to all, complaining of the common infelicities. These kind of people neither get enemies, nor lose their friends. They are fit to be mediators, and loving arbitratours, who are better than *Mediators.* the common. So that of such as are not partakers, who are foure, two are euill, neuters, and inconstant persons; two good, common, and mediators: but alwaies the one more than the other; as of partakers there are two sorts, headie outrageous, and moderate.

XIII. Of priuate troubles and diuisions.

IN priuate diuisions a man may commodiously and loyallie cary himselfe betweene enemies, if not with equall affection, yet in such a temperate maner, as that he engage not himselfe so much to one more than to another, as that either part may thinke they haue more interest in him, and so contenting himselfe with an indifferent measure of their grace, report nothing but indifferent things, and such as are knowen, or that serue in common to both parts, speaking nothing to the one that he may not say to the other in it due time, changing only the accent and the forme thereof.

Of Iustice, the second vertue.

CHAP. V.

Of Iustice in generall.

IUSTICE is to giue to euery one that which appertaineth vnto him, to himselfe first, and afterwards to others: so that it *The description.* comprehendeth all the duties and offices of euery particular person: which are two-fold, the first to himselfe, the second to another, and they are contained in that generall commandement, which is the summarie of all iustice, *Thou shalt loue thy neighbour as thy selfe,* which doth not only set downe the dutie of a man towards another in the second place, but it

sheweth and ruleth it according to the paterne of that durie and loue he oweth towards himselfe : for as the Hebrews say, a man must begin charitie with himselfe.

2
The first and
originall
iustice.

The beginning then of all iustice, the first and most ancient commaundement, is that of reason ouer sensualitie. Before a man can well commaund others, he must learne to commaund himselfe, yeelding vnto reason the power of commaunding, and subduing the appetite, & making it pliant to obedience. This is the first originall, inward, proper, and most beautifull iustice that may be. This commaund of the Spirit ouer the brutall and sensuall part, from whence the passions do arise, is compared to an esquire or horseman, who by reason that he keepeth his horse and mounteth him often, and is euer in the saddle, he turneth and manageth him at his pleasure.

3
The distinction
of
iustice.

To speake of that iustice which is outwardly practised and with another, we must first know that there is a two-fold iustice; the one naturall, vniuersall, noble, philosophicall; the other after a sort artificiall, particular, politike, made and restrained to the necessitie of policies and states; That hath better rules, is more firme, pure and beautifull, but it is out of vse, vnprofitable to the world such as it is; *Veri iuris germanaque iustitie solidam & expressam effigiem nullam tenemus; umbris & imaginibus utimur*; is not in a maner capable thereof, as hath been said. That is the rule of *Polytelus*, inflexible, inuvariable. This is more loose and flexible accommodating it selfe to humane weaknes, and vulgar necessitie. It is the leaden Lesbian rule, which yeeldeth & bendeth it selfe as there is need, and as the times, persons, affaires, & accidents do require. This permitteth vpon a necessitie, and approueth many things, which that wholly reiecteth and condemneth. It hath many vices lawfull, and many good actions vnlawfull. That respecteth wholly and purely reason, honestie; This profit, ioyning it as much as may be with honestie. Of that, which is but an Idea and in contemplation we shall not need to speake.

4
Iustice in
practise dis-
tinguished.

The vsuall iustice, and which is practised in the world, is first two-fold, that is to say, equall, bound, and restrained to the tearmes of the law; according to which iudges and magistrates are to proceede: the other iust and conscionable, which not enthralling it selfe to the words of the law, marcheth

cheth more freelie, according to the exegencie of the case, yea sometimes against the words of the law. Now to speake better, it handleth and ruleth the law as need requireth: And therefore saith a wise man, the lawes themselves and iustice haue neede to be ordered and handled iustlie, that is to say, with equitie, *qua expositio & emendatio legis est, exponit sensum, emendat defectum*. This is the fine floure of iustice, which is in the hand of those that iudge in soueraigntie. Againe to speake more particularlie, there is a two-fold iustice; the one commutative, betwixt priuat men, which is handled and practised by Arithmeticke proportion; the other distributive, publicly administred by Geometrical proportion, it hath two parts, reward, and punishment.

Now this vsuall and practised iustice, is not truly and perfectly iustice: humane nature is not capable thereof no more ⁵ *There is no true iustice in the world.* than of all other things in their puritie. As humane iustice is mingled with some graine of iniustice, fauour, rigour, too much, or too little, and there is no pure and true mediocritie; from whence haue sprung these ancient proverbs, That he is enforced to do wrong by retaile, that will do iustice in grosse: & iniustice in small things that will do iustice in great. Lawyers to giue course and passage to commutative iustice, doe couertlie and silentlie suffer themselves to deceiue one another, and that in a certaine measure, so that they passe not the moitie of the iust price; and the reason is, because they know not how to do better. And in distributive iustice, how many innocents are apprehended and condemned, how many guiltie quit and set at libertie, and that without the fault of the Iudges, neuer dreaming either of that too much, or too little, which is almost perpetuall in the purest iustice? Iustice is a let and hindrance to it selfe, and humane sufficiencie cannot see and provide for all. And heere we may take notice among other matters, of a great defect in distributive iustice, in that it punisheth only and rewardeth not, although these are the two parts and the two hands of iustice: but as it is commonly practised it is lame, and inclineth wholly vnto punishment. The greatest fauour that a man receiueth from it, is indemnitie, which is a play too short for such as deserue better than the common sort. But yet this is not all; for if a man bee

falsely accused, and vpon that accusation committed, he is sure to endure punishment sufficient: at the last his innocence being knowne, he escapeth perhaps his vttermost punishment, but without any amends of that wrongfull affliction he hath indured, euen such perhaps as shall neuer leaue him. And the accuser in the meane time, be the colour and ground of his accusation neuer so light (which is easie to do) escapeth without punishment; so sparing is iustice in rewarding, as that it consisteth wholly in chastisement, whereof that common speech ariseth, That to do iustice, and to be subiect vnto iustice, is alwaies to be vnderstood of punishment. And it is an easie matter for any man that will, to bring another man into danger and punishment, euen to such an estate, as that he shall neuer know which way to get foorth, but with losse.

6
The diuision
of this mat-
ter.

see p. 274. L 2.c.5.

Of iustice and dutie there are three principall parts: for man is indebted to three, to God, to himselfe, to his neighbour: to one aboue himselfe, to himselfe, and to others beside himselfe: of his dutie towards God, which is pietie and religion, hath sufficientlie beene spoken before. It remaineth that we now speake of his dutie towards himselfe and his neighbour.

CHAP. VI.

Of the iustice and dutie of man towards himselfe.

THis is sufficientlie contained in this whole worke; in the first booke which teacheth a man to know himselfe, and all humane condition; in the second, which teacheth a man to be wise, and to that end giueth aduiselements and rules; and in the rest of this booke, especiallie in the vertues of fortitude and temperance. Neuerthelesse I will heere summarilie set downe some aduiselement, more expresse and formall.

The first and fundamentall aduice is, to resolute not to liue careleslie, after an vncertaine fashion, and by chance and aduventure, as almost all are accustomed to doe, who seeme to mocke and deceiue themselves, and not to liue in good earnest, not leading their life seriousslie and attentiuely, but liuing from day to day, as it falleth out. They taste not, they possesse not, they enioy not their life: but they vse it to make
vse

use of other things. Their designments and occupations doe many times trouble, and hurt their life more than doe it service. These kind of people doe all things in good earnest, except it be to liue. All their actions, and the lesser parts of their life are serious, but the whole body thereof passeth away as if they thought not thereof: it is a bare supposition, that is not worth the thinking of. That which is but an accident is principall vnto them, and the principall as an accessarie. They affect and incline themselves to all things, some to get knowledge, honours, dignities, riches: others to take their pleasures, to hunt, to sport themselves, to passe away the time; others to speculations, imaginations, inuentions: others to manage and order affaires: others to other things; but to liue is the least they thinke of. They liue as it were insensibly, being wholly addicted, and fastning their thoughts vpon other things. Life is vnto them but as a tearme, and a procrastination or delaie to employ it about other things. Now all this is very vniust, it is an infelicity and treason against a mans selfe: it is for a man to lose his life, and to goe against that which euery man should doe, that is, liue seriously, attentiuely, and cheerefully, *bene viuere & latari: sibi semper valere & viuere doctus*, to the end he may liue well, and well die: it is the fault of euery man. A man must lead and order his life, as if it were a businesse of great waight and consequence, and as a bargain made whereof he must giue an account exactly by parts and parcels. It is our greatest businesse, in respect whereof all the rest are but toies, things accessarie and superficiall. There are some that deliberate and purpose to doe it, but it is when they must liue no longer, wherein they resemble those that put off their buying and selling till the market bee past, and when they see their follie, they complaine saying, Shall I neuer haue leisure to make my retrait, to liue vnto my selfe? *quàm seruum est incipere viuere cùm desinendum est? quàm stulta mortalitatis obliuio? dum differtur, vita transcurrit.* And this is the reason why the wise crie out vnto vs, well to vse the time, *tempori parce*; That wee haue not need of any thing so much as time, saith *Zenon*. For life is short, and arte is long; not the arte to heale, but rather to liue, which is wisdom.

To this first and principall aduice, these following doe serue :

2

To learne to dwell, to content, to delight himselfe alone, yea to quit himselfe of the world if need bee; the greatest thing is for a man to know how to bee to himselfe; vertue is content with it selfe, let vs winne so much of our selues, as to be able in good earnest and willingly to liue alone, and to liue at our ease. Let vs learne to quit our selues of all those bands that fasten and binde vs to another, and that our contentment depend of our selues, neither seeking nor disdaining or refusing company, but cheerefully to goe on with or without companie, as either our owne, or anothers need do require: but yet not so to shut vp our selues, and to settle and establish our pleasure as some that are halfe lost being alone. A man must haue within himselfe wherewith to entertaine & content himselfe, *& in sinu suo gaudere*. He that hath woon this point pleaseth himselfe in all places and in all things. He must cary a countenance conformable to the company and the affaires that are in hand and present themselves, and accommodate himselfe vnto another, be sad if need be, but inwardly to keep himselfe one and the same : this is the meditation and consideration, which is the nourishment and life of the spirit, *mens viuere est cogitare*. Now for the benefit of nature, there is not any businesse which we do more often, continue longer, that is more easie, more naturall, and more our owne, than to meditate, and to entertaine our thoughts. But this meditation is not in all after one maner, but very diuers, according to the diuersity of spirits. In some it is weake, in others strong; in some it is languishing idlenesse, a vacancy and want of other businesse. But the greater spirits make it their principall vacation and most serious study, whereby they are neuer more busied, nor lesse alone, (as it is said of *Scipio*) than when they are alone, and quitting themselves of affaires, in imitation of God himselfe, who liueth and feedeth himselfe with his eternall thoughts and meditations. It is the businesse of the goddes (saith *Aristotle*) from whence doth spring both their, and our blessednesse.

3
To know
and culture
himselfe.

Now this solitary employment, and this cheerefull entertainment

tainment of a mans selfe, must not be in vanity, much lesse in any thing that is vitious; but in study and profound knowledge, and afterwards in the diligent culture of himselfe. This is the price agreed, the principall, first and plainest trauell of euerie man. Hee must alwaies watch, taste, sound himselfe, neuer abandon, but be alwaies neere, and keepe himselfe to himselfe: and finding that manie things go not well, whether by reason of vice, and defect of nature, or the contagion of another, or other casuall accident that troubleth him, hee must quietlie and sweetlie correct them, and prouide for them. He must reason with himselfe, correct and recall himselfe courageously, and not suffer himselfe to be caried away either with disdain or carelesnesse.

He must likewise in auoiding all idlenesse, which doth but rust and marre both the soule and body, keepe himselfe alwaies in breath, in office and exercise, but yet not ouer bent, violent and painfull, but aboue all, honest, vertuous and serious. And that he may the better do it, he must quit himselfe of other businesse, and propose vnto himselfe such designments as may delight him, conferring with honest men, and good bookes, dispensing his time well, and well ordering his houres, and not liue tumultuousslie and by chaunce and hazard.

Again, he must well husband, and make profit of all things that are presented vnto him, done, said, and make them an instruction vnto him, applie them vnto himselfe, without any shew or semblance thereof.

And to particularise a little more, we know that the duty of man towards himselfe consisteth in three points, according to his three parts, to rule and gouerne his spirit, his body, his goods. Touching his spirit (the first and principall, whereunto especially do belong these generall aduifements which we are to deliuer) we know that all the motions thereof are reduced to two, to thinke, and to desire, the vnderstanding and the will; whereunto do answer science and vertue, the two ornaments of the spirit. Touching the former, which is the vnderstanding, he must preserve it from two things, in some sort contrarie and extreame, that is, sottishnesse and follie, that is to say, from vanities and childish follies, on the

4

To keepe
himselfe in
exercise.

5

To make vse
of all things.

6

To gouerne
his spirit,
that is, his
iudgements.

one

one side; this is to bastardise and to lose it: it was not made to play the nouice or baboun, *non ad iocum & lusum genitus, sed ad seueritatem potius*; and from phantasticall, absurd, and extrauagant opinions, on the other side; this is to pollute and debaile it. It must be fed and entertained with things profitable and serious, and furnished and indued with sound, sweet, and naturall opinions: and so much care must not be taken to eleuate and mount it, to extend it beyond the reach, as to rule, and order it. For order and continencie is the effect of wisdom, and which giueth price to the soule, and about all to be free from presumption and obstinacie in opinion; vices very familiar with those that haue any extraordinarie force and vigor of spirit; and rather to continue in doubt and suspence, especiallie in things that are doubtfull, and capable of oppositions and reasons on both parts, not easily digested and determined. It is an excellent thing, and the securest way, well to know how to doubt, and to be ignorant, and the most noble philosophers, haue not beene ashamed to make profession thereof, yea it is the principall fruit and effect of science.

see pag. 192, 230.

7

see p. 224, 248.

Touching the will, it must in all things be governed and submit it selfe to the rule of reason, which is the office of vertue, and not vnto fleeting inconstant opinion, which is commonly false, and much lesse vnto passion. These are the three that moue and gouerne our soules. But yet this is the difference, that a wise man ruleth and rangeth himselfe according to nature and reason, regardeth his duty, holdeth for apocryphall, and suspects whatsoeuer dependeth vpon opinion, or passion: and therefore he liueth in peace, passeth away his life cheerefully and pleasingly, is not subiect to repentance, recantations, changes; because whatsoeuer falleth out, he could neither do, nor choose better, and therefore he is neuer kindled nor stirred; for reason is alwaies peaceable. The foole that suffereth himselfe to bee led by these two, doth nothing but wander and warre with himselfe, and neuer resteth. He is alwaies readuiling, changing, mending, repenting, and is neuer contented; which, to say the truth, belongeth to a wise man, who hath reason and vertue to make himselfe such a one. *Nulla placidior quies nisi quam ratio composuit.* An honest man must gouerne and respect himselfe, and feare his reason
and

and his conscience, which is his *bonus genius*, his good spirit, in such sort that hee cannot without shame stumble in their presence, *rarum est, ut satis se quisque vereatur.*

As touching the bodie, we owe thereunto assistance, and conduct or direction. It is follie to goe about to separate and sunder these two principall parts the one from the other; but contrarily it is fit and necessarie they be vnited and ioyned together. Nature hath giuen vs a bodie as a necessarie instrument to life: and it is fit that the spirit as the principall should take vpon it the guardianship & protection of the bodie. So farre should it be from seruing the bodie, which is the most base, vniust, shamefull, and burthensome seruitude that is, that it should assist, counsell it, and be as a husband vnto it. So that it oweth thereunto care, not seruice: It must handle it as a lord, not as a tyrant; nourish it, not pamper it, giuing it to vnderstand, that it liueth not for it, but that it cannot liue heere below without it. This is an instruction to the workeman, to know how to vse, and make vse of his instruments. And it is likewise no small aduantage to a man, to know how to vse his bodie, and to make it a fit instrument for the exercise of vertue. Finallie, the bodie is preserued in good estate by moderate nourishment and orderly exercise. How the spirit must haue a part, and beare it companie in those pleasures that belong vnto it, hath been said before, and shall heereafter be set downe in the vertue of temperance.

Touching goods and the dutie of euery man in this case, there are many and diuers offices, for to gather riches, to keep them, to husband them, to employ them, to yeeld vnto them all that is fit, are different sciences. One is wise in the one of them, that in the other vnderstandeth nothing, neither is it fit he should. The acquisition of riches hath more parts than the rest. The employment is more glorious and ambitious. The preservation and custodie, which is proper to the woman, is the harbour to couer them.

These are two extremities alike vitious, to loue and affect riches: to hate and reiect them. By riches I vnderstand that which is more than enough, and more than is needfull. A wise man will do neither of both, according to that wish and praier of *Salomon*, Giue me neither riches nor pouertie: but he will hold

hold them in their place, esteeming them as they are, a thing of it selfe indifferent, matter of good and euill, and to many good things commodious.

see p. 80, 217,
298.

The euils and miseries that follow the affecting and hating of them, haue been spoken of before. Now in fiue words we set downe a rule touching a mediocritie therein. 1. To desire them, but not to loue them, *sapiens non amat diuitias, sed manult.* As a little man and weake of bodie, would willinglie be higher and stronger, but this his desire is without care or paine vnto himselfe, seeking that without passion which nature desireth, and fortune knoweth not how to take from him. 2. And much lesse to seeke them at the cost and dammage of another, or by arte, and bad and base meanes, to the end no man should complaine or enuie his gaines. 3. When they come vpon him, entring at an honest gate, not to reiect them, but cheerfullie to accept them, and to receiue them into his house, not his heart; into his possession, not his loue, as being vnworthie thereof. 4. When he possesseth them, to employ them honestlie and discretlie, to the good of other men; that their departure may, at the least, be as honest as their entrance. 5. If they happen to depart without leaue, be lost or stollen from him, that he be not sorrowfull, but that he suffer them to depart with themselues, without any thing of his, *si diuitie effluxerint, non auferent nisi semetipsas.* To conclude, he deserueth not to be accepted of God, and is vnworthie his loue, and the profession of vertue, that makes account of the riches of this world.

Aude hospes contemnere, & te quoque dignum singe deo.

*Of the iustice and dutie of man
towards man.*

An aduertisement.

see pag. 316.

THis dutie is great, and hath many parts, we will reduce them to two great ones: In the first we will place the generall, simple, and common duties required in ail, and euery one, towards all and euery one, whether in heart, word, or deed,

deed, which are amitie, faith, veritie, and free admonition, good deeds, humanitie, liberalitie, acknowledgment or thankfulnes. In the second shall be the speciall duties required for some speciall and expresse reason and obligation betweene certaine persons, as betweene a man and his wife, parents and children, masters and seruants, princes and subiects, magistrates, the great and powerfull, and the lesse.

*The first part, which is of the generall and common duties of all towards all,
and first*

CHAP. VII.

Of loue or friendship.

Amitie is a sacred flame, kindled in our breasts first by nature, and hath expressed it first heate betweene the husband and the wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, and afterwards growing cold hath recovered heate by arte, and the inuention of alliances, companies, fraternities, colleges, and communities. But forasmuch as in all this being di-^Iuided into many parts, it was weakned, and mingled with o-^{The de-}ther profitable & pleasant considerations, to the end it might ^{scription.}restrengthen it selfe and grow more feruent, it hath recollected it selfe, and vnited it owne forces into a narrower roome, betwixt two true friends. And this is perfect amitie, which is so much more feruent and spirituall than other, by how much the heart is hotter than the liuer, and the bloud than the vaines.

Amitie is the soule and life of the world, more necessarie (say the wise) than fire and water: *amicitia, necessitudo, amici necessarij*, it is the summe, the staffe, the salt of our life: for without it all is darknes, and there is no ioy, no stay, no taste of life: *amicitia iustitia consors, natura vinculum, ciuitatis praesidium, senectutis solatium, vite humanae portus: ea omnia constant, discordia cadunt.* And we must not thinke that friendship

is profitable and delightfull to priuat men only, for it is more ³How neces-
sary to the
com- weale-pub.

commodious to the weale-publike : it is the true nursing mother of humane societie, the preseruer of states and policies. Neither is it suspected, nor displeaseth any but tyrants and monsters, not because they honor not it in their hearts, but because they cannot be of that number, for only friendship sufficeth to preserue the world. And if it were euery where in force, there would be no need of a law, which hath not been ordained but as a help, and as a second remedie for want of friendship, to the end it might enforce and constraîne by the authoritie thereof that which for loue and friendship should be free and voluntarie; but howsoeuer, the law taketh place farre below friendship. For friendship ruleth the heart, the tongue, the hand, the will, and the effects, the law cannot provide but for that which is without. This is the reason why *Aristotle* said, That good law-makers haue euer had more care of friendship, than of iustice : And because the law and iustice do many times lose their credit, the third remedie and least of all hath been in armes and force, altogether contrarie to the former, which is friendship. Thus we see by degrees the three meanes of publike gouernment. But loue or friendship is worth more than the rest; for second and subsidiarie helps are no way comparable to the first and principall.

4
The first distinction of the causes.

The diuersitie and distinction of friendship is great : That of the ancients into foure kinds, Naturall, Sociable, Hospitall, Venereous, is not sufficient. We may note three ; The first is drawne from the causes which ingender it, which are foure, nature, vertue, profit, pleasure, which sometimes goe together in troope; sometimes two, or three, and very often one alone: But vertue is the more noble and the stronger, for that is spirituall, and in the heart as friendship is : Nature in the blood, profit in the purse, pleasure in some part, or sense of the body. So likewise vertue is more liberall, more free, and pure, and without it the other causes are poore, and idle, and fraile. He that loueth for vertue is neuer weary with louing, and if friendship be broken, complaineth not. He that loueth for profit, if it faile, complaineth, and it turneth to his reproch, that when he hath done all he can, he hath lost all. He that loueth for pleasure, if his pleasure cease, his loue ceaseth with it, and without complaint enstrangeth himselfe.

The

The second distinction which is in regard of the persons, is in three kinds; the one is in a straight line betweene superiours and inferiours, and it is either naturall, as betweene parents and children, vncles and nephues; or lawfull, as between the prince and the subiects, the lord & his vassals, the master and his seruants, the doctour and the disciple, the prelat or gouernor and the people. Now this kind to speake properly, is not friendship, both because of the great disparitie that is betwixt them, which hindreth that inwardnes and familiaritie and entire communication, which is the principall fruit and effect of friendship, as likewise because of the obligation that is therein, which is the cause why there is lesse libertie and lesse choice and affection therein. And this is the reason why men giue it other names than of friendship: for in inferiours there is required of them honor, respect, obedience; in superiours care and vigilancie ouer their inferiours. The second kind of friendship in regard of the persons, is in a collaterall line betweene equals, or such as are neere equals. And this is likewise two-fold, for either it is naturall, as betweene brothers, sisters, cosens, and this comes neerer to friendship than the former, because there is lesse disparitie. But yet there is a bond of nature, which as on the one side it knitteth and fastneth, so on the other it looseth: for by reason of goods, and diuisions, and affaires, it is not possible but brothers and kinsfolke must sometimes differ; Besides that many times the correspondencie and relation of humours and wills, which is the essence of friendship, is not found amongst them; He is my brother or my kinsman, but yet he is a wicked man, a foole: Or it is free and voluntarie, as betweene companions and friends, who touch not in bloud, and hold of nothing but only of friendship and loue: and this is properly and truly friendship.

3 The third kind of friendship in regard of the persons is mixt, and as it were compounded of the other two, whereby it is, or it should be more strong; this is matrimoniall of married couples, which holdeth of loue or friendship in a straight line, because of the superioritie of the husband, and the inferioritie of the wife; and of collaterall friendship, being both of them companions ioined together by equall bands. And therefore the

the wife was not taken out of the head, nor foote, but the side of man. Againe, such as are married, in all things and by turnes exercise and shew both these friendships, that which is in a streight line in publike; for a wise woman honoreth and respecteth hir husband; that which is collaterall in priuat, by priuat familiaritie. This matrimoniall friendship is likewise after another fashon double and compounded; for it is spirituall & corporall, which is not in other friendships, saue only in that which is reprobued by all good lawes, and by nature it selfe. Matrimoniall friendship then is great, strong, and puissant. There are neuerthelesse two or three things that stay and hinder it, that it cannot attaine to the perfection of friendship; The one, that there is no part of mariage free but the entrance, for the progresse and continuance thereof is altogether constrained, enforced, I meane in christian mariages; for euery where else it is lesse enforced, by reason of those diuorcements which are permitted: The other is the weaknes and insufficiencie of the wife, which can no way correspond to that perfect conference and communication of thoughts and iudgements: hir soule is not strong and constant enough to endure the streightnes of a knot so fast, so strong, so durable: it is as if a man should sow a strong and course peece of cloth to a soft and delicate. This filleth not the place, but vanisheth and is easily torne from the other. Againe, this inconuenience followeth the friendship of married cupples, that it is mingled with so many other strange matters, children, parents of the one side & the other, and so many other distaffe busines that doe many times trouble and interrupt a liuely affection.

7
3 Of degrees.

The third distinction of friendship respecteth the force and intention, or the weaknes and diminution of friendship. According to this reason, there is a two-fold friendship, the common and imperfect, which we may call good will, familiaritie, priuate acquaintance: and it hath infinite degrees, one more strict, intimate and strong than another: and the perfect, which is inuisible, and is a Phenix in the world, yea hardly conceiued by imagination.

8
The differē-
ces of friend-
We shall know them both by confronting them together, and by knowing their differences. The common may be attained

tained in a short time. Of the perfect it is said, that we must *ship common*
take long time to deliberate, and they must eate much salt to- *and perfect.*
gether before it be perfected.

2 The common is attained, built, and ordered by diuers profitable and delightfull occasions & occurrents; and therefore a wise man hath set downe two meanes to attaine vnto it, to speake things pleasant, and to doe things profitable; the perfect is acquired by an only true and liuely vertue reciprocalie knowne.

3 The common may be with and betweene diuers, the perfect is with one only, who is another selfe, and betweene two only, who are but one. It would intangle and hinder it selfe amongst many, for if two at one time should desire to be succoured, if they should request of me contrarie offices, if the one should commit to my secrecie a thing that is expedient for another to know, what course, what order may be kept heerein? Doubtlesse, diuision is an enemy to perfection, and vnion hir cosen-germaine.

4 The common is capable of more and lesse, of exceptions, restraints, and modifications, it is kindled and cooled, subiect to accession and recession, like a feuer, according to the presence or absence, merits, good deeds, and so forth. The perfect not so, alwaies the same, marching with an equall pace, firme, hawtie, and constant.

5 The common receiueth, and hath need of many rules and cautions giuen by the wise, whereof one is, to loue without respect of pietie, veritie, vertue, *amicus vsq; ad aras.* Another, so to loue as that a man may hate, so to hate, as that he may likewise loue, that is, to hold alwaies the bridle in his hand, and not to abandon himselfe so profusely, that he may haue cause to repent, if the knot of friendship happen to vntie.

Againe to aid and succour at a need without intreaty: for a friend is bashfull, and it costes him deare, to request that that he thinkes to be his due. Againe, not to bee important to his friends, as they that are alwaies complaining, after the maner of women. Now all these lessons are very wholesome in ordinary friendships, but haue no place in this soueraigne and perfect.

9
The descrip-
tion of per-
fect friend-
ship.

We shall know this better by the portrait & description of perfect friendship, which is a very free, plaine, and vniuersall confution of two soules. See here three words. 1. A confusion, not only a coniunction, & ioining together, as of solid things, which howsoever they be fastned, mingled, & knit together, may be separated and known apart. For the soules of men in this perfect amity are in such sort plunged and drowned the one within the other, that they can no more be diuided, neither would they, than things liquid that are mingled together. 2. Very free, and built vpon the pure choice and libertie of the will, without any other obligation, occasion, or strange cause. There is nothing more free and voluntarie than affection. 3. Vniuersall, without any exception of all things, goods, honors, iudgements, thoughts, willes, life. From this vniuersall and full confusion it proceedeth, that the one cannot lend or giue to the other, and there is no speech betwixt them of good turnes, obligations, acknowledgements, thankfulness, and other the like duties, which are the nourishers of common friendships, but yet testimonies of diuision and difference, as I know not how to thanke my selfe for the seruice I do vnto my selfe, neither doth that loue which I beare vnto my selfe increase by those succors and helps I giue vnto my selfe. And in mariage it selfe, to giue some resemblance of this diuine knot, though it come farre short thereof: donations are forbid betweene the husband and the wife: and if there were place for the one to giue vnto the other, he is the giner that giues cause to his friend to expresse and imploy his loue, and he receiueth the good turne, that by giuing binds his companion: for the one and the other seeking aboue all things euen with a greedie desire to do good to one another, he that giueth the occasion and yeeldeth the matter, is he that is liberrall, giuing that contentment to his friend, to effect that which he most desireth.

10
Examples.

Of this perfect friendship and communion, antiquitie yeeldeth some examples. *Blossius* taken for a great friend of *Tiberius Gracchus* then condemned to die, and being asked what hee would doe for his sake, and hee answering that hee would refuse nothing, it was demanded what he would doe if *Gracchus* should intreat him to fire the Temples? To whom he

he answered, that *Gracchus* would neuer intreat such a matter at his hands, but if he should he would obey him. A verie bold and dangerous answer. He might boldlie haue said, that *Gracchus* would neuer haue required such a matter, and that should haue beene his answer, for according to this our description, a perfect friend doth not onlie fullie know the will of his friend, which might haue sufficed for an answer, but he holdeth in his sleeue, and wholly possesseth it. And in that he added, that if *Gracchus* would haue required it, hee would haue done it, it is as if he had said nothing, it neither altereth nor hurteth his first answer concerning that assurance that he had of the will of *Gracchus*. This of willes and iudgements.

3. Touching goods, There were three friends (this word three is some impeachment to our rule, and may make vs thinke that this was no perfect amity) two rich, & one poore charged with an old mother, and a daughter to marrie; this man dying made his will, wherein hee bequeathed to one of his friends his mother to be fed and maintained by him; to the other his daughter, to be married by him, enioining him withall to bestow vpon hir the best dowrie that his ability would affoord, and if it should happen that the one of them should die, he should substitute the other. The people made themselues merry with this will or testament; the legataries accepted of it with great contentment, and each of them receiued vnto them their legacy; but he that had taken the mother, departing this life within fise daies after, the other suruiuing and remaining the sole vniuersall inheritour, did carefullie intertaine the mother; and within a few daies after hee married in one day his owne and only daughter, and hir that was bequeathed vnto him, diuiding betwixt them by equall portions all his goods. The wise according to this description haue iudged that the first dying, expressed greatest loue, and was the more liberall, making his friends his heires, and giuing them that contentment, as to employ them for the supplie of his wants. 4. Touching life, that history is sufficiently known of those two friends, wherof the one being condemned by the tyrant to die at a certaine day and houre, he requested that giuing baile, hee might in the meane time goe and dispose of his domesticall affaires, which the tyrant

agreeing vnto vpon this condition, that if he did not returne by that time his baile should suffer the punishment. The prisoner deliuered his friend, who entred into prison vpon that condition: and the time being come, and the friend who was the baile resolving to die, his condemned friend failed not to offer himselfe, and so quit his friend of that danger. Whereat the tyrant being more than astonished, and deliuering them both from death, desired them to receiue, and to adopt him in their friendship as a third friend.

CHAP. VIII.

Of faith, trust, treachery, secrecy.

1
The dignity
of fidelity.

ALL men yea the most treacherous know and confesse that faith is the band of humane society, the foundation of all iustice, and that aboue all things it ought to be religiously obserued. *Nihil augustius fide, quæ iustitiæ fundamentum est, nec vlla res vehementius rem publicam continet & vitam Sanctissimum humani pectoris bonum:*

Cic.

*Ante Iouem generata decus diuumq; hominumq;
Qua sine non tellus pacem non æquora norunt,
Iustitiæ consors tacitumq; in pectore numen.*

2
Fidelity rare

Neuerthelesse the world is full of treacheries. There are but few that do well and truly keepe their faith. They break it diuers waies, and they perceiue it not. So they find some pretext and colour thereof, they thinke they are safe enough. Others seeke corners, euasions, subtilties; *Querunt latebras per inuicio.* Now to remoue all the difficulties, that are in this matter, and truly to know how a man should carrie himselfe, there are foure considerations, whereunto all the rest may be referred: The persons, as well he that giueth faith, as he that receiueth it; the subiect whereof the question is made, and the maner according to which the faith is giuen.

The diuision
of this mat-
ter.

3
He that gi-
ueth faith.

As touching him that giueth faith, it is necessarie that hee haue power to doe it. If he be subiect to another, hee cannot giue it, and hauing giuen it without the leaue and approbation of his master, it is of none effect; as it did well appeare in the Tribune *Saturnine* and his complices, who comming foorth of the Capitoll (which they had taken by rebellion)

vpon

upon the faith giuen by the Consuls, subiects, and officers of the Common-weale, were iustly slaine. But euery free man must keepe his faith, how great and honourable so euer he be: yea the greater he is, the more he is bound to keep it, because he is the more free to giue it. And it was well said, That the simple word of a prince should be of as great force, as the oth of a priuate man.

As touching him to whom faith is giuen, whosoever he be, it must carefully be kept, and there are but two exceptions which are cleare enough, the one if he receiued it not, and were not contented with it, but demanded other caution and assurance. For faith is a sacred thing, must simple bee receiued; otherwise it is no more faith, nor trust, when hostages are demanded, suerties are giuen; to take gages or cautions with faith, is a thing ridiculous. Hee that is held vnder the guard of men, or wals, if hee escape and saue himselfe is not faultie. The reason of that Roman is good: *Vult sibi quisque credi, & habita fides ipsam sibi obligat fidem: fides requirit fiduciam, & relativa sunt.* The other if hauing accepted it, he first brake it, *Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem: quando tu me non habes pro Senatore, nec ego te pro Consule.* A treacherous man deserueth not by the law of nature that faith should bee kept vnto him, except it be after an agreement, which couereth the treacherie and maketh reuenge vnlawfull. Now these two cases excepted, a man must keepe his faith to whomsoever, to his subiect as shall be said. 2. To an enemy, witnesse that act of *Attilius Regulus*, the proclamation of the Senat of Rome against all those that had beene licenced by *Pyrrhus* vpon their faith giuen to depart; and *Camillus*, who would not so much as make vse of the treacherie of another, but resent the children of the *Falissians* with their master. 3. To a theefe and publike offender, witnesse that fact of *Pompey* to the pirates and robbers, and of *Augustus* to *Crocotas*. 4. To the enemies of religion, according to the example of *Iosua* against the *Gabaonites*. But faith ought not to be giuen to these two latter, theeues and heretickes, or apostataes, nor taken of them: for we ought not to capitulate, nor to treat wittinglie of peace and alliance with such kind of people, except it bee in extreame necessitie, or for the winning of them to the

4
He that re-
ceiveth it.

Cap. 14.

truth, or for the publike good ; but being giuen it ought to be kept.

5
The subject
of faith.

Liuy.

As touching the thing subiect, if it be vniust or impossible, a man is quit : and being vniust, it is well done to flie from it, and a double fault to keepe it. All other excuses besides these two, are of no account, as losse, damage, displeasure, discommoditie, difficultie; as the Romanes haue manie times practised, who haue reiected many great aduantages to auoid the breach of faith, *quibus tanta utilitate fides antiquior fuit.*

6
The maner
of giuing
faith.

Touching the maner of giuing faith, there is some doubt: for many thinke that if it haue beene extorted either by force and feare, or by fraud and sudden surprise, a man is not bound vnto it, because in both cases, he that promised hath not a will whereby all things are to be iudged. Others are of a contrary opinion: and to say the truth, *Iosua* kept his faith and promise to the Gabaonites, though it were extorted from him by a great surprise, and false intelligence, and it was afterwards declared that he did therein what he ought to do. And therefore it seemeth that a man may say, that where there is only a simple word and promise past a man is not bound, but if faith or promise giuen bee confirmed and authorised by an oath, as in the fact of *Iosua*, hee is bound to performe it in regard of the name of God: but yet that it is afterwards in iudgement to seeke meanes to right himselfe of that either deceit or violence. Faith giuen with an oath, and the interposition of the name of God, bindeth more than a simple promise; and the breach thereof which includeth periury with treacherie, is farre worse. But to thinke to giue assurance of faith by new and strange oathes, as many doe, is superfluous amongst honest men, and vnprofitable, if a man will bee disloyall. The best way is to sweare by the eternall God, the reuenger of those that vainlie vse his name, and breake their faith.

7
Treachery
iniurious to
God.

Treachery and periurie is in a certaine sense, more base and execrable than atheism. The Atheist that beleueth there is no God, is not so iniurious against him in thinking there is no God, as he that knoweth him, beleueth in him, and in mockery and contempt doth periuriously abuse his name.

He

He that sweareth to deceiue, mocketh God, and feareth man. It is a lesse sinne to contemne God, than to mocke him. The horroure of treachery and periury cannot bee better deciphered, than it was by him that said, It was to giue a testimony of the contempt of God, and the feare of men. And what thing is more monstrous than to be a coward with men, and resolute and valorous with God? Treachery is secondly the traitour and capitall enemy of humane society. For it breaketh and destroyeth the band thereof, and all commerce which dependeth vpon the word and promises of men, which if it faile we haue nothing else to sticke vnto.

To man.

To the keeping of faith belongeth the faithfull guard of the secrets of another, which is a charge full of inconuenience, especially of great personages, which though it may wisely be performed, yet it is good to flie the knowledge of the m, as sometimes that Poet did the secrets of *Lysimachus*. He that takes into his custody the secrets of another, drawes a greater trouble vpon him, than he dreams of: for besides the care that he takes vnto himselfe, to keepe them well, hee bindes himselfe to faine, and to deny his owne thoughts, a thing very irksome to a noble and generous heart. Neuerthelesse hee that takes that charge vpon him, must keepe it religiously, and to the end he may do it well, and play the good secretary, he must be such a one by nature, not by arte and obligation.

8

To keepe secrets.

CHAP. IX.

Verity and free admonition.

Free and hearty admonition is a very wholesome and excellent medicine, and the best office of amity. For to wound and offend a little, to profit much, is to loue soundly. It is one of the principall and most profitable Euangelicall commandements: *Si peccauerit in te frater tuus, corripes eum, &c.*

1

An excellent thing.

All haue sometimes need of this remedy, but especially all those that are in prosperity, for it is a very hard thing to bee happie and wise together. And princes who lead a life so publicke and are to furnish themselves with so many things, and haue so many things hid from them, cannot see nor vnder-

2

To whom profitable.

stand, but by the eies and cares of another. And therefore they haue great need of aduertisements, otherwise they may chaunce to runne strange and hard fortunes, if they be not very wise.

3
Rare, diffi-
cult, danger-
ous.

This office is vndertaken by very few; There are required thereunto (as the wise affirme) three things, iudgement or discretion, couragious libertie, amitie and fidelitie. These are tempered and mingled together, but few there are that do it, for feare of offending, or want of true amitie; and of those that do it, few there are that know how to do it well. Now if it be ill done, like a medicine ill applied, it woundeth without profit, and produceth almost the same effect with griefe, that flattery doth with pleasure. To be commended, and to be reprehended vnfittinglie and to small purpose, is the selfe-same wound, and a matter alike faultie in him that doth it. Veritie how noble soeuer it be, yet it hath not this priuiledge, to be employed at all houres and in all fashions. A wholesome holie reprehension may be vitiously applied.

4
The rules of
true admo-
nition.

The counsels and cautions for a man well to gouerne himselfe heerein (it is to be vnderstood where there is no great inwardnesse, familiaritie, confidence, or authoritie and power, for in these cases there is no place for the carefull obseruation of these rules following) are these: 1. To obserue place and time; that it be neither in times nor places of feasting and great ioy, for that were (as they say) to trouble the feast; nor of sorrow and aduersitie, for that were a point of hostilitie, and the way to make an end of all; that is rather a fit time to succour and comfort a man. *Cruelis in re aduersa, obiurgatio, damnare est obiurgare, cum auxilio est opus.* King *Perseus* seeing himselfe thus handled by two of his familiar friends, killed them both. 2. Not to reprehend all faults indifferentlie, not small and light offences, this were to be enuious, and an importunate, ambitious reprehender; not great and dangerous, which a man of himselfe doth sufficientlie feelee, and feares a worse punishment to come, this were to make a man thinke he lies in wait to catch him. 3. Secretlie and not before witnesses, to the end he make him not ashamed, as it hapned to a young man, who was so much abashed, that he was reprehended by *Pythagoras*, that he hanged himself. And *Plutarch*

is of opinion, that it was for this cause that *Alexander* killed his friend *Clitus*, because he reprehended him in companie: but especiallie that it be not before those whose good opinion he that is reprehended desireth to retaine, and with whom he desires to continue his credit, as before his wife, his children, his disciples. 4. Out of a simple carelesse nature and freedome of heart, without any particular interest, or passion of the mind, be it neuer so little. 5. To comprehend himselfe in the same fault, and to vse generall termes, as, We forget our selues; What do we thinke of? 6. To begin with commendations, and to end with proffers of service and help, this tempereth the tartnesse of correction, and giues a better entertainment: Such and such a thing becomes you well, but not so well such and such a thing. 7. To expresse the fault with better words than the nature of the offence doth require; as, You haue not been altogether well aduised; in steed of, You haue done wickedlie: Receiue not this woman into your companie, for she wil vndoe you; in steed of, Allure hir not, perswade hir not to yeeld to your desires, for thereby you will vndoe your selfe: Enter not into dispute with such a man; in steed of, Quarrell not, enuie not such a man. 8. The admonition being ended, be not presentlie gone, but stay and fall into some other common and pleasant discourse.

CHAP. X.

Of Flattery, lying, and dissimulation.

FLatterie is a very dangerous poison to euery particular person, and almost the only cause of the ruine of a prince and the state: it is worse than false witness, which corrupteth not the Iudge, but deceiueth him only, causing him to giue a wicked sentence against his will and iudgement: but flattery corrupteth the iudgement, enchanteth the spirit, and makes him vnapt to be farther instructed in the truth. And if a prince be once corrupted by flattery, it necessarily followeth that all that are about him, if they will liue in grace and fauour, must be flatterers. It is therefore a thing as pernicious as truth is excellent, for it is the corruption of truth. It is also a villanous vice of a base beggerlie mind, as foule and ill be-
I
Flattery a
pernicious
and villa-
nous thing.
ming

ming a man, as impudencie a woman. *Vt matrona meretrici dispar erit atq; discolor, infido scurra distabit amicus.* Flatterers are likewise compared to harlots, forcerers, oyle-sellers, to woolfes; and another saith, That a man were better fall among crows than flatterers.

2
Especially to
two sorts of
people.
There are two sorts of people subiect to be flattered, that is to say, such as neuer want people to furnish them with this kind of merchandize, and easily suffer themselves to be taken by it; that is to say, princes, with whom wicked men get credit thereby; and women, for there is nothing so proper and ordinarie to corrupt the chastitie of women, than to feede and entertaine them with their owne commendations.

3
Hardly a-
voided.

Flattery is hardlie auoided, and it is a matter of difficultie to be preferued from it, not only to women by reason of their weaknesse, and their natures full of vanitie and desirous of praise; and to princes, because they are their kinsfolke, friends, principall officers, whom they cannot auoid, that professe this mysterie; (*Alexander* that great king and philosopher could not defend himselfe from it, and there is not any priuat man that would not yeeld much more vnto it than kings, if he were daily assaulted and corrupted by such base rascall sort of people as they are) but generallie vnto all; yea to the wisest, both by reason of the sweetnes thereof; in such sort, that though a man withstand it, yet it pleaseth, and though he oppose himselfe against it, yet he neuer shutteth it quite out of doores, *unde sape exclusa nouissime recipitur*; and because of the hypocrisie thereof, whereby it is hardlie discovered: for it is so well counterfaieted and couered with the visage of amitie, that it is no easie matter to discerne it.

It imitateth
and resem-
bleth amitie,
but it is the
plague there-
of.

It vsurpeth the offices, it hath the voice, it carieth the name and counterfait thereof so artificiallie, that you will say that it is the same. It studieth to content and please, it honoreth and commendeth; It busieth it selfe much and takes much paines to do seruice, it accommodateth it selfe to the willes and humours of men: What more? It takes vpon it euen the highest and most proper point of amitie, which is to chide, and freely to reprehend. To be brieft, a flatterer will seeme to excede in loue him that he flattereth, whereas contrariwise, there is nothing more opposite vnto loue, not detraction, not iniurie,

not

not professed enmitie: It is the plague and poison of true amitie; they are altogether incompatible, *non potes me simul amico & adlatore vis*. Better are the sharp admonitions of a friend, than the kisses of a flatterer: *Meliora vulnera diligentis, quam oscula blandientis*.

Wherefore not to mistake it, let vs by the true picture thereof, find out the meanes to know it, and to discern it from true amitie. 1. Flattery respecteth for the most part it owne particular benefit, and thereby it is knowne; but true friendship seeketh not the good of it selfe. 2. The flatterer is changeable and diuers in his iudgements, like wax, or a looking-glasse that receiueth all formes: He is a Camelion, a *Polypus*: faine to praise or dispraise, and he will do the like, accommodating himselfe to the mind of him he flattereth. A friend is firme and constant. 3. He carrieth himselfe too violentlie and ambitiousslie in all that he doth, in the view and knowledge of him he flattereth, euer praising and offering his seruice, *non imitatur amicitiam, sed praterit*. He hath no moderation in his outward actions, and contrariwise inwardlie he hath no affection, which are conditions quite contrarie to a true friend. 4. He yeeldeeth and alwaies giueth the victorie to him he flattereth, alwaies applauding him, hauing no other end than to please, in such sort that he commendeth all and more than all, yea sometimes to his owne cost, blaming and humbling himselfe like a wrestler, that stoopeth the better to ouerthrow his companion. A friend goes roundlie to worke, cares not whether he haue the first or the second place, and respecteth not so much how he may please, as how he may profit, whether it be by faire meanes, or by foule, as a good Physitian vseth to doe to cure his patient. 5. A flatterer sometimes vsurpeth the liberty of a friend to reprehend; but it is with the left hand and vntowardly. For he staies himselfe at small and light matters that are not worthy reprehension, faining want of knowledge of any greater; but yet hee will bee rude and rough enough in the censuring of the kindred and seruants of him he flattereth, as failing much in that duty they should do vnto him. Or he faineth to haue vnderstood some light accusations against him, and that hee could not be quiet vntill hee knew the truth thereof, and if it fall out that hee that is flattered

4
The description
and antithesis of
flattery and
amitie.

red deny them, or excuse himselfe, hee taketh occasion to commend him the more. I was much astonished at it (saith he) and I could not beleue it, for I see the contrarie. For how should I thinke that you will take from another man, when you giue all that is your owne, and take more care to giue than to take? Or at leastwise he will make his reprehension to serue his turne, that hee may flatter the better, telling him that he takes not care enough of himselfe, he is not sparing enough of his person and presence so necessarie to the common-weale, as once a Senatour did to *Tiberius* in a full Senat, but with an ill sent and a bad successe. 6. Finally, to conclude in a word, a friend alwaies respecteth, procureth, and attempteth that which is reason, and honesty, and dutie; the flatterer that which belongs to passion and pleasure, and that which is already a maladie in the mind of him that is flattered. And therefore hee is a proper instrument for all things that belong to pleasure and licentious libertie, and not for that which is honest or painfull and dangerous. Hee is like an ape, who being vnto for any other seruice, as other beasts are, serues for a play-game and to make sport.

^s
Of lying, the
fowlenesse
and hurt
thereof.

A neere neighbour and alliance to flatterie is lying, a base vice; and therefore said an ancient Philosopher, That it was the part of slaues to lie, of freemen to speake the truth. For what greater wickednesse is there, than for a man to belie his owne knowledge? The first steppe to the corruption of good maners is the banishment of truth, as contrarie, saith *Pindarus*, To be true is the beginning of vertue. It is likewise pernicious to humane society. We are not men, neither can we knit and ioine together in humane society, as hath beene said, if this be wanting. Doubtlesse silence is more sociable, than vnture speech. If a lie had but one visage as truth hath, there were some remedy for it; for we would take the contrarie to that which a lier speaketh to bee the certaine truth. But the contrary to truth hath a hundred thousand figures, and an indefinit & vnlimited field. That which is good, that is to say, vertue and verity is finite and certaine, because there is but one way to the marke: That which is euill, that is to say, vice and error, and lying is infinite and vncertaine, because there are a thousand waies to misse the marke. Doubtlesse

lesse if men knew the horreur of lying, they would pursue it with sword and fire. And therefore such as haue the charge of youth are with all instance and diligence to hinder it, and to withstand the first birth and progresse of this vice, as likewise of opinatiue obstinacy; and that in time, for they neuer leaue growing.

There is likewise a couered and disguised lie, which is hypocrisie and dissimulation (a notable quality of Courtiers, and in as great credit amongst them as vertue) ⁶ *of hypocrisy* the vice of licentious and base mindes; for a man to disguise and hide himselfe vnder a maske, as not daring to shew himself to be that which he is, it is a cowardly and seruile humour.

Now he that makes profession of this goodly mysterie, ⁷ *The difficultie thereof.* liues in great paine; for it is a great vnquietnesse for a man to endeavour to seeme other than that hee is, and to haue an eie vnto himselfe, for feare lest he should be discovered. It is a torment for a man to hide his owne nature, to be discovered, a confusion. There is no such pleasure as to liue according to his nature, and it is better to bee lesse esteemed and to liue openly, than to take so much paines to counterfait and liue vnder a canopie; so excellent and so noble a thing is freedom.

But the mysterie of these kind of men is but poore; for dissimulation continues not long vndiscovered, according to ⁸ *The discomfort.* that saying, Things fained and violent dure not long; and the reward of such people is, that no man will trust them, nor giue them credit when they speake the truth, for whatsoever comes from them is held for apocryphall and mokerie.

Now heere is need of indifferency and wisdom. For if ⁹ *The counsell heerupon.* nature be deformed, vitious and offensive to another, it must bee constrained, and to speake better, corrected. There is a difference betweene liuing freely and careleslie. Againe, a man must not alwaies speake all hee knowes, that is a follie, but that which hee speaketh, let it bee that which hee thinketh.

There are two sorts of people in whom dissimulation is excusable, yea sometimes requisite, but yet for diuers reasons, ¹⁰ *Dissimulation befitting women.* that is to say, in the prince for the publike benefit, and the good.

good and peace of himselfe or the state, as before hath beene said; and in women for the conueniency thereof, because an ouer free and bold libertie becomes them not, but rather inclines to impudency. Those small disguisements, fained cariages, hypocrisies, which well besit their shamesfastnesse and modestie, deceiue none but fooles, beseme them well and defend their honors. But yet it is a thing which they are not to take great paines to learne, because hypocrisie is naturall in them. They are wholly made for it, and they all make vse of it, and too much, their visage, their vestments, their words, countenance, laughter, weeping; and they practise it not onely towards their husbands liuing, but after their death too. They faine great sorrow, and many times inwardly laugh. *Lucretius moerent quae minus dolent.*

C H A P. XI.

Of Benefits, obligation and thankfulness.

THe science and matter of benefits or good turnes, and the thankfull acknowledgement of the obligation, a ctive & passiue is great, of great vse, and very subtile. It is that wherein we faile most. We neither know how to doe good, nor to be thankfull for it: It should seeme that the grace as well of the merit, as of the acknowledgement is decayed, and reuenge and ingratitude is wholly in request, so much more ready and ardent are we thereunto. *Gratia oneri est, ultio in questu habetur: altius iniuria quam merita descendunt.* First then we will speake of merit and good deeds, where we will comprehend humanity, liberality, almes deeds, and their contraries, inhumanity, crueltie: and afterwards of obligation, acknowledgement, and forgetfulness, or ingratitude and reuenge.

Tacit.
Sen.

I
An exhortation to
good workes
by diuers
reasons.

God, nature and reason, doe inuite vs to do good, and to deserue well of another; God by his example, and his nature, which is wholly good, neither do we know any better means how to imitate God, *nulla re propius ad Dei naturam accedimus, quam beneficentia. Deus est mortalem succurrere mortali; nature*, witnesse this one thing, that euerie one delighteth to see him, to whom he hath done good: it best agreeth with nature, *nihil tam secundum naturam, quam iuuare consortem natura.*

tura.

inra. It is the worke of an honest and generous man to doe good, and to deserue well of another, yea to seeke occasions thereunto, *liberalis etiam dandi causas querit*. And it is said Ambros. that good bloud cannot lie, nor faile at a need. It is greatnesse to giue, basenesse to take, *Beatius est dare quàm accipere*. Hee that giueth honoureth himselfe, makes himselfe master ouer the receiuer, he that takes selles himselfe. He, saith one, that first inuented benefits or good turnes, made stockes and manacles to tie and captiuate another man. And therefore diuers haue refused to take, lest they should wound their liberty, especially from those whom they would not loue, and bee beholding vnto, according to the counsell of the wise, which aduise a man not to receiue any thing, from a wicked man, lest he be thereby bound vnto him. *Cesar* was wont to say, that there came no sound more pleasing vnto his eares, than praiers and petitions: It is the mot of greatnesse, Aske mee, *inuocame in die tribulationis (erua me) & honorificabis me*. It is likewise the most noble, and honourable vse of our meanes or substance, which so long as wee hold and possesse them priuately, they carrie with them base and abiect names, houses, lands, money, but being brought into light, and employed to the good and comfort of another, they are enobled, with new and glorious titles, benefits, liberalities, magnificences. It is the best, and most commodious imploiment that may bee: *ars quaestuosissima, optima negotiatio*, whereby the principall is assured, and the profit is very great. And to say the truth, a man hath nothing that is truly his owne, but that which hee giues, for that which he retaines, and keepes to himselfe, benefits neither himselfe, nor another; and if he imploy them otherwise, they consume and diminish, passe through manie dangerous accidents, and at last death it selfe. But that which is giuen, it can neuer perish, neuer wax old. And therefore *Marc. Antony* being beaten downe by fortune, and nothing remaining to him, but his power to die, cried out that he had nothing, but that which he had giuen, *hoc habeo quodcumq; dedi*. And therefore this sweet, debonaire and readie will to do good vnto all, is a right excellent and honourable thing in all respects; as contrarie, there is not a more base and detestable vice, more against nature, than crueltie, for which cause

it

it is called inhumanity, which proceedeth from a contrarie cause, to that of bountie and benefits, that is to say, dastardlie cowardlinesse, as hath beene said.

2
The distinction
of benefits.

There is a two-fold maner of doing good vnto another, by profiting and by pleasing him: for the first a man is admired and esteemed; for the second beloued. The first is farre the better, it regardeth the necessitie and want of a man, it is to play the part of a father and true friend. Againe, there are two sorts of bounties or good turnes, the one are duties, that proceed out of a naturall or lawfull obligation; the other are merits and free, which proceed out of pure affection. These seeme the more noble; neuerthelesse if the other be done with attention and affection, though they be duties, yet they are excellent.

3
Inward and
outward be-
nefits.

The benefit and the merit is not properly that, that is giuen, is seene, is toucht; this is but the grosse matter, the marke, the shew thereof, but it is the good will. That which is outward is many times but small, that which is inward very great; for this hath commonlie with it a kind of hunger and affection, and is alwaies seeking occasions to do good; It giueth so much as it can, and what is needfull, forgetting it owne benefit, *in beneficio hoc suspiciendum quod alteri dedit, ablaturus sibi, utilitatis suae oblitus*. Contrarily where the gift is great, the grace may be small; for it is commonly giuen with an ill will, with an expectation of much intreatie, and leasure enough to consider whether he may giue it or no. This is to make too great preparation thereunto, and too great vse thereof, to giue it rather to himselfe, and his ambition, than to the good and necessitie of the receiuer. Againe that which is outward may incontinentlie vanish, that which is inward remaine firme: The libertie, health, honor, which is to be giuen, may all at an instant, by some accident or other, be taken away, the benefit neuerthelesse remaining entire.

4
Rules of be-
nefits.
1. To whom.

The aduiselements whereby a man should direct himselfe, in his bounties and benefits he bestoweth, according to the rules and instruction of the wise, are these: First, to whom must he giue? to all? It seemeth that to do good vnto the wicked and vnworthie, is at one instant to commit many faults, for it brings an ill name vpon the giuer, entertaineth and

and kindleth malice, giues that which belongs to vertue and merit, to vice also. Doubtlesse free and fauorable graces are not due, but to the good and worthie; but in a time of necessitie, and in a generalitie all in common. In these two cases the wicked and vngratefull haue a part, if they be in necessitie, or if they be in such sort mingled with the good, that the one can hardlie receiue without the other. For it is better to do good to those that are vnworthie, for their sakes that are good, than to depriue the good for their sakes that are euill. So doth God good vnto all, he suffereth the sunne to shine, & the raine to fall indifferentlie vpon all: But yet his speciall gifts he giueth not but to those whom he hath chosen for his; *non est bonum sumere panem filiorum & proicere canibus: multum refert utrum aliquem non excludas an eligas.* At a need therefore, in a time of affliction and necessitie we must do good vnto all, *hominibus prodesse natura iubet, ubicumq; homini beneficio locus.* Nature, and humanitie teach vs, to regard and to offer our selues vnto them, that stretch out their armes vnto vs, and not vnto those that turne their backs towards vs; rather vnto those to whom we may do good, than vnto those that are able to do good vnto vs. It is the part of a generous mind to take part with the weaker side, to succour the afflicted, and to help to abate the pride and violence of the conquerour, as *Chelopsis* once did, the daughter and wife of a king, whose father and husband being at variance and warres, one against the other, whensoever hir husband had got the better against hir father, like a good daughter she followed and serued hir father in all things, in his afflictions; but the chaunce turning, and hir father getting the mastrie, like a good wife, she turned to hir husband, and accompanied him in his hardest fortunes.

Secondly, he must do good willingly and cheerefullie, *non ex tristitia aut necessitate; hilarem datorem diligit deus: Bis est gratum, quod opus est, si ultro offeras,* not suffering himselfe to be ouer-intreated, and importuned; otherwise it will neuer be pleasing; *Nemo libenter debet quod non accepit sed expressit:* That which is yeelded by force of intreatie and praiers is dearely sold; *non tulit gratis qui accepit rogans, imo nihil charius emitur, quam quod precibus.* He that prayeth and intreateth, humbleth himselfe, confesseth himselfe an inferior, coue-

reth his face with shame, honoreth him whom he intreateth: whereupon *Cesar* was wont to say, after he had overcome *Pompey*, That he lent not his cares more willinglie, nor took so much content in any thing, as to be intreated; whereby he gaue a kind of hope vnto all, euen his enemies, that they should obtaine whatsoever they should request. Graces are like vestments, transparent, free, and not constrained.

6
3. Speedily.

Thirdly, speedily and readily. This seemes to depend vpon the former, for benefits are esteemed according to the will wherewith they are bestowed; Now he that stayes long before he succour and giue, seemes to haue bene a long time vnwilling to doe it, *qui tarde fecit, diu noluit*. As contrarily, a readinesse heerein doubleth the benefit: *bis dat, qui celeriter*. That indifferencie and carelesse regard, whether it be done, or not done, that is vsed heerein, is not approued by any, but impudent persons. Diligence must bee vsed in all points. Heerein then there is a five-fold maner of proceeding, whereof three are reprov'd; to refuse to do a good turne, and that slowly too, is a double iniurie: to refuse speedily, and to giue slowly, are almost one; And some there are that are lesse offended with a quick deniall; *Minus decipitur cui negatur celeriter*. The best way then is, to giue speedily; but that which is most excellent, is, to anticipate the demaund, to preuent the necessitie and the desire.

7
4. Without
hope of restitu-
tion.

Fourthly, without hope of restitution, this is that wherein the force and vertue of a benefit doth principallie consist. If it be a vertue, it is not mercenarie: *tunc est virtus dare beneficia non reditura*. A benefit is lesse richly bestowed, where there is a retrogradation and reflexion; but when there is no place for requitall, yea it is not knowne from whence the good turne cometh, there it is in it true lustre and glorie. If a man looke after the like, he will giue slowly and to few. Now it is farre better to renounce all such hopes of like returnes, than to cease to merit, and to do good; for whilest a man seeketh after that strange and accidentall payment, he deprieth himselfe of the true and naturall, which is that inward ioy and comfort he receiueth in doing good. Again, he must not be twice intreated for one thing. To do wrong, is in it selfe a base and abominable thing, and there needs no other thing to dissuade

a man from it: so to deserue well of another, is an excellent and honorable thing, and there needs no other thing to inflame a man to it. And in a word, it is not to do good to looke after a like returne, it is to make merchandize & profit thereof: *Non est beneficium quod in questum mittitur.* A man should not confound and mingle together actions so diuers: *demus beneficia, non fœneremus.* It is pitie but such men should be deceiued that hope after such requitals: *dignus est decipi qui de recipiendo cogitaret, cum daret.* She is no honest woman who either for feare, or the better to inflame, or to draw a man on, refuseth: *qua quia non licuit non dedit, ipsa dedit.* So hee deserues nothing that doth good, to receiue good againe. Graces are pure virgins, without hope of returne, saith *Hesiodus.*

Fiftly, to do good in a proportion answerable to the desire of a man, and as it may be acceptable to him that receiue it, to the end he may know and find, that it is truly intended and done vnto him. Concerning which point, you are to know, that there are two sorts of benefits, the one are honorable to the person that receiue it, and therefore they should be done publickly: The other are commodious, such as succour the want, weaknesse, shame, or other necessitie of the receiuer. These are to be done secretlie, yea if neede be, that he only may take notice that receiue it; and if it be fit, the receiuer should not know from whence they come (because it may be he is bashfull, and the knowledge thereof may discourage him from taking, though his needs be great) it is good and expedient to conceale it from him, and to suffer the benefit to drop into his hand, as it were vnawares. It is enough the benefactor know it, and his owne conscience serue him for a witnesse, which is better than if he had a thousand lookers on.

8
5. According to the desire of the receiuer.

Sixtly, without the hurt and offence of another, and the prejudice of iustice: to do good not doing euill: To giue to one at the charge of another, is to sacrifice the sonne in the presence of the father, saith a wise man.

9
6. Without the offence of another.

Seuenthly, wisely. A man may be sometimes hindered from answering demaunds and petitions, from refusing or yeelding vnto them. This difficultie proceedeth from the euill nature of man, especiallie of the petitioner, who vexeth

10
7 wisely.

himselfe too much in the enduring of a repulse, be it neuer so iust and reasonable. And this is the reason why some promise and agree to all (a testimonie of weaknesse) yea, when they haue neither power, nor will to performe; and referring the auoiding of this difficultie to the very point of the execution, they hope that many things may happen that may hinder and trouble the performance of their promise, and so thinke to quit themselves of their obligation; or if it fall out there be question made thereof, they find excuses and auoidances, and so for that time content the petitioner. But none of all this is to be allowed, for a man ought not to promise or agree to any thing, but to that which he can, will, and ought to performe. And finding himselfe betweene these two straits and dangers, either of a bad promise, because it is either vniust, or ill besitting, or an absolute deniall, which may stirre vp some sedition, or misconceit, the counsell is, that he salue this matter either by delaying the answer, or in such sort composing the promise in such generall and doubtfull termes, that they bind not a man precisely to the performance thereof. But heere is craft and subtiltie, farre different from true freedome, but this iniquitie of the petitioner is the cause thereof, and he deserueth it.

II
8. From a
hartie affe-
ction.

Eightly, it must proceed from a manlie heart, and hartie affection, *homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto*, especiallie towards those that are afflicted and in want, and this is that which wee call mercie. They that haue not this affection, ἀσπλαγχις *immanes*, are inhumane, and cary the marks of dishonest men. But yet this must proceed from a strong, constant, and generous, not a soft, effeminate, and troubled mind: for that is a vitious passion, and which may fall into a wicked mind, whereof in this place we haue alreadie spoken: for there is a good and an euill mercie. A man must succour the afflicted, not afflicting himselfe, and applying the euill vnto himselfe, detract nothing from equitie, and honor; for God saith, that wee must not haue pitie of the poore in iudgement: and so God and his Saints are said to be mercifull and pitifull.

12
9. Without
boasting.

Ninthly, it must be without boasting, and shew, or publike proclamation thereof, for this is a kind of reproch: These kind

kind of vaunts do not only take away the grace, but the credit, and make a benefit odious, *hoc est in odium beneficia perducere*. And in this sense it is said, that a benefactor must forget his good deeds.

He must continue them, and by new benefits confirme, and renew the old, (this inuiteth the whole world to loue him, and to seeke his loue) and neuer repent himselfe of the old, howsoever it may seeme, that he hath cast his seed vpon a barraine and vnthankfull ground, *beneficij tui etiam infelicitas placeat, nusquam hac vox, vellem non fecisse*. An vnthankfull man wrongs none but himselfe, and a good turne is not lost by his ingratitude; It is a holy consecrated thing that cannot be violated, nor extinguished by the vice of another. And it is no reason because another is wicked, that therefore a man should cease to be good, or discontinue his office: and that which is more, the worke of a noble and generous heart is to continue to do well, to breake and to vanquish the malice and ingratitude of another man, and to mend his manners, *optimi viri & ingentis animi est tamdiu ferre ingratum, donec feceris gratum: vincit malos pertinax bonitas*.

Lastly, not to trouble, or importune the receiuer in the fruition thereof, as they do who hauing giuen an honor, or an office to a man, will afterwards execute it themselues; or at leastwise procure them one good, that they may reape another themselues. He that is the receiuer, ought not to indure this, and therefore is not vnthankfull; and the benefactor defaceth the benefit, and cancelleth the obligation. One of our Popes denying a Cardinall an vniust boone which hee demanded, alleaging vnto him that hee was the cause why hee was made Pope, answered him, Why then giue me leaue to be Pope, and take not that from me that thou hast giuen me.

After these rules and aduisements concerning good deeds, we must know that there are some benefits, more acceptable and welcome than others, and which are more or lesse binding. They are best welcome, that proceed from a friendlie hand, from those whom a man is inclined to loue without this occasion; and contrarily it is a griefe to be obliged vnto him, whom a man likes not, and to whom he would not willingly be indebted. Such benefits also are welcome, that come from

13

10. Continue them without repentance.

14

11. Not to reuoke or trouble a good turne.

15

Distinctions of benefits.

the hand of him, that is any way bound to the receiuer : for heere is a kind of iustice and they bind lesse. Those good deeds that are done in necessities, and great extremities, carie with them a greater force; they make a man forget all iniuries and offences past, if there were any, and binde more strongly; as contrariwise, the deniall in such a case, is very iniurious, and makes a man forget all benefits past. Such benefits likewise, as may be requited with the like, are more gladly received, than their contraries, which ingender a kind of hate, for he that findeth himselfe wholly bound, without any power or possibility of repaiment, as often as he seeth his benefactor, hee thinkes hee sees a testimony of his inabilitie or ingratitude, and it is irksome to his heart. There are some benefits, the more honest and gracious they are, the more burthen some are they to the receiuer, if he be a man of credit, as they that tie the conscience and the will, for they lock faster, keepe a man in his right memorie, and some feare of forgetfulness, and failing his promise. A man is a safer prisoner vnder his word, than vnder locke and keie. It is better to be tied by ciuill and publicke bands, than by the law of honestie, and conscience: two notaries are better than one. I trust your word and your faith, and conscience: heere is more honour done to the receiuer; but yet constraint fastneth, solliciteth, and presseth much more; and heere is more safety to the lender, and a man carrieth himselfe more carelesly, because he doubteth not but that the law, and those outward ties will awaken him, when the time shall serue. Where there is constraint, the will is more loose, where there is lesse constraint, the will hath lesse libertie: *quod me ius coget vix a voluntate impetrem.*

16
Obligation
the mother
and daughter
of a benefit
or good
turne.

From a benefit proceeds an obligation, and from it a benefit; and so it is both the child and the father, the effect, and the cause, and there is a twofold obligation, actiue and passiue. Parents, princes and superiours, by the dutie of their charge, are bound to do good vnto those that are committed and commended vnto them, either by law or by nature; and generally all men that haue means are bound to relecue those that are in want, or anie affliction whatsoever, by the command of nature. Behold heere the first obligation, afterwards from

from benefits or good turnes, whether they be due, and springing from this first obligation, or free and pure merits, ariseth the second obligation, and discharge, whereby the receiuers are bound to an acknowledgement and thankfull requitall. All this is signified by *Hesiodus*, who hath made the Graces three in number, holding each other by the hands.

The first obligation is discharged by the good offices of euerie one that is in anie charge, which shall presentlie be discouered of in the second part, which concerneth particular duties: but yet this obligation is strengthened, and weakned, and lesned accidentallie by the conditions and actions of those that are the receiuers. For their offences, ingraticudes, and vnworthinesse doe in a maner discharge those, that are bound to haue care of them; and a man may almost say as much of their naturall defects too. A man may iustly with lesse affection loue that child, that kinsman, that subiect, that is not onelie wicked and vnworthie, but foule, misshapen, crooked, vnfortunate, ill borne; God himselfe hath abated him much, from their naturall price and estimation: but yet a man must in this abatement of affection, keepe a iustice, and a moderation, for this concerneth not the helps and succors of necessitie, and those offices that are due by publike reason, but onely that attention, and affection which is in the inward obligation.

17
The first obligation and mother.

The second obligation, which ariseth from benefits, is that which we are to handle, & concerning which we must at this time set down some rules: 1. the law of dutifull acknowledgement & thankfulnesse is naturall, witnesse beasts themselves, not only priuat and domesticali, but cruell and sauage, among whom there are many excellent examples of this acknowledgement, as of the Lion towards the Roman slaue. *Officia etiam fera sentiunt*. Secondly it is a certaine act of vertue, and a testimony of a good mind, and therefore it is more to be esteemed than bountie or benefit, which many times proceeds from abundance, from power, loue of a mans proper interest, and very seldome from pure vertue, whereas thankfulnesse springeth alwaies from a good heart; and therefore howsoeuer the benefit may be more to be desired, yet kinde acknowledgement is farre more commendable. Thirdly it is an easie thing,

18
The second obligation which is thankfulnes.

thing, yea a pleasant, and that is in the power of euery man. There is nothing more easie, than to doe according to nature, nothing more pleasing, than to be free from bands, and to be at liberty.

19
Of ingra-
titude.

Senec.

By that which hath beene spoken, it is easie to see how base and vilanous a vice forgetfulnesse and ingratitude is, how vnpleasing and odious vnto all men, *Dixeris maledicta euncta, cum ingratum hominem dixeris*; It is against nature, and therefore *Plato* speaking of his disciple *Aristotle*, calleth him an vngratefull mule. It is likewise without all excuse, and cannot come but from a wicked nature, *grauē vitium, intolerabile quod dissociat homines*. Reuenge which followeth an iniury, as ingratitude a good turne, is much more strong and pressing (for an iniurie inforceth more than a benefit, *altius iniuria quam merita descendunt*) it is a very violent passion, but yet nothing so base, so deformed a vice as ingratitude. It is like those euils that a man hath, that are not dangerous, but yet are more grievous and painful than they that are mortall. In reuenge there is some shew of iustice, and a man hides not himselfe, to worke his will therein; but in ingratitude there is nothing but base dishonesty and shame.

20
Rules of
thankfulness.

Senec.

Idem.

Plin.

Thankfulnesse or acknowledgement that it may be such as it should bee, must haue these conditions. First hee must graciously receiue a benefit, with an amiable and cheerefull visage, and speech, *qui gratē beneficium accepit, primam eius pensionem soluit*. Secondly, he must neuer forget it, *Ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus, nusquam enim gratus fieri potest, cui totum beneficium elapsum est*. The third office is to publish it; *ingenui pudoris est fateri per quos profecerimus, & hac quasi merces auctoris*. As a man hath found the heart, and the hand of another, open to do good, so must he haue his mouth open to preach and publish it, and to the end the memory thereof may be the more firme, and solemne, he must name the benefit, and that by the name of the benefactor. The fourth office is to make restitution, wherein hee must obserue these foure conditions: That it be not too speedie, nor too curiously; for this carries an ill sent with it, and it bewraies too great an vnwillingnesse to be in debt, and too much haste to bee quit of that band. And it likewise giueth an occasion to the friend or benefactor,

benefactor, to thinke that his curtesie was not kindlie accepted of; for to be too carefull, and desirous to repay, is to incur the suspicion of ingratitude. It must therefore follow some time after, and it must not be too long neither, lest the benefit grow too ancient, (for the Graces are painted yong) and it must be vpon some apt and good occasion, which either offereth it selfe, or is taken, and that without noise and rumour. That it be with some vsurie, and surpasse the benefit, like fruitfull ground, *ingratus est, qui beneficium reddit sine usura*, or at least equall it with all the shew and acknowledgement that may be, of great reason of a farther requitall, and that this is not to satisfie the obligation, but to giue some testimony that he forgetteth not how much he is indebted. That it bee willingly and with a good heart, *Ingratus est, qui metu gratus est*; for if it were so giuen, *eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur: errat si quis beneficium libentius accipit, quam reddit*. Lastly, if his inability bee such, as that hee cannot make present restitution, yet let his will be forward enough, which is the first and principall part, and as it were the soule, both of the benefit and acknowledgement; though there bee no other witnesse heereof than it selfe; and he must acknowledge not onely the good hee hath receiued, but that likewise that hath bene offered, and might haue bene receiued, that is to say, the goodwill of the benefactor, which is, as hath bene said, the principall.

The second part, which concerneth the
*speciall duties of certaine men, by certaine and
 speciall obligation.*

THE PREFACE.

BEING to speake of speciall and particular duties, differing according to the diuersitie of persons and their states, whether they be vnequall, as superiours and inferiours, or equall, we will begin with married folks, who are mixt, and hold with both equallitie and inequallitie. And so much the rather, because we are first to speake of priuate and domestick iustice and duties, before publike, because they are before them;

them; as families and houses are before common-weales, and therefore that priuat iustice which is obserued in a familie, is the image, and source, and modell of a common-weale. Now these priuat and domesticall duties are three, that is to say, betweene the husband and the wife, parents and children, masters and seruants, and these are the parts of a household or familie, which taketh the foundation from the husband and the wife, who are the masters and authours thereof. And therefore first of married folke.

CHAP. XII.

The dutie of married folke.

see p. 175

1
Common
duties.

According to those two diuers considerations that are in marriage, as hath been said, that is to say, equalitie and inequality, there are likewise two sorts of duties and offices of married folke, the one common to both, equalle reciprocal of like obligation, though according to the custome of the world, the paine, the reproch, the inconuenience, be not equal: that is to say, an entire loyaltie, fidelitie, communitie, and communication of all things, and a care and authoritie ouer their familie, and all the goods of their house. Heereof we haue spoken more at large in the first booke. p. 174.

2
Particular
duties of the
husband.

The other are particular and different, according to that inequality that is betwixt them, for those of the husband are: 1. To instruct his wife with mildnesse in all things that belong vnto hir dutie, hir honor and good, and whercof she is capable. 2. To nourish hir, whether she brought downe with hir or no. 3. To cloath hir. 4. To lie with hir. 5. To loue and defend hir: The two extremities are base and vitious, to hold hir vnder like a seruant, to make her mistris by subiecting himselfe vnto hir. And these are the principall duties. These follow after, to comfort hir being sicke, to deliuer hir being captiue, to burie hir being dead, to nourish hir living, and to prouide for his children he hath had by hir, by his will and testament.

3
Of the wife.

The duties of the wife, 1. are to giue honor, reuerence, and respect to hir husband, as to hir master and lord; for so haue the wisest women that euer were termed their husbands, and the

the hebrew word *Baal* signifieth them both, husband and lord. She that dischargeth hirselfe of this dutie honoreth hir selfe more than hir husband: and doing otherwise, wrongs none but hir selfe. 2. To giue obedience in all things iust and lawfull; applying and accomodating hir selfe to the maners and humours of hir husband; like a true looking-glasse, which faithfullie representeth the face, hauing no other particular designement, loue, thought, but as the dimensions and accidents which haue no other proper action or motion, and neuer moue but with the bodie, she applieth hir selfe in all things to hir husband. 3. Service, as to prouide either by hir selfe or some other his viands, to wash his feet. 4. To keepe the house; and therefore she is compared to the Tortois, and is painted hauing hir feet naked, and especiallie in the absence of hir husband. For hir husband being farre from hir, she must be as it were inuisible, & contrarie to the Moone (which appeareth in hir greatnes when she is farthest from the sunne) not appeare, but when she comes neere hir sunne. 5. To be silent, and not to speake but with hir husband, or by hir husband: and forasmuch as a silent woman is a rare thing and hardlie found, she is said to be a pretious gift of God. 6. To Eccles. 26. employ hir time in the practise and studie of hufwifrie, which is the most commodious and honorable science and occupation of a woman, this is hir speciall mistris qualitie, and which a man of meane fortune should especiallie seeke in his marriage. It is the only dowrie that serueth either to ruinate, or preserue families, but it is very rare. There are diuers that are couetous, few that are good hufwiues. We are to speake of them both, of household husbandrie presentlie by it selfe.

In the priuat acquaintance and vse of mariage there must be a moderation, that is, a religious and deuout band, for that pleasure that is therein, must be mingled with some seueritie; it must be a wise and conscionable delight. A man must touch his wife discretlie and for honestie, as it is said, and for feare, as *Aristotle* saith, lest prouoking hir desires too wantonlie, the pleasure thereof make hir to exceed the bounds of reason, and the care of health: for too hot and too frequent a pleasure altereth the seed, and hindereth generation. On the other side, to the end she be not ouer-languishing, barraine, and subiect

4
An aduise-
ment vpon
the acquain-
tance of ma-
ried folks.

to.

Plutar. in
Solone.

to other diseases, he must offer himselfe vnto hir though sel-
dome. *Solon* saith thrise in a month; but there can no certaine
law or rule be giuen heereof.

The doctrine of household husbandrie doth willinglie fol-
low, and is annexed vnto mariage.

CHAP. XIII.

Household Husbandrie.

1 **H**ousehold husbandrie is an excellent, iust, and profi-
table occupation. It is a happie thing saith *Plato*, for
a man to goe through his priuat affaires without iniustice.
There is nothing more beautifull than a household well and
peaceably gouerned.

2 It is a profession which is not difficult, for he that is ca-
pable of any thing else, is not vncapable of this; but yet it is
carefull, and painefull, and troublesome, by reason of the mul-
titude of affaires, which though they be small and of no great
importance, yet forasmuch as they are common & frequent,
and neuer at an end, they do much annoy and wearie a man.
Domesticall thornes prick, because they are ordinarie; but
if they come from the principall persons of the familie, they
gaule and exulcerate, and grow remediless.

3 It is a great happines and a fit meane to liue at ease, to
haue one whom a man may trust, and vpon whom he may
repose himselfe; which that he may the better do, he must
choose one that is true and loyall, and afterwards bind him to
do well by that trust and confidence he putteth in him: *habi-
ta fides ipsam obligat fidem; multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent
falli; & alijs ius peccandi, suspicando dederunt.*

4 The principall precepts and counsels that belong to
frugalitie, or good husbandrie are these: 1. To buy and
sell all things at the best times and seasons, that is, when
they are best and best cheape. 2. To take good heed lest
the goods in the house bee spoiled or miscarrie, bee ei-
ther lost or caried away; This doth especiallie belong to
the woman, to whom *Aristotle* giues this authoritie and
care. 3. To prouide first and principallie for these three,
necessitie, cleanness, order: and againe, if there be meanes,
some

some aduise to prouide for these three too; (but the wiser sort with no great paines to bee taken therein: *non amplius sed munditer conuiuium: plus salis quam sumptus*): abundance, pompe, and preparation, exquisite and rich fashion.

The contrary is many times practised in good houses, where you shall haue beds garnished with silke, embrodered with gold, and but one simple couerlid in winter, which were a commoditie farre more necessarie. And so of the rest.

4. To rule and moderate his charge, which is done by taking away superfluities, yet prouiding for necessitie, and that which is fit and befitting. A ducket in a mans purse will doe a man more honour and honestie, than tenne prodigallie spent, saith one. Againe (but this requires industrie and good sufficiencie) to make a great shew with a little charge, and aboue all, not to suffer the expence to grow aboue the receipt and the income.

5. To haue a care and an eie ouer all; the vigilancie and presence of the master, saith the prouerbe, fatteth the horse and the land. And in any case the master and mistrisse must take a care to conceale their ignorance and insufficiencie in the affaires of the house, and much more their carelesnesse, making a shew as if they attended and thought of nothing else. For if officers and seruants haue an opinion that their masters looke not vnto them, they may chance to make his haire grow through his hood.

CHAP. XIII.

The duty of Parents and children.

THE dutie of parents and children is reciprocall and reciprocallie naturall: if that of children be more strait, that of parents is more ancient, parents being the first authours and cause, and more important to a common-weale: for to people a state and to furnish it with honest men and good citizens, the culture and good nourishment of youth is necessarie, which is the seed of a common-wealth. And there comes not so much euill to a weale-publike by the ingratitude of children towards their parents, as by the carelesnesse of parents in the instruction of their children: and therefore with great

¹ See pag. 184

great reason in Lacedemon and other good & politike states, there was a punishment and a penaltie laid vpon the parents when the children were ill conditioned. And *Plato* was wont to say, that he knew not in what a man should bee more careful and diligent than to make a good sonne. And *Crates* cried out in choler, To what end doe men take so much care in heaping vp goods, and so little care of those to whom they shall leaue them? It is as much as if a man should take care of his shoo and not of his foot. What should hee do with riches that is not wise and knowes not how to vse them? It is like a rich and beautifull saddle vpon a iades backe. Parents then are doubly obliged to this duty; both because they are their children, and because they are the tender plants, and hope of the Common-weale: This is to till his owne land together with that of the weale-publicke.

2
The diuision
of the office
of parents.

p. 461.
462.
p. 482.

Now this office or dutie hath foure successiue parts, according to those foure goods or benefits that a child ought to receiue successiue from his parents, life, nourishment, instruction, communication. The first regardeth the time, when the infant is in the wombe, vntill his comming into the world inclusiuelie: the second the time of his infancie in his cradle, vntill hee know how to goe and to speake: the third all his youth; this part must be handled more at large, and more seriously: the fourth concerneth their affection, communication and cariage towards their children now come to mans estate, touching their goods, thoughts, designments.

3
The first
part, the office
of parents.

The first, which regardeth the generation, and fruit in the wombe is not accounted of and obserued with such diligence as it ought, although it haue as much part in the good or euill of a child (as well of their bodies as their soules) as their education and instruction after they are borne and come to some growth. This is that that giueth the subsistence, the temper and temperature, the nature; the other is artificiall and acquired: and if there be a fault committed in this first part, the second and third can hardly repaire it, no more than a fault in the first concoction of the stomacke, cannot bee mended in the second nor third. We men go vnadvisedlie and headlong to this copulation, only prouoked thereunto by pleasure, and a desire to disburthen our selues of that which tickleth and presseth

presseth vs thereunto : if a conception happen thereby, it is
 by chance, for no man goeth to it warily, and with such deli-
 beration and disposition of body as hee ought, and nature
 doth require. Since then men are made at aduventure, and by
 chance, it is no maruell if they seldome fall out to bee beauti-
 full, good, sound, wise and well composed. Behold then
 briefly, according to Philosophy the particular aduise-
 ments touching this first point, that is to say, the begetting of male
 children, sound, wise, and iudicious : for that which serueth
 for the one of these qualities, serues for the other. 1. A man
 must not couple himselfe with a woman that is of a vile, base
 and dissolute condition, or of a naughty and vitious compo-
 sition of body. 2. He must abstaine from this action and co-
 pulation seuen or eight daies. 3. During which time hee is to
 nourish himselfe with wholesome victuals, more hot and drie
 than otherwise, and such as may concoct well in the sto-
 macke. 4. He must vse a more than moderate exercise. All
 this tendeth to this end and purpose, that the seed may be wel
 concocted and seasoned, hot and drie, fit and proper for a
 masculine, sound and wise temperature. Vagabounds, idle
 and lazie people, great drinkers, who haue commonly an ill
 concoction, euer beget effeminate, idle and dissolute children
 (as *Hippocrates* recounteth of the Scythians.) Againe a man
 must applie himselfe to this encounter after one maner, a long
 time after his repast, that is to say, his bellie being empty, and
 he fasting (for a full panch performes nothing good either
 for the mind or for the body) and therefore *Diogenes* repro-
 ched a licentious yong man, for that his father had begotten
 him being drunke. And the law of the Carthaginians is com-
 mended by *Plato*, which enioined a man to abstaine from
 wine that day that he lay with his wife. 6. And not neere the
 monthly tearmes of a woman, but six or seuen daies before,
 or as much after them. 7. And vpon the point of conception
 and retention of the seed, the woman turning and gathe-
 ring herselfe together vpon the right side, let hir so rest for a
 time. 8. This direction touching the viands and exercise
 must be continued during the time of hir burthen.

To come to the second point of this office after the birth of
 the infant, these foure points are to be obserued. 1. The infant

must

The second
part of the
office of pa-
rents.
Ezech. 16.

Aul. Gell.
L. 12. c. 1.

Galen.
multis lo-
cis.
Homer.
10. Iliad.
I say 7.

must be washed in warme water, somewhat brinish, to make the members supple and firme, to cleanse and drie the flesh & the braine, to strengthen the sinewes, a very good custome in the Easterne parts & among the Iewes. 2. The nurse if she be to be chosen, let hir be young, of a temperature or complexion the least cold and moist that may be, brought vp in labour, hard lodging, slender diet, hardned against cold and heate. I say if she be to be chosen, because according to reason, and the opinion of the wisest, it should be the mother; and therefore they crie out against hir, when she refuseth this charge, being inuited and as it were bound thereunto by nature, who to that end hath giuen hir milke and dugs, by the example of beasts; and that loue and iealousie that she ought to haue of hir little ones, who receiue a very great hurt by the change of their aliment, now accustomed in a stranger, and perhaps a bad one too, of a constitution quite contrarie to the former, whereby they are not to be accounted mothers but by halfe. *Quod est hoc contra naturam imperfectum, ac dimidiatum matris genus peperisse, & statim ab se abiicisse, aluisse in utero sanguine suo nescio quid quod non videret: non alere autem nunc suo lacte, quod videat iam viuentem, iam hominem, iam matris officia implorantem.* 3. The nourishment besides the dugged should be goates milke, or rather creame, the most subtile and aerie part of the milke, sod with honie and a little salt. These are things very fit for the bodie and the mind, by the aduice of all the wise and great Physitians, Greeks, and Hebrews. *Butyrum & mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum, & eligere bonum.* The qualitie of milke or creame is very temperate, and full of good nourishment; the drinesse of the honie and salt consumeth the too great humiditie of the braine, and disposeth it vnto wisdom. 4. The infant must by little and little be accustomed and hardned to the aire, to heate and cold: and we are not to be fearefull thereof; for in the Northerne parts of the world they wash their children so soone as they come out of the womb of their mothers in cold water, and are neuer the worse.

The two first parts of the office of parents we haue soone dispatched; whereby it appeareth, that they are not true fathers that haue not that care, affection and diligence in these matters

matters that is fit; for they are the cause and occasion, either by carelesnesse or otherwise, of the death and vntimely birth of their children; and when they are borne they care not for them, but expose them to their own fortunes, for which cause they are depriued by law of that fatherlie power ouer them that is due vnto them; and the children to the shame of their parents are made slaues by those that haue nourished them and brought them vp, who are farre from taking care to preserve them from fire and water, and all other crosses and afflictions that may light vpon them.

The third part which concerneth the instruction of children we are to handle more seriouſlie. So soone as this infant

6

is able to goe and to speake, and shall begin to employ his mind and his bodie, and that the faculties thereof shall be awakened and shew themselves, the memorie, imagination, reason, which begin at the fourth or fift yeare, there must be a great care and diligence vsed in the well forming thereof: for this first tincture and liquor wherewith the mind must be seasoned, hath a very great power. It cannot be expressed how much this first impression and formation of youth preuaileth, euen to the conquering of nature it selfe. Nourture, saith one, excelleth nature. *Lycurgus* made it plaine to all the world, by two little dogs of one litter, but diuerslie brought vp, to whom presenting before them in an open place a pot of pottage and a hare, that which was brought vp tenderlie in the house fell to the pottage; the other that had beene euer trained vp in hunting, forsooke the pottage and ranne after the hare. The force of this instruction proceeds from this, that it entreth easily, and departeth with difficultie: for being the first that entreth, it taketh such place and winneth such credit as a man will, there being no other precedent matter to contest with it, or to make head against it. This mind then wholly new and neat, soft and tender, doth easily receiue that impression that a man will giue vnto it, and afterwards doth not easily lose it.

The third part of the office of parents.

An instruction very important.

Quint. Senec.

Now this is not a thing of small importance, but a man may rather say it is the most difficult and important that may be. For who seeth not that in a state all depends vpon this? Neuerthelesse (and it is the greatest, most dangerous and lamentable

7

Hh

table

table fault that is in our policies, noted by *Aristotle* and *Plutarch*) wee see that the conduct and discipline of youth is wholly left vnto the charge and mercie of their parents what kind of men soeuer they be, many times carelesse, foolish, wicked, and the publike state regardeth it not, cares not for it, whereby all goes to ruine. Almost the only states that haue giuen to the lawes the discipline of children, were that of Lacedemon and Creet: But the most excellent discipline of the world for youth, was the Spartaine; and therefore *Agésilais* perswaded *Xenophon* to send his children thither, for there, faith he, they may learne the most excellent science of the world, and that is to commaund and to obey well, and there are formed good Lawyers, Emperours at armes, Magistrates, Citizens. This youth and their instruction they esteemed aboue all things; and therefore *Antipater* demanding of them fiftie children for hostages, they answered him, that they had rather giue him twise as many men at their ripest yeares.

8

Now before we enter into this matter, I will heere giue an aduertisement of some weight. There are some that take great paines to discouer the inclinations of children, and for what imployment they shall be most fit; but this is a thing so obscure, and so vncertaine, that when a man hath bestowed what cost, and taken what paines he can, he is commonlie deceived. And therefore not to tie our selues to these weake and light diuinations and prognostications drawne from the motions of their infancie, let vs indeuor to giue them an instruction vniuersallie good & profitable, whereby they are made capable, readie, and disposed to whatsoever. This is to goe vpon a sure ground, and to do that which must alwaies be done. This shall be a good tincture, apt to receiue all others.

9

The diuision
of this mat-
ter.

x sec p. 480.

To make an entrance into this matter, we may referre it vnto three points, the forming of the spirit, the ordering of the bodie, the ruling of the maners. But before we giue any particular counsell touching these three, there are generall aduiselements that belong to the maner of proceeding in this businesse, that shew vs how to carie our selues worthily and happilietherein, which must be first knowne as a preamble to the rest.

10

The first is carefullie to gard his soule, and to keepe it neate
and

and free from the contagion and corruption of the world, that it receiue not any blot nor wicked attainture. And the better to do this, he must diligentlie keepe the gates, which are the eares especiallie, and then the eies, that is to say, giue order, that not any, no not his owne father, come neere vnto him to buz into his eares any thing that is euill. There needs no more but a word, the least discourse that may be, to make an euill almost past reparation. Gard thine eares aboue all, and then thy eies. And for this cause *Plato* was of opinion, that it was not fit that seruants and base persons should entertaine children with discourse, because their talke can be no better than fables, vaine speeches and fooleries, if not worse. This were to traine vp and to feede those tender yeares with follies and fooleries.

The first generall aduice touching instruction. To gard the eares.

The second aduice concerneth not only the persons that must haue charge of this child, but the discourse and conference wherewith he must be entertained, and the bookes he must reade. Touching the persons, they must be honest men, well borne, of a sweet and pleasing conuersation, hauing their head well framed, fuller of wisdom than of science; and that they agree in opinion together, lest that by contrarie counsels, or a different way in proceeding, the one by rigour, the other by flatterie, they hinder not one another, and trouble their charge and designments. Their bookes and communication must not be of small, base, sottish, friuolous matters, but great and serious, noble and generous; such as may rule and enrich the vnderstanding, opinions, maners; as they that instruct a man in the knowledge of our humane condition, the motions and mysteries of our minds, to the end he may know himselfe and others; such, I say, as may teach him what to feare, to loue, to desire; what passion is, what vertue, how he may iudge betwixt ambition and avarice, seruitude and subiection, libertie and licentiousnes. He is deceiued that thinketh that there is a greater proportion of spirit required to the vnderstanding of those excellent examples of *Valerius Maximus*, and all the Greeke and Romane histories (which is the most beautifull science and knowledge of the world) than to vnderstand *Amadis of Gaule*, and other like vaine and friuolous discourses. That child that can know how many

II
The second generall aduice touching the choice of instructors. Conference. Bookes.

hennes his mother hath, and who are his vncles and his consens, will as easilie carrie away how many kings there haue beene, and how many *Cæsars* in *Rome*. A man must not distrust the capacity and sufficiency of his mind, but know how to conduct and manage it.

12
The third
generall ad-
vice.
Instruction
milde and
free.

Coloss. 3.

The third is to carrie himselfe towards him, and to proceed not after an austere, rude and seuerer manner, but sweetly, mildly, & cheerefullie. And therefore we do heere altogether condemne that custome which is common in all places, to beat and to box, and with strange words and outcries to hazen children, and to keepe them in feare & subiection, as the maner is in free-schools & colléges. For it is a custome too vniust, and as foule a fault, as when a Iudge or Physitian shall be moued to choler against an offender and patient: preiudiciall and quite contrarie to that purpose that a man hath, which is to stir vp a desire in them, and to bring them in loue with vertue, wisdom, science, honesty. Now this imperious and rude cariage breeds in children a hatred, horror and detestation of that they should loue; it prouoketh them, makes them head-strong, abateth and taketh away their courage, in such sort that their mindes become seruile, base and slavish, like their vsage; *Parentes ne prouocetis ad iracundiam filios vestros ne despondeant animum*. For seeing themselves thus handled, they neuer performe any thing of woorth, but curse their master and their apprenticeshippe. If they doe that which is required at their hands, it is because the eie of the master is alwaies vpon them, it is for feare, and not cheerefullie and noblie, and therefore not honestly. If they faile and performe not their taske, to saue themselves from the rigour of the punishment, they haue recourse to base vnlawfull remedies, lies, false excuses, teares of despite, flights, triuentings, all worse than the fault they haue committed.

Terent.

*Dum id re scitum iri credit, tantisper cauet;
Si sperat fore clam, rursus ad ingenium redit:
Ille, quem beneficio adiungas, ex animo facit;
Studet par referre, praesens, absensq, idem erit.*

My will is that they be handled freely and liberally, vsing therein reason, and sweet and milde perswasions, which ingender in their hearts the affections of honour and of shame.

The

The first will serue them as a spurre to what is good, the second as a bridle to checke and withdraw them from euill. There is something, I know not what, that is seruile and base in rigor and constraint, the enemy to honour and true liberty. We must clean contrary fat their hearts with ingenuity, liberty, loue, vertue and honour.

Terent.

Pudore & liberalitate liberos retinere

Satiū esse credo, quā meū.

Hoc patrum est potius consuefacere filium

Sua sponte recte facere, quā alieno meū.

Hoc pater ac dominus interest, hoc qui nequit

Fateatur se nescire imperare liberis.

Blowes are for beasts that vnderstand not reason: iniuries and brawles are for slaues. He that is once accustomed thereunto is mard for euer. But reason, the beautie of action, the desire of honesty and honour, the approbation of all men, cheerefulnesse and comfort of heart, and the detestation of their contraries, as brutishnesse, basenesse, dishonour, reproch and the improbation of all men; these are the armes, the spurs and the bridles of children well borne, and such as a man would make honest men. This is that which a man should alwaies sound in their eares; and if these means cannot preuaile, all other of rigour and roughnesse shall neuer do good. That which cannot be done with reason, wisdom, endeouour, shall neuer be done by force; and if happily it be done, yet it is to small purpose. But these other meanes cannot be vnprofitable, if they be imploied in time, before the goodnesse of nature be spent and spilt. But yet for all this, let no man thinke that I approoue that loose and flattering indulgence, and sottish feare to giue children cause of discontent and sorrow, which is another extremity as bad as the former. This were like the Iuie, to kill and make barren the tree which it embraceth, or the ape that killeth hir yoong with culling them: or like those that feare to hold him vp by the haire of the head that is in danger of drowning, for feare of hurting him, and so suffer him to perish. Against this vice the wise Hebrew spake much. Youth must be held in obedience and discipline, not Eccles. 30. bodily like beasts and madmen, but spirituall, humane, liberal according to reason.

13
Particular
advisements
touching the
minde.

L.I.ca.7.

Tacit.

We come now to the particular and more expresse advise-
ments of this instruction. The first head of them is, as wee
have said, to exercise, sharpen and forme the mind. Where-
upon there are diuers precepts, but the first principall and
fundamentall of all others, which respecteth the end of in-
struction, and which I most desire to inculcate, because it is
least embraced and followed, and euery man runneth after
the contrary, which is a common and ordinarie error, is, to
haue much more, and the chiefe and principall care to exer-
cise, to husband and manure, to vse the proper good, and
much lesse to get and to endeouour the attainment of that
which is strange; to strue and study more for wisdom, than
for science and arte; rather well to forme the iudgement, and
by consequence the will, and the conscience, than to fill the
memorie, and to inflame the imagination. These are the
three mistresse parts of a reasonable soule: But the first is the
iudgement, as before hath beene discoursed, to which place I
resend the Reader. Now the custome of the world is quite
contrarie, which runneth wholly after arte, science, and what
is acquired. Parents to the end they may make their children
wise, are at great charge, and their children take great paines,
Vt omnium rerum sic literarum intemperantiâ laboramus: and
many times all is lost. But to make them wise, honest, apt
and dexterious, which is a matter of small charge or labour,
they take no care at all. What greater folly can there be in
the world, than more to admire science, that which is acqui-
red, memorie, than wisdom, than nature? Now all commit
not this fault with one and the same minde; some simplie car-
ried by custome, thinke that wisdom and science are not
things different, or at leastwise, that they march alwaies to-
gether, and that it is necessarie a man haue the one to attaine
the other; these kinde of men deserue to be taught: others
goe out of malice, and they thinke they know well enough
what they doe, and at what price soeuer it be they will haue
arte and science: For this is a meane in these daies in the oc-
cidentall parts of Europe to get fame, reputation, riches.
These kinde of people make of science an arte and merchan-
dise, science mercenarie, pedanticall, base and mechanicall.
They buie science to sell it againe. Let vs leaue these mer-
chants

chants as vncureable. Contrariwise, I cannot heere but blame the opinion and fashion of some of our gentlemen of Fraunce, (for in other nations this fault is not so apparent) who haue knowledge or arte in such disdaine & contempt, that they do lesse esteeme of an honest man only for this, because he hath studied: they discarde it as a thing that seemeth in some sort to impeach their nobilitie. Wherein they shew themselves what they are, ill borne, woorse aduised, and truely ignorant of vertue and honour; which they likewise bewray in their cariage, their idlenesse, their impertinencies, their insufficiencie, in their insolencies, vanities, and barbarities.

To teach others, and to discouer the fault of all this, we must make good two things; The one, that science and wisdom are things verie different; and that wisdom is more woorth than all the science or arte of the world; as heauen exceeds the price of the earth, gold of iron: the other, that they are not onely different, but that they seldome or neuer goe together, that they commonly hinder one another; he that hath much knowledge or arte is seldome wise, and he that is wise hath not much knowledge. Some exceptions there are heerein, but they are verie rare, and of great, rich, and happie spirits. Some there haue beene in times past, but in these daies there are no more to be found.

I 4
A compari- See p. 215.
son of science
and wisdom.

The better to performe this, we must first know what science and wisdom is. Science is a great heape, or accumulation and prouision of the good of another; that is, a collection of all that a man hath seene, heard and read in bookes, that is to say, of the excellent sayings and doings of great personages that haue beene of all nations. Now the garner or storehouse where this great prouision remaineth and is kept, the treasure of science and all acquired good, is the memorie. He that hath a good memorie, the fault is his owne if he want knowledge, because he hath the meane. Wisdom is a sweet and regular managing of the soule. He is wise that gouerneth himselfe in his desires, thoughts, opinions, speeches, actions, with measure and proportion. To be brieft, and in a word, wisdom is the rule of the soule: and that which manageth this rule is the iudgement, which seeth, iudgeth, esteemeth all things: rangeth them as they ought, giuing to euery thing

I 5
The definition
of science and
wisdom.

that which belongs vnto it. Let vs now see their differences and how much wisdom excels the other.

16

Science is a small and barraine good in respect of wisdom, for it is not only not necessarie (for of three parts of the world two and more haue made little vse thereof) but it brings with it small profit, and serues to little purpose. 1. It is no way seruiceable to the life of a man: How many people rich and poore, great and small, liue pleasantlie and happilie, that haue neuer heard any speech of science? There are many other things more commodious and seruiceable to the life of man, and the maintenance of humane societie, as honor, glorie, nobilitie, dignitie, which neuerthelesse are not necessarie. 2. Neither is it seruiceable to things naturall, which an ignorant sot may as well performe, as he that hath best knowledge: Nature is a sufficient mistrisse for that. 3. Nor to honestie, and to make vs better, *paucis est opus literis ad bonam mentem*, nay, it rather hindreth it. He that will marke it well shall find not only more honest people, but also more excellent in all kind of vertue amongst those that know little, than those that know most; witnesse Rome, which was more honest being young and ignorant, than when it was old, craftie, and cunning, *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientiam versa est*. Science serueth not for any thing, but to inuent crafts & subtleties, artificiall cunning, deuises, and whatsoever is an enemy to innocencie, which willingly lodgeth with simplicitie and ignorance. Atheisme, errours, sects, and all the troubles of the world haue risen from the order of these men of arte & knowledge. The first temptation of the diuell, saith the scripture, and the beginning of all euill, and the ruine of mankind, was the opinion and the desire of knowledge: *Eritis sicut dii scientes bonum & malum*. The Sirenes to deceiue and intrap *Vlysses* within their snares, offered vnto him the gift of science; and *S. Paul* aduiseth you all to take heed, *ne quis vos seducat per philosophiam*. One of the sufficient men of knowledge that euer was, spake of Science, as of a thing not only vaine, but hurtfull, painfull, and tedious. To be brieft, Science may make vs more humane and courteous, but not more honest. 4. Again, it serueth nothing to the sweetning of our life, or the quitting vs of those evils that oppresse vs in the

Salomon
in his Ec-
clesiast.

the world; but contrarily it increaseth and sharpneth them; witnesse children and fooles, simple and ignorant persons, who measuring euery thing by the present taste, run thorow them with the lesse grieve, beare them with better content, than men of greatest learning and knowledge. Science anticipateth those euils that come vpon vs, in such sort that they are sooner in the soule of man by knowledge, than in nature.

The wiseman said, that he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow: Ignorance is a more fit remedie against all euils, *inert malorum remedium ignorantia est.* From whence proceed those counsels of our friends, Thinke not of it, put it out of your head and memorie. Is not this to cast vs into the armes of ignorance, as into the best and safest sanctuarie that may be? But this is but a mockerie, for to remember and to forget is not in our power. But they would do as Chirurgions vse to do, who not knowing how to heale a wound, yet set a good shew vpon it by allaying the paine and bringing it asleepe. They that counsell men to kill themselves in their extreame and remediless euils, do they not fend a man to ignorance, stupiditie, insensibilitie? Wisdome is a necessarie good, and vniuersallie commodious for all things: it gouerneth and ruleth all: there is not any thing that can hide, or quit it selfe of the iurisdiction or knowledge thereof: It beareth sway euery where, in peace, in warre, in publick, in priuat: It ruleth and moderateth euen the insolent behaviors of men, their sports, their daunces, their banquets, and is as a bridle vnto them. To conclude, there is nothing that ought not to be done discretly and wisely; and contrarily, without wisdom all things fall into trouble and confusion.

Ecclesiastes 1. 18.

Secondly, Science is seruile, base, and mechanically in respect of wisdom, and a thing borrowed with paine. A learned man is like a crow deckt with the feathers that he hath stollen from other birds. He maketh a great shew in the world, but at the charge of another, and he had need to vaile his bonnet often, as a testimonie of that honor he giues to those from whom he hath borrowed his arte. A wise man is like him that liues vpon his owne reuenues; for wisdom is properly a mans owne; it is a naturall good well tilled and laboured.

17

Thirdly, the conditions are diuers, the one more beautifull and

18

and more noble than the other. Learning or Science is fierce, presumptuous, arrogant, opinatiue, indiscreet, querulous, *scientia inflat.* 2. Science is talkatiue, desirous to shew it selfe, which neuerthelesse knowes not how to do any thing, is not actiue, but only fit to speake and to discourse: wisdom acteth and gouerneth all.

Learning then and wisdom are things very different, and wisdom of the two the more excellent, more to be esteemed than science. For it is necessarie, profitable to all, vniuersall, actiue, noble, honest, gracious, cheerefull. Science is particular, vnnecessarie, seldome profitable, not actiue, seruile, mechanicall, melancholicke, opinatiue, presumptuous.

19
Learning
and wisdom
meete not
together.

Wisdom
without
science.

We come now to the other point, and that is, that they are not alwaies together, but contrarily almost alwaies separated. The naturall reason, as hath been said, is, that their temperatures are contrarie. For that of science and memorie is moist, and that of wisdom and iudgement drie. This also is signified vnto vs, in that which happened to our first parents, who as soone as they cast their eies vpon knowledge, they presently desired it, and so were robbed of that wisdom where-withall they were indued from their beginning; whereof we euery day see the like in common experience. The most beautifull and flourishing states, Common-weales, Empires, ancient and moderne, haue beene and are gouerned very wisely, both in peace and warre, without science. Rome the first five hundred yeares, wherein it flourished in vertue and valour, was without knowledge; and so soone as it began to be learned, it began to corrupt, to trouble, and ruinate it selfe by ciuill warres. The most beautifull policie that euer was, the Lacedemonian built by *Lycurgus*, from whence haue sprung the greatest personages of the world, made no profession of learning, and yet it was the schoole of vertue and wisdom, and was euer victorious ouer *Athens*, the most learned citie of the world, the schoole of all science, the habitation of the Muses, the store-house of Philosophers. All those great and flourishing realmes of the east and west Indies, haue stood for many ages together without learning, without the knowledge of bookes or writings. In these dayes they learne many things, by the good leaue and assistance of their new masters,

masters, at the expence of their owne libertie, yea their vices and their subtilties too, whereof in former times they neuer heard speach. That great, and it may be the greatest and most flourishing state and Empire which is at this day in the world, is that of that great Lord, who like the Lion of the whole earth, makes himselfe to be feared of all the Princes and Monarks of the world; and euen in this state, there is not any profession of science, nor schoole, nor permission or allowance to reade, or teach publickly, no not in matters of religion. What guideth & gouerneth, and maketh this state to prosper thus? It is wisdom, it is prudence. But come wee to those states wherein learning and sciences are in credit. Who do gouerne them? Doubtlesse not the learned. Let vs take for example this our realme, wherein learning and knowledge haue greater honor than in all the world besides, and which seemeth to haue succeeded Greece it selfe: The principall officers of this crowne, the Constable, Marshall, Admirall, the Secretaries of the state, who dispatch all affaires, are commonlie men altogether illiterate. And doubtlesse, many great Lawyers, founders, and Princes haue banished science as the poyson and pestilence of a Common-wealth; *Licinius, Valentinian, Mahomet, Lycurgus*. And thus wee see what wisdom is without science. Let vs now see what science is without wisdom, which is not hard to doe. Let vs looke a little into those that make profession of learning, that come from Schooles and Vniuersities, and haue their heads full of *Aristotle, Cicero, Bartolus*. Are there any people in the world more vntoward, more sottish, more vnfit for all things? From hence cometh that prouerb, that when a man would describe a foole, or an vntowardlie person, hee calleth him Clerke, Pedante: And to expresse a thing ill done, it is the maner to say, It is Clearklike done. It should seeme that learning doth intoxicate, and as it were hammer a mans braines, and makes him to turne sottish and foole, as king *Agrippa* said to *S. Paul*, *Multe te litera ad insaniam adducunt*. There are diuers men that had they neuer beene trained vp in schooles and colleges, they had beene farre more wise; and their brethren that haue neuer applied themselues to learning, haue prooued the wiser men: *Vt melius fuisset non didicisse: nam postquam docti prodierunt,*

Science
without
wisdom.

Act. 26.

dierunt, boni desunt. Come to the practise, chuse me one of these learned schollers, bring him to the common counsell of a citie, or any publike assemblee, wherein the affaires of the state are consulted of, or matter of policie, or household husbandrie, you neuer saw a man more astonished, he waxeth pale, blusheth, cougheth, and at last knowes not what to say. And if he chance to speake, he entreth into a long discourse, of definitions, and diuisions of *Aristotle*; *ergo* potlead. Marke in the selfe-same counsell a merchant, a burgesse, that neuer heard speake of *Aristotle*, he will yeeld a better reason, giue a sounder iudgement and more to purpose than these scholasticall doctors.

20
The reason
of this separation.

Now it is not enough to haue said, that wisdom and learning seldome concur and meete together, vnlesse we seeke the reason and cause thereof, not doubting thereby but sufficiently to content and to satisfie those, that mislike what I haue said, or thinke me perhaps an enemy to erudition and learning. The question thereof is, from whence it cometh that learning and wisdom doe seldome encounter and meete together in one and the same man: And there is great reason why we should moue this question: for it is a strange thing and against reason, that a man the more learned he is, should not be the more wise, learning and knowledge being a proper meanes, and instrument vnto wisdom. Behold therefore two men, the one a student, the other none; he that hath studied, is in some sort bound to be farre the wiser of the two, because he hath all that the other hath, that is, nature, reason, iudgement, spirit; and besides these the counsels, discourses, iudgements of all the greatest men of the world, by reading their books. Is there not then great reason, he should be much more wise, more dexterious, more honest than the other, since that with these proper and naturall meanes, he attaineth so manie extraordinarie on euerie side? For as one saith well, the naturall good cohering and concurring with the accidentall frameth an excellent composition: and yet neuerthelesse, we see the contrarie, as hath bene said.

21
An answer

Now the true reason and answer to all this, is the euill and sinister maner of studie and ill instruction. They learne out of

of bookes and schooles excellent knowledge, but with ill *to ill disci-*
 meanes, and as bad successe. Whereby it comes to passe, that *pline.*
 all their studie profiteth them nothing at all, but they re-
 maine indigent and poore, in the midst of their plentie and
 riches, and like *Tantalus*, die for hunger in the midst of their
 dainties: the reason is, because whilest they pore vpon their
 bookes, they respect nothing so much as to stufte and fur-
 nish their memories with that which they read and vn-
 derstand, and presently they thinke themselves wise: like
 him that put his bread into his pocket and not into his bel-
 ly, when his pocket was full, died for hunger. And so with
 a memory fully stufed, they continue fooles; *Student non*
sibi & vita, sed alijs & schola. They prepare themselves to
 be reporters; *Cicero* hath said it, *Aristotle*, *Plato* hath left
 it in writing, &c. but they for their parts know nothing.
 These men commit a double fault, the one in that they apply
 not that which they learne, to themselves, that so they may
 forme themselves vnto vertue, wisdom, resolution, by which
 meanes their knowledge is vnprofitable vnto them: the
 other is, that during all that time, which with great paines
 and charge they employ, to the heaping together and poc-
 keting vp for another without any profit to themselves,
 whatsoeuer they can robbe from other men, they suffer their
 owne proper good to fall to the ground, and neuer put in
 practise. They on the other side that studie not, hauing no
 recourse vnto another, take a care to husband their naturall
 gifts, and so prooue many times the better, the more wise, and
 resolute, though lesse learned, lesse gainers, lesse glorious.
 One there is that hath said as much, though otherwise and
 more briefly; That learning marreth weake wits and spirits,
 perfecteth the strong and naturall.

Now hearken to that counsell that I giue heereupon; A
 man must not giue himselfe to the gathering and keeping *22*
 the opinions and knowledges of another, to the end he may *Good disci-*
 afterwards make report of them, or vse them for shew or *pline.*
 ostentation, or some base and mercenary profit; but he must
 vse them so, as that he may make them his owne. He must
 not onely lodge them in his minde, but incorporate and tran-
 substantiate them into himselfe. He must not onely water his
 minde

minde with the deaw of knowledge; but he must make it essentially better, wise, strong, good, couragious; otherwise to what end serueth studie? *Non paranda nobis solum, sed fruenda sapientia est.* He must not doe as it is the maner of those that make garlands, who picke heere and there whole flowers, and so carry them away to make nose-gaies, and afterwards presents, heape together out of that booke and out of this booke many good things, to make afaire and a goodly shew to others; but he must do as bees vse to do, who carie not away the flowers, but settle themselves vpon them, like a hen that couereth hir chicken, and draweth from them their spirit, force, vertue, quintessence, and nourishing themselves, turne them into their owne substance, and afterwards make good and sweet honie, which is all their owne; and it is no more either thyme or sweet mariarom. So must a man gather from bookes the marrow and spirit (neuer enthralling himselfe so much as to retaine the words by heart, as many vse to do, much lesse the place, the booke, the chapter; that is a foolish and vaine superstition and vanitie, and makes him lose the principall) and hauing sucked and drawne the good, feed his mind therewith, informe his iudgement, instruct and direct his conscience and his opinions, rectifie his will; and in a word, frame vnto himselfe a worke wholly his owne; that is to say, an honest man, wise, aduised, resolute. *Non ad pompam nec ad speciem, nec ut nomine magnifico sequi otium velis, sed quo firmior aduersus fortuita rempublicam capeffas.*

Tacit.

23
2 The second
aduice touching the
choice of sciences.

And heereunto the choice of sciences is necessarie. Those that I commend aboue all others, and that best serue to that end, which I propose and whereof I am to speake, are naturall and morall, which teach vs to liue, and to liue well, nature and vertue; that which we are, and that which we should be: vnder the morall are comprehended, the Politicks, Economicks, Histories. All the rest are vaine and frothie, and we are not to dwell vpon them, but to take them as passing by.

24
3 The means
to learne.

By word of
mouth.

This end of the instruction of youth and comparison of learning and wisdom, hath held me too long, by reason of the contestation. Let vs now proceede to the other parts and aduise-ments of this instruction. The meanes of instructions are diuers, especiallie of two sorts; the one by word, that is to say,

say, by precepts, instructions, and lectures; or else by conference with honest and able men, filing and refining our wies against theirs, as iron is cleansed and beautified by the file; This meanes and maner is very pleasing and agreeable to nature.

The other by action, that is, example, which is gotten not only from good men by imitation, and similitude, but also ²⁵ *By example.* wicked, by disagreement in opinions; For some there are that learne better by the opposition and horror of that euill they see in another. It is a speciall vse of Iustice, to condemne one, that he may serue for an example vnto others. And old Cato was wont to say, That wise men may learne more of fooles, than fooles of wise men. The Lacedemonians the better to dissuade their children from drunkennesse, made their seruants drunken before their faces, to the end that seeing how horrible a spectacle a drunken man was, they should the rather detest it.

Now this second meanes or maner by example, teacheth *A comparison of these two.* vs with more ease and more delight. To learne by precepts is a long way, because it is a painefull thing to vnderstand well, and vnderstanding to retaine well, and retaining to vse and practise well. And hardlie can we promise our selues to reape that fruit which they promise vnto vs. But example and imitation teach vs aboue the worke or action it selfe, inuite vs with much more ardour, and promise vnto vs that glorie which we learne to imitate. The seed that is cast into the earth draweth vnto it selfe in the end the qualitie of that earth whereunto it is transported, and becomes like vnto that which doth there naturallie grow: So the spirits and maners of men conforme themselves to those with whom they commonlie conuerse.

Now these two maners of profiting by speech and by example, are likewise twofold, for they are drawne from excellent personages, either ²⁶ *From the living.* living, by their sensible and outward frequentation and conference; or dead, by the reading of their bookes. The first, that is the commerce with the living, is more liuely and more naturall, it is a fruitfull exercise of life, which was much in vse amongst the ancients, yea the Greeks themselves, but it is casuall depending on another, and rare: It

It is a difficult matter to meete with such people, and more difficult to make vse of them. And this is practised either by keeping home, or by traueilling & visiting strange countries, not to be fed with vanities as the most do, but to carie with them the knowledge and consideration especiallie of the humours and customes of those nations. This is a profitable exercise, the bodie is neither idle, nor tyred with labour, for this moderate agitation keepes a man in breath, the mind is in continuall exercise, by marking things knowen and new. There is not a better schoole to forme the life of man, than to see the diuersitie of so many other liues, and to taste a perpetuall varietie of the formes of our nature.

27
From the
dead by
bookes.

The other commerce with the dead by the benefit of their bookes, is more sure, and more neere vnto vs, more constant, and lesse chargeable. He that knowes how to make vse of them, receiueth thereby great pleasure, great comfort. It dischargeth vs of the burthen of a tedious idlenesse, it withdraweth vs from fond imaginations; and other outward things, that vex and trouble vs: It counselleth vs, and comforteth vs in our griefes and afflictions: but yet it is only good for the mind, whereby the bodie remaineth without action, altereth and languisheth.

28
4 To make
the scholler
to speake and
to reason.

We must now speake of that order of proceeding and formalitie which a teacher of youth must keepe, that he may happilie arriue to his proposed end. It hath many parts; we will touch some of them. First, hee must often examin his scholler, aske his iudgement and opinion of whatsoever shall present it selfe vnto him. This is quite contrarie to the ordinarie stile, which is, that the master do alwaies speake and teach his child with authoritie, and worke into his head as into a vessell, whatsoever he will, in so much that children are only auditours and receiuers, which maner of teaching I can not commend, *obest plerunq; is, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum qui docent.* Their spirits must be awakened and inflamed by demaunds, make them first to giue their opinions, and then giue them the same libertie, to aske others, to enquire and to open the way at their owne will. If without questioning with them a man speake wholly vnto them, it is a labour in a maner lost, the child is not profited thereby, because he thinks

thinks it belongs not vnto him, so long as he yeelds not an account thereof; he lends only his eares and those coldly too; he sets not forward with so good a pace, as when he is a partie in the businesse. Neither is it enough to make them giue their iudgement, but that they maintaine it, and be able to giue a reason of their saying, to the end that they speake not by rote, but that they be attentiuē, and carefull of that they speake: and to giue them the better encouragement thereunto, a man must not seeme to neglect that they say, but commend at the least their good essay and indeuor. This forme of teaching by questions and demaunds is excellentlie obserued both by *Socrates* (the principall in this businesse) as wee see euery where in *Plato*, where by a long connexion and enfolding of demaunds wittilie and dexteriously made, he sweetlie leaderh a man to the closet of veritie; and also by the Doctor of veritie in his Gospell. Now these questions must not be only of things touching science and memorie, as hath been said, but matter of iudgement. For to this exercise all things may serue, euen the least that are, as the follies of a Laquey, the malice of a Page, a discourse at table: for the worke of iudgement is not to handle and to vnderstand great and high matters, but iustlie to weigh them, and consider of them whatsoeuer they bee. Questions therefore must bee mooued touching the iudgement of men and their actions, and by reason determined, to the end that thereby men may frame their iudgement and their conscience. The tutor or instructor of *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* for a lecture proposed this question; A great youth hauing a little coat or cassocke, gaue it to one of his companions of a lesse stature, and tooke from him his cassocke, which was the greater: vpon which fact he demanded his iudgement. *Cyrus* answered, that it was wel, because both of them were thereby the better fitted. But his master reprehended him sharply for it, because hee considered onely the fittest and conueniencie thereof, and not the iustice, which should first and especially haue beene thought of, which was, that no man may be enforced in that which was his owne. And this no doubt is an excellent maner of instruction. And though a man may recite authorities out of books, the sayings of *Cicero* or *Aristotle*, yet it is not one-

Mat. 16.22.

Luk. 10.

& 24.

ly to recite them, but to iudge of them, and so to frame and fashion them to all vses, and to apply them to diuers subjects. It is not enough to report as a historie, that *Caro* kilde himselfe at *Vitruue*, that he might not fall into the hands of *Cesar*; and that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were the authors of the death of *Cesar*; for this is the least: but I will that he proceed and iudge, whether they did well heerein or no; whether they deserued well of the common-weale; whether they carried themselves therein according to wisdom, iustice, valour; and wherein they did ill, wherein well. Finally and generally, in all these discourses, demands, answers, the conueniencie, order, veritie, must be inquired into, a worke of iudgement & conscience. These things a man by any means must not dissemble, but euer presse them, and hold him subiect vnto them.

29
5 An ad-
uise-ment
touching ho-
nest curio-
sitie.

Secondly, he must accustome and frame him to an honest curiolity to know all things; whereby he must first haue his eyes vpon euery thing, the better to consider all that may be saide, done or attempted concerning himselfe, and nothing must passe his hands, before it passe and repasse his iudgement; and then he must make an enquirie into other matters, as well of right as of action. He that enquireth after nothing, knowes nothing, saith one; He that busieth not his minde, suffereth it to rust, and becomes a foole; and therefore he must make profit of all, apply euery thing to himselfe, take aduice and counsell, as well of what is past, the better to see the errour he hath committed, as of that which is to come, the better to rule and to direct himselfe. Children must not be suffered to be idle, to bring themselves asleepe, to entertaine themselves with their owne prattle; for wanting sufficiencie to furnish themselves with good and worthy matter, they will feed vpon vanities; they must therefore be alwaies busied in some imploiment, and kept in breath, and this curiositie must be ingendred in them, the better to awaken them, and to spurre them forward, which being such as is saide, shall be neither vaine in it selfe, nor tedious to another.

30
6 Advice.

He must likewise fashion and mould his spirit to the generall paterne and modell of the world and of nature, make it vniversall,

vniuersall, that is to say, represent vnto him in all things, the
 vniuersall face of nature: that the whole world may be his
 booke: that of what subiect soeuer a man talke, he cast his
 eie and his thought vpon the large immensitie of the world,
 vpon so many different fashions and opinions, which haue
 beene, and are in the world touching that subiect. The most
 excellent and noble mindes, are the more vniuersall and
 more free; and by this meanes the minde is contented, learn-
 eth not to be astonished at any thing, is formed to a resoluti-
 on and stedfast constancie. To be breefe, such a man doth no
 more admire any thing, which is the highest and last point
 of wisdom. For whatsoeuer doth happen, or a man may re-
 port vnto him, he easily findeth that there is nothing in the
 world either new or strange; that the condition of man is
 capable of all things; that they haue come from others, and
 that elsewhere diuers things passe more strange, more great.
 And in this sense it was that wise *Socrates* called himselfe a ci-
 tizen of the world. And contrarily, there is not any thing that
 doth more depraue and enthrall the minde of man, than to
 make him taste and vnderstand but one certaine opinion,
 beleefe, and maner of life. What greater follie or weak-
 nesse can there be, than to thinke that all the world walketh,
 beleeueth, speaketh, doth, liueth and dieth according to the
 maner of his countrey? like those barde block-heads, who
 when they heare one recite the maners and opinions of for-
 raine countries, very different and contrarie to theirs, they
 tremble for feare, and belecue them not; or else doe absurdly
 condemne them as barbarous, so much are they enthralled
 and tied to their cradell, a kinde of people brought vp (as
 they say) in a bottle, that neuer saw any thing but through a
 hole. Now this vniuersall spirit must be attained by the dili-
 gence of the master or teacher, afterwards by trauell, and
 communication with strangers, and the reading of bookes
 and the histories of all nations.

Finally, he must teach him to take nothing vpon credit
 and by authoritie: this is to make himselfe a beast, and to
 suffer himselfe to be ledde by the nose like an oxe; but to exa-
 mine all things with reason, to propose all things, and then
 to giue him leaue to chuse. And if he know not how to chuse,

but doubt, which perhaps is the better, sounder, and surer course, to teach him likewise to resolute of nothing of himselfe, but rather to distrust his owne iudgement.

See before
p. 462, 466

32 An aduise-
ment touch-
ing the body.

After the minde comes the body, whereof there must likewise be a care taken, at one and the same instant with the spirit, not making two works thereof. Both of them make an entire man. Now a master must endeavour to keepe his childe free from delicacie and pride in apparrell, in sleeping, eating, drinking; he must bring him vp hardly to labour and pains; accustome him to heat and cold, winde and weather, yea and vnto hazards too; harden his muscles and his sinewes, as well as his minde, to labour, and then to paine and griefe too; For the first disposeth to the second, *Labor callum obducit dolori*. To be brieft, he must endeavour to make him lustie and vigorous, indifferent to all kinde of viands. All this serueth not onely for his health, but for publike affaires and seruices.

See before
p. 462

33 An ad-
uisement
touching
maners.

We come now to the third head which concerneth maners, wherein both body and soule haue a part. This is twofold; To hinder the euill, to ingraft and to nourish the good. The first is the more necessarie, and therefore the greater care, and heed must be taken. It must therefore be done in time, for there is no time too speedy, to hinder the birth and growth of ill maners and conditions, especially these following, which are to be feared in youth.

1
Evill ma-
ners.

To lie, a base vice of seruants and slaues, of a licentious and fearefull minde, the cause whereof ariseth many times from bad and rude instruction.

2

A fottish shame and weaknesse, whereby they seeke to hide themselves, hold downe their heads, blush at euerie question that is proposed, cannot indure a correction, or a sharpe word, without a strange alteration of countenance. Nature doth many times beare a great sway heerein, but it must be corrected by studie.

3

All affectation and singularitie in habit, cariage, gate, speech, gesture, and all other things; this is a testimonie of vanitie and vaine-glory, and marreth all therest, euen that which is good. *Licet sapere sine pompa, sine inuidia*.

4

But aboue all, choler, fullennesse, obstinacie; and there-
fore

fore it is very necessarie that a childe neuer haue his will by such froward meanes, and that he learne and finde that these qualities are altogether vnprofitable and bootlesse, yea base and villanous; and for this cause he must neuer be flattered, for that marreth and corrupteth him, teacheth him to be sullen and froward, if he haue not his will, and in the end maketh him insolent, that a man shall neuer worke any good vpon him. *Nihil magis reddit iracundos, quàm educatio mollis & blanda.*

By the selfesame meanes a man must ingraft into him good and honest maners; And first instruct him to feare and reuerence God, to tremble vnder that infinite and inuisible maiestie, to speake seldome and soberly of God, of his power, eternitie, wisdom, will, and of his works; not indifferently and vpon all occasions, but fearefully, with shame and reuerence. Not to be ouer scrupulous in the mysteries and points of religion, but to conforme himselfe to the gouernment and discipline of the church. 34
Good maners.

Secondly, to replenish and cherish his heart with ingenuitie, freedome, candor, integritie, and to teach him to be an honest man; out of an honorable and honest minde, not seruilely and mechanically for feare, or hope of any honour or profit, or other consideration, than vertue it selfe. These two are especially for himselfe. 2

For another and the company with whom he conuerseth, he must worke in him a sweet kinde of affabilitie to accomodate himselfe to all kinde of people, to all fashions. *Omnis Aristippum decuit color, & status & res.* Heerein Alcibiades was excellent. That he learne how to be able, and to know how to doe all things, yea excesse and licentious behauiours if need be; but that he loue to doe onely that which is good: That he refraine to doe euill, not for want of courage, nor strength, nor knowledge, but will. *Multum interest virum peccare quis nolit, aut nesciat.* 3

Modestly, whereby he contesteth not, nor tieth himselfe, either to all, as to the greatest and most respectiue persons, or such as are his inferiors either in condition or sufficiencie, nor defendeth any thing obstinately, with affirmatiue, resolute, commanding words, but sweet, submisle and moderate speeches. 35
See Lib. 2. cap. 9.

ches. Hereof hath beene spoken else-where. And thus the three heads of the duties of parents towards their children are dispatched.

see before 36

p. 458 The fourth part touching the dutie of parents.

The loue of parents greater than the loue of children.

The fourth concerneth their affection and communication with them, when they are great and capable of that wherunto they were instructed. We know that affection is reciprocal and naturall betwixt parents and their children, but that of parents towards their children is farre more strong and more naturall, because it is giuen by nature to loue those things that are comming on to the maintenance and continuance of the world, especiallie those in whom a man doth liue when he is dead. That of children towards their parents is retrograde, and therefore it goeth not so stronglie, nor so naturallie; and it seemeth rather to be the paiment of a debt, and a thankfull acknowledgement of a benefit receiued, than a pure, free, simple, and naturall loue. Moreouer, he that giueth and doth good, loueth more than he that receiueth and is indebted: And therefore a father and euery agent that doth good to another, loueth more than he is beloued. The reasons of this proposition are many. All loue to be (which being is exercised and demonstrated in motion and action.) Now he that giueth, and doth good to another, is after a sort in him that receiueth. He that giueth and doth good to another, doth that which is honest and honorable; he that receiueth doth none of this: honestie is for the first, profit for the second. Now honestie is farre more worthie, firme, stable, amiable, than profit, which in a moment vanisheth. Againe, those things are most beloued that cost vs most; that is dearest vnto vs, which we come more dearely by. Now to beget, to nourish, to bring vp, is a matter of greater charge than to receiue all these.

37 The loue of parents two-fold.

This loue of parents is two-fold, though alwaies naturall, yet after a diuers maner: the one is simple and vniuersallie naturall, and as a simple instinct which is common with beasts, according to which parents loue and cherish their children, though deformed, stammering, halting, milke-sops, and vse them like moppers, or little apes. This loue is not truly humane. Man indued with reason, must not seruilelie subiect himselfe vnto nature as beasts do, but follow it more noble

noblie with discourse of reason. The other then is more humane and reasonable, whereby a man loueth his children more or lesse, according to that measure wherein he seeth the seeds and sparks of vertue, goodnes, and towardlinesse to arise and spring vp in them. Some there are who being besotted and caried with the former kind of affection, haue but little of this, and neuer complaining of the charge so long as their children are but small, complaine thereof when they come to their growth, & begin to profit. It seemeth that they are in a sort offended and vexed to see them to grow and set forward in honest courses that they may become honest men: These parents are brutish and inhumane.

Now according to this second, true, and fatherlie loue in the well gouerning thereof, parents should receiue their children, if they be capable, into their societie and partnership in their goods, admit them to their counsell, intelligence, the knowledge and course of their domesticall affaires, as also to the communication of their designements, opinions and thoughts; yea consent and contribute to their honest recreations and pastimes, as the case shall require, alwaies reseruing their ranke and authoritie. For wee condemne the austere, lordlike, and imperious countenance and cariage of those that neuer looke vpon their children, nor speake vnto them but with authoritie, will not be called fathers but lords, though God himselfe refuse not this name of father, neuer caring for the hartie loue of their children, so they may be feared, reuerenced, and adored. And for this cause they giue vnto them sparinglie, keepe them in want, that they may the better keepe them in awe and obedience, euer threatning them some small pittance by their last will, when they depart out of this life. Now this is a sottish, vaine, and ridiculous foolerie; It is to distrust their owne proper, true, and naturall authoritie, to get an artificiall; And it is the way to deceiue themselues, and to grow into contempt, which is cleane contrarie to that they pretend. It causeth their children to carie themselues cunninglie with them, and to conspire and find meanes how to deceiue them. For parents should in good time frame their minds to dutie, by reason, and not haue recourse to these meanes more tyrannous than fatherlie.

38

*Of the true
fatherly loue
in communi-
cating with
his children
being come
to yeares of
discretion.*

*Errat longè mea quidem sententia,
Qui imperium credit esse gravioris aut stabilius
Vt quod sit, quàm illud quod amicitia adiungitur.*

39 *The vsage of them in their last willes according to the lawes.* In the last disposition of our goods, the best and surest way is to follow the lawes & customes of the countrie. The lawes haue better provided for it than we, and it is a safer course to suffer them to faile in some thing, than to aduenture vpon our owne defects, in our owne proper choice. It is to abuse that libertie we haue therein, to serue our foolish fantasies and priuat passions, like those that suffer themselues to be caried by the vnwonted officious actions and flatteries of those that are present, who make vse of their last willes and testaments, either by gratifying or chastising the actions of those that pretend interest therein. A man must conforme himselfe to reason and common custome heerin, which is wiser than we are, and the surer way.

40 *Of the dutie of children towards their parents.* We come now to the dutie of children towards their parents, so naturall and so religious, and which ought to be done vnto them not as vnto pure and simple men, but demi-gods, earthlie, mortall, visible gods. And thus is the reason why *Philo* the Iew said, that the commandement touching the dutie of children was written the one halfe in the first table, which conteined the commandements that concerne our dutie towards God; and the other halfe in the second table, wherein are the commandements that concerne our neighbour, as being halfe diuine, and halfe humane. This dutie likewise is so certaine, so due and requisite, that it may not be dispensed withall by any other dutie or loue whatsoever, be it neuer so great. For, if it shall happen that a man see his father and his sonne so indangered at one and the same instant, as that he cannot rescue and succour them both, he must forsake his sonne, and goe to his father, though his loue towards his sonne be greater, as before hath beene said. And the reason is, because the dutie of a sonne towards his father is more ancient, and hath the greater priuiledge, and cannot be abrogated by any later dutie.

41 *This dutie consisteth in five points.* Now this dutie consisteth in five points, comprehended in this word, Honour thy father and thy mother. The first is reuerence, not only in outward gesture and countenance, but also inward,

inward, which is that high and holy opinion and esteeme, that a childe ought to haue of his parents, as the authors and originall causes of his being, and of his good, a qualitie that makes them resemble God himselfe.

The second is obedience, euen to the roughest and hardest commands of a father, according to the example of the *Rechabites*, who to obey the command of their father, neuer drank wine in all their liues: Nay more than that, *Isaac* refused not to yeeld his necke to the sword of his father. 2
Ier. 35.

The third is to succour their parents in all their needs and necessities, to nourish them in their old age, their impotency, and want, to giue them their assistance in all their affaires. We haue an example and paterne heereof euen in beasts. In the *Storke*, whose little ones (as *S. Basil* affirmeth) feed and nourish their old dames, couer them with their feathers, when they fall from them, and couple themselves together to carrie them vpon their backs. Loue furnisheth them with this arte. This example is so liuely and so significant, that the dutie of children towards their parents hath beene signified by the qualitie of this creature, *ἐν πτερὰ γένειν*, *reciconiare*. And the Hebrewes call this bird for this cause, *chasida*, that is to saie, the debonaire, the charitable bird. 3
In examer.
Leuit. 11. We haue likewise notable examples heere amongst men. *Cymon* the sonne of great *Miltiades*, whose father dying in prison, as some say for debt, and not hauing wherewithall to burie his bodie, much lesse to redeeme it being arested for the debt, whilest it was caried to the buriall, according to the lawes of that country, *Cymon* sold himselfe and his libertie for money to provide for his funerall. He with his plentie and goods relieued not his father, but with his libertie; which is deerer than all goods, yea and life too. He helped not his father liuing and in necessitie, but dead, and being no more a father nor a man. What had he done to succour his father liuing, wanting, and requiring his helpe? This is an excellent president. We haue two the like examples, euen in the weake and feeble sex of women, of two daughters which haue nourished and giuen sucke the one to the father, the other to hir mother, being prisoners and condemned to die by famine, the ordinarie punishment of the ancients. It seemeth in some sort a thing against

gainst nature, that the mother should be nourished with the daughters milke; but this is truly according to nature, yea those first lawes, that the daughter should nourish her mother.

4 The fourth is, not to doe, to attempt, or enterprise any thing of weight or importance, without the aduice, consent, and approbation of parents, and especially in mariage.

5 The fift is, mildly and gently to endure the vices, imperfections, and testie and impatient humors of parents, their feueritie and rigour. *Manlius* hath made good prooffe heereof: for the Tribune *Pomponius* hauing accused the father of this *Manlius* in the presence of the people of many crimes, and amongst others, that he ouer cruelly handled his sonne, enforcing him to till the earth: the sonne goeth to the Tribune and finding him in his bedde, putting the point of his dagger to his throat, inforced him to sweare, that he should desist from that pursuit he made against his father, desiring rather to indure his fathers rigour, than to see him troubled for it.

A childe shall finde no difficultie in these fiae duties, if he consider how chargeable he hath beene to his parents, and with what care and affection he hath beene brought vp. But he shall neuer know it well, vntill he haue children of his owne, as hee that was found to ride vpon a hobbie-horse playing with his children, entreated him that so tooke him to hold his peace vntill he were himselfe a father, reputing him till then no indifferent iudge in this action.

CHAP. XV.

The dutie of Masters and seruants.

See pag. 187. **H**Eere commeth the third and last part of priuate and domesticall iustice, which is the duties of masters and seruants. Touching which it is necessarie to know the distinction of seruants: for they are principally three sorts. That is to say, of slaues, whereof all the world hath beene full in former time, and is at this present, except a part of Europe, and no place more free than heere about France; they haue no power neither in their bodies nor goods, but are

are wholly their masters, who may giue, lend, sell, resell, exchange, and vse them as beasts of seruice. Of these hath beene spoken of at large.* There are inferiour seruants, and seruants, free people, masters of their persons and goods, yea they cannot bargaine, or otherwise doe any thing to the prejudice of their owne libertie. But they owe honour, obedience, and serue vntill such times, and vpon such conditions, as they haue promised, and their masters haue power to command, correct, and chastise them with moderation and discretion. There are also mercenaries, which are lesse subiect, they owe no seruice nor obedience, but onely worke and labour for money; and they haue no authoritie in commanding or correcting them.

* See pag. 209

The duties of masters towards their seruants, as well of slaves as inferior seruants, are, not to handle them cruellie, remembering they are men, and of the same nature with vs, but onely fortune hath put a difference, which is euer variable and sporteth it selfe in making great men little, and little great. And therefore the difference is not so great, so much to contemne them. *Sunt homines, contubernales, humiles amici, conserui, aequè fortuna subiecti.* Senec. To handle seruants gently, seeking rather to be beloued than feared, is the testimonie of a good nature: to vse them roughly and too seuerely, proceedeth from a crabbed and cruell minde, and that he beareth the same disposition towards all other men, but want of power hindereth the execution thereof. They ought to instruct them with godly and religious counsell, and those things that are requisite for their health and safety.

The duties of seruants are, to honour and feare their masters whatsoeuer they be, and to yeeld them obedience and fidelitie, seruing them not for gaine, or onely outwardly and for countenance, but heartily, seriously, for conscience sake, and without dissimulation. We read of most worthie, noble, and generous seruices performed in former times by some towards their masters, euen to the engaging and hazard of their liues, for their masters safegard and honour.

CHAP. XVI.

The dutie of Soueraignes and Subiects.

OF Princes and Soueraignes, their descriptions, notes, humours, markes, and discommodities hath beene discoursed in the first booke, chap. 49^r. Their dutie to gouerne the common-wealth hath beene spoken at large in this present booke, chap. 2. and 3^r. which is of politike prudence: yet we will touch a little heere the heads and generall points of their dutie.

¹
The dutie of
Soueraignes.

To be religi-
ous.

Mercur.
Trism.

The Soueraigne as the meane betweene God and the people, and debtour to these two, ought alwaies remember that he is the liuely image, the officer, and lieutenant generall of the great God his soueraigne; and to the people a perfect mirrour, a bright beame, a cleere looking glasse, an eleuated theater for euerie one to behold, a fountaine where all refresh themselves, a spurre to vertue, and who doth not any good, that is not famous, and put in the register of perpetuall memorie. He ought then first of all to feare and honour God, to be deuout, religious, to obserue pietie not onely for himselfe and for conscience sake, as euery other man, but for his state, and as he is a soueraigne. The pietie which we heere require in a prince, is the care he ought to haue, and to shew for the conseruation of religion and the ancient lawes and ceremonies of the countrey, prouiding by lawes penalties and punishments that the religion be neither changed, troubled, nor innouated. This is a thing that highly redoundeth to his honour and securitie (for all doe reuerence, and more willingly obey, and more slowly attempt or enterprise any thing against him whom they see feareth God; and beleue to be in his protection and safegard; *vna custodia pietas: pium virum nec malus genius nec fatum deuincit. Deus enim eripit eum ab omni malo.*) And also to the good of the state, for as all the wisest haue said, Religion is the band and cement of humane societie.

²
To obserue
the lawes of
superiors.

The Prince ought also to be subiect, and inuiolable to obserue and cause to be obserued the lawes of God, and nature, which

which are not to be dispensed with: and he that infringeth them is not only accounted a tyrant, but a monster.

Concerning the people, he ought first to keepe his covenants and promises, be it with subiects or others with whom he is interessed or hath to do. This equitie is both naturall and vniuersall. God himselfe keepeth his promise. Moreover, the prince is the pledge and formall warrant of the law and those mutuall bargaines of his subiects. He ought then aboute all to keepe his faith, there being nothing more odious in a prince than breach of promise and periurie; and therefore it was well said, that a man ought to put it among those casual cases if the prince do abiure or reuoke his promise, and that the contrarie is not to be presumed. Yea he ought to obserue those promises and bargaines of his predecessors, especially if he be their heire, or if they be for the benefit and welfare of the common-wealth. Also he may relieue himselfe of his vnreasonable contracts and promises vnaduisedlie made, euen as for the selfe-same causes priuat men are releued by the benefit of the prince.

He ought also to remember, that although he be aboute the law (I meane the ciuill and humane) as the Creator is aboute the creature (for the law is the worke of the prince, and which he may change and abrogate at his pleasure, it is the proper right of the soueraigntie) neuerthelesse though it be in force and authoritie, he ought to keepe it: to lue, to conuerse and iudge according vnto it: and it would be a dishonor and a very euill example to contradict it, and as it were falsifie it. Great *Augustus* hauing done something against the law, by his owne proper acte would needs die for grieve: *Lycurgus*, *Agessilaus*, *Selencus*, haue left three notable examples in this point, and to their cost.

Thirdly, the prince oweth iustice to all his subiects; and he ought to measure his puissance and power by the rule of iustice. This is the proper vertue of a prince trulie royall and princelike, whereof it was rightlie said, by an old man to king *Philip* that delayed him iustice, saying he had no leisure, That he should then desist & leaue off to be king. But *Demetrius* sped not so well, who was dispossessed of his realme by his subiects, for casting from a bridge into the riuer many of their

their petitions, without answer, or doing them iustice.

6
To take care
and affect
the common
good.

Senec.

Finally, the prince ought to loue, cherish, to be vigilant and carefull of his state, as the husband of the wife, the father of his children, the shepheard of his flock, hauing alwaies before his eyes the profit and quiet of his subiects. The prosperitie and welfare of the state is the end and contentment of a good prince, *ut respub. opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, uirtute honesta sit.* The prince that tieth himselfe to himselfe abuseth himselfe: for he is not his owne man, neither is the state his, but he is the states. He is a Lord, not to domineere, but to defend. *Cui non ciuium seruitus tradita, sed tutela:* to attend, to watch, to the end his vigilance may secure his sleeping subiects, his trauell may giue them rest, his prouidence may maintaine their prosperitie, his industrie may continue their delights, his businesse their leisure their vacation, and that all his subiects may vnderstand and know that he is as much for them, as he is aboue them.

7

p. 354. 374.

To be such and to discharge his dutie well, he ought to demean and carie himselfe as hath bin said at large in the second and third chapter of this booke, that is to say, to furnish himselfe of good counsell, of treasure, and sufficient strength within his state, to fortifie himselfe with alliance, and forraime friends to be readie, and to command both in peace and war; by this meanes he may be both loued and feared.

8

And to conteine all in a few words, he must loue God aboue all things, be aduised in his enterprises, valiant in attempts, faithfull and firme in his word, wise in counsell, carefull of his subiects, helpfull to his friends, terrible to his enemies, pitifull to the afflicted, gentle and curteous to good people, seuerer to the wicked, and iust and vpright towards all.

9

The dutie
of subiects.

Exod. 12.

The dutie of subiects consisteth in three points, to yeeld due honor to their princes, as to those that carie the image of God, ordeined and established by him; therefore they are most wicked, who detract or slander; such were the seed of *Cham* and *Chanaan*. 2. To be obedient, vnder which is contained many duties, as to goe to the warres, to pay tributes and imposts imposed vpon them by their authoritie. 3. To wish them all prosperitie and happinesse, and to pray for them.

But

But the question is, Whether a man ought to yeeld these three duties generallie to all princes, if they be wicked or tyrants. This controuersie cannot be decided in a word, and therefore wee must distinguish. The prince is a tyrant and wicked either in the entrance, or execution of his gouernmēt. If in the entrance, that is to say, that he treacherouslie inuadeth, and by his owne force and powerfull authoritie gaines the soueraigntie without any right, be he otherwise good or euill (for this cause he ought to be accounted a tyrant) without all doubt we ought to resist him either by way of iustice, if there be opportunitie & place, or by surprise: and the Grecians, saith *Cicero*, ordeined in former times rewards and honors for those that deliuered the common-wealth from seruitude and oppression. Neither can it be said to be a resisting of the prince, either by iustice or surprise, since he is neither receiued, nor acknowledged to be a prince.

If in the execution, that is to say, that his entrance be rightfull and iust, but that he carieth himselfe imperiouslie, cruellie, & wickedlie, and, according to the common saying, tyrannicallie, it is then also to be distinguished; for it may be so three waies, and euery one requireth particular consideration. The one is in violating the lawes of God and nature, that is to say, against the religion of the countrie, the commaundement of God, inforcing and constraining their consciences. In this case he ought not to yeeld any dutie or obedience, following those diuine axiomes, That we ought rather obey God than men, and feare him more that commaundeth the intire man, than those that haue power but ouer the least part. Yet he ought not to oppose himselfe against him by violence or sinister meanes, which is another extremitie, but to obserue the middle way, which is either to flie or suffer, *fugere, aut pati*; these two remedies named by the doctrine of veritie in the like extremities. 2. The other lesse euill, which concerneth not the consciences, but only the bodies and the goods, is an abuse to subiects, denying them iustice, imprisoning their persons, and depriuing them of their goods. In the which case he ought with patience and acknowledgement of the wrath of God yeeld these three duties following, honor, obedience, vowes and prayers; and to be mindfull of three things, that

IO
Whether it
be lawfull
to lay violēt
hands vpon
the person of
a tyrant.
A double
tyrant.
The entrance.

2
In the execution three
waies.

Heerof see
aboue Chap.
4. in Chap. of
tyrannie
and rebel-
lion. p. 714

all

Tacit.

all power and authoritie is from God, and whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: *principi summum rerum iudicium dii dederunt. Subditis obsequij gloria relicta est: bonos principes voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare.* And he ought not to obey a superior, because he is worthie and worthilie commaundeth, but because he is a superior; not for that he is good, but because he is true and lawfull. There is great difference betweene true and good, every one ought to obey the law, not because it is good and iust, but simple, because it is the law. 2. That God causeth an hypocrite to raigne for the sinnes of the people, though he reserue him for a day of his furie; that the wicked prince is the instrument of his iustice, the which we ought to indure as other evils, which the heavens do send vs; *quomodo sterilitatem aut nimias imbres & cetera natura mala, sic luxu & auaritiam dominantium tolerare.*

Tacit.

3. The examples of *Saul, Nabuchodonoser*, of many Emperours before *Constantine*, and others since him as cruell tyrants as might be: towards whom neuerthelesse these three duties haue been obserued by good men, and enioined them by the Prophets and learned men of those daies, according to the oracle of the great Doctour of truth, which inferreth an obedience to them which sit in the seate of gouernment, notwithstanding they oppresse vs with insupportable burthens, and their gouernment be euill.

The third concerneth the whole state, when he would change or ruinate it, seeking to make it electiue, hereditarie, or of an Aristocracie, or Democracie, a Monarchie, or otherwise: And in this case he ought to withstand and hinder their proceedings, either by way of iustice or otherwise: for he is not master of the state; but only a gardian and a suertie. But these affaires belong not to all, but to the tutours and maintainers of the state, or those that are interessed therein, as Electours of electiue states; or Princes apparent in hereditarie states; or states generall, that haue fundamentall lawes. And this is the only case wherein it is lawfull to resist a tyrant. And all this is said of subjects, who are neuer permitted to attempt anything against a soveraigne Prince for what cause soeuer, and the lawes say that he deserueth death, who attempteth, or giueth counsell, and which intendeth, or only thinketh

L. Cogitatio-
nis ff de pæn.
L. Si quis non
dicam c. de
sacrof. Eccles.

thinketh it. But it is honorable for a stranger, yea, it is most noble and heroicall in a prince by warlike means to defend a people vniustlie oppressed; and to free them from tyrannie, as *Hercules* did, and afterward *Dion*, *Timoleon*, and *Tamberlaine* prince of the Tartars, who ouercame *Baiazeth* the Turkish Emperour, and besieged *Constantinople*.

These are the duties of subiects towards their liuing soveraignes: But it is a point of iustice to examine their life after they are dead. This is a custome iust and very profitable, which benefiterh much those nations where it is obserued: and which all good Princes doe desire, who haue cause to complaine, that a man handleth the memorie of the wicked as well as theirs. Soueraignes are companions if not masters of the lawes; for seeing iustice cannot touch their liues, there is reason, it taketh hold of their reputation, and the goods of their successours. We owe reuerence and dutie equallie to all kings, in respect of their dignitie and office, but inward estimation and affection to their vertue. We patientlie indure them, though vnworthie as they are: We conceale their vices; for their authoritie and publike order where we liue hath neede of our common help: but after they are gone, there is no reason to reiect iustice, and the libertie of expressing our true thoughts; yea it is a very excellent and profitable example, that we manifest to the posteritie faithfullie to obey a Master or Lord, whose imperfections are well knowne. They who for some priuat dutie commit a wicked prince to memorie, do priuat iustice to the publike hurt. O excellent lesson for a successour if it were well obserued!

12
Examination
of Some
raignes after
their death.

CHAP. XVII.

The dutie of Magistrates.

Good people in a common-wealth would loue better to enjoy ease of contentment; which good and excellent spirits know how to giue themselves in consideration of the goods of nature, and the effects of God, than to vndertake publike charges, were it not that they feare to be ill gouerned, and by the wicked, and therefore they consent to be magistrates: but to hunt and follow publike charges, especiallie

1 See p. 196.
For what
cause Magi-
strates are
allowed of.

Lamprid.

the iudgement seat is base and vile, and condemned by all good lawes, yea euen of the heathen, witnesse the law *Julia de ambitu*: vnworthie a person of honour, and a man cannot better expresse his insufficiencie, than by seeking for it. But it is most base and vile by briberie or money to purchase them, and there is no merchandize more hatefull and contemptible than it: for it necessarily followeth, that he which buieth in grosse, selleth by retaile: Whereupon the Emperour *Seuerus* speaking against the like inconuenience, saith, That a man can not iustly condemne him which selleth that he bought.

2
How a magistrate
ought to prepare himself
before he take the
charge.

Euen as a man apparrelleth himselfe, and putteth on his best habit before he departeth his house to appeare in publike: so before a man vndertake publike charge, he ought priuately to examine himselfe, to learne to rule his passions, and well to settle and establish his minde. A man bringeth not to the turney a raw vnmanaged horse, neither doth a man enter into affaires of importance, if he hath not beene instructed and prepared for it before: so, before a man vndertakes these affaires, and enters vpon the stage and theater of this world, he ought to correct that imperfect and sauage part in vs, to bridle and restraine the libertie of affections, to learne the lawes, the parts, and measures thereof, wherewith it ought to be handled in all occasions. But contrarily it is a very lamentable and absurd thing, as *Socrates* saith, that although no man vndertaketh the profession of any mysterie or mechanicall arte, which formerly he hath not learned: yet in publike charges, in the skill to command and obey well, to gouerne the world, the deepest and difficultest mysterie of all, they are accepted, and vndertake it, that know nothing at all.

3
A generall
description
of magistrates.

Magistrates are intermixed persons, placed betweene the soueraigne and priuate men, and therefore it behooueth them to know how to command, and to obey, how to obey their soueraigne, yeeld to the power of superiour magistrates, honour their equals, command their inferiors, defend the weake, make head against the great, and be iust to all: and therefore it was well said, That magistracie descrieth a man, being to play in publike so many parts.

In

In regard of his soueraigne, the magistrate according to the diuerſitie of the commands, ought diuerſly to gouerne, or readily, or not at all to obey, or ſurceaſe his obedience. ⁴ *The dutie of magiſtrates as touching the ſoueraigne.* First, in thoſe commands which yeeld vnto him acknowledgement and allowance, as are all the warrants of Juſtice, and all other where this claufe, or any equiualent vnto it (if it appeare vnto you) or which are without attribution of allowance, iuſt and indifferent of themſelues, he ought to obey, and hee may eaſily diſcharge himſelfe without any ſcruple and danger.

2 In thoſe commands which attribute vnto him no acknowledgement, but onely the execution, as are warrants of command, if they be againſt right and ciuill Juſtice, and that haue in them claufes derogatorie, he ought ſimplie to obey: for the ſoueraigne may derogate from the ordinarie law, and this is properly that wherein ſoueraigntie conſiſteth.

3 To thoſe which are contrarie to right, and conteine no derogatorie claufe, but are wholly preiudiciall to the good and vtilitie of the common-wealth, what claufe ſoeuer it hath, and though the magistrate knoweth it to be falſe, and inforced againſt right and by violence, he ought not to yeeld readily in theſe three cauſes, but to hold them in ſuſpence, and to make reſiſtance once or twice; and at the ſecond or third command to yeeld.

4 Touching thoſe which are repugnant to the law of God, and nature; he ought to diſmiſſe and acquit himſelfe of his office, yea to indure any thing, rather than obey or conſent: and he need not ſay that the former commands may haue ſome doubt in them: becauſe naturall Juſtice is more cleere than the light of the Sunne.

5 All this is good to be done in reſpect of the things themſelues; But after they are once done by the ſoueraigne, how euill ſoeuer they be, it is better to diſſemble them, and burie the memorie of them, than to ſtirre and loſe all (as *Papinian* did) *frustra viti & mihi aliud, niſi odium querere, extrema demencia eſt.*

In reſpect of priuate ſubiectſ, magiſtrates ought to remember, that the authority which they haue ouer them, they haue but at a ſecond hand, and hold it of the ſoueraigne, who

⁵ *As touching priuate men.*

alwaies remaineth absolute lord, and their authoritie is limited to a prefixed time.

2 The magistrate ought to be of easie accessse, ready to heare and vnderstand all complaints and sutes, hauing his gate open to all, and himselfe alway at hand, considering he is not for himselfe, but for all, and seruant of the common-wealth, *Magna seruitus, magna fortuna.* And for this cause the law of *Deut. 16.* *Moyse* prouided, that the Iudges and iudgement seats were held at the gates of the cities, to the end euery man might haue easie accessse thereto.

3 He ought also indifferently to receiue and heare all, great and little, rich and poore, being open to all; Therefore a wise man compareth him to an altar whereto a man repairerth being oppressed and afflicted, to receiue succour and comfort.

4 But he ought not to conuerse and be familiar with many, but with very few, and those very wise and aduised, and that secretly: for it debaseth authoritie, it diminisheth and dissolueth the grace and reputation thereof. *Cleon* called to the gouernment of the common-wealth, assembled all his friends, and there renounced and disclaimed all intimation or inward amitie with them, as a thing incompatible with his charge, for *Cirero* saith, he deprineth himselfe of the person of a friend, that vndertaketh that of a Iudge.

5 His office is especially in two things, to vphold and defend the honor, the dignitie, and the right of his soueraigne, and of the weale publike which he representeth: *gerere personam ciuitatis, eius dignitatem & decus sustinere*, with authority and a milde seueritie.

6 Then as a good and loyall interpreter and officer of the Prince, he ought exactly to see that his will be performed; that is to say the law, of which he is the minister, and it is his charge to see it diligently executed towards all, therefore he is called the liuing law, the speaking law.

7 Although the magistrate ought wisely to temper mildnesse with rigour, yet it is better for a magistrate to be seuer and cruell, than gentle, facill, and pitifull: and God forbidderth to be pitifull in iudgement. A seuer Iudge holdeth subiects in obedience of the lawes: a milde and pitifull makes them to contemne the lawes, the magistrates, and the Prince.

Cic. lib. 1.
Officior.

Prince, who made both. To be briefe, to discharge well his office, there is required two things, honesty and courage. The first hath need of the second. The first preserveth the magistrate free from avarice, respect of persons, of bribes, which is the plague, and smotherer of truth. (*Acceptatio munerum pravaricatio est veritatis*) from the corruption of iustice which *Plato* calleth an hallowed virgin: Also from passions, of hatred, of loue, and others, all enemies to right and equity. But to carrie himselfe well against the threatnings of great men, the importunate intreaties of his friends, the lamentations and teares of the poore distressed, which are all violent and forceable things, and yet haue some colour of reason and iustice, and which maketh sometimes the most resolute to relent, he had need of courage. Firme and inflexible constancie is a principall qualitie and vertue in a magistrate, to the end he may not feare the great and mightie, and be not mooued and mollified with the miserie of another, though it cary with it some shew of goodnesse: But yet it is forbid to haue pitie of the poore in iudgement.

CHAP. XV III.

The dutie of the great and small.

THe dutie of the great consisteth in two things, in endeavouring by all meanes, to spend their bloud and abilitie for the defence and conseruation of pietie, iustice, of the Prince, of the state, and generally for the welfare and good of the common-wealth; of which they ought to be the pillars & supporters; and after in defending and protecting the poore afflicted and oppressed, resisting the violence of the wicked: and like good bloud, to runne to the wounded part, according to the prouerbe; That good bloud, that is to say, noble and generous, can not lie, that is to say, deceiue where is need. By this meanes *Moyse* became the head of the Iewish nation, vndertaking the defence of men iniured and vniustly trod vnder foot. *Hercules* was deified for deliuering the oppressed from the hands of tyrants. Those that haue done the like, haue beene called Heroes and demi-gods, and to the like, all honours haue beene anciently ordeined, that is, to

Exod. 2.

such as deserued well of the common-wealth, and were the deliuerers of the oppressed. It is no greatnesse for a man to make himselfe to be feared, (except it be of his enemies) and to terrifie the world, as some haue done, which also haue procured them hate. *Oderint dum metuant.* It is better to be beloved than adored. This commeth of a naturall pride, and inhumanitie, to contemne and disdaine other men as the ordure and excrements of the world, and as if they were not men; and from thence they grow cruell, and abuse both the bodies and goods of the weake, a thing wholly contrarie to true greatnesse and honour, who ought to vndertake the defence thereof.

The dutie of inferiors towards their superiors, consisteth in two points, in honoring and reuerencing them, not onely ceremoniously and in outward shew, which he must doe as well to the good as the euill, but with loue and affection, if they deserue it, and are louers of the common-wealth. These are two things, to honour, and to esteeme, which are due to the good and truely great: to others to bend the knee, to bowe the body, not the heart, which is to esteeme and loue. Moreouer to please them by humble and seruiceable duties, and to insinuate into their fauour.

Principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est.

And to make himselfe capable of their protection, which if he cannot procure them to be his friends, yet at the least not to make them his enemies, which must be done with measure and discretion. For ouer-greedilie to auoid their indignation, or to seeke their grace and fauour, besides that it is a testimonie of weaknesse, it is silentlie to condemne them of iniustice and crueltie; *Non ex professo cauere aut fugere: nam quem quis fugit, damnat;* Or to stirre vp in them a desire to execute their furie, seeing so base and fearefull a submission.

Of Fortitude the third vertue.

P R E F A C E .

THe two former precedent vertues rule and gouerne man in companie, or with another: these two following rule him in himselfe and for himselfe: respecting the two visages of

of fortune, the two heads and kinds of all accidents, Prosperitie, and Aduersitie: for fortitude armeth a man against aduersitie, Temperance guideth him in prosperitie: moderating the two brutish parts of our soule, fortitude ruleth the irascible, temperance the concupiscible: These two vertues may wholly be comprised and vnderstood by this word Constancie, which is a right and equall stayednesse of the mind, in all accidents and outward things, whereby he is not puffed vp in prosperitie, nor deiected in aduersitie. *Nec aduersis frangitur, nec prosperis astuat.*

CHAP. XIX.

Of Fortitude or Valour in generall.

VAlour, (for this vertue is more properlie so called than fortitude) is a right and strong resolution, an equall, and vniforme stayednes of the mind against all dangerous, difficult, and dolorous accidents: in such sort, that difficultie and danger is the obiekt and matter wherein it is exercised: to be breefe, it is all that which humane weaknes feareth, *Timendorum contemptrix, qua terribilia, & sub iugum libertatem nostram mittentia, despicit, pronocat, frangit.* Senec.

¹
The description
of valour.

Senec.

Of all the vertues in greatest estimation and honor, this is most renowned, who for the prerogatiue thereof is simplic called a vertue. That is the more difficult, the more glorious, which produceth the greatest, famous, and most excellent effects; it containeth magnanimitie, patience, constancie, an inuincible resolution, heroicall vertues, whereupon many haue sought the inconueniences that belong thereunto, with greedinesse to attaine so honorable imployment. This vertue is an impregnable bulwarke, a compleat armour to encounter all accidents, *Munimentum imbecillitatis humane inexpugnabile: quod qui circumdedit sibi, securus in hac vite obsidione perdurat.* Senec.

²
The praise
thereof.

Senec.

But because many do mistake, and in place of the only true vertue conceiue the false and bastardlie valours, I will in declaring more at large the nature and definition thereof, expell those popular errors that are heere intruded. We will note then in this vertue four conditions; the first is generallie and

³
Of imperfect
or false
valours.

Military
valour.

indifferentlie against all sorts of difficulties & dangers: wherefore they are deceived that thinke there is no other valour than the militarie, which only they esteeme, because it may be it is most renowned and glorious, and carrieth greatest reputation and honor, which is the tongue and trumpet of immortalitye; for to say truth, there is more fame and glorie therein than paine and danger. Now this is but a small part and a little raye or light of the true, entire, perfect, and vniuersall, whereby a man is one and the same; in companie, in bed with his griefes, as in the field, as little fearing death in his house, as in the armie. This militarie valour is pure and naturall in beasts, with whom it is as well in females as in males; in men it is often artificiall, gotten by feare and the apprehension of captiuitie, of death, of griefe, of pouertie; of which things beasts haue no feare. Humane valour is a wise cowardlinesse, a feare accompanied with foresight to auoid one euill by another; choler is the temper, and file thereof; beasts haue it simplie. In men also it is attained by vse, institution, example, custome, and it is found in base and flauish minds: of a seruant or slaue, or a factour, or fellow trained vp in merchandise, is made a good and valiant souldier, and often without any tincture or instinct of vertue and true philosophicall valour.

4
Temeritie or
stupiditie.

Seneca.

The second condition, it presupposeth knowledge as well of the difficultie, paine, and danger, which there is in the action that is presented, as of the beautie, honestie, iustice, and dutie required in the enterprise or support thereof. Wherefore they are deceived that make valour an inconsiderate temeritie, or a senselesse brutish stupiditie: *Non est inconsulta temeritas, nec periculorum amor, nec formidabilium appetitio, diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo est: & eadem patientissima eorum quibus falsa species malorum est.* Vertue cannot be without knowledge and apprehension, a man cannot trulie contemne the danger which he knoweth not; if a man will also acknowledge this vertue in beasts. And indeed they that ordinarily attempt without any foresight or knowledge, when they come to the point of execution the sent is their best intelligence.

5

The third condition; this is a resolution and stayednes of the

the mind grounded vpon the dutie, and the honestie, and justice of the enterprise; which resolution neuer slacketh, ^{Bodily strength.} whatsoeuer hapneth, vntill he haue valiantlie ended the enterprise, or his life. Many offend against this condition, first and more grossely they that seeke this vertue in the body, and in the power and strength of the limmes. Now valour is not a qualitie of the bodie, but of the mind; a settled strength, not of the armes and legs, but of the courage. The estimation and value of a man consisteth in his heart and will: heere lieth his true honor: and the only aduantage and the true victorie over his enemy, is to terrifie him, and to arme himselfe against his constancie and vertue: all other helps are strange and borrowed: strength of armes and legs is the qualitie of a porter: to make an enemy to stoope, to dazell his eies at the light of the sunne, is an accident of fortune. He whose courage faileth not for any feare of death, quelleth not in his constancie and resolution: and though he fall, is not vanquished of his aduersarie, who perhaps may in effect be but a base fellow, but of fortune: and therefore he is to accuse his owne unhappinesse, and not his negligence. The most valiant are oftentimes the most vnfortunate. Moreouer they are deceiued, which disquiet themselves, and make account of those vaine Thra-sonicall brags of such swaggering Braggadochios, who by their loftie looks, and braue words, would win credit of those that are valiant and hardie, if a man would do them so much fauour to beleue them.

Moreouer, they that attribute valour to subtiltie and craft, ⁶ or to arte or industrie, do much more prophane it, and make ^{Arte and industrie.} it play a base and abiect part. This is to disguise things, and to place a false stone for a true. The Lacedemonians permitted no Fencers nor master-Wrestlers in their cities: to the end their youth might attaine thereto by nature, and not by arte. We account it a bold and hardie thing to fight with a Lion, a Beare, a wilde Bore, which encounter a man onely according to nature: but not with Wasps, for they vse subtiltie. *Alexander* would not contend in the Olympique games, saying, there was no equalitie: because a priuate man might ouercome, and a king be vanquished. Moreouer it is not fitting for a man of honour, to trie and aduenture his valour

lour in a thing, wherein a base fellow instructed by rule may gaine the prize. For such victory commeth not of vertue, nor of courage, but of certaine artificiall tricks and inventions: wherein the basest will doe that, which a valiant man knoweth not, neither should he regard to doe it. Fencing is a trick of arte, which may be attained by base persons, and men of no account. And although infamous and ruffinlike fellowes are apt to fight or doe any thing in cities or townes, with the dexteritie of the sword; if they see an enemy, would they not runne away? Euen so is it in that, which is attained by long habit and custome, as builders, tumblers, mariners, who vnder take dangerous things, and more difficult than the most valiant, being trained and instructed therein from their youth.

7
Passion.

Finally, they which consider not sufficiently the motiue and circumstance of actions, wrongly attribute to valour and vertue, that which appertaineth and belongeth to some passion or particular intent. For as it is not properly vertue, nor iustice to be loyall and officious towards some, which a man particularly loueth; nor temperance, to abstaine from the carnall pleasure of his sister, or of his daughter; nor liberalitie towards his wife and children: so is it not true valour to aduenture himselfe to any danger, for his owne benefit and particular satisfaction. Wherefore if it be good for gaine, as spies, pioners, traitors, merchants on the sea, mercenarie souldiers; if for ambition or reputation to be esteemed and accounted valiant, as the most part of our men of warre, who say, being naturally caried thereunto, that if they thought they should lose their life, would not goe; if wearie of his life through paine and griefe, as the souldier of *Antigonus*, who living in extreame torment by the meanes of a fistula he had, was hardie to attempt all dangers, being healed auoided them; if to prevent shame, captiuitie, or any other euill, if through furie and the heat of choler: to be brief, if by passion or particular consideration, as *Aiax*, *Catiline*, it is neither valour nor vertue, *Sicut non martyrem poena, sic nec fortem poena sed causa fecit.*

8
Discretion. The fourth condition: It ought to bee in the execution therof wise and discreet, whereby many false opinions are reiected

reiected in this matter, which are not to hide themselves from those euils and inconueniences that threaten them; neither to feare lest they surprize vs, nor to flie, yea not to feele the first blowes, as the noise of thunder or shot, or the fall of some great building. Now this is to vnderstand amisse: for so that the minde remaine firme and entire in it owne place and discourse, without alteration, hee may outwardly disquiet and make a stirre. He may lawfully, yea it is honorable, to ouerthrow, to vndoe; and to reuenge himselfe of euils, by all meanes and honest indeauors: and where there is no remedie, to carrie himselfe with a setled resolution. *Mens immota manet: lachryma voluntur inanes. Socrates* mocked those that condemned flight: What, saith he, is it cowardlinesse to beate and vanquish them by giuing them place? *Homer* commendeth in his *Vlysses* the skill to flie: the Lacedemonians professors of valour in the iourney of the Plateans, retired, the better to breake and dissolue the Persian troope, which otherwise they could not doe, and ouercame them. This hath beene practised by the most warlike people. In other places the Stoickes themselves allowed to waxe pale, to tremble at the first sudden encounter, so that it proceed no farther into the minde and courage. And this is valour in grosse. There are things which are iustly to be feared and fled, as shipwracks, lightnings, and those where there is no remedie, neither place of vertue, prudence, valour.

Of fortitude or valour in particular.

TO diuide the matter and discourse of that which is heere to be said, this vertue is exercised and employed against all that which the world accounteth euill. Now this euill is two-fold, externall, and internall, the one proceedeth from without, it is called by diuers names; aduersitie, affliction, iniurie, unhappinesse, euill and sinister accidents: The other is inward in the mind, but caused by that which is outward: These are hatefull and hurtfull passions, of feare, sadnesse, choler, and diuers others. We must speake of them both; prescribe meanes and remedies to overcome, suppress, and rule them. These are the arguments and counsels of our vertue,

The proposition and diuision of this matter.

tue, fortitude, and valour. It consisteth then heere of two parts, the one of euils or ill accidents, the other of passions, which proceed thereof. The generall aduice against all good and euill fortune hath beene declared before: we will speake heere more specially and particularly thereof. *p. 298, 299*

C H A P. XX.

The first part of outward euils.

The distinction and comparison of euils by their causes.

WE will consider these outward euils three waies, in their causes, which shall be declared in this chapter; afterward in their effects; lastly in themselves distinctly, and particularly euery kinde of them: And we will giue aduice and meanes in them all, by vertue to be armed against them.

The cause of euill and hatefull accidents, which happen to vs all, are either common and generall, when at the same instant they concerne many, as pestilence, famine, warre, tyranny. And these euils are for the most part scourges sent of God, and from heauen, or at least the proper and neereft cause thereof we cannot easily know: Or particulars, and those that are knowne, that is to say, by the meanes of another. And so there are two sorts of euils; publike and priuate. Now the common euils, that is to say, proceeding of a publike cause, though they concerne euery one in particular, are in diuers kinds, more or lesse grieuous, weightie, and dangerous, than the priuate, whose causes are knowne. More grieuous, for they come by flockes and troopes, they assaile more violently, with greater stirre of vehemencie and furie: they haue a greater concourse and traine: they are more tempestuous, they bring foorth greater disorder and confusion. Lesse grieuous: because generalitie and communitie seemeth to mitigate, and lessen euery mans euill. It is a kinde of comfort not to be alone in miserie: it is thought to be rather a common unhappinesse, where the course of the world, and the cause is naturall, than personall affliction. And indeed those wrongs which a man doth vs, torment vs more, wound vs to the quicke, and much more alter vs. Both these two haue their remedies and comforts.

Against

Against publicke euils, a man ought to consider from whom, and by whom they are sent, and to marke their cause. ² *The aduice against pub-
licke euils.
Providence.
Destinie.* It is God, his prouidence, from whence cometh and dependeth an absolute necessitie, which gouerneth and ruleth all, whereunto all things are subiect. His prouidence, and destinie, or necessitie, are not, to say the truth, two distinct laws in essence, *ἡ προνοία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη*, neither are they one. The diuersitie is only in the consideration and different reason. Now to murmur, and to be grieued at the contrarie, is first of all such impietie, as the like is not elsewhere found: for all things doe quietly obey, man only torments himselfe. And againe it is a folly, because it is vaine and to no purpose. If a man will not follow this soueraigne and absolute mistris willingly, it shall cary all by force: *ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus ferre mortalia, nec perturbari ijs, quæ vitare nostra potestatis non est: in regno nati sumus, deo parere libertas est.*

Desine fata deum flecti sperare querendo.

There is no better remedie, than to applie our willes to the will thereof; and according to the aduice of wisdom to make a vertue of necessitie. *Non est aliud effugium necessitatis, quam velle quod ipsa cogat.* In seeking to contend or dispute against it, we doe but sharpen and stirre the euill. *Leto animo ferre quicquid acciderit quasi tibi volueris accidere: debuisses enim velle, si scisses ex decreto Dei fieri.* Besides we shall better profit our selues, we shall do that which we ought to do, which is to follow our generall and soueraigne, who hath so ordeined it. *Optimum pati, quod emendare non possis; & deum, quo auctore cuncta proueniunt, sine murmuratione conitari.* Malus miles est qui imperatorem gemens sequitur. And without contestation to allow for good whatsoeuer he will. It is magnanimitie of courage to yeeld vnto him. *Magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit.* It is effeminacie and dastardlines to murmur or complaine, *pusillus & degener, qui oblectatur, de ordine mundi male existimat, & emendare mauult Deum quam se.*

Against those priuat euils, which do proceed from the act of another, and which pierce vs more, we ought first well to ³ *The distin-
tion.
Of priuat
euils.* distinguish them, lest we mistake them. There is displeasure, there is offence. We often conceiue ill of another, who notwithstanding hath not offended vs neither in deed nor will,

as.

as when he hath either demaunded, or refused any thing with reason, but yet was then hurtfull vnto vs: for such causes it is too great simplicitie to be offended, since that they are not offences. Now there are two sorts of offences, the one croseth our affaires against equitie; this is to wrong vs: the others are applied to the person, who is contemned by it, and handled otherwise than it ought, be it in deed or in word. These are more grieuous and harder to be indured, than any other kind of affliction.

4
The aduice
against them
in generall.

The first and generall aduice against all these sorts of euils, is to be firme and resolute, not to suffer himselfe to be lead by common opinion, but without passion to consider of what weight and importance things are, according to veritie and reason. The world suffereth it selfe to be perswaded and lead by impression. How many are there that make lesse account to receiue a great wound, than a little blow? more account of a word, than of death? To be brieve, all is measured by opinion: and opinion offendeth more than the euill; and our impatience hurts vs more, than those of whom wee com-
plaine.

5
Particular
aduise-
ments
drawne from
our selues.

The other more particular counsels and remedies are drawne first from our selues, (and this is that we must first looke into.) These pretended offences may arise of our owne defects and weaknesse. This might be a follie grounded vpon some defect, in our owne person, which any one in derision would counterfait. It is follie to greeue and vex himselfe for that which proceedeth not from his owne fault. The way to preuent others in their scoffes, is first to speake, and to let them know, that you know as much as they can tell you; if it be that the iniurie hath taken his beginning by our default, and that we haue giuen the occasion of this abuse, why should we be offended therewith? for it is not an offence, but a correction, which he ought to receiue, and make vse of as a punishment. 3. But for the most part it proceedeth of our owne proper weaknesse, which makes vs melancholie. Now he ought to quit himselfe of all those tender delicacies, which makes him liue vnquietlie, but with a manly courage, strong and stoutlie to contemne, and tread vnder foote the indiscretions and follies of another. It is no signe that a man is sound,
if

if he complaine when one toucheth him. Neuer shalt thou be at rest if thou frame thy selfe to all that is presented.

They are also drawne from the person that offendeth. We represent in generall the maners and humours of those persons with whom we are to liue in the world. The most part of men take no delight but to do euill, and measure their power by the disdain, and the iniurie of another. So few there are which take pleasure to do well. He ought then to make account, that whether soeuer we turne vs, we shall finde those that will harme, and offend vs. Wheresoever we shall finde men, we shall finde iniuries. This is so certaine and necessarie, that the lawyers themselves, who rule the trafficke and affaires of this world, haue wincked at, and permitted in distributiue and commutatiue iustice many escapes in lawe. They haue permitted deceit and hinderances euen to the one halfe of the iust price. This necessitie to hurt and offend, commeth first of the contrarietie, and incompatibilitie of humours and willes, whereof it commeth that a man is offended without will to offend. Then from the concurrence and opposition of affaires, which inferreth that the pleasure, profit, and good of one, is the displeasure, dammage, and ill of others; and it cannot be otherwise, following this common & generall picture of the world, if he who offendeth thee is insolent, a foole, and rash (as he is, for an honest man neuer wrongeth any) wherefore complaine thou, since he is no more his owne man, than as a mad man? You can well indure a furious man without complaint, yea, you will pitie him; an innocent, an infant, a woman, yee will laugh at them: a foole, a drunken man, a cholericke, an indiscreet man in like sort. Wherefore when these people assaile vs with words, we ought not to answer them: we must hold our peace, and quit our selues of them. It is an excellent & worthie reuenge, and grieuous to a foole, not to make any account of him, for it is to take away that pleasure which he thinketh to haue in vexing vs, since our silence condemnes his simplicitie, and his owne temeritie, is smothered in his owne mouth: if a man answer him, he makes him his equall, and by esteeming him too much, he wrongs himselfe. *Male loquuntur, quia bene loqui nesciunt, faciunt quod solent & sciunt, male quia mali, & secundum se.*

Behold

7
The conclu-
sion of these
counsels
with the rule
of wisdom.

Behold then for conclusion the aduice and counsel of wisdom : we must haue respect vnto our selues, and vnto him that offendeth vs. As touching our selues, wee must take heed we do nothing vnwoorthy and vnbesitting our selues, that may giue another aduantage against vs. An vnwise man that distrusteth himselfe, growes into passion without cause, and thereby giues encouragement to another to contradict him. This is a weakenesse of the minde, not to know to contemne offence : an honest man is not subiect to iniurie : he is inuiolable : an inuiolable thing is not onely this, that a man can not beate, but being beaten, neither receiue wound nor hurt : This resolution is a more strong bulwarke against all accidents ; that we can receiue no euill, but of our selues. If our iudgement be as it ought, we are inuulnerable. And therefore we alwaies say with wise *Socrates*, *Anitus* and *Melitus* may well put me to death, but they shall neuer inforce me to doe that I ought not. Moreover, an honest man, as he neuer giueth occasion of iniurie to any man, so he cannot endure to receiue an iniurie. *Ladere enim ladique coniunctum est.* This is a wall of brasse, which a man is not able to pierce ; scoffes, and iniuries trouble him not. Touching him that hath offended vs, if you hold him vaine and vnwise, handle him accordingly, and so leaue him : if he be otherwise, excuse him ; Imagine that he hath had occasion, and that it is not for malice, but by misconceit and negligence ; he is vexation enough to himselfe, and he wisheth he had neuer done it. Moreover, I say, that like good husbands we must make profit and commoditie of the iniuries that are offered vs. Which wee may doe at the least two waies, which respect the offendor & the offended. The one, that they giue vs occasion to know those that wrong vs, to the end we may the better flie them at another time. Such a man hath slandered thee, conclude presently that he is malicious : and trust him no more : The other, that they discouer vnto vs our infirmity, and the means whereby we are easilie beaten, to the end we should amend and repaire our defects ; lest another take occasion to saie as much or more. What better reuenge can a man take of his enemies, than to make profit of their iniuries, and thereby better and more securely to manage our affaires ?

CHAP. XXI.

Of outward evils considered in their effects and fruits.

After the causes of evils we come to the effects and fruits thereof, where are also found true preseruatiues and remedies. The effects are many, are great, are generall and particular. ¹ *Generall effects very profitable.* The generall respect the good, maintenance and culture of the vniuerse. First of all, the world would be extinguished, would perish, and be lost, if it were not changed, troubled, and renewed by these great accidents of pestilence, famine, warre, mortalitie, which season, perfect and purifie it, to the end to sweeten the rest, and giue more libertie and easeto the whole. Without these a man could neither turne himselfe nor be settled. Moreouer besides the varietie and interchangeable course, which they bring both to the beautie and ornament of this vniuerse, also all parts of the world are benefited thereby. The rude and barbarous are heereby polished and refined, artes and sciences are dispersed and imparted vnto all. This is as a great nurserie, wherein certaine trees are transplanted from other stockes, others pruned and pulled vp by the rootes, all for the good and beautie of the orchard. These good and generall considerations ought to remaine and resolue every honest and reasonable minde, and to hinder the curious inquirie of men into those great and turbulent accidents so strange and wonderfull, since they are the works of God and nature, and that they doe so notable a seruice in the generall course of the world. For wee must thinke, that that which is a losse in one respect, is a gaine in another. And to speake more plainly, nothing is lost, but such is the course of the world, so it changeth and so it is accommodated. *Vir sapiens nihil indignetur sibi accidere, sciatque illa ipsa quibus ladi videtur, ad conseruationem vniuersi pertinere, & ex his esse, quae cursum mundi officiumq; consummant.* ²

The particular effects are diuers, according to the diuers ^{Particular effects diuers.} spirits & states of those that receiue them: For they exercise the good, relieue and amend the fallen, punish the wicked. Of euery one a word, for heereof wee haue spoken elsewhere. ^{1. Lib. of the three verities, cap 11.} These outward evils are in those that are good, a very profitable

table exercise, and an excellent schoole wherein (as Wrestlers and Fencers, Mariners in a tempest, Souldiers in dangers, Philosophers in their Academies, and all other sorts of people in the serious exercise of their profession) they are instructed, made and formed vnto vertue, constancie, valour, the victorie of the world and of fortune. They learne to knowe themselves, to make triall of themselves, and they see the measure of their valour, the vttermost of their strength; how farre they may promise or hope of themselves; and then they encourage and strengthen themselves to what is best, accustom and harden themselves to all, become resolute and inuincible; whereas contrarily, the long calme of prosperitie mollifieth them, and maketh them wanton and effeminate. And therefore *Demetrius* was wont to say, That there were no people more miserable, than they that had neuer felt any crosles or afflictions, that had neuer beene miserable, calling their life a dead sea.

3
Medicine
and cha-
stisment.

These outward euils to such as are offenders, are a bridle to stay them, that they stumble not, or a gentle correction and fatherly rod after the fall to put them in remembrance of themselves, to the end they make not a second reuolt. They are a kinde of letting bloud, and medicine or preseruatiue to diuert faults and offences; or a purgation to voide and purifie them.

4
Punishment.

To the wicked and forlorne they are a punishment, a sickle to cut them off, and to take them away, or to afflict them with a long and miserable languishment. And these are their wholsome and necessarie effects, for which these outward euils are not onely to be esteemed of, and quietly taken with patience and in good part, as the exploits of diuine iustice, but are to be embraced as tokens and instruments of the care, of the loue and prouidence of God, and men are to make a profitable vse of them, following the purpose and intention of him, who sendeth and disposeth them as pleaseth him.

Of outward euils in themselves and particularly.

AN ADVERTISEMENT.

ALL these euils, which are many and diuers, are priuations of their contrarie good, as likewise the name and nature of

of euill doth signifie. And therefore as many heads as there are of good, so many are there of euils, which may all be reduced and comprehended in the number of seauen, sicknesse, griefe, (I include these two in one) captiuitie, banishment, want, infamie, losse of friends, death; which are the priuations of health, libertie, home-dwelling, meanes or maintenance, honors, friends, life, whereof hath beene spoken before at large. We will heere inquire into the proper and particular remedies and medicines against these seuen heads of euils, and that briefly without discourse. In the first booke.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Sicknesse and griefe.

WE haue said before that griefe is the greatest, and, to say the truth, the onely essentiall euill, which is most felt, and hath least remedies. Neuerthelesse, behold some few that regard the reason, iustice, vilitie, imitation and resemblance with the greatest and most excellent.

It is a common necessitie to indure; there is no reason that for our sakes a miracle should be wrought; or that a man should be offended if that happen vnto him, that may happen vnto euery man. 1

It is also a naturall thing; we are borne thereunto, and to desire to be exempted from it is iniustice, we must quietly endure the lawes of our owne condition. We are made to be old, to be weake, to grieue, to be sicke, and therefore we must learne to suffer that which we cannot auoid. 2

If it be long, it is light and moderate, and therefore a shame to complaine of it; if it be violent it is short, and speedily ends either it selfe or the patient, which comes all to one end. *Confide, summus non habet tempus dolor. Si gravis, brevis; Si longus, levis.* 3

And againe, it is the body that endureth: it is not our selues that are offended, for the offence diminisheth the excellencie and perfection of the thing, and sicknesse or griefe is so far from diminishing, that contrarily it serueth for a subiect and an occasion of a commendable patience, much more than health doth: And where there is more occasion of commendation, 4

mendation, there is not lesse occasion of good. If the body be the instrument of the spirit, who will complaine when the instrument is imploied in the seruice of that whereunto it is destinated? The body is made to serue the soule: if the soule should afflict it selfe for any thing that hapneth to the bodie, the soule should serue the body. Were not that man ouer delicate & curious, that would cry out and afflict himself, because some one or other had spoiled his apparell, some thorne had taken hold of it, or some man passing by had torne it? Some base broker perhaps would be aggriued therewith, that would willingly make a commoditie thereof: But a man of abilitie and reputation would rather laugh at it, and account it as nothing in respect of that state and abundance that God hath bestowed on him. Now this body is but a borrowed garment, to make our spirits for a time to appeare vpon this lowe and troublesome stage, of which onely we should make account, and procure the honour and peace thereof. For from whence commeth it that a man suffereth griefe with such impatiencie? It is because he accustometh not himselfe to seeke his content in his soule; *non assuerunt animo esse contenti, nimium illis cum corpore fuit.* Men haue too great a commerce with their bodies; And it seemeth that griefe groweth proud, seeing vs to tremble vnder the power thereof.

5 It teacheth vs to distaste that which we must needs leaue, and to vnwinde our selues from the vanity and deceit of this world, an excellent peece of seruice.

6 The ioy and pleasure we receiue by the recouerie of our health, after that our griefe or sicknesse hath taken his course, is a strange enlightning vnto vs, in such sort that it should seeme that nature hath giuen sicknesse for the greater honor and seruice of our pleasure and delight.

7 Now then if the griefe be indifferent, the patience shall be easie: if it be great, the glory shall be as great: if it seeme ouerhard, let vs accuse our delicacie and nicenesse; and if there be but few that can indure it, let vs be of the number of those few. Let vs not accuse nature for hauing made vs too weake, for that is nothing, but we are rather too delicate. If we flie it, it will follow vs; if we cowardly yeeld vnto it, and suffer our selues to be vanquished, it will handle vs the more roughlie, and

and the reproch will light vpon our selues. It would make vs
afeard, and therefore it standeth vs vpon to take heart, and
that when it cometh it find vs more resolute than was ima-
gined. Our yeelding makes that more eager and more fierce,
*stare fidenter, non quia difficilia non audemus: sed quia non aude-
mus, difficilia sunt.*

But lest these remedies should seeme but faire words and
meere imaginations, and the practise of them altogether im-
possible; we haue examples both frequent and rich not only 8
of men, but of women and children, who haue not only a long Examples.
time indured long and grieuous sicknesses with such con-
stancie, that their griefe hath rather given them life than cou-
rage; but haue attended and borne euen with ioy, yea, haue
fought after the greatest and most exquisite torments. In La-
cedemon little children whipped one another, yea sometimes
to the death, without any shew in their countenance of any
griefe or smart that they felt, only to accustome themselves to
suffer for their countrie. *Alexanders* page suffered himselfe to
be burnt with a cole without crie or countenance of discon-
tent, because he would not interrupt the sacrifice: and a lad
of Lacedemon suffered a foxe to gnaw his guts out of his
belly before he would discover his theft. *Pompey* being sur-
prised by king *Gentius*, who would haue constrained him to
reueale the publike affaires of Rome, to make knowne that
no torment should make him to do it, did voluntarilie put his
finger into the fire, and suffered it to burne, vntill *Gentius* him-
selfe tooke it out. The like before that had *Mutius* done be-
fore another king, *Porfenna*; and that good old *Regulus* of
Carthage endured more than all these: and yet more than
Regulus, *Anaxarchus*, who being halfe pounded in a mortar
by the tyrant *Nicacreon*, would neuer confesse that his mind
was touched with any torment; Beat and pound the sacke of
Anaxarchus till you be gluttred, as for himselfe you shall neuer
touch him.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Captinitie and imprisonment.

THis affliction is no more than nothing, and in respect of
sickness and griefe it is an easie matter to vanquish it.

For sick folke are not without captiuitie in their beds, in their houses, for the time they lye in, yea, they ingrosse as it were affliction aboue captiuitie; neuerthelesse, a word or two thereof. There is nothing but the bodie, the couer, the prison of the soule that is captiue, the soule it selfe remaineth alwaies free, and at libetie in despite of all; and therefore how should that man know or perceiue that he is in prison, who as freely, yea and more freely too, may walke and wander whither he will, than he that is abroad? The walls and dungeons of the prison are not strong enough to shut him vp, the body that toucheth him and is ioyned vnto him, cannot hold nor stay him. He that knoweth how to maintaine himselfe in his libertie, and to vse and hold his owne right, which is not to be shut vp, no not in this world, will but laugh at these sleight and childish embarrments. *Christianus etiam extra carcerem saculo renuntiauit: in carcere etiam carceri: nihil interest ubi sitis in saculo qui extra saculum estis; auferamus carceris nomen, secessum vocemus, & si corpus includitur, caro detinetur, omnia spiritui patent, totum hominem animus circumfert, & quò vult transfert.*

Tertul.

The prison hath gentlie receiued into the lap thereof many great and holy personages; it hath beene the sanctuarie, the haue of health, and a fortresse to diuers that had beene vtterlie vndone if they had had their libertie, yea, that haue had recourse thereunto to be in libertie, haue made choyce thereof, and espoused themselves vnto it, to the end they might liue at rest, and free themselves from the cares of the world, *& carcere in custodiarum translati.* That which is shut vp vnder locke and key is in safest custodie: and it is better to be vnder the safegard of a key, than to be bound and enthralled with those fetters and stocks, whereof the world is full, that publicke places and courts of great princes, and the tumultuous affaires of this world bring with them, as ieaiousies, enuies, violent humours, and the like. *Si recogitemus ipsum magis mundum carcerem esse, exisse nos è carcere quàm in carcerem introisse intelligemus, maiores tenebras habet mundus quàm hominum praeordia excecant, grauiore catenas induit, quàm ipsas animas constringunt, peiores immunditias expirat, libidines hominum, plures postremo reos continet vniuersum genus hominum.* Many haue escaped the hands of their enemies, and other

Tertul.

great

great dangers and miseries by the benefit of imprisonment. Some haue there written bookes, and haue there bettered their knowledge. *Plus in carcere spiritus acquirit quam caro amittit.* Diuers there are whom the prison hauing kept and preferred for a time, hath reserued vnto their former soueraigne dignities, and mounted them to the highest places in the world; others it hath yelded vp vnto heauen, and hath not at any time receiued any that it restoreth not.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Of Banishment & exile.

EXile is a change of place that brings no ill with it, but in opinion; it is a complaint and affliction wholly imaginarie: for according to reason there is not any ill in it: In all places all is after one fashion, which is comprehended in two words, Nature, & Vertue. *Duo quæ pulcherrima sunt, quocumq; nos mouerimus, sequentur, natura communis & propria virtus.*

In all places we finde the selfesame common nature, the same heauens, the same elements. In all places the heauens 2 *Nature.* and the starres appeare vnto vs in the same greatnes, extent, and that is it which principallie we are to consider, and not that which is vnder vs, and which we trample vnder foete. Againe, at a kenning we cannot see of the earth aboue ten or twelue leagues: *Angustus animus quem terrena delectant.* But the face of the great azured firmament, decked and counterpointed with so many beautifull and shining diamonds, doth alwaies shew it selfe vnto vs; and to the end we may wholly behold it, it continuallie whirleth about vs. It sheweth it selfe all vnto all, and in all respects in a day and a night. The earth which with the sea and all that it conteineth, is not the hundredth and sixtie part of the greatnes of the sunne, sheweth not it selfe vnto vs but in that small proportion that is about the place where we dwell: yea and that change of that earthlie floore that is vnder vs is nothing. What matter is it to be borne in one place and to liue in another? Our mother might haue layen in elsewhere, and it is a chance that we are borne heere or there. Againe, all Countries bring foorth and nourish men, and furnish them with whatsoeuer is necessarie. All

countries haue kindred; nature hath knit vs all together in blood and in charitie. All haue friends; there is no more to do but to make friends, and to win them by vertue and wisdom. Every land is a wise mans countrie, or rather no land is his particular countrie. For it were to wrong himselfe, and it were weaknesse and basenesse of heart, to thinke to cary himselfe as a stranger in any place. He must alwaies vse his owne right and libertie, and liue in all places as with himselfe, and vpon his owne, *omnes terras tanquam suas videre, & suas tanquam omnium.*

3
Vertue.

Moreouer what change or discommoditie doth the diuersitie of the place bring with it? Do we not alwaies cary about vs one and the same spirit and vertue? Who can forbid, saith *Brutus*, a banished man to cary with him his vertues? The spirit and vertue of a man is not shut vp in any place, but it is euery where equallie and indifferentlie. An honest man is a citizen of the world, free, cheerfull, and content in all places, alwaies within himselfe, in his owne quarter, and euer one and the same, though his case or scabberd be removed and caried hither and thither: *animus sacer & aternus ubiq; est, dijs cognatus, omni mundo & aeo par.* A man in euery place is in his own countrie where he is well. Now for a man to be well, it dependeth not vpon the place, but himselfe.

4
Examples.

How many are there, that for diuers considerations haue willinglie banished themselues? How many others banished by the violence of another, being afterwards called home, haue refused to returne, and haue found their exile not only tollerable, but pleasant and delightfull, yea, neuer thought they liued vntill the time of their banishment, as those noble Romans *Rutilius*, *Marcellus*? How many others haue beene led by the hand of good fortune out of their countrie, that they may grow great and puissant in a strange land?

CHAP. XXV.

Of Pouertie, want, losse of goods.

I
Pouertie
two-fold.

THis complaint is of the vulgar and miserable sottish sort of people, who place their soueraigne good in the goods of fortune, and thinke that pouertie is a very great euill. But

to shew what it is, you must know that there is a two-fold po-
 uertie, the one extreame, which is the want of things necessa-
 rie, and requisit vnto nature; This doth seldome or neuer
 happen to any man, nature being so iust, and hauing formed
 vs in such a fashion, that few things are necessarie, and those
 few are not wanting, but are found euery where, *parabile est
 quod natura desiderat, & expositum*, yea in such a sufficiencie
 as being moderatly vsed, may suffice the condition of euery
 one. *Ad manum est, quod sat est*. If we will liue according to na-
 ture and reason, the desire and rule thereof, we shall alwaies
 find that which is sufficient. If we will liue according to opi-
 nion, whilest we liue we shall neuer find it. *Si ad naturam viues
 nunquam eris pauper, si ad opinionem nunquam diues: exiguum
 natura desiderat, opinio immensum*. And therefore a man that
 hath an arte or science to stick vnto, yea, that hath but his
 armes at will, is it possible he should either feare or complaine
 of pouertie?

1. Want of
 things neces-
 sarie.

The other is the want of things, that are more than suffici-
 ent, required for pomp, pleasure and delicacie. This is a kind
 of mediocritie and frugallitie: and to say the truth, it is that
 which we feare, to lose our riches, our moueables, not to haue
 our bed soft enough, our diet well drest, to be deprived of
 these commodities, and in a word, it is delicatenesse that hol-
 deth vs, this is our true maladie. Now this complaint is vn-
 iust; for such pouertie is rather to be desired than feared: and
 therefore the wise man asked it of God, *mendicitatem nec diui-
 tias, sed necessaria*. It is farre more iust, more rich, more peace-
 able and certaine, than abundance which a man so much de-
 sireth. More iust; for man came naked, *nemo nascitur diues*; The praise of
 and he returneth naked out of this world. Can a man tearme
 that truly his, that he neither bringeth nor carieth with him?
 The goods of this world, they are as the moueables of an
 Inne. We are not to be discontented so long as we are heere,
 that we haue need of them. More rich; It is a large seignorie,
 a kingdome, *magna diuitia lege natura composita paupertas: mag-
 nus questus pietas cum sufficientia*. More peaceable and afflu-
 red; it feareth nothing, and can defend it selfe against the ene-
 mies thereof, *etiam in obseffa via paupertas pax est*. A small body
 that may couer and gather it selfe vnder a buckler, is in better
 safetie

2. Want of
 things super-
 fluous.

Prouer. 30.

The praise of
 sufficiencie.

1. Timot. 6.

safetie than a great, which lieth open vnto euery blow. It is neuer subiect to great losses, nor charges of great labour and burthen. And therefore they that are in such an estate, are alwaies more cheerfull and comfortable, for they neither haue so much care, nor feare such tempests. Such kind of pouertie is free, cheerfull, assured; it maketh vs truly masters of our owne liues; whereof the affaires, complaints, contentions that do necessarilie accompanie riches, cary away the better part. Alas what goods are those, from whence proceed all our euils? That are the cause of all those iniuries that we indure, that makes vs slaues, trouble the quiet of our soules, bring with them so many iealousies, suspicions, feares, frights, desires? He that vexeth himselfe for the losse of these goods is a miserable man, for together with his goods he loseth his spirit too. The life of poore men is like vnto those that saile neere the shore; that of the rich like to those that cast themselves into the maine Ocean. These cannot attaine to land, though they desire nothing more, but they must attend the wind and the ride; the other come aboard, passe and repasse as often as they will.

3

Finally, wee must endeavour to imitate those great and generous personages, that haue made themselves merrie with such kinde of losses, yea haue made aduantage of them, and thanked God for them, as *Zenon*, after his shipwracke, *Fabricsius*, *Seranus*, *Curius*. It should seeme that pouertie is some excellent and diuine thing, since it agreeth with the gods who are imagined to be naked, since the wisest haue embraced it, or at least haue endured it with great contentment. And to conclude in a word, with such as are not ouer passionate it is commendable, with others insupportable.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Infamie.

THis affliction is of diuers kinds. If it be losse of honors and dignities, it is rather a gaine than a losse: Dignities are but honorable seruitudes, whereby a man by giuing himselfe to the weale-publike, is deprived of himselfe. Honors are but the torches of enuie, iealousie, and in the end exile & pouertie.

pouertie. If a man shall call to minde the historie of all antiquitie, he shall finde that all they that haue liued, and haue earied themselves woorthily and vertuously, haue ended their course, either by exile, or poison, or some other violent death: witnesse among the Greekes, *Aristides, Themistocles, Phocion, Socrates*; amongst the Romans, *Camillus, Scipio, Cicero, Papinian*; among the Hebrues the Prophets: In such sort that it should seeme to be the liuerie of the more honest men, for it is the ordinarie recompence of a publike state to such kinde of people. And therefore a man of a gallant and generous spirit should contemne it, and make small account thereof, for he dishonoureth himselfe, and shewes how little he hath profited in the studie of wisdom that regardeth in any respect the censures, reports, and speeches of the people, be they good or euill.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the losse of Friends.

Heere comprehend parents, children, and whatsoeuer is neere and deere vnto a man. First wee must know vpon what this pretended complaint or affliction is grounded, whether vpon the interest or good of our friends, or our owne. Vpon that of our friends? I doubt we shall say yea to that; but yet we must not be too credulous to beleue it. It is an ambitious faining of pietie, whereby we make a shew of sorrow and griefe for the hurt of another, or the hindrance of the weale publike: but if wee shall withdraw the vaile of dissimulation, and sound it to the quicke, we shall finde that it is our owne particular good that is hid therein, that toucheth vs neerest. Wee complaine that our owne candle burneth, and is consumed, or at least is in some danger. This is rather a kinde of enuie, than true pietie: for that which we so much complaine of touching the losse of our friends, their absence, their distance from vs, is their true and great good: *mœrere hoc euentum inuidi magis quàm amici est*. The true vse of death is to make an end of our miseries. If God had made our life more miserable, he had made it longer.

And therefore to say the truth, it is vpon our owne good
that

that this complaint and affliction is grounded: now that becommeth vs not; it is a kind of iniurie to be grieued with the rest and quiet of those that loue vs, because we our selues are hurt thereby. *Suis in commodis angere non amicum, sed seipsum amantissimum est.*

3

Againe, there is a good remedie for this, which fortune cannot take from vs, and that is, that suruiuing our friends, we haue meanes to make new friends. Friendship as it is one of the greatest blessings of our life, so it is most easily gotten. God makes men, and men make friends: Hee that wanteth not vertue, shall neuer want friends: It is the instrument wherewith they are made, and wherewith when he hath lost his old, he makes new. If fortune haue taken away our friends, let vs endeouour to make newe; by this meanes wee shall not lose them, but multiply them.

Of death.

WE haue spoken heereof so much at large and in all respects in the eleuenth and last chapter of the second booke, that there remaineth not any thing else to be spoken, and therefore to that place I referre the Reader.

The second part of inward euils, tedious and troublesome passions.

THE PREFACE.

From all these aboue named euils, there spring and arise in vs diuers passions and cruell affections: for these being taken and considered simply as they are, they breed feare, which apprehendeth euils as yet to come, sorrow for present euils, and if they be in another, pitie and compassion. Being considered as comming and procured by the act of another, they stirre vp in vs the passions of choler, hatred, enuie, ieaiousie, despite, reuenge, and all those that procure displeasure, or make vs to looke vpon another with an enuious eie. Now this vertue of fortitude and valour consisteth in the gouernment and receipt of these euils according to reason, in the resolute and couragious cariage of a man, and the keeping

keeping of himselfe free and cleere from all passions that spring thereof. But because they subsist not, but by these evils, if by the meanes and help of so many aduilements and remedies before deliuered, a man can vanquish and contemne them all, there can be no more place left vnto these passions. And this is the true meane to free himselfe, and to come to the end, as the best way to put out a fire is to withdraw the fuell that giues it nourishment. Neuerthelesse wee will yet adde some particular counsels against these passions, though they haue bin in such sort before deciphered, that it is a matter of no difficultie to bring them into hatred and detestation.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Against Feare.

Let no man attend evils before they come, because it may be they will neuer come: our feares are as likely to deceiue vs as our hopes; and it may be that those times that we thinke will bring most affliction with them, may bring greatest comfort. How many vnexpected aduentures may happen that may defend a man from that blow we feare? Lightning is put by with the winde of a mans hatre, and the fortunes of the greatest states with accidents of small moment. The turne of a wheele mounteth him that was of lowest degree, to the highest step of honour; and many times it falleth out that wee are preserued by that, which we thought would haue beene our ouerthrow. There is nothing so easily deceived as humane foresight. That which it hopeth, it wanteth; that which it feareth, vanisheth; that which it expecteth hapneth not. God hath his counsell by himselfe; That which man determineth after one maner, he resolueeth after another. Let vs not therefore make our selues vnfortunate before our time, nay when perhaps we are neuer likely to be so. Time to come which deceiueh so many, will likewise deceiue vs as soone in our feares, as in our hopes. It is a maxime commonly receiued in Physicke, that in sharp maladies the predictions are neuer certaine: and euen so is it in the most furious threatnings of fortune; so long as there is life, there is hope, for
hope

see pag. 99.

hope continues as long in the body as the soule, *quandiu spirato, spero.*

2

But forasmuch as this feare proceedeth not alwayes from the disposition of nature, but many times from an ouer delicate education (for by the want of exercise and continuall trauell and labour, euen from our youth we many times apprehend things without reason) we must by a long practise accustom our selues vnto that, which may most terrifie vs, present vnto our selues the most fearefull dangers that may light vpon vs, and with cheerefulnesse of heart attempt sometimes casuall aduentures, the better to trie our courage, to preuent euill occurrents, and to sease vpon the armes of fortune. It is a matter of lesse difficultie to resist fortune by assailing it, than by defending our selues against it. For then we haue leasure to arme our selues, we take our aduantages, we provide for a retrait; whereas when it assaulteth vs, it surpriseth vs vnawares, and handleth vs at her owne pleasure. We must then whilest we assaile fortune learne to defend our selues, giue vnto our selues false alarums, by proposing vnto vs the dangers that other great personages haue past, call to mind that some haue auoided the greatest, because they were not astonished at them, others haue beene ouerthrowne by the least, for want of resolution.

CHAP. XXIX.

Against Sorrow.

see p. 94.
THe remedies against sorrow (set downe before as the most tedious, hurtfull, and vniust passion) are twofold: some are direct or streight, others oblique. I call those direct which Philosophie teacheth, which concerne the confronting and disdaining of euils, accounting them not euils, or at leastwise very small and light (though they be great and grievous) and that they are not woorthie the least motion or alteration of our mindes; and that to be sorrie for them, or to complaine of them, is a thing very vniust and ill befitting a man, so teach the *Stoicks*, *Peripateticks*, and *Platonists*. This maner of preserving a man from sorrow and melancholike passion

passion, is as rare, as it is excellent, and belongs to spirits of the first ranke. There is likewise another kinde of Philosophicall remedy, although it be not of so good a stampe, which is easie and much more in vse, and it is oblique, this is by diuerting a mans minde and thought to things pleasant & delightfull, or at least indifferent from that that procureth our sorrow: which is to deale cunningly, to decline and auoid an euill, to change the obiect. It is a remedie very common, and which is vsed almost in all euils, if a man marke it, as well of the body as of the minde. Physitians when they cannot purge a rheume, they turne it into some other part lesse dangerous. Such as passe by steepe and precipitate deepes and downfalls, that haue need of launcings, searing-irons, or fire, shut their eies, and turne their faces another way. Valiant men in warre doe neuer taste nor consider of death, their mindes being caried away by the desire of victorie: In so much that diuers haue suffered death gladly, yea haue procured it, and beene their owne executioners, either for the future glorie of their name, as many Greekes and Romans; or for the hope of another life, as Martyrs, the disciples of *Hegeſias*, and others after the reading of *Plato* his booke to *Antiochus*, *de morte contemnenda*; or to auoid the miseries of this life, and for other reasons. All these are they not diuersions? Few there are that consider euils in themselves, that relish them as *Socrates* did his death; and *Flavius* condemned by *Nero* to die by the hands of *Niger*. And therefore in sinister accidents & misadventures, and in all outward euils, we must diuert our thoughts, and turne them another way. The vulgar sort can giue this aduice; Thinke not of it. Such as haue the charge of those that are any way afflicted, should for their comfort furnish affrighted spirits with other obiects. *Abducendus est animus ad alia studia, sollicitudines, curas, negotia; loci denique mutatione sepe curandus est.*

CHAP. XXX.

Against mercy and compassion.

There is a two-fold mercie, the one good and vertuous, *see p. 98.*
 which is in God and in his saints, which is in will and in effect

effect to succour the afflicted, not afflicting themselves, or diminishing any thing that concerneth honor or equitie; the other is a kind of feminine passionate pitie, which proceedeth from too great a tendernesle and weaknesle of the minde, whereof hath beene spoken before in the aboue-named passion. Againe, this wisdom teacheth vs to succour the afflicted, but not to yeeld and to suffer with him. So is God said to be mercifull; as the Physician to his patient; the aduocate to his client affoordeth all diligence and industrie, but yet taketh not their euils and affaires to the heart; so doth a wise man, not entertaining any grieffe, or darkning his spirit with the smoke thereof. God commandeth vs to aid, and to haue a care of the poore, to defend their cause; and in another place he forbids vs to pitie the poore in iudgement.

CHAP. XXXI.

Against Choler.

see before p. 87.

The first
head.

THe remedies are many and diuers wherewith the minde must before hand be armed and defended, like those that feare to be besieged; for afterwards it is too late. They may be reduced to three heads; The first is to cut off the way, and to stop all the passages vnto choler. It is an easier matter to withstand it, and to stay the passage thereof in the beginning, than when it hath seased vpon a man to cary himselfe well and orderly. He must therefore quit himselfe from all the causes and occasions of choler, which heertofore haue been produced in the description thereof, that is to say, 1. weaknesle and tendernesle; 2. maladie of the minde in hardning it selfe against whatsoever may happen; 3. too great delicatenesse; the loue of certaine things do accustome a man to facilitie and simplicitie, the mother of peace and quietnes. *Ad omnia compositi sumus: quæ bona & paratiora sint nobis meliora & grauiora;* it is the generall doctrine of the wise. King Cotys hauing receiued for a present many beautifull and rich vessels, yet fraile and easie to be broken, brake them all, to the end he might not be stirred to choler and furie when they should happen to be broken. This was a distrust in himselfe, and a base kinde of feare that prouoked him thereunto. 4. Curiosi-

tie

tie according to the example of *Cæsar*, who being a conquerour, and having recovered the letters, writings, and memorials of his enemies, burnt them all before he saw them; 5. Lightnes of belife; 6. and above all, an opinion of being contemned, and wronged by another, which he must chase from him as unworthie a man of spirit: for though it seeme to be a glorious thing, and to proceed from too high an esteeme of himselfe (which neuertheless is a great vice) yet it commeth of basenesse and imbecillitie. For he that thinketh himselfe to be contemned by another, is in some sense his inferior, iudgeth himselfe, or feares that in truth he is so, or is so reputed, and distrusteth himselfe. *Nemo non eo à quo se contemptum indicat minor est.* A man must therefore thinke that it proceedeth rather from any thing than contempt, that is, fortifinesse, indiscretion, want of good maners. If this supposed contempt proceed from his friends, it is too great familiaritie. If from his subiects or seruants, knowing that their master hath power to chasten them, it is not to be believed that they had any such thought. If from base and inferior people, our honor or dignitie, or indignitie, is not in the power of such people: *indignus Cæsaris ira.* *Agathocles & Antigonus* laughed at those that wronged them, and hurt them not hauing them in their power. *Cæsar* excelled all in this point; and *Moyse*, *David*, and all the greatest personages of the world haue done the like; *magnam fortunam magnus animus decet*: The most glorious conquest is for a man to conquer himselfe, not to be moued by another. To be stirred to choler is to confesse the accusation; *Conuitia si irascere agnita videntur, spreta exolescunt.* He can neuer be great, that yeeldeth himselfe to the offence of another: If we vanquish not our choler, that will vanquish vs. *Iniurias & offensiones superne despicere.*

The second head is of those remedies that a man must im-
 ploy when the occasions of choler are offered, and that there
 is a likelihood that we may be moued thereunto, which are, 2. Head.
 first, to keepe and containe our bodies in peace and quietnes,
 without motion or agitation; which inflameth the bloud and
 the humours, and to keepe himselfe silent and solitarie. Se-
 condlie, delay in beleeuing and resoluing, and giuing leasure
 to the iudgement to consider. If we can once discover it, we

shall easily stay the course of this feuer. A wise man counselled *Augustus* being in choler, not to be moued before he had pronounced the letters of the Alphabet. Whatsoever we say or doe in the heate of our blood, ought to be suspected. *Nihil liceat dum irasceris. Quare? Quia vis omnia licere.* Wee must feare and be doubtfull of our selues, for so long as we are moued, we can do nothing to purpose. Reason when it is hindered by passions, serueth vs no more than the wings of a bird being fastned to his feet. We must therefore haue recourse vnto our friends, and suffer our choler to die in the midst of our discourse. And lastly, diuersion to all pleasant occasions, as musicke &c.

3
3. Head.

The third head consisteth in those beautifull considerations wherewith the mind must long before be seasoned. First, in the consideration of the actions and motions of those that are in choler, which should breed in vs a hatred thereof, so ill do they become a man. This was the maner of the wise, the better to dissuade a man from this vice, to counsell him to behold himselfe in a glasse. Secondly and contrarily, of the beautie which is in moderation; Let vs consider how much grace there is in a sweet kind of mildnes and clemencie, how pleasing and acceptable they are vnto others, and commodious to our selues: It is the adamant that draweth vnto vs the hearts & willes of men. This is principallie required in those whom fortune hath placed in high degree of honor, who ought to haue their motions more remisse and temperate, for as their actions are of greatest importance, so their faults are more hardly repaired. Finally, in the consideration of that esteeme and loue which we should beare to that wisdom which we heere studie, which especiallie sheweth it selfe in retaining and commanding it selfe, in remaining constant and inuincible; a man must mount his mind from the earth, and frame it to a disposition, like to the highest region of the aire, which is neuer ouer-shadowed with cloudes, nor troubled with thunders, but in a perpetuall serenitie; so our mind must not be darkned with sorrow, nor moued with choler, but flie all precipitation, imitate the highest planets that of all others are caried most flowlie. Now all this is to be vnderstood of inward choler and couered, which indureth being ioyned with

with an ill affection, hatred, desire of reuenge, *qua in sinu stulti requiescit, ut qui reponunt odia; quodq, sene cogitationis indicium est, secreto suo satiantur.* For the outward and open choler is short, a fire made of straw, without ill affection, which is only to make another to see his fault, whether in inferiours by reprehensions, or in others by shewing the wrong and indiscretion they commit, it is a thing profitable, necessarie, and very commendable. It is good and profitable both for himselfe and for another sometimes to be moued to anger, but it must be with moderation and rule.

4
To be angry
when it is
good and
commodious.

There are some that smother their choler within, to the end it breake not forth, and that they may seeme wise and moderate; but they fret themselves inwardlie, and offer themselves a greater violence than the matter is worth. It is better to chide a little, and to vent the fire, to the end it be not ouer ardent and painfull within. A man incorporateth choler by hiding it. It is better that the point thereof should prick a little without, than that it should be turned against it selfe: *Omnia vitia in aperto leuiora sunt, & tunc perniciosissima cum simulata sanitate subsidunt.*

For himselfe.

Moreouer, against those that vnderstand not, or seldome suffer themselves to be led by reason, as against those kind of seruants that doe nothing but for feare, it is necessarie that choler either true or dissembled put life into them, without which there can be no rule or gouernment in a familie. But yet it must be with these conditions. First, that it be not often, vpon all, or light occasions. For being too common, it growes into contempt, and works no good effect. Secondly, not in the aire, murmuring and railing behind their backs, or vpon vncertainties, but be sure that he feeles the smart that hath committed the offence. Thirdly, that it be speedily, to purpose and seriously, without any mixture of laughter, to the end it may be a profitable chastisement for what is past, and a warning for that which is to come. To conclude, it must be v-
sed as a medicine.

5
For another
with condi-
tions.

All these remedies may serue against the following passions.

CHAP. XXXII.

Against Hatred.

see p. 90.

THat a man may the better defend himselfe against hatred, he must hold a rule that is true, that all things haue two handles whereby he may take them: by the one they seeme to be grieuous and burthensome vnto vs, by the other easie and light. Let vs then receiue things by the good handle, and we shall finde that there is something good and to be loued, in whatsoeuer we accuse and hate. For there is nothing in the world that is not for the good of man. And in that which offendeth vs, we haue more cause to complaine thereof, than to hate it: for it is the first offence, and receiue the greatest damage, because it loseth therein the vse of reason, the greatest losse that may be. In such an accident then, let vs turne our hate into pitie, and let vs endeavour to make those worthe to be beloued, which we would hate, as *Lycurgus* did vnto him, that had put out his eie, whom he made, as a chastisement of that wrong, an honest, vertuous, and modest citizen, by his good instruction.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Against Enuie.

see p. 91.

Against this passion, we must consider that which wee esteeme and enuie in another. We willingly enuie in others riches, honors, fauours, and the reason is, because we know not how dearly they haue cost them. He that shall say, thou shalt haue as much at the same price, we would rather refuse his offer, than thanke him for it. For before a man can attaine vnto them, he must flatter, endure afflictions, iniuries; to be briefe, lose his libertie, satisfie and accommodate himselfe to the pleasures and passions of another. Man hath nothing for nothing in this world. To think to attaine to goods, honors, states, offices otherwise, and to peruert the law or rather custome of the world, is to haue the money and wares too. Thou therefore that makest profession of honour and of vertue, why dost thou afflict thy selfe if thou haue not these goods,

goods, which are not gotten but by a shamefull patience? Doe thou therefore rather pitie others, than enuie them. If it be a true good that is hapned to another, we should reioice thereat; for we should desire the good of one another: To be pleased with another mans prosperitie, is to increase our owne.

CHAP. XXXIIII.

Against Reuenge.

Against this cruell passion, we must first remember, that there is nothing so honorable, as to know how to pardon. Euery man may prolecute the law to right that wrong that he hath receiued; but to giue grace, to remit and forgiue, belongeth to a soueraigne Prince. If then thou wilt be a king of kings themselves, and doe an act that may become a king, pardon freely, be gracious towards him that hath offended thee.

1 see p. 92.

Secondly, there is nothing so great and so victorious, as hardinesse and a couragious insensibilitie in the suffering of iniuries, whereby they returne and rebound wholly vpon the wrongers, as heauie blowes vpon a hard and steeled anuill, which doe no other but wound and benum the hand and arme of the striker: To meditate reuenge is to confesse himselfe wounded: to complaine is to acknowledge himselfe guiltie and inferiour. *Vltio doloris confessio est: non est magnus animus quem incuruat iniuria: ingens animus & verus estimator sui non vindicat iniuriam, quia non sentit.*

But some will obiect, that it is irksome and dishonorable to endure an offence; I agree thereunto, and I am of opinion not to suffer, but to vanquish and master it: but yet after a faire and honorable fashion, by scorning it and him that offered it; nay more than that, by doing good vnto him. In both these *Cesar* was excellent. It is a glorious victorie to conquer, and to make the enemy to stoope, by benefits, and of an enemy to make him a friend, be the iniurie neuer so great. Yea to thinke that by how much the greater the wrong is, by so much the more woorthie it is to be pardoned; and by how much more iust the reuenge is, by so much the more commendable is clemencie.

3

4

Againe, it is no reason that a man should be iudge and a partie too, as he that reuengeth is. Hee must commit the matter to a third person, or at least take counsell of his friends, and of the wiser sort, not giuing credit vnto himselfe. *Jupiter* might alone dart out his fauourable lightnings; but when there grew a question of sending forth his reuenging thunderbolts, he could not doe it without the counsell and assistance of the twelue gods. This was a strange case that the greatest of the gods, who of himselfe had power to doe good to the whole world, could not hurt a particular person, but after a solemne deliberation. The wisdom of *Jupiter* himselfe feareth to erre, when there is a question of reuenge, and therefore he hath need of a counsell to deteine him.

5
Clemencie.

We must therefore forme vnto our selues a moderation of the minde, this is the vertue of clemencie, which is a sweete mildnesse and graciousnesse, which tempereth, retaineth, and represseth all our motions. It armeth vs with patience, it perswadeth vs that we cannot be offended but with our selues; that of the wrongs of another nothing remaineth in vs, but that which we will retaine. It winneth vnto vs the loue of the whole world, and furnisheth vs with a modest carriage agreeable vnto all.

CHAP. XXXV.

Against Iealousie.

see p. 91.

1

THE only meane to auoid it, is for a man to make himselfe worthie of that he desireth, for iealousie is nothing else but a distrust of our selues; and a testimonie of our little desert. The Emperour *Aurelius*, of whom *Faustine* his wife demanded what he would do, if his enemie *Cassius* should obtaine the victorie against him in battell, answered, I serue not the gods so slenderlie, as that they will send me so hard a fortune. So they that haue any part in the affection of another, if there happen any cause of feare to lose it, should say, I honor not so little his loue, that he will depriue me of it. The confidence we haue in our owne merit, is a great gage of the will of another.

2

He that prosecuteth any thing with vertue, is eased by ha-
uing

uing a companion in the pursuit; for he serueth for a comfort, and a trumpet to his merit. Imbecillitie only feareth the incounter, because it thinketh that being compared to another, the imperfection thereof will presentlie appeare. Take away emulation, you take away the glorie and spurre of vertue.

My counsell to men against this maladie, when it proceedeth from their wiues, is, that they remember that the greatest part, and most gallant men of the world haue fallen into this misfortune, and haue beene content to beare it without stirring and molestation: *Lucullus, Caesar, Pompey, Cato, Augustus, Antonius*, and diuers others. But thou wilt say, the world knoweth it and speakes of it: and of whom speake they not in this sense, from the greatest to the least? how many honest men do euery day fall into the same reproch? and if a man stirre therein, the women themselves make a iest of it: the frequencie of this accident should moderate the bitterness thereof. Finally be thou such that men may complaine of thy wrong, that thy vertue extinguish thy hard fortune, that honest men may account neuerthelesse of thee, but rather curse the occasion.

As touching women, there is no counsell against this euill, for their nature is wholly composed of suspicion, vanitie, curiositie. It is true that they cure themselves at the charge of their husbands, turning their euill vpon them, and healing it with a greater. But if they were capable of counsell, a man would aduise them not to care for it, not to seeme to perceiue it: which is a sweet mediocritie betweene this foolish ieaousie, and that other opposite custome practised in the Indies and other nations, where women labour to get friends, and women for their husbands seeke aboue all things their honor and pleasure (for it is a testimonie of the vertue, valor, and reputation of a man in those countries to haue many wiues.) So did *Linia* to *Augustus*, *Stratonice* to king *Deiotaurus*; and for multiplication of stock *Sara, Lea, Rachel* to *Abraham* and *Iacob*.

Of Temperancie, the fourth vertue.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of Temperancie in generall.

1
Temperancie
two-fold.
Generall.

Temperancie is taken two waies, generallie for a moderation and sweet temper in all things. And so it is not a speciall vertue, but generall and common, the seasoning sauce of all the rest: and it is perpetuallie required, especiallie in those affaires where there is controuersie and contestation, troubles and diuisions. For the preservation thereof, there is no better way, than to be free from particular phantasies and opinions, and simplie to hold himselfe to his owne deuoire. All lawfull intentions or opinions are temperate; choler, hatred are inferior to dutie and to iustice, and serue only those that tie not themselues to their dutie by simple reason.

2
Speciall.

Speciallie, for a bridle and rule in things pleasant, delightful, which tickle our senses and naturall appetites. *Habena voluptatis, inter libidinem & stuporem natura posita, cuius due partes; verecundia in fuga turpium, honestas in obseruatione decori:* We will heere take it more at large, for a rule and dutie in all prosperitie, as fortitude is the rule in all aduersitie, and it shall be the bridle, as fortitude the spurre. With these two we shall tame this brutish, sauage, vntoward part of our passions which is in vs, and we shall carry our selues well and wisely in all fortunes & accidents, which is a high point of wisdom.

3
The descrip-
tion of tem-
perancie.

Temperancie then hath for the subiect and generall obiekt thereof all prosperitie, pleasant and plausible things, but especiallie and properlie pleasure, whereof it is the razor and the rule; the razor to cut off strange and vitious superfluities; the rule of that which is naturall and necessarie: *Voluptatibus imperat, alias odit & abigit, alias dispensat, & ad sanum modum redigit: nec unquam ad illas propter illas venit, scit optimum esse modum cupitorum, non quantum velis, sed quantum debeas.* This is the authoritie and power of reason ouer concupiscence and violent affections, which carrie our willes to delights and pleasures. It is the bridle of our soule, and the proper instrument to cleare those boyling tempests which arise in vs by the heate and intemperancie of our bloud, that the soule may
be

be alwaies kept one; and appliant vnto reason, that it applie not it selfe to sensible objects, but that it rather accommodate them vnto it selfe, and make them serue it. By this we weane our soule from the sweet milke of the pleasures of this world, and we make it capable of a more solid and soueraigne nourishment. It is a rule that sweetlie accommodateth all things vnto nature, to necessitie, simplicitie, facilitie, health, constancie. These are things that goe willinglie together, and they are the measures and bounds of wisdom; as contrarily arte, lust, and superfluitie, varietie, and multiplicitie, difficultie, maladie, and delicatenesse keepe companie together, following intemperancie and follie: *Simplici cura constant necessaria, in delicijs laboratur. Ad parata nati sumus: nos omnia nobis difficultia facilius fastidio fecimus.*

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of Prosperitie, and counsell thereupon.

That prosperitie which sweetly falles vpon vs, by the common course and ordinarie custome of the world, or by our own wisdom and discreet cariage, is farre more firme and assured, and lesse enuied, than that which commeth from heauen, with fame and renowne beyond and against the opinion of all, and the hope euen of him that receiueth these bounties.

Prosperitie is very dangerous: whatsoeuer there is that is vaine and light in the soule of man, is raised and caried with the first fauorable winde. There is nothing that makes a man so much to lose and forget himselfe, as great prosperitie; as corne lodgeth by too great abundance, and boughs overcharged with fruit breake asunder, and therefore it is necessarie that a man looke to himselfe, and take heed, as if he went in a slipperie place, and especiallie of insolencie, pride, and presumption. There be some that swimme in a shallow water, and with the least fauour of fortune are puffed vp, forget themselves, become insupportable, which is the true picture of follie.

From thence it commeth that there is not any thing more fraile, and that is of lesse continuance than an ill aduised prosperitie, which commonly changeth great and ioyfull occurrences

rents into heavy and lamentable, and fortune of a loving mother, is turned into a cruell step-dame.

4

Now the best counsell that I can giue to a man, to carrie himselfe heerein, is, not to esteeme too much of all sorts of prosperitie and good fortunes, and in any sort not to desire them: If they shall happen to come, out of their good grace and fauour, to receiue them willingly and cheerefully; but as things strange and no way necessarie, but such as without which a man may passe his life, and therefore there is no reason he should make account of them, or thinke himselfe the woorse or better man for them. *Non est tuum, fortuna quod fecit tuum. Qui tutam uitam agere uolet, ista viscata beneficia deuinet, nil dignum putare quod speres. Quid dignum habet fortuna quod concupiscas?* See before p. 80, & 298.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Pleasure, and aduice thereupon.

The description and distinction of pleasure.

PLeasure is an apprehension and sense of that which is agreeable to nature, it is a pleasant motion and tickling: as contrarie, griefe or sorrow is vnwelcome and vnpleasing to the senses; neuerthelesse, they that place it in the highest degree, and make it the soueraigne good, as the Epicures, take it not so, but for a priuation of euill and displeasure, in a word Indolence. According to their opinion, the not hauing of any euill, is the happiest estate that man can hope for in this life. *Nimum boni est cui nihil est mali:* This is as a mid-way or neutralitie betwixt pleasure taken in the first and common sense, and griefe; it is as sometime the bosome of Abraham was said to be, betwixt paradise and the hell of the damned. This is a sweete and peaceable state and setting, a true, constant and staied pleasure, which resembleth in some sort the tranquillitie of the soule, accounted by Philosophers the chiefe and soueraigne good: the other first kinde of pleasure is actiue and in motion. And so there should be three estates, the two extreame opposites, Griefe and Pleasure, which are not stable nor durable, and both of them sickly: and that in the middle, stable, firme, sound, wherunto the Epicures gaue the name of pleasure (as indeed it is in regard of griefe and sorrow)

sorrow) making it the chiefe and soueraigne good. This is that which hath so much defamed their schoole, as *Seneca* hath ingenuously acknowledged and said, that their euill was in the title and words, not in the substance, hauing neuer had either doctrine or life more sober, temperate, and enemy to wickednesse and vice than theirs. And it is not altogether without reason that they called this Indolence and peaceable state, Pleasure: for that tickling delight which seemeth to mount vs aboue indolence, aimeth at nothing else but indolence, or want of griefe, as it proper butte; as for example, that appetite that rauisheth vs with desire of women, seeketh nothing else but to flie that paine that an ardent and furious desire to satisfie our lust bringeth with it, to quit our selues of this feuer, and to purchase our rest.

Pleasure hath diuersly beene spoken of, and more briefly and sparingly than was fit; some haue deified it, others detested it as a monster, and tremble at the very word, taking it alwaies in the worser part. They that doe wholly condemne it say; First, it is short, a fire of straw, especially if it be liuely and actiue. Secondly, fraile and tender, easily and with nothing corrupted and ended, an ounce of sorrow marres a whole sea of pleasure: It is called a choaked peece of artillery. Thirdly, base, shamefull, exercising it selfe by vilde instruments, in hidden corners, at least for the most part, for there likewise are magnificent and pompous pleasures. Fourthly, quickly subiect to satietie. A man knowes not how to continue long in his pleasures, he is impatient as wel in his delights as his griefes, and it is not long ere repentance follow, which many times yeelds pernicious effects, the ouerthrow of men, families, common-weales. Fifthly, and aboue all they alleadge against it, that when it is in his greatest strength, it mastreth in such a maner, that reason can haue no entertainment.

On the other side, it is said, to be naturall, created and established of God in the world, for the preservation and continuance thereof, as well by retaile of the indiuiduall parts, as in grosse of the speciall kindes. Nature the mother of pleasure, in those actions that are for our need and necessitie, hath likewise mingled pleasure. Now to liue well is to consent vnto nature. God, saith *Moyse*, hath created pleasure, *Plantauit*

2
Against it.

3
For it, See
Lib. 2. ca. 6.

uerat

uerat dominus paradysum voluptatis, hath placed and established man in a pleasant estate, place and condition of life; and in the end, what is the last and highest felicitie, but certaine and perpetuall pleasure? *Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tue, & torrente voluptatis tue potabis eos. Suis contenta finibus res est diuina voluptas.* And to say the truth, the most regular Philosophers, and the greatest professors of vertue, *Zeno, Cato, Scipio, Epaminondas, Plato, Socrates* himselfe haue been in effect amorous, and drinkers, dancers, sporters, and haue handled, spoken, written of loue and other pleasures.

⁴
The distinction
of pleasures.

And therefore this matter is not decided in a word, but we must distinguish, for pleasures are diuers. There are naturall, and not naturall: This distinction as more important we will presently better consider of. There are some that are glorious, arrogant, difficult; others that are obscure, milde, easie & ready. Though to say the truth, Pleasure is a qualitie not greatly ambitious; it is accounted rich enough of it selfe, without the addition of any thing to the reputation thereof, and it is loued best in obscuritie. They likewise that are so easie and ready are cold and frozen, if there be no difficultie in them: which is as an inducement, a baite, a spurre vnto them. The ceremonie, shame and difficultie that there is in the attainment of the last exploits of loue, are the spurres, and matches that giue fire vnto it, and increase the price thereof. There are spirituall pleasures & corporall, not (to say the truth) because they are separated: for they al belong to the entire man, and the whole composed subiect: and the one part of our selues hath not any so proper, but that the other hath a feeling thereof, so long as the marriage and amorous band of the soul & bodie continueth in this world. But yet there are some wherein the soule hath a better part than the body, & therefore they better agree with men, than with beasts, and are more durable, as those that enter into vs by the sense of seeing and hearing, which are the two gates of the soule, for hauing onely their passage by them, the soule receiueth them, concocteth and digesteth them, feedeth and delighteth it selfe a long time; the body feeleth little. Others there are wherein the body hath the greater part, as those which belong to the taste and touch, more grosse and material, wherein the beasts beare

vs companie, such pleasures are handled, tried, vsed and ended in the bodie it selfe, the soule hath onely the assistance and companie, and they are but short, like a fire of straw, soone in, soone out.

The chiefe thing to be considered heerein, is to know how wee should carrie and gouerne our selues in our pleasures, which wisdome will teach vs, and it is the office of the vertue of temperance. We must first make a great and notable difference betweene the naturall, and not naturall. By the not naturall we doe not onely vnderstand those that are against nature, and the true vse approoued by the lawes; but also the naturall themselves, if they degenerate into too great an excelle and superfluitie, which is no part of nature, which contenteth it selfe with the supplie of necessitie; whereunto a man may likewise adde decencie and common honestie. It is naturall pleasure to be couered with a house and garments against the rigour of the elements, and the iniuries of wicked men; but that they should be of gold or siluer, of Iasper or Porpherie, it is not naturall: Or if they come vnto a man by other meanes than naturall, as if they be sought and procured by arte, by medicines, or other vnnaturall meanes: Or if they be first forged in the minde, stirred by passion, and afterwards from thence come vnto the body, which is a preposterous order: for the order of nature is, that pleasures enter into the bodie, and be desired by it, and so from thence ascend vnto the minde. And even as that laughter that is procured by tickling the arme-holes, is neither naturall nor pleasing, but rather a kinde of conuulsion; so that pleasure that is either sought or kindled by the soule, is not naturall.

Now the first rule of wisdome concerning pleasures is this, to chase away, and altogether to condemne the vnnaturall, as vicious, bastardly (for as they that come to a banquet vnbidden, are to be refused; so those pleasures that without the invitation of nature present themselves, are to be reiected) to admit and receiue the naturall; but yet with rule and moderation: and this is the office of temperancie in generall, to drive away the vnnaturall, to rule the naturall.

The

Rules for the
naturall.

The rule of naturall pleasures consisteth in three points :
First, that it be without the offence, scandall, dammage,
and preiudice of another.

Secondly, that it be without the preiudice of himselfe, his
honor, his health, his leasure, his dutie, his functions.

Thirdly, that it be with moderation, that he take them no
more to the heart, than against the heart, neither couet them,
nor flie from them, but take and receiue them, as men doe
honie with the tip of the finger, not with a full hand; not to
engage himselfe in them too farre, nor to make them his prin-
cipall businesse, and onely worke; much lesse to enthrall
himselfe vnto them, and of recreations make them necessities,
for that is the greatest miserie of all others. Pleasure should be
but as an accessarie, a recreation for the time, that he may the
better returne to his labour, as sleepe which strengthneth the
bodie, and giueth vs breath to returne the more cheerfullie to
our worke. To be short, a man must vse them, not inioy them.
But aboue all, he must take heed of their treason: for some
there are, that whilest we giue our selues vnto them, and loue
them ouer dearely, returne euill for good, and more displea-
sure than delight: but this is treacherouslie: for they goe be-
fore to besot and deceiue vs, and hiding from vs their taile,
they tickle vs and embrace vs to strangle vs. The pleasure of
drinking goes before the paine of the head: such are the de-
lights and pleasures of indiscreet and firie youth, wherewith
they are made drunken. We plunge our selues into them, but
in our old age they forsake vs, as it were drowned and ouer-
whelmed, as the sea in his reflux ouer-runne the sandie
banks: That sweetnesse which we haue swallowed so gree-
dilie, endeth with bitternesse and repentance, and filleth our
soules with a venomous humor that infecteth and corrup-
teth it.

8
Want of go-
uernment in
pleasure pre-
iudicious.

Now as moderation and rule in pleasures is an excellent
and profitable thing according vnto God, nature, reason: so
excesse and immoderate unrulinesse is of all others the most
pernicious, both to the publicke and priuat good. Pleasure ill
valued, softneth and weakneth the vigor both of soule and
bodie; *Debilitatem induxere delitia, blandissima domina*: it be-
sotteth

softeth and effeminateth the best courages that are, witnes *Hannibal*: and therefore the Lacedemonians that made profession of contemning all pleasures were called men, and the Athenians soft and delicate women. *Xerxes* to punish the revolt of the Babylonians, and to assure himself of them in time to come, tooke from them their armes, forbidding all painfull and difficult exercise, and permitting all pleasures and delicacies whatsoeuer. Secondly, it banisheth and driueth away the printipall vertues, which cannot continue vnder so idle and effeminate an empire: *Maximas virtutes iacere oportet voluptate dominante*. Thirdly, it degenerateth very suddenly into the contrarie thereof, which is griefe, sorrow, repentance: for as the riuers of sweet water run their course to die in the salt sea, so the honie of pleasure endeth in the gall of griefe; *In precipiti est, ad dolorem vergit, in contrarium abit, nisi modum teneat. Extrema gaudij luctus occupat*. Finally, it is the seminarie of all euils, of all ruine. *Malorum esca voluptas*. From it come those close and secret intelligences, then treasons, and in the end euerfions and ruines of Common-weales. Now wee will speake of pleasures in particular. *see before p. 83.*

CHAP. XXXIX.

*Of eating and drinking, Abstinence,
and Sobrietie.*

Victuals are for nourishment, to sustaine and repaire the infirmitie of the bodie; the moderate, naturall, and pleasant vse thereof entertaineth it, maketh it a fit and apt instrument for the soule; as contrarily an vnnaturall excesse weakeneth it, bringeth great and loathsome diseases, which are the naturall punishments of intemperancie; *Simplex ex simplici causa valetudo; multos morbos supplicia luxuria, multa fercula fecerunt*. A man complaineth of his braine for sending downe so many rheumes, the foundation of all dangerous maladies; but the braine may well answere him, *Desine fundere, & ego desinam fluere*; Be thou sober in powring downe, and I will be sparing in dropping downe. But what, the excesse and provision, the multitude, diuersitie, and exquisit preparation of viands;

The vse of
victuals.

viands is come in request; and it is our custome euen in the greatest and most sumptuous superfluities, to craue pardon for not prouiding enough.

- 2 How preiudicate both to the mind and to the body a full diet, with diuersitie, curiositie, exquisit and artificiall preparation is, euery man may finde in himselfe. Gluttonie and drunkennes are idle and vndecent vices; they bewray themselves sufficientlie by the gestures and countenances of those that are therewith tainted; whereof the best and more honest is, to be dull and drouisie, vnprofitable and vnfit for any good: for there was neuer man that loued his belly too well, that did euer performe any great worke. Moreouer, it is the vice of brutish men, and of no worth, especiallie drunkennes, which leadeth a man to all vnworthie actions; witnesse *Alexander*, otherwise a great Prince, being ouercome with this vice, killed his dearest friend *Clitus*, and being come to himselfe, would haue kild himselfe for killing *Clitus*. To conclude, it wholly robbeth a man of his sense, and peruerteth his vnderstanding: *Vinum clauo caret, dementat sapientes, facit repuerascere senes.*

- 3 *Sobrietie commended.* Sobrietie though it be none of the greatest and more difficult vertues, and which is not painfull to any but fooles and mad-men, yet it is a way and a kinde of progresse to other vertues: It extinguisheth vice in the cradell, and stifleth it in feed: It is the mother of health, and an assured medicine against all maladies, and that that lengthneth a mans life. *Socrates* by sobrietie had alwaies a strong bodie and liued euer in health; *Masinissa* the soberest king of all the rest got children at 86. yeeres of age, and at 92. vanquished the Carthaginians; whereas *Alexander* by his drunkenness died in the flowre of his age, though he were better borne and of a sounder constitution than them all. Many subiect to goutes and other diseases by Physicke incurable, haue recovered their health by diet. Neither is it seruiceable to the bodie onely, but to the minde too, which thereby is kept pure, capable of wisdom and good counsell; *Salubrium consiliorum parens sobrietas.* All the greatest personages of the world haue beene sober, not onely the professours of singular vertue and austeritie
- Hierom.

ritie of life, but all those that haue excelled in any thing, *Cyrus, Caesar, Iulian* the emperour, *Mahomet: Epicurus* the great doctor of pleasure heerein excelled all men. The frugalitie of the Romanie *Curi* and *Fabritij* is more extolled than their great victories: The Lacedemonians as valiant as they were, made expresse profession of frugalitie and sobrietie.

But a man must in time and from his youth embrace this part of temperancie, and not stay till the infirmities of old age come vpon him, lest that he be vtterly cast downe with varietie of diseases; as the Athenians, who were reproched for that they neuer demanded peace, but in their mourning garments, after they had lost their kindred and friends in warre, and were able to defend themselves no longer. This is to aske counsell when it is too late; *Sera in fundo parsimonia*; it is to play the good husband when there is nothing left but bare walles, to make his market when the faire is ended.

It is a good thing for a man not to accustome himselfe to a delicate diet, lest when he shall happen to be deprived thereof, his bodie grow out of order, and his spirit languish and faint; and contrarily to vse himselfe to a grosser kinde of sustenance, both because they make a man more strong and healthfull, and because they are more easily gotten.

CHAP. XL.

*Of riot and excesse in apparell and ornaments,
and of frugalitie.*

IT hath beene said before that garments are not naturall, nor necessarie to a man; but artificiall, inuented and vsed onely by him in the world. Now inasmuch as they are artificiall, (for it is the maner of things artificiall to varie and multiplie, without end and measure, simplicitie being a friend vnto nature) they are extended and multiplied into so many inuentions (for to what other end are there so many occupations and traffiques in the world, but for the couering and decking of our bodies?) dissolutions and corruptions, insomuch that it is no more an excuse and couering of our defects and necessities,

ties, but a nest of all maner of vices, *vexillum superbiae, nidus luxuria*, the subiect of riot and quarrels: for from hence did first begin the proprietie of things, mine and thine; and in the greatest communities or fellowships that are, apparell is alwaies proper, which is signified by this word, disrobe.

2

It is a vice very familiar and proper vnto women (I meane excesse in apparell) a true testimonie of their weaknesse, being glad to winne credit and commendations by these small and slender accidents, because they know themselues to be too weake and vnable to purchase credit and reputation by better meanes: for such as are vertuous, care least for such vanities. By the lawes of the Lacedemonians it was not permitted to any to weare garments of rich and costly colours, but to common women: That was their part, as vertue and honour belonged vnto others.

Now the true and lawfull vse of apparrell is to couer our selues against winde and weather, and the rigour of the aire, and should neuer be vsed to other end; and therefore as they should not be excessiue nor sumptuous, so should they not be too base and beggerly. *Nec affectata sordes, nec exquisita munditia*. Caligula was as a laughing stocke to all that beheld him, by reason of the dissolute fashion of his apparell. Augustus was commended for his modestie.

C H A P. XLI.

Carnall pleasure, Chastitie, Continencie.

I
See the chap.
24.

C Continencie is a thing verie difficult, and must haue a carefull and a painfull guard: It is no easie matter wholly to resist nature, which in this is most strong and most ardent. *See before p. 53.*

2

And this is the greatest commendation that it hath, that there is difficultie in it; as for the rest, it is without action and without fruite, it is a priuation, a not doing, paine without profit; and therefore sterilitie is signified by virgin-
tie.

tie. I speake heere of simple continencie, and onely in it selfe, which is a thing altogether barren & vnprofitable, and hardly commendable, no more than not to play the glutton, not to be drunken; and not of Christian continencie, which to make it a vertue hath two things in it, a deliberate purpose alwaies to keepe it, and that it be for Gods cause. *Non hoc in virginibus August. predicamus, quod sint virgines, sed quod deo dicata;* witnesse the Vestalles, and the five foolish virgins shut out of doores; and therefore it is a common error, and a vanitie, to call continent women honest women and honorable, as if it were a vertue, and there were an honor due vnto him that doth no euill, doth nothing against his dutie. Why should not continent men in like sort haue the title of honestie and honour? There is more reason for it, because there is more difficultie, they are more hot, more hardie, they haue more occasions, better meanes. So vnlikely is it that honour should be due vnto him that doth no euill, that it is not due vnto him that doth good, but onely, as hath beene said, to him that is profitable to the weale-publike, and where there is labour, difficultie, danger. *Lib. I. ca. 60.* And how many continent persons are there stufte with other vices, or at least that are not touched with vaine-glory and presumption, whereby tickling themselves with a good opinion of themselves, they are readie to iudge and condemne others? And by experience wee see in many women how dearly they sell it vnto their husbands, for dislodging the diuell from that place where they rowe, and establishing the point of honor as in it proper throne, they make it to mount more high, and to appeare in the head, to make him belieue that it is not any lower elsewhere. If neuerthelesse this flattering word, honor, serue to make them more carefull of their dutie, I care not much if I allow of it. Vanitie it selfe serues for some vse, and simple incontinencie and sole in it selfe is none of the greatest faults, no more than others that are purely corporall, and which nature committeth in hir actions either by excesse or defect without malice. That which discrediteth it and makes it more dangerous, is, that it is almost neuer alone, but is commonlie accompanied and followed with other

greater faults, infected with the wicked and base circumstances of prohibited persons, times, places, practised by wicked meanes, lies, impostures, subornations, treasons; besides the losse of time, distractions of those functions from whence it proceedeth by great and grievous scandals.

3
An aduise-
ment.

And because this is a violent passion and likewise deceitfull, we must arme our selues against it, and be wary in descrying the baits thereof, and the more it flattereth vs, the more distrust it: for it would willingly embrace vs to strangle vs; it pampereth vs with honie, to glut vs with gall; and therefore let vs consider as much, that the beautie of another is a thing that is without vs, and that as soone it turneth to our euill as our good; that it is but a flower that passeth, a small thing and almost nothing but the colour of a body; and acknowledging in beautie the delicate hand of nature, we must prise it as the sunne and moone for the excellencie that is in it: and comming to the fruition thereof by all honest meanes, alwaies remember that the immoderate vse of this pleasure consumeth the body, effeminateth the soule, weakneth the spirit; and that many by giuing themselves ouermuch thereunto, haue lost, some their life, some their fortune, some their spirit: and contrarily, that there is greater pleasure and glory in vanquishing pleasure, than in possessing it: that the continencie of *Alexander* and of *Scipio* hath beene more highlie commended, than the beautifull countenances of those yong damfels that they tooke captiues.

4

There are many kinds and degrees of continencie and incontinencie. The coniugall is that which importeth more than all the rest, which is most requisit and necessarie, both for the publike and particular good, and therefore should be by all in greatest account. It must be kept and retained within the chaste breast of that partie whom the destinies haue giuen for our companion. He that doth otherwise, doth not only violate his owne bodie, making it a vessell of ordure by all lawes; the lawe of God, which commaundeth chastitie; of Nature, which forbiddeth that to be common which is proper to one, and imposeth vpon a man faith and constancie;

cie; of Countries, which haue brought in mariages; of families, transferring y^e m^ultie the labour of another to a stranger; and lastly, Iustice it selfe, bringing in vncertainties, iealousies, and brawles amongst kindred, depriving children of the loue of their parents, and parents of the pietie and dutie of their children.

CHAP. XLII.

Of Glory and Ambition.

see before p. 76, & 213.

Ambition, the desire of glory and honor (wherof we haue already spoken) is not altogether and in all respects to be condemned. First, it is very profitable to the weale-publike as the world goeth, for it is it from whence the greatest of our honorable actions doth arise, that hartneth men to dangerous attempts, as we may see by the greatest part of our ancient heroicall men, who haue not all been lead by a philosophical spirit, as *Socrates, Phocion, Aristides, Epaminondas, Cato, and Scipio*, by the only true and liuely image of vertue; for many, yea the greatest number haue beene stirred thereunto by the spirit, of *Themistocles, Alexander, Caesar*: and although these honorable atchievements and glorious exploits haue not beene with their authors and actors, true works of vertue but ambition; neuerthelesse their effects haue beene very beneficiall to the publike state. Besides this consideration, according to the opinion of the wisest, it is excusable and allowable in two cases: the one in good and profitable things, but which are inferior vnto vertue, and common both to the good and to the euill, as artes and sciences: *Honos alit artes: incenduntur omnes ad studia gloria*; inuentions, industrie, military valour. The other in continuing the good will and opinion of another. The wise doe teach, not to rule our actions by the opinion of another, except it be for the auoiding of such in-conueniences as may happen by their contempt of the approbation and iudgement of another.

But that a man should be vertuous, and doe good for glorie, as if that were the salarie and recompence thereof, is a false

and vaine opinion. Much were the state of vertue to be pitied, if she should fetch hir commendations and prise from the opinion of another, this coine were but counterfeit, and this pay too base for vertue; She is too noble to begge such recompence. A man must settle his soule, and in such sort compose his actions, that the brightnesse of honor dazell not his reason, and strengthen his minde with braue resolutions, which serue him as barriers against the assaults of ambition.

5

Hee must therefore perswade himselfe, that vertue seeketh not a more ample and more rich theater to shew it selfe than hir owne conscience: The higher the Sunne is, the lesser shadowe doth it make: The greater the vertue is, the lesse glorie doth it seeke. Glory is truely compared to a shadowe, which followeth those that flie it, and flieth those that follow it. Againe, hee must neuer forget, that man commeth into this world as to a Comedy, where hee chooleth not the part that he is to play, but onely be-thinks himselfe how to play that part well that is giuen vnto him: or as a banquet, wherein a man feeds vpon that that is before him, not reaching to the farre side of the table, or snatching the dishes from the master of the feast. If a man commit a charge vnto vs, which we are capable of, let vs accept of it modestlie, and exercise it sincerelie; making account that God hath placed vs there to stand sentinell, to the end that others may rest in safetie vnder our care. Let vs seeke no other recompence of our trauell, than our owne conscience to witnesse our well doing, and desire that the witnesse be rather of credit in the court of our fellow-citizens, than in the front of our publike actions. To be short, let vs hold it for a maxime, that the fruit of our honorable actions, is to haue acted them. Vertue cannot finde without it selfe a recompence worthie it selfe. To refuse and contemne greatnes, is not so great a miracle, it is an attempt of no difficultie. He that loues himselfe, and iudgeth soundlie, is content with an indifferent fortune. Magistracies very actiue and passiue are painfull,
and

and are not desired but by feeble and sicke spirits. *Otanes* one of the seauen that had title to the soueraigntie of *Persia*, gaue ouer vnto his companions his right, vpon condition, that he and his might liue in that Empire free from all subiection and magistracie, except that which the ancient lawes did impose, being impatient to commaund, and to be commaunded. *Diocletian* renounced the Empire, *Celestinus* the Popedome.

CHAP. XLIII.

*Of Temperancie in speech, and of
Eloquence.*

THis is a great point of wisdom: Hee that ruleth his tongue well, in a word, is wise, *qui in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est*: The reason heereof is, because the tongue is all the world, in it is both good and euill, life and death, as hath beene said before. Let vs now see what aduice is to be giuen to rule it well.

The first rule is, that speech be sober and seldome: To know how to be silent is a great aduantage to speake well; and he that knowes not well how to do the one, knowes not the other. I
Rules of
speech.

To speake well and much, is not the worke of one man; and the best men are they that speake least, saith a wise man.

They that abound in words, are barraine in good speech and good actions; like those trees that are full of leaues and yeeld little fruit, much chaffe, and little corne.

The Lacedemonians, great professors of vertue and valour, did likewise professe silence, and were enemies to much speech: And therefore hath it euer beene commendable to be sparing in speech, to keepe a bridle at the mouth: *Pone domine custodiam ori meo*. And in the law of *Moyse* that vessel that had not his couering fastned to it, was vncleane. By speech a man is knowne and discerned: The wise man hath

hath his tongue in his heart, the foole his heart in his tongue.

2 The second, that it be true; The vse of speech is to assist the truth, and to carrie the torch before it, to make it appear; and contrarie to discover and rectifie lying. In so much that speech is the instrument whereby wee communicate our willes and our thoughts: It had need be true and faithful, since that our vnderstanding is directed by the onely meanes of speech. He that falsifieth it, betrayeth publike societie; and if this meane faile vs and deceiue vs, there is an end of all, there is no liuing in the world. But of lying we haue

Cap. 10.

3 The third, that it be natural, modest, and chaste: not accompanied with vehemencie and contention, whereby it may seeme to proceede from passion; not artificiall nor affected; not wicked, immodest, licentious.

4 The fourth, that it be serious and profitable, not vaine and vnprofitable. A man must not be too attentiu^e in relating what hath hapned in the market place or theater, or repeating of sonets and meriments, it bewrayes too great and vnprofitable leasure, *otio abundantis, & abutentis*. Neither is it good to enter into any large discourse of his owne actions and fortunes; for others take not so much pleasure to heare them, as he to relate them.

5 But aboue all, it must neuer be offensive, for speech is the instrument and fore-runner of charitie, and therefore to vse it against it, is to abuse it, contrarie to the purpose of nature. All kind of foule speech, detraction, mockerie, is vnworthie a man of wisedome and honour.

6 The sixt, to be gentle and pleasing, not crabbed, harsh, and enuious; and therefore in common speech acute and subtil questions must be auoided, which resemble crasishes, where there is more picking worke than meate to eate, and their end is nothing else but brawles and contentions.

7 Lastly, that it be constant, strong, and generous, not loose, effeminate, languishing, whereby wee auoid the manner of speech of Pedanties, pleaders, women.

To

To this point of Temperancie belongeth secrecie (where-
of wee haue spoken in the Chapter of faith or fidelitie) not
onely that which is committed vnto vs, and giuen vs to
keepe, but that which wisdom and discretion telleth vs
ought to be suppressed.

Now as speech makes a man more excellent then a beast,
so eloquence makes the professours thereof more excellent
then other men. For this is the profession or arte of speech,
it is a more exquisite communication of discourse and of rea-
son, the stearne or roother of our soules, which disposeth the
hearts and affections like certaine notes to make a melodious
harmonic.

Eloquence is not onely a puritie and elegancie of speech,
a discret choice of words properly applied, ending in a
true and a iust fall, but it must likewise be full of ornaments,
graces, motions; the words must bee liuely, first, by a
cleare and distinct voyce, rayning it selfe, and falling by
little and little; Afterwards by a graue and naturall action,
wherein a man may see the visage, hands, and members
of the Orator to speake with his mouth, follow with their
motion that of the minde, and represent the affections: for
an Orator must first put on those passions which hee would
stirre vp in others. As Brutus drew from his owne wound
the dart wherewith he slew his enemy: So passion being
conceiued in our heart, is incontinentlie formed into our
speech, and by it proceeding from vs, entreth into another,
and there giueth the like impression which wee our selues
haue, by a subtile and liuely contagion. Heereby wee see
that a sweet and a mild nature is not so fit for eloquence,
because it cannot conceiue strong and couragious passions,
such as it ought, to giue life vnto the Oration; in such sort,
that when he should display the master-sailes of eloquence
in a great and vehement action, hee cometh farre short
thereof; as Cicero knew well how to reproch Callidius, who
accused Gallus with a cold and ouermild voyce and action,
tu nisi fingeres, sic ageres? But being likewise vigorous, and
furnished as hath beene said, it hath not lesse force and vio-

8
Chap. 8. p. 436.

9
Of eloquence
and the com-
mendation
thereof.

10
The descrip-
tion.

lence then the commaunds of tyrants, enuironed with their gards and halberds; It doth not only leade the hearer, but intangleth him, it reigneth ouer the people, and establiseth a violent empire ouer our soules.

II
Obiections
answered.

A man may say against Eloquence that truth is sufficiently maintained and defended by it selfe, and that there is nothing more eloquent then it selfe: which I confesse is true, where the minds of men are pure, and free from passions: but the greatest part of the world, either by nature, or arte, and ill instruction is preoccupied, and ill disposed vnto vertue and veritie, whereby it is necessary that men be handled like iron, which a man must soften with fire before he temper it with water: So by the fire motions of eloquence, they must be made supple and manageable, apt to take the temper of veritie. This is that whereunto Eloquence especiallie tendeth; and the true fruit thereof is to arme vertue against vice, truth against lying & calumnies. The Orator, saith *Theophrastus*, is the true Physitian of the soule, to whom it belongeth to cure the biting of serpents by the musicke of the pipe, that is, the calumnies of wicked men by the harmonie of reason. Now since no man can hinder, but that some there are that sease vpon eloquence, to the end they may execute their pernicious designments, how can a man do lesse than defend himselfe with the same armes; for if we present our selues naked to the combat, do we not betray vertue and veritie? But many haue abused eloquence to wicked purposes, and the ruine of their countrie: It is true, but that is no reason why eloquence should be despised, for that is common to it with all the excellent things of the world, to be vsed or abused, well or ill applied, according to the good and bad disposition of those that possesse them. Most men abuse their vnderstanding, but yet we must not therefore conclude that vnderstanding is not necessarie.

FINIS.



ERRATA.

- P**age 89. lin. 23. *which we most flie.*
Page 118. lin. 19. *uncleane seed.*
Page 215. lin. 4. *with those that know them.*
Page 244. lin. 7. *ouerruleth the minde.*
Page 292. lin. 23. *liue senerely.*
Page 336. lin. 23. *in the way to death.*
Page 357. lin. 1. *it is religion.*
Page 395. lin. 24. *And this in a brieife summe, is the military*
Page 433. lin. 24. *constant.* (discipline.
Page 502. lin. 24. *wherefore if it be for gaine.*
Page 540. lin. 24. *and stiflet it in the seed.*

